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Abstract 
Issues concerning immigration and asylum have attracted considerable news media 
coverage in countries of the ‘Global North’ such as the United Kingdom during recent 
decades. The UK national press – famous for its longevity, mass appeal and partisanship – 
has been uniquely placed to report on and provide commentary about issues of social 
change such as these, especially as they have become more prominent in UK party 
politics. 
This thesis therefore analyses the press coverage of immigration issues in seven national 
newspapers during the final week of general election campaigns between 1918 and 2010 
in order to provide a historical context to these recent developments. Using content 
analysis and critical discourse analysis methods, the study assesses several aspects of the 
representational pattern of immigration coverage and offers a perspective which 
emphasises continuities and contrasts across time and across the press.  
Over two empirical chapters, the content analysis provides a thorough profile of the 
coverage in terms of its volume, the news presence and access of social actors, the 
balance of supportive and critical voices in coverage, the lexicon used to describe 
immigrants and immigration processes and the themes of debate. The findings suggest 
that immigration has become a low-threshold political issue within recent campaigns, for 
which there is a core element of detailed discussion but an unprecedented expansion in 
superficial reference to such issues. The prominence, politicisation and problematisation 
of immigration have combined to frequently provide critical voices with a prominent 
platform. Meanwhile, supportive voices and those of immigrants were mostly 
marginalised. There was relatively little variation in the thematic dimension of coverage 
over time and to some extent across the press. 
A third empirical chapter offers a critical discourse analysis of the headlines in three main 
areas of coverage: ‘precarious routes’ comprising forced and irregular migration, 
‘numbers’ and immigrants as voters and candidates. These aspects of the debate are 
examined in terms of ‘our’ and ‘their’ rights and responsibilities to reveal how the press 
has constructed the ethics and politics of immigration qualitatively. 
Keywords: Newspapers, Journalism, Elections, Migration, Asylum, Refugees.   
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1: Introduction 
During the past two decades, issues relating to immigration and asylum have seemingly 
become established as an intertwined and ever-more integral part of public policy-
making, a highly-charged area of the policy terrain between mainstream political parties 
and of growing importance for restriction-favouring voters left unquenched by recurrent 
legislative intervention. Immigration processes have become an increasingly substantial 
contributory factor to population growth, economic development, the size and age 
profile of the labour force as well as socio-cultural change. The mass media have been 
well-positioned to mediate the public debate concerning these issues, but it has been 
particularly within the pages of the national daily press, notorious for its partisanship and 
mass appeal, that debate has grown to become a consistent and prominent feature. 
Indeed, in certain sections of the press, immigration and asylum issues regularly make the 
front page1 or else are the subject of much editorial comment, and often colonise (or at 
least colour) discussion of political issues as diverse as healthcare, higher education, 
foreign policy, social security and so on. This has subsequently raised concerns in some 
quarters about the impact of such coverage on social cohesion, policy-making and the 
process and outcome of electoral politics. Being such apparently dominant and divisive 
issues in public life, this study therefore asks how immigration and asylum are 
represented in the national daily press at the critically-important time of general 
elections. 
Moreover, as much of the above is assumed to be very recent in occurrence yet rarely 
empirically demonstrated as such, this study explores press coverage of immigration and 
asylum issues during election periods in the longue durée, spanning 25 campaigns over 
almost a century (1918-2010) and across seven newspaper titles (the Guardian, Times, 
Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror and Daily Herald/Sun) in order to 
provide a comprehensive view of continuity and change over time. This is achieved 
through the utilisation of both quantitative and qualitative methods (see Chapter 5). 
These methods provide an insight into how the press debate over immigration and 
asylum issues has developed in several different ways, notably with regards to the 
                                                     
1 For instance, in 2003 at the height of a so-called ‘asylum crisis’ the Daily Express ran 22 front-page stories 
about asylum seekers and refugees alone in a 31-day period (Greenslade 2005: 21). 
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amount of coverage there has been, which social actors and views are present in and 
have access to the debate, what the debate has been about thematically, how the 
language of the debate has altered and how the press has constructed the ethics of 
immigration and its consequences in regard to discussion of a few key themes.  
This introductory chapter will discuss the justifications for a study of this kind and the 
organisation of the thesis. 
Why study election campaigns? 
The introduction of cheap, mass-circulation, national newspapers in the twentieth 
century came alongside both the enfranchisement of larger numbers of people2 and the 
development of national political campaigning at election times (Denver 2007: 125). 
Previously, campaigning had ‘largely consisted of canvassing, leafleting and meetings’ 
(Wring 1996: 95) in local, intimate environments. Politicians, however, began to 
recognise that the public reach of newspapers allowed for the dissemination of 
information regarding their campaign activities to people across the country. Over the 
years this has come to mean that ‘modern campaigns are, therefore, media campaigns; 
they are a form of spectator sport’ (Denver 2007: 131). Voters become aware of and 
essentially experience the campaign through the mass media (including newspapers, 
radio, television and the Internet) and, during the mandated three-to-four weeks of 
electoral campaigning, media coverage ‘reaches saturation point with the progress of the 
campaign being charted day by day’ (ibid.). 
Although considerations for voting behaviour in relation to long-term effects are 
undoubtedly important, election campaigns are also of interest to news media 
researchers and critical periods of time in society for a number of other reasons. They 
represent a brief period of time in which governmental power is at stake, and during 
which ordinary political and media logics correspondingly alter (Walgrave and van Aelst 
2006: 96-98). Ordinarily central actors in the news such as the staff of government 
departments make way to some extent for the vigorous and well-resourced activities of 
parties and candidates, the media ‘devote more attention to politics in campaign times, 
                                                     
2 This was the case especially in 1918, when the electorate trebled in size to 21 million people – mostly due 
to the enfranchisement of women -  as a result of the Representation of the People Act 1918 (Wring 1996: 
94). 
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opening opportunity windows for political actors’ with regards to both ‘horse race’ as 
well as issue-oriented coverage (ibid.: 97) and the partisanship of newspapers themselves 
is at its most overt. Putatively ‘key’ issues of the day are fore-grounded on the news 
agenda, perhaps (but not necessarily) related to their longer-term sedimentary saliency, 
and are subject to strident debate, while a number of issues and sources deemed not 
germane to the election are relatively marginalised. The presence and coverage of social 
issues such as immigration and asylum during campaign periods, especially when viewed 
in their historical context, are therefore of great significance.  
Certainly, then, news organisations and political professionals take election campaigns 
seriously. Further, even allowing for the possibly minor or secondary influence of short-
term campaigns in electoral outcomes overall, there is still cause to believe that 
campaigns ‘at least have the potential to matter’ (Holbrook 1996: 12, my emphasis). 
Holbrook identifies several reasons for this, including that ‘there are a significant number 
of people who decide how to vote during the campaign’ whose votes could be decisive in 
a close poll, ‘party identification is less important to the electorate than it used to be’3, 
‘there is significant fluctuation in candidate support during the campaign’ and ‘as 
elections become more media oriented they generate a lot of information that can be 
used by voters as they consider how to vote’ (ibid.).  
The potentially critical importance of election campaigns can indeed be illustrated with 
reference to an immigration-related example. There is cause to speculate that a late 
swing for the Conservative party and therefore the result of the 1992 general election 
may have been in large-part owed to an orchestrated campaign of immigration ‘scare 
stories’ by the largely Tory-supporting popular press (e.g. the Sun, the Daily Express, the 
Daily Star) in the final days of the campaign (Billig and Golding 1992a, 1992b; Thomas 
                                                     
3 This has become known as ‘partisan de-alignment’. As Blumler and Kavanagh point out, in the first two 
decades after the Second World War, much of the electorate ‘related to politics through more or less firm 
and long-lasting party identifications’ and voters were therefore unlikely to ‘sift the arguments concerned, 
tending to vote instead on group-based loyalties’ (1999: 211-212). It is certainly true that the electorate’s 
loyalties lie less dominantly with the Labour Party and the Conservative Party now than in the past; in 1950, 
together they amassed 90 per cent of the vote and over 98 per cent of the seats, whereas in 2005 they 
obtained only 69 per cent of the vote and 88 per cent of the seats (Denver 2007: 2). This has therefore 
conceivably created opportunities whereby voters may be influenced by short-term factors such as 
perceptions of party competence (either in general or on specific policy issues of concern) or the quality of 
party leaders during election campaigns (ibid.: 85). 
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1998). These stories warned (in the case of the Sun) of a ‘human tide’ of ‘bogus refugees’ 
in the event of a Labour win, based on their opposition to proposed asylum legislation. 
Billig and Golding (1992a: 163) postulate that, with a combined readership of 
approximately seventeen million people, these newspapers reached roughly half of the 
electorate, meaning that ‘even if only two in a hundred electors were swayed by the 
immigration scares in the Tory tabloids, the effects would have been profound: such a 
late swing would have been sufficient to give the Conservatives their overall majority’.   
More recently, the 2010 election campaign saw the appearance of immigration in a 
number of ways. In terms of the electoral outcome, immigration may have played more 
of a role as a long-term issue rather than as something with a short-term impact while 
economic concerns were undoubtedly of greater importance for many voters (Flynn et al. 
2010). Nonetheless, the media furore over Gordon Brown’s ‘bigot-gate’ gaffe, the 
appearance of immigration-related questions in each of the televised prime ministerial 
debates and David Cameron’s attempts to detoxify the Conservative Party’s ‘nasty party’ 
image underscored the importance and ordinariness of immigration as a political issue 
and demonstrated the fragility which marks its public discussion. The campaign was also 
a reminder of the way in which electoral debates can play a part in the development of 
the political initiatives and narratives which ensue (ibid.: 110), such as in the subsequent 
formulation of Coalition government policy on net migration and various retrospectives 
emanating from the Labour Party about their perceived lack of engagement with the 
public about the issue.  
It is therefore important to study general election campaign coverage both for what 
campaigns reveal symbolically about the contemporary political concerns of each period 
and for the potentially significant role the press and the mass media may play in the 
electoral and political process. 
Given this rationale, it is perhaps surprising that there have been few systematic 
historical comparisons of electoral coverage of particular social issues to chart changes in 
the way in which their politics have been represented in the news media at this critically 
important juncture over more than a handful of elections (but see Harmer 2012).  
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Why study the press in the longue durée? 
It is hoped that this thesis will therefore help to remedy a general neglect in media and 
discourse studies to attend to media content in its historical context. This is consonant 
with the viewpoint advanced by James Curran in 1991 when he called history the 
‘neglected grandparent of media studies’ (1991: 27 in Pickering 2014: 9), but the 
argument has been expressed recurrently since, suggesting that it is yet to be adequately 
addressed and that media studies retains its ‘frantically contemporary agenda’ (Corner 
1999: 126 in Pickering 2014: 9). The ‘present-centredness’ which has marked much media 
studies research is characterised by the seizing on what seems emergent, ‘[hustling] it 
into greater prominence than it would deserve in the longer term; and [pronouncing] 
upon its epochal significance’ (Pickering 2014: 10). According to Pickering, this ‘obsession 
with the waves just breaking at our feet’ induces an ‘amnesia’ that ignores ‘how long 
those waves have travelled in their movement towards the present’ (ibid.).  
Curran, in identifying the major problems which have beset the writing of media history, 
notes that ‘most media history is media-centric’ and therefore ‘tends not to illuminate 
the links between media development and wider trends in society’, while the 
‘technological determinist version of media history’ has dominated the field4 (2002: 135), 
contributing to an impoverished understanding  of media and their consumption which 
assumes that it is communications technology driving historical change rather than 
constituting one of its features (Pickering 2014). 
Another issue has come in the traditional neglect of the diachronic study of the popular 
press on the part of historians, due to perceptions of the ‘predictable, trivial, 
unsophisticated’, conservative and sensationalist characteristics of this section of the 
press (Bingham 2012). This over time led to an emphasis on the study of elite newspapers 
and a general dismissal of the content of the popular press as ephemeral rather than an 
important source of public information – especially as circulation grew in the twentieth 
century. This also has to be seen in the context of a general neglect of newspapers as 
                                                     
4 Curran also notes that ‘most [media] history is medium history’, i.e. ‘It takes the form of historical 
accounts of an individual medium’ and provides ‘fractured and incomplete understandings of the historical 
role of the media’ as a whole (2002: 135). Although this concern is noted, the justification for focussing 
solely on the national press is made in Chapter 5. 
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primary historical sources in part due to methodological barriers which are only now 
being ameliorated with the introduction of digitized newspaper archives (Bingham 2010). 
Carvalho (2008) has pointed out that news discourse studies methodologically require 
proper consideration for the historical context of the texts produced on a given topic in 
order to produce an adequately explanatory analysis. More importantly, though, this is 
required because it is impossible to understand how public issues emerge, are 
constituted into political problems and provoke the formulation of answers and the 
adoption, implementation and evaluation of measures without providing a ‘biography’ of 
social and political issues in the media (ibid.: 164). Regrettably, most news discourse 
studies tend to provide ‘snapshot’ views of such issues which neglect their significantly 
longer ‘life’ or else focus on long-term change in terms of issues of style and genre ‘rather 
than to change in the meaning of issues in the media’ (ibid.: 163-164). 
An approach which recognises these concerns is especially necessary in relation to press 
coverage of immigration issues, so that a comprehensive understanding of the formation 
of the debate can be attained. There are two factors involved in the justification for this. 
The first relates to evidence and perceptions concerning the recency of immigration’s 
ascent as a prominent and divisive political issue. It has been established that the past 
twenty years have seen immigration and asylum become increasingly salient as political 
issues in the media reporting of general election campaigns (Richardson 2008: 321), 
during which time polls have also charted the rise of immigration and asylum as issues of 
major importance for voters (see Chapter 4). The second relates to a general lack of 
longitudinal analysis establishing patterns and features of continuity and change in 
immigration coverage, which has been exacerbated by a more general neglect in research 
to examine how immigration appeared in the press prior to the second half of the 
twentieth century (see Chapter 2). Various examples can be found which have tentatively 
suggested that the migrant groups subject to hostile coverage in parts of the popular and 
conservative press historically have changed, but that the underlying attitudes towards 
the immigrants of each period are similar (e.g. Bingham 2005). But without a systematic 
and longitudinal research approach, it is difficult to assess how this is manifest in 
coverage or to explain whether recent patterns are a product of contemporary social 
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conditions or whether they are merely the recent materialization of historically-
entrenched discourses.   
An intervention such as this will also provide an experiment to test widely-propagated 
notions in public discourse such as those which claim that immigration is ‘off limits’ to 
public and political discussion. One example of this in particular came in the aftermath of 
the so-called ‘bigot-gate’ incident from the most recent election campaign5, wherein a 
Daily Mail front page headline read: DEMONISED: THE GRANNY WHO DARED TO UTTER 
THE I-WORD (29 April 2010). The invocation of ‘the I-word’ dramatised allusions to 
censorship which were spelled out explicitly in the standfirst: ‘Politicians’ censorship of 
any debate on mass immigration explodes as Brown brands 66-year-old care worker a 
bigot’. This kind of framing can be related theoretically to what Teun van Dijk has named 
the ‘pretence of censorship’ (1992: 105). More broadly, some coverage of the incident 
also questioned the extent to which the political classes (though particularly the Labour 
Party) had faithfully and sufficiently engaged public concern in the preceding years (e.g. 
Glover 2010; Chapman 2010; Kavanagh 2010); this too can be related to the persistent 
invocation of what Martin Barker called ‘the argument from genuine fears’ in his ‘new 
racism’ thesis in the 1980s (1981: 14-16). The invocation of both the ‘pretence of 
censorship’ and ‘the argument from genuine fears’ (whenever expressed as a 
disillusionment with political responses to immigration) have gone some way to suggest 
that immigration has never been properly discussed or legislated for by the allegedly 
elitist political or media classes as a whole over time. Meanwhile, Britain is claimed to be 
‘post-racial’, an assumption which pre-emptively eliminates opportunities for the 
articulation of grievances on the part of immigrants and people of ethnic minorities 
regarding ongoing discriminatory treatment in everyday situations and at the hands of 
                                                     
5 ‘Bigot-gate’ refers to an incident in which the incumbent Prime Minister Gordon Brown was overheard 
calling the floating (though traditionally Labour) voter, Gillian Duffy, ‘just a sort of bigoted woman’ to an 
aide on a Sky News lapel microphone in what he had thought was the privacy of his campaign car. Duffy 
had voiced, along with a number of other issues, her concerns about immigration from Eastern Europe to 
Brown (‘You can't say anything about the immigrants because you're saying that you're... but all these 
Eastern Europeans what are coming in, where are they flocking from?’), and it was seemingly this aspect of 
the conversation to which Brown referred in his subsequent comment. Footage of the incident was played 
repeatedly on news broadcasts in the hours afterwards and thus, from what was intended to be a closely 
managed photo opportunity, the beleaguered Labour leader was forced to provide numerous mea culpas in 
public and private, and the incident was believed to end any hopes for a Labour victory (Lim and Moufahim 
2011: 657). 
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the state (Alexander 2014: 1787). This thesis will help to assess whether assumptions 
such as these are sustainable. 
Why study the press coverage of immigration? 
Migration is an incredibly complex and multi-faceted phenomenon which presents a 
number of opportunities and challenges to migrants and non-migrants as well as to 
sending and receiving countries (Koser 2007: 1).  
Historically, migration has been an inevitable result of the physical, vocational and social 
capacities of humans as a species and as such a fundamental and crucial feature of the 
human experience (De Genova 2013). Although ‘read as conquest, trade, war, kinship 
networks and so on’, human mobility in all its historic forms is a reminder that migratory 
processes are not a modern occurrence, and pre-date the existence of more 
contemporary notions such as globalization, capitalism, nation states and borders 
(Anderson 2013: 12). Legal obstacles, selective filters and physical barriers to human 
mobility, now endemic throughout the world but only relatively recent and reactive 
artefacts of these contemporary notions (except where such barriers are geological), are 
ultimately what constrain the intensification of migratory processes (De Genova 2013).  
Nevertheless, such obstacles, filters and barriers are inexorably navigated or 
circumvented, and as such global international migration is numerically on the rise. This 
in itself is at the root of much dispute and debate about the ethics of migration, but it has 
also coincided with distinctive changes in the character and consequences of global 
migratory patterns (Castles and Miller 2009). Their impact upon social, cultural, political 
and economic development at global and local levels has had profound effects on 
societies around the world, and migration of course transforms the lives of migrants 
themselves. Correspondingly, migration has ascended to the top of the political agenda in 
a number of countries, with the public and political debate in each shaped by parochial 
concerns and solutions. For the countries of the ‘Global North’ which receive more 
migrants than they ‘send’, it is with regards to the consequences of inward migration that 
political solutions are most keenly-sought. 
Britain has not been exempt from its own experiences of migration, either in the distant 
past or presently. Historians of immigration to Britain have frequently recognised the 
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centrality of immigration in the earliest formation of British society6, contradicting 
widespread popular myths which ignore the historical importance of immigration in 
nation building (Castles and Miller 2009: 79) and which permit the promulgation of a 
perspective in which the British population is seen as a homogenous ‘island race’ only 
recently touched by outside influences (Runnymede Trust 2000: 18; Hayter 2004: 13).  
In fact, a history of Britain during the past several hundred years would arguably be 
incomplete without taking into account its role in the establishment of major global 
migration patterns, which have usually been to the benefit of its Empire. The 
establishment of these migrations not only helped to compose the global demographic 
patterns of today but is also related to some extent to the formation of contemporary 
international migration routes. There have broadly been four key periods of mass 
migration around the world since the sixteenth century. The first was ‘the forced 
transportation of between 10 and 20 million people as slaves from Africa to America’ to 
provide forced labour for mines and plantations; the second comprised ‘indentured or 
bonded labour, or temporary slaves, from India and China’ to various places in Asia, 
South Africa and the Caribbean; and the third was of ‘Europeans to America and 
Australia, which began in the eighteenth century and reached its peak in the first decade 
of the twentieth century’ (Hayter 2004: 9-10). The fourth, beginning in the 1950s, 
constituted ‘a reverse flow from the South to the North’ (ibid., see also Castles and Miller 
2009: 6, 81, 85, 98 for illustrative diagrams of these major global migrations), which in the 
case of the UK came most notably and problematically from the countries of the New 
Commonwealth (see Chapter 3). An important distinction between these migration 
patterns is that the first three were effected in large part by the colonial European 
powers, while in the fourth era the migrations unexpectedly (if perhaps inevitably) ‘came 
home’7. The sequential transference of these processes from ‘elsewhere’ to ‘here’ was 
                                                     
6 For example, ‘the British are clearly among the most ethnically composite of the Europeans’ (Geipel 1969: 
163-164 in Holmes 1988: 3), ‘it would be difficult to locate an epoch when some immigration [to the UK] 
did not take place’ (Holmes 1988: 3), immigration is ‘not only one of the biggest stories of British life; it is 
also one of the most resonant, and one of the oldest’ (Winder 2004: 2), ‘the history of Britain is a long story 
of immigration – the immigration of Angles, Saxons, Normans, Danes, Dutchmen, Belgians and many other 
people from different parts of the world’ (Foot 1965: 80) and ‘Britain has always been a country involved in 
migration’ (Layton-Henry 1992: 1). 
7 Beyond economic, social and cultural factors (e.g. relative disparities in prosperity between the people of 
post-colonial and previously colonised countries, familial networks, common language, shared cultural 
traditions and the participation of colonised subjects in imperial warfare), this ‘reverse flow’ was 
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named Britain’s ‘imperial legacy’ by Zig Layton-Henry (1984: 1, 14-15) and was recognised 
aptly in a reputed slogan of the Asian Youth Movement in the 1970s: ‘We are here 
because you were there’ (Hayter 2004: 17). This historical trajectory of global migrations 
has led to proposals from some quarters (e.g. Smith 2014) that once-colonial (and now 
affluent) nations bear special obligations relating to entry and citizenship to (the 
descendents of) their former subjects. However, the formal rejection of such 
responsibilities and their concomitant removal from public debate essentially occurred in 
the UK by the passing of the immigration policy of the 1960s and 1970s8. 
Indeed, the sustained politicisation and problematisation of immigration effectively 
began in the UK at this point, while internal migration and emigration have not attracted 
nearly as much political attention for their no less critical if distinct size, ethics, 
consequences and experiential features. In fact, emigration from the UK was much larger 
than immigration to the UK during most of the twentieth century – though by its end the 
UK had become a country of sustained overall net immigration. This became even more 
apparent in the opening decade of the twenty-first century during which immigration 
reached unprecedented levels. Within this apparently simple narrative – from net 
emigration to net immigration – lie the fractious tensions at the heart of debates about 
inter alia the merits and methods of exclusion and inclusion, national and cultural 
identity, citizenship and representation, responsible governance, tolerance and post-
colonial politics (see Hall 1978; Gilroy 1987, 2004).  
These debates have crucially emerged, in notable part at least, in a national press which 
‘flags the homeland daily’ (Billig 1995). The role of the press in mediating such a 
fundamental and increasingly influential element of social life in the nation as that of 
immigration, especially at significantly important points in time such as during election 
                                                                                                                                                                
unexpected and probably inevitable due to the concession of subjecthood which came with colonialism. 
This concession was predicated on ‘the expectation that the major movement would continue to be an 
outflow from Britain’ (Layton Henry 1984: 13, my emphasis), traditionally encouraged as a ‘conscious part 
of Britain’s imperial policy’ in order to ‘assist the economic development of Dominion territories, 
strengthen the ties with Britain and increase the power of the Empire’ (ibid.: 9). Even the authors of the 
British Nationality Act 1948, which ultimately affirmed the rights of Commonwealth subjects to migrate to 
the UK, had not imagined that these rights would be taken up in any substantial number (see Hansen 2000: 
52-56).  
8 A sense among some politicians of Britain’s duty as the ‘Mother Country’ of its Empire was, in fact, what in 
part delayed the introduction of legislation to curtail Commonwealth immigration until 1962 (see Foot 
1965). 
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campaigns, is of vital concern in liberal democracies (Benson 2013: 18). According to 
liberal theorists of the media’s normative democratic role, there is an onus on the press 
to diligently and responsibly marshal a full and fair debate if citizens are to understand 
the features, causes and impacts (upon readers as much as upon other people and social 
processes) of immigration issues. Indeed, newspapers are not only ‘strategically placed’ 
(Golding and Middleton 1979: 5) to explain such phenomena but, as a culturally-
dominant product, have the potential to project an inclusive vision of the cosmopolitan 
nation and provide space for the circulation of a wide range of views about Britain’s role 
in the world and its responsibilities to other people if we are to take their occasionally-
voiced cosmopolitan credentials (see Law 2002) at face value. This thesis will shed light 
on how they have approached their task.  
Moreover, as global migration continues to rise, the profile of migrants continues to 
change and the consequences of immigration become even more diffuse, it is an 
appropriate time to pause and consider how the press might help audiences to 
understand these patterns in future. Circulation figures for most national newspaper 
titles continue to dwindle, so it is pertinent to question how the press will continue to 
reach a national audience and influence the national debate and whether such a press 
will remain as relevant a force in an apparently increasingly ‘globalised’ world, in which 
prospective audiences might hold multi-faceted personal identities.  
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Outline of thesis 
The thesis is organised into several further chapters. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to a theoretical discussion about the sociology of journalism and 
specifically how this may be related to the press coverage of immigration. It begins by 
considering what impact ordinary news practices and organisational structures may have 
upon the journalistic representation of immigration. In the latter section of the chapter, 
the expected roles of journalism in covering immigration, how the national orientation of 
the press may affect the reporting of issues such as immigration, and the findings of 
prominent studies relating to the representation of immigration and 'race' in news media 
are explored in order to provide a contextual background to continuity and change in 
representational patterns over time.  
Chapter 3 moves the discussion on to provide a historical background to the politics of 
immigration in the UK. It begins by developing a discussion about the political definitions 
concerning immigration, thus providing an insight into the linkages between official and 
popular discourses and the symbolic boundaries of national belonging which might be 
shaped and re-shaped in press coverage. This entails examining the role and power of the 
state in awarding or denying entry and citizenship to differing groups of migrants, an 
overview of the major categories and shifts in immigration and nationality law over time 
and a discussion of alternative perspectives used to define types of migrants. This 
subsequently leads to the presentation of a typology of migrants relevant to the purposes 
of the study, which both creates an analytical framework through which to see migrant 
categories and provides an opportunity to consider the distinct experiential and ethical 
features of different kinds of migration. 
Chapter 4 focuses briefly on two other major aspects to the politics of immigration, both 
crucial to a deeper contextual understanding of the mediated migration debate. The first 
relates to demographic change in the UK over time, in order to provide a background to 
political debates centring on what is usually termed the 'numbers game'. The second 
relates to public attitudes towards immigration as represented in public opinion polls and 
their analysis. This provides an essential background into what citizens might demand of 
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immigration politics and how their knowledge and attitudes may interplay with the 
construction of immigration news. 
Chapter 5 explains the methodological design of the thesis. It details the main research 
questions of the study and the research design, including the sampling of data, the 
rationale for choosing both quantitative and qualitative methods, which methods were 
chosen and why. 
Chapter 6 is the first of two chapters which present the results of a systematic content 
analysis of the coverage of immigration in all seven sampled newspapers during election 
week. The first part of the chapter charts the volume of such coverage in terms of its 
quantity, frequency and depth while the second assesses the appearance of a range of 
social actors in terms of their news presence and news access. In doing so, the chapter 
highlights fluctuations in the appearance of immigration on the electoral news agenda 
and considers which social groups are able to define the mediated immigration debate. 
Chapter 7 elaborates on these findings to explore the attitudinal and thematic 
dimensions of coverage. The first part of the chapter continues to consider the role of 
social actors in debate, by providing a profile of the balance between ‘supportive’ and 
‘critical’ attitudes expressed in coverage. This is followed by an analysis of the lexicon 
used to describe migrant groups and migration processes in coverage, in order to provide 
a snapshot of how the ‘terms’ of debate have developed over time. These aspects of the 
chapter help to determine the extent to which the debate is ‘fair’. The final part of the 
chapter examines which themes appear in newspaper coverage, in terms of their breadth 
and depth, in order to assess the extent to which coverage is ‘full’. 
Chapter 8 complements the findings of the content analysis of the previous two chapters 
with a critical discourse analysis of newspaper headlines which questions how issues 
surrounding the ethics of immigration are addressed in coverage. In studying the 
headlines and lead paragraphs of three major thematic areas of coverage, the analysis 
utilises a framework that considers the construction of ‘our’ rights and responsibilities 
and ‘their’ rights and responsibilities over time in coverage dealing with i) ‘numbers’, ii) 
‘precarious routes’ and iii) ‘the migrant vote’ and migrant candidature. 
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The final chapter concludes the study by summarising the major findings revealed by the 
previous three analytical chapters, in terms of continuity and change. This leads on to a 
discussion of the major contributions of the thesis. In particular, the chapter considers 
what the findings of the study mean for the role of the press in immigration and electoral 
politics.  
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2: The Sociology of Journalism and the Reporting of Immigration 
Introduction 
This chapter provides two main functions through an exploration of key theoretical 
debates in news studies both generally and with specific regards to news media 
representations of immigration and immigrants. First, it will establish how the dynamics 
of news reporting may affect the press coverage of immigration. In order to do so, I will 
consider issues central to the sociology of journalism, such as news values and source 
practices, as well as those more particular to immigration reporting, such as ethnic 
minority representation in the newsroom and the role of relevant industry guidelines and 
regulation. Second, the chapter will also explore the role of journalism in mediating social 
issues such as that of immigration, the significance of the nationally-defined orientation 
of the national press in terms of the likely effects of this orientation on immigration 
coverage and the major findings of textualist accounts of the news media representation 
of immigration and ‘race’. This is supported by a discussion of theories relating to the 
contemporary history of racist discourse. Since the focus of this thesis is longitudinal, this 
chapter is intended to provide where appropriate a reflection on the continuities and 
changes which have been observed in these areas of research. 
The sociology of journalism 
Organisational issues 
What ‘makes’ the news? Contrary to the view that the news is ‘random reactions to 
random events’ (in Negrine 1994: 123), decades of news analysis have contributed to the 
view that news is the result of a routine selection of all the possible (i.e. virtually infinite) 
events which take place around the world every day to produce a product fitting the 
available space of the newspaper (after advertising space has been accounted for) and 
which is intended to be sold in sufficient volume (in combination with the sale of 
advertising space) to return a profit (ibid.: 118-123). As newspaper organisations have 
finite space, time and material resources available for each published edition, the 
selection of events as ‘news’ must make the production of copy as efficient and 
inexpensive as possible, while at the same time providing an informative and entertaining 
‘product’, in order to make the business which publishes the newspaper economically 
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viable. These constraints, along with the need (or at least desire) to ‘maintain a political 
line’ (ibid.: 118), shape the news production process. Journalists must negotiate all of 
these constraints but, according to organisational approaches to news production, in 
order to do so effectively they tend to develop rituals and practices which ‘routinize the 
unexpected’ (Tuchman 1973). On the contrary, according to political economic 
approaches to news production, news output is circumscribed in service to powerful 
interests due to the economic orientation and reproductive social functions of news 
media (e.g. Herman and Chomsky 1988; Golding and Murdock 2000) – which are, after 
all, profit-oriented businesses. As will be shown, however, it is not necessary to discuss 
the political economy of the press at length – important though such factors may be at 
the general level (and which are to some extent implicit within the everyday routines of 
news production anyway) – in order to explain the specific logics which drive the 
construction of immigration news and account to a large extent for the representational 
patterns found in immigration coverage (see below). The main organisational issues 
which will be focussed upon therefore include news values, minority representation in 
the newsroom, guidelines and regulation, and the sourcing of news.  
News values  
One important practice in news selection and gathering is the adherence to a set of 
criteria which index what journalists perceive a news story to ‘look like’9, and which they 
think align with the ‘imagined’ preferences of the ‘expected audience’10 (Richardson 
2007: 92). Such criteria are known as news values. 
As Bell duly observes, news values are ‘values’ (1991: 156, my emphasis). They ‘reflect 
ideologies and priorities held in society’ and are therefore not neutral (ibid.). This helps to 
indicate that the news provides a construction rather than a ‘reflection’ of reality through 
the choices inevitably made in its gathering and arrangement. ‘Events’ ostensibly contain 
no intrinsic or ‘natural’ framework of meaning in themselves; the media’s active 
selecting, presenting, structuring and shaping of events produces meaning and assigns 
meaning to those events (Hall 1982: 64). 
                                                     
9 Fowler stresses, however, that these criteria ‘are probably more or less unconscious in editorial practice’ 
(1991: 13). 
10 This perhaps helps to account for some of the variation in thematic focus between the output of certain 
journalists and newspapers, whose audiences hold differing expectations of their newspapers. 
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Deacon suggests that ‘structural and cultural factors have a far more significant role in 
this construction process than deliberate political bias – that is, the tendency to privilege 
people, issues and perspectives because they fit more effectively into the cycles and 
demands of the news industries, because they have greater cultural significance and 
proximity and because they do not confound broadly accepted normative values’ (2008: 
8). Hence, news values provide journalists with a routine and ‘common sense’ way of 
selecting events to construct meaning in news narratives without requiring laborious 
consideration of the potentially troubling implications of their choices. 
Galtung and Ruge provided an influential typology of news values in their study of foreign 
news reporting in Norway. Their set of criteria included: frequency, threshold (including 
absolute intensity and intensity increase), unambiguity, meaningfulness (including 
cultural proximity and relevance), consonance (including predictability and demand), 
unexpectedness (including unpredictability and scarcity), continuity, composition, 
reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to persons and reference 
to something negative (1973, discussed in Fowler 1991: 13-17). These news values, it was 
suggested, would work in combination to provide news stories with their 
newsworthiness; the more news values satisfied by an event, the more likely the event is 
to become news.  
This typology was criticised and adapted by Harcup and O’Neill (2001), who argued that it 
ignored the ‘day-to-day coverage of lesser, domestic and bread-and-butter news’ (ibid.: 
276). Harcup and O’Neill therefore offered their own set of news values, namely: the 
power elite, celebrity, entertainment, surprise, bad news, good news, magnitude, 
relevance, follow-ups and the media agenda. 
Another criticism of theirs was that journalists may, in fact, construct news to fit these 
criteria, rather than that the events contain such features in and of themselves (e.g. 
‘most journalists are trained to write unambiguous angles to stories that may be 
ambiguous, complex or unclear’) (2001: 277; Fowler 1991: 19). Further, it must also be 
considered that news values are not universal over time, place or institution and are 
subject to interpretation. By way of example, Richardson notes the demise of the 
‘Parliament page’ in the UK broadsheet press in the 1990s, to illustrate that the editorial 
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staff of these newspapers during this time changed in their opinion of what audiences 
wanted, concluding that it was not in-depth coverage of the goings-on in Westminster11 
(2007: 93-94).  
News values need not necessarily be interpreted in the same way across the press, either. 
For newspapers serving a local audience, for instance, not only will the focus of the 
newspaper change in accordance with local concerns, but it is possible that they may take 
a ‘responsible journalism’ approach with regard to immigration matters to avoid fuelling 
intra-community tensions and to commercially appeal to the diverse potential audience 
which has formed in some areas over the past several decades (Machin and Mayr 2007; 
Bagley 1973, but see Rasinger 2010; Finney and Robinson 2008; Chessum 1998). Likewise, 
for media outlets aimed at diaspora audiences, news values are interpreted in ways 
which help to ‘sensationalise struggles for racial equality rather than inflame racial 
tensions’ (Gordon and Rosenberg 1989: 62), providing a populist alternative to 
mainstream news narratives.  
However, the audience in the case of the national press is in general a nationally-defined 
one. The importance of this is that, as Conboy remarks, ‘categories such as threshold, 
unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, reference to elite nations, and reference to 
elite individuals all function best within the news when they are linked to national 
narratives’ (2007a: 155).  
This correspondingly has specific and potentially critical implications for the likely 
interpretation and application of news values to immigration issues in these newspapers. 
For example, in their pivotal study Racism and the Mass Media, Hartmann and Husband 
found that, despite newspapers’ explicit condemnation of overt forms of racism and 
prejudice12, the news content they found was augmented towards reporting events on 
the basis of the news values of ‘conflict’, ‘negativity’13, ‘consonance’14 and 
                                                     
11 This accords with a roughly twenty-five percent decline in the number of parliamentary and political 
items in the Guardian and Daily Telegraph between 1986 and 1996 (Negrine 1999: 332). 
12 Their overall results came despite the apparently earnest intentions of reflexive journalists (at least, of 
those contacted) to improve upon such practices (e.g. Hartmann and Husband 1974: 163-165), and news 
and editorial comment which ostensibly ‘condemned and deplored’ prejudice and discrimination as well as 
showing a concern for improvements in race relations (1974: 145). 
13 This and the previous news value are very important for the impressions audiences may receive about 
immigrants. As Hartmann and Husband put it, ‘positive stories of harmonious race relations are less likely 
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‘unambiguity’15 (1974: 154-155), producing a perspective which emphasised social 
tension and amplified the perceived ‘problems’ of immigration and immigrants.  
Just as economic imperatives may oblige the local and regional press to sometimes 
cultivate a ‘positive’ interpretation of news values, for the national press ‘within a 
predominantly white society and culture, economic forces can centre ‘middle ground' 
white opinion and interests since this is where the largest market and profits are found, 
and thereby marginalize minority interests, voices and opinions’ (Cottle 2000a: 20). As 
Shibutani points out, the news is not just anything ‘new’; ‘it is information that is 
timely...This transient quality is the very essence of news, for an event ceases to be 
newsworthy as soon as the tension it has aroused has been dissipated’ (1966 in 
Hartmann and Husband 1974: 153). To news staff and the national newspaper audience 
concerned with preserving the privileges associated with their position in the social 
structure (and who perceive immigrants as a threat to this), this ‘tension’ is likely to lead 
to a partial immigration problematic which ignores the ‘everyday’ (Essed 1991) 
experiences of violence, discrimination, exploitation or hardship often suffered by recent 
immigrants themselves (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 153-154). In other words, events 
involving minorities become of interest and therefore ‘news’ when journalists believe 
they affect or are of interest to ‘us’ (Sonwalkar 2005: 271).  
Further, news values which focus on ‘us’ have their own implications for the construction 
of people categorised as ‘them’. For instance, the news value of ‘threshold’ is commonly 
                                                                                                                                                                
to be carried than stories of racial conflict, and the negative behaviour of minority groups becomes more 
newsworthy than their positive achievements’ (1974: 154).  
14 ‘Subsequent events that conform to the expectation stand a better chance of making the news than 
those that do not, and new events may be interpreted in terms of existing images even if the existing image 
is not in fact the most appropriate’ (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 155). An example of such an 
inappropriate image from this period that Hartmann and Husband use is the image of ethnic conflict in 
America in the 1960s as the framework for the reporting of the British situation (ibid.). If journalists and 
news audiences come to expect (based on past news coverage) the issue of immigration to be 
characterised by conflict, negativity, etc. and concerned with only a limited range of topics then this news 
value may sediment this further to fit in with the prior narrative. 
15 The problem inherent to this news value is that complex events are made to seem straightforward and 
events deemed too ‘ambiguous’ to be easily pared down into a convenient news narrative are more likely 
to be ignored. This presents a dual problem for immigration news. Firstly, unfamiliarity on the part of 
reporters with the complexities of the phenomena, law, etc. of immigration is likely to lead to simplistic or 
partial narratives (c.f. Hartmann and Husband 1974: 155). Secondly, this news value may facilitate the 
propagation of stereotypes. This is undoubtedly problematic for the representation of immigrants where 
such stereotypes contain negative connotations, but even ‘positive’ stereotypes may simply serve to 
provide essentialist portrayals of migrants (Cottle 2000a: 11). 
20 
 
implemented in ways which lead to ethnocentric or ‘homocentric’ (‘a preoccupation with 
countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself’) reporting (Fowler 1991: 
16). This is due to its interpretation not just in terms of the ‘size’ or ‘importance’ of an 
event at some notionally universalist level, ‘but more specifically to the size or 
importance of an event to a particular audience within a national setting’ (Conboy 2007a: 
155). Events abroad affecting scores of British ex-pats (ibid.), for instance, provides 
grounds for the selection of such events as news (with central events subordinate to the 
plight of the British people involved), dovetailing with the news value of ‘reference to 
elite nations’. One consequence of this approach can be summarised with reference to 
the succinct rule-of-thumb, commonly known as ‘McLurg’s Law’ and attributed variously 
to newsrooms throughout the modern history of journalism: ‘news is what happens to 
‘one Englishman, 10 Germans, or 1000 Indians’’ (in Bell 1991: 204). 
This imagines the world as a series of ‘concentric circles, each one taking us further away 
from our imagined kith and kin’ (Kundnani 2001: 53) and further towards indifference 
and a devaluation of other(ed) people’s ‘worth’. As Kundnani notes (ibid.: 54), with the 
decline in foreign news across the news media since the 1980s (and in keeping with 
selections based on other news values such as ‘consonance’ and ‘unambiguity’), it has 
become less likely that distant and complex events will be duly explained and more likely 
that impressions will be formed that ‘trouble is endemic to these places’. This can lead, 
for example, to audiences (glad for their distance from these remote problems) coming 
to consequently see the plight of refugees as something of little concern to them (ibid.).  
It would be unsurprising if newspaper readers were to share a strongly 'partial' (Gibney 
2004) (or 'particularist' [Schuster 2003b]) view of desirable refugee (and immigration) 
policy (contra ‘impartial’ or ‘universalist’ view) given such consequences. 
Even news values with no obvious ramifications for the coverage of immigration may play 
a role in diminishing the quality of journalism associated with its construction. Frequency 
(or ‘recency’), for example, is such a taken-for-granted influence in news production that 
‘time is rarely specified in headlines, and often not in lead sentences’ (Bell 1995: 320). 
One associated aspect of this news value is the ‘desire to report a result rather than a 
process’ (ibid.: 321). In other words, ‘the murder is more newsworthy than the police 
investigation, the verdict more than the trial’ (ibid.). This kind of coverage is therefore 
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associated with an ‘episodic’ framing of events. The crux of this is, as Suro puts it, that 
immigration, as with many other areas of public policy (e.g. education and health care), 
‘produces a narrative that may be punctuated by high-profile events but is defined by the 
cumulative impact of many small events that go unnoticed individually’ (2011: 8). 
Consequently, a focus on high-profile events which disappear as quickly as they arrive 
may ‘[condition] the public to think of immigration in the “problem/conflict/difficulty” 
framework’ (Gemi et al. 2011: 19). Further, in combination with a focus on ‘reference to 
persons’, the immediacy of this news value neglects to attend to the background 
influence of social, economic and political structures and institutions essential in making 
sense of people’s migration (c.f. Iyengar 1992 in Suro 2011: 7; Hartmann and Husband 
1974: 157). The less dramatic, the processual and the historical dimensions of 
immigration patterns therefore remain under-reported; their explanation and context 
ignored.  
Similarly, the news value of ‘unexpectedness’ or ‘surprise’ lends itself to a focus on the 
unusual rather than the routine. For instance, the theme of illegality with regard to 
immigration appears to dominate in American journalism as journalists strive to highlight 
the aberrant (civil) law-breaking of the few rather than the law-abiding activities of many 
more millions of ‘legal’ migrants (Suro 2011: 6). Indeed, in a recent study which utilised 
corpus linguistics methods to analyse UK press coverage from 2010 to 2012, the term 
‘illegal immigrant’ was found to appear fairly regularly in each of the tabloid press (in 
6.6% of immigration-related items), mid-market press (10% of items) and broadsheet 
press (5% of items) (Allen and Blinder 2013). In combination with the news value of 
‘threshold’ or ‘magnitude’ (and the expectation of these news values on the part of 
audiences), the reporting of events unusual-but-minor, such as irregular migration, might 
lead to assumptions that such events are in fact commonplace and therefore worthy of 
concern.  
Minority representation in the newsroom 
Another contributory factor in the production of immigration news lies in the extent to 
which non-British – especially ethnic minority – journalists are employed in the 
newsrooms of the national press. At its most acute, under-representation in this regard 
can have ‘serious consequences for news production, writing style, source access and 
22 
 
[the] general perspective of news discourse’ (van Dijk 1996: 92). It may, of course, also 
undermine the frequent claim that the press is qualified to, and does, speak on behalf of 
British society as a whole (Bingham and Conboy 2015; Curran 2000; Hampton 2004). 
It is difficult to assess the proportion of Black or Asian journalists in the staff of the British 
press because newspapers have not generally been at all forthcoming with such data 
(Richardson 2004: 39). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that despite an increase in 
the ethnic minority population in the UK (especially in London, where the national press 
is based), there have been disproportionately few ethnic minority journalists working in 
the British press, that progress has been slow and ‘piecemeal’ over time and that there 
have been few ethnic minority editorial staff (Ainley 1998; Law 2002; Francis 2003; 
Commission for Racial Equality 2005; Cole 2006; Markova and McKay 2013). Indeed, the 
first non-white editor-in-chief of a nationally-circulated daily British newspaper (Amol 
Rajan of the Independent) was appointed only in 2013 (Halliday 2013).  
Despite statutory legislation relating to anti-discriminatory recruitment as well as the 
apparent presence of equality policies in media institutions (Markova and McKay 2013), 
the continuing under-representation of ethnic minority journalists can be accounted for 
in part by the ‘clique’ nature of employment in the press (Statham 2002: 414). In other 
words, applications are made and jobs are awarded on the basis of word-of-mouth and 
‘who you know’, rather than through the formal advertising of vacancies16. This tends to 
structurally preserve the existing composition of the national press’ staff ‘to the 
detriment of not just Black journalists but also working class and female journalists’ 
(Richardson 2004: 40). 
Even for the few Black or Asian journalists present in the newsroom, it would be a 
mistake to automatically assume that their reporting interests would align with the 
interests of Black or Asian newspaper readers (ibid.), and certainly that their reporting 
interests would necessarily correspond with a positive approach to the reporting of 
immigration per se. Nevertheless, when journalists (regardless of ethnicity) have 
addressed such interests, this may confound the ordinary news policy set by those in the 
                                                     
16 Even when journalists are ‘head-hunted’ from the local or regional press, the pool of available non-white 
journalists has been proportionately even lower than in the national press (15 out of 8000 journalists in 
1998 according to Ainley [1998 in Richardson 2004: 40]).   
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predominantly white editorial structure, leading to ‘sanctions’, whether formally in the 
case of editing of copy and reprimand or informally in the case of the closure of career 
opportunities later on and loss of influence in the newsroom (Wilson and Gutiérrez 1985: 
143-144, see also Philo et al. 2013, Richardson 2004: 40-42). This provides journalists with 
an uncomfortable dilemma between professional achievement and personal integrity 
(Richardson 2004: 42-43). Otherwise, ethnic minority journalists may be expected to 
cover only ‘ethnic topics’ but still be seen as ‘less competent, less credible, and partisan 
in the coverage of ethnic affairs’ (van Dijk 1993a: 244-245). 
Guidelines and regulation 
In order to counter the negative portrayal of minority groups, the National Union of 
Journalists created several guidelines in a code of conduct in 1975 for journalists 
reporting on issues of ‘race’, which called for more balance in news reports about black 
communities, the eradication of spurious reference to ethnic origin in crime reports and 
the avoidance of sensationalism in the reporting of issues which could have an impact on 
‘race relations’ (Troyna 1981: 13), which were later accompanied by guidelines on the 
reporting of racist organisations. However, it initially proved difficult to address breaches 
of the code (Cohen 1982: 90), and journalists claim that they are more likely to rely on 
professional codes of ‘common sense’ and ‘objectivity’ in their approach to immigration 
and asylum issues than to scrupulously consult such guidelines (Statham 2002: 412). 
Further, despite the establishment of self-regulatory industry bodies such as the Press 
Council (in 1953) and Press Complaints Commission (in 1991), neither were able or willing 
to tackle incidents which contravened their codes of practice in regard to discriminatory 
representation to any adequate effect whatsoever (Gordon and Rosenberg 1989: 66; 
Greenslade 2005; Petley 2006; Leveson 2012). 
The failure to faithfully implement these codes of conduct despite honourable intentions 
and reflexive journalists (e.g. Hartmann and Husband 1974: 163-165; Philo et al. 2013; 
Bennett et al. 2013) demonstrates that such measures and attitudes are perhaps not 
enough to curtail discriminatory coverage and do not overshadow the overarching 
influence of the general structures, ideologies and practices of the press on immigration 
coverage. Meanwhile, statutory legislation contends only to deal with excessively 
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offensive content, rather than with the sedimentary effects of ‘less serious’ 
discriminatory discourse. 
The sourcing of news 
Sources are seen as so integral to the production of news content by some that, as Sigal 
puts it, news is not ‘what happens, but what someone says has happened or will happen’ 
(1988: 15). Dialogically, this means that the production of the news can be characterised 
as a form of ‘cultural argumentation’: ‘an unending battle between a multitude of 
differentially powerful parties over the definition of reality’ (Turow 1989: 206 in Deacon 
et al. 1999: 9). Amid recurrent concerns from some quarters that power imbalances may 
be reflected in news production and therefore news output, the study of sources helps to 
‘investigate the extent to which the news is dominated by elite versions of contemporary 
events’ (Richardson 2006: 103). 
Indeed, for critical analysts, the media 'routinely privilege the voices of the powerful and 
marginalize those of the powerless – whether as a result of media ownership, control and 
instrumental design; prohibitive costs of market entry, advertising pressures and the 
commodification of news; or more diffuse cultural processes informing journalist 
socialization, news production and the ideological reproduction of consensus' (Cottle 
2000b: 427). In such accounts, elite perspectives ‘dominate and direct public discourses, 
until they become “common sense”’ (Jacomella 2010: 92). With regards to immigration 
news, for instance, van Dijk (1996: 93, see also 1991: 151-175, 1993a: 252-255) argues 
that media access relating to minority actors is characterised by several features which 
serve to undermine the representation of pro-minority perspectives in the news, 
including that: minority groups which represent migrants have traditionally been unable 
to find the resources and news attention for the arrangement of routine, organised 
media events such as press conferences; minority speakers are much less frequently 
quoted in the news; that when quoted, ‘then either moderate spokespersons will be 
quoted who share the opinions or perspective of the majority17, or radicals or extremists 
will be quoted in order to facilitate ridicule or attack’; ‘minorities are especially quoted on 
‘soft’ and less ‘risky’ topics’ and, finally, ‘unlike majority group speakers, minorities are 
                                                     
17 Journalists tend also ‘to quote those speakers who voice the position of the newspaper’, with the claims 
of ‘ideological opponents’ undermined by ‘distance markers’ (e.g. scare quotes) (van Dijk 1991: 175). 
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seldom allowed to speak alone. Their accusations of the host society and its elites, when 
quoted at all, never go unchallenged’ (van Dijk 1996: 93, emphasis in original). However, 
it is difficult to assess on the basis of such accounts the extent to which these features 
have been sustained longitudinally. Indeed, there has been much debate over the nature 
of sourcing practices over time. 
According to some accounts, the cultivation of ‘news beats’ (Fishman 1980) provides a 
way for journalists to ‘routinize the unexpected’ (Tuchman 1973) through attendance at 
events and places of likely ‘newsworthy’ events, which subsequently leads to problematic 
issues concerning imbalances in news access. It has been suggested that there are only a 
select range of institutions and events which journalists routinely attend, including: 
parliament, councils, police, other emergency services, courts (including inquests and 
tribunals), royalty, diary events (e.g. annual events such as Ascot), airports and other 
news media (Whitaker 1981: 31-32 in Fowler 1991: 21). Further, there are organisations 
whose public pronouncements are also likely to be regularly attended, including: 
government departments, local government, public services (e.g. transport authorities), 
corporations, trade unions, non-commercial organisations (e.g. pressure groups), political 
parties and the military (ibid.). Finally, prominent individuals and members of the public 
may also be accessed, but ordinary citizens are usually only accessed incidentally rather 
than through privilege (Fowler 1991: 22; Lewis and Wahl-Jorgensen 200518).  
Further, journalists often rely on eachother (see Seymour Ure 1968, ch. 6 and 7; Tunstall 
1970, ch. 7), on the output of other (particularly prestigious) news organisations in what 
has been called ‘inter-media agenda setting’ and on ‘wire’ services such as the Press 
Association (Atkinson et al. 2014: 358) in order to meet the pressures associated with 
producing regular and quality copy. It is suggested that these pressures have increased 
over recent decades, exacerbated by declines in newspaper circulation, increased 
                                                     
18 According to Lewis and Wahl Jorgensen (2005: 101), public opinion tends to play a ‘minimal role in 
driving the news agenda...as such, politics on the news is usually about what politicians do, and not 
necessarily about what people want them to do’. Crucially, they argue that a common way in which public 
opinion features in the news comes through ‘impressionistic strategies’ (ibid.: 105), such as through 
anecdote, ‘statements that infer something about public opinion in general’ (ibid.: 102), or through vox 
pops, which are used in casual ways that suggest that they are representative of public opinion generally 
(ibid.: 103). The routine ways in which journalists attempt to invoke and address what the public is thinking 
may therefore actually tell us more about journalists’ impressions of the world than citizens’ (ibid.: 105) 
and do a disservice to producing a democratic and creative (rather than reactive) public dialogue. 
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pagination and the contraction of newsroom staff (Lewis et al. 2008a, 2008b). This has 
produced concerns that the press is increasingly reliant on plagiarising the claims of 
outside influences such as PR agencies without due fact-checking or the critical 
interrogation of sources, and therefore that there has been a decline in editorial 
independence (ibid.; Davies 2008). 
Unlike in a number of other areas of news reporting, there is still mostly no specific 
immigration ‘beat’ to speak of in the UK per se; ‘issues relating to immigration and ethnic 
relations are subsumed into the general reporting practices and covered by Home Affairs, 
Crime and Law correspondents’ (Statham 2002: 404). This may result in a neglect both to 
source a range of other authorities on the nebulous and expansive issues that 
immigration touches on politically, in addition to the innumerable sites geographically 
across (and within) the borders of the nation at which immigration-related and 
potentially ‘newsworthy’ events may occur19 (Dummett 1973: 246-249). However, it also 
suggests that editorial staff presume immigration to handily fit within the rubric of policy 
and reportorial areas such as ‘crime’ (which may prefigure the framing of its coverage by 
correspondents more familiar with stories about criminals), and mean that non-expert 
journalists are assigned to stories for which their background knowledge is inadequate to 
source prominent organisations and spokespersons, ask constructive questions and 
critically evaluate what they are told (ibid.) This suggests a lack of consideration on the 
part of newsrooms to deal with immigration and asylum as a set (or two sets) of related 
issues in their own right. The immigration news beat is thus unlikely to operate 
substantially differently in effect from other beats on a newspaper’s political roster, 
except inasmuch as the quality of reporting associated with other such areas may be 
diminished. 
The key to understanding the general routine rights of news access enjoyed by powerful 
institutions (particularly political organisations and individuals during election campaigns) 
lies in the reciprocity of the relationship between the media and their sources: ‘the media 
conventionally expect and receive the right of access to the statements of these 
                                                     
19 Even in the USA, where the ‘immigration beat’ is perhaps more established within national press 
newsrooms, it is claimed that ‘it’s like no other beat. There’s no City Hall, no cop shop, generally no press 
room, to mention a few typical news-gathering venues. The whole issue is a lot more dispersed and 
amorphous’ and ‘lacks the cache of more traditional beats’ (McDonnell 2011: 91). 
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individuals, because the individuals have roles in the public domain; and reciprocally 
these people receive access to the columns of the papers when they wish to air their 
views’ (Fowler 1991: 22). Not only do such sources have ‘roles in the public domain’ (and 
thus represent others), but they are ‘accredited’ by their institutional power or expertise 
(Hall et al. 1978: 58). In Hall et al.’s ‘primary definition’ model (ibid.), pressures both 
professional (e.g. objectivity) and commercial (i.e. ‘constantly working against the clock’) 
‘combine to produce a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in 
powerful and privileged institutional positions’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Consequently, 
‘these ‘spokesmen’ [sic] become what we call the primary definers of topics’, whose 
‘initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question...sets the terms of 
reference within which all further coverage or debate takes place. Arguments against a 
primary interpretation are forced to insert themselves into its definition of ‘what is at 
issue’ (ibid., emphases in original). This, for the authors, has significant consequences, 
even within immigration debates: ‘once race relations in Britain have been defined as a 
'problem of numbers'...then even liberal spokesmen, in proving that the figures for black 
immigrants have been exaggerated, are nevertheless obliged to subscribe, implicitly, to 
the view that the debate is 'essentially' about numbers’ (ibid.: 59, emphasis in original). 
The power imbalance facilitated by the consequences of the primary definition model is 
seemingly exacerbated further by the astute ability of powerful institutions to adapt their 
message to the ‘media logic’ (Altheide and Snow 1979) of news organisations by, for 
example, creating ‘pseudo-events’ (such as press conferences and manifesto launches) 
that are planned and announced in advance (Boorstin 1962).  
Since the 1990s, however, there has been a move towards approaches which have 
focused on source strategies themselves (Schlesinger 1989, 1990; Schlesinger and 
Tumber 1994) and which have thus helped to reconcile to some extent political economic 
approaches and organisational approaches to the sociology of journalism (Deacon et al. 
1999: 8). Schlesinger’s call for less media-centrism in an approach to source strategies 
(i.e. recognising their own competitive activities) was accompanied by an influential 
critique of the primary definition model (1990). Schlesinger claimed that the primary 
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definition model did not take account of: ‘the contention between official sources20; the 
behind the scenes manoeuvrings of sources, rendered methodologically invisible by 
culturalist readings of texts21; the competitive and shifting nature of key sources within 
privileged elites22; longer-term shifts in the structure of access; and for assuming a uni-
directional flow of definitions from power centres to media’ (ibid.: 66–7 in Cottle 2000b: 
436). In his view, news access therefore becomes an ‘achievement’ rather than an 
atemporal, axiomatic result of the shape of existing social structures (Deacon et al. 1999: 
9), though he (along with his colleague Tumber) did not seek to deny the general 
tendency for authoritative views to be promoted in the news (Schlesinger and Tumber 
1994: 20). 
Another approach which sought to explain this general tendency came with Bennett’s 
‘indexing hypothesis’: ‘[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the 
beat, tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials 
according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a 
given topic’ (1990: 106). This hypothesis is therefore linked in some respects to Daniel 
Hallin’s (1986) concept of the spheres of debate (see below) not just in that it posits that 
news media output will generally reflect the dominant views of the powerful, but that it 
allows for the re-shaping of the news debate in times of elite dissensus23 (Bennett 1990). 
As McNair puts it, ‘when the British establishment lacks unity and coherence, the British 
media reflect that disunity and become more open’ (McNair 2009: 66, see also Deacon 
and Golding 1994). 
A final point to consider is that the particular and peculiar politics of immigration may in 
fact lead to apparent idiosyncrasies in the nature of sources and their expressed 
attitudes. This is due to the ‘strange bedfellows’ alliances of policy preferences towards 
immigration which mean that the usual cleavages characteristic of other areas of public 
                                                     
20 ‘In cases of dispute, say amongst members of the same government over a key question of policy, who is 
the primary definer? Or–and it goes against the very logic of the concept–can there be more than one?’ 
(Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 18, emphasis in original). 
21 This is the case most notably with ‘off-the-record briefings’ (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 18). 
22 ‘There is nothing in the formulation of primary defining that permits us to deal with...inequalities of 
access amongst the privileged themselves’ (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 18). 
23 Note, however, that Bennett claimed that the indexing hypothesis was ‘intended to apply more to news 
accounts of everyday events, crises, and policies than to “special coverage” of things like elections that may 
have a normative-ritual order of their own’ (1990: 107). 
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policy are less significant in immigration politics, ‘scrambling’ typical categories of left and 
right (Benson 2013: 7). Benson argues of the American context that the ‘pro-immigration 
side’ includes ‘left progressives’, ‘civil libertarians’ and ‘laissez-faire capitalists’, while the 
‘anti-immigration side’ includes certain ’labour unions and African American groups’, in 
addition to ‘various tribes of conservatives, sometimes (but not always) overlapping, 
concerned with balanced budgets...cultural unity...or law and order’ (ibid.). For example 
the op-ed pages of the New York Times are frequently in alignment with the views of left 
wing Democrats and agricultural interests in favouring increased immigration (Schuck 
2011: 77), despite ideological differences in other areas. As for the UK context, it has also 
been observed that journalists tend to quote and treat more favourably sources in 
immigration news with which the newspaper’s editorial line accords (van Dijk 1991: 175; 
Balch and Balabanova 2011: 901). In recent years this has meant that broadly 
authoritarian, ‘anti-immigration’ newspapers have often turned to think-tanks such as 
MigrationWatch (which ‘sees immigration as a source of chaos’, imploring the 
government to ‘impose draconian measures’) for ‘expert’ opinion, while broadly 
cosmopolitan, ‘pro-immigration’ newspapers have instead tended to source ‘large 
employers’ for their views in the same debates, whose rationale for less restrictive 
immigration may not overlap with the newspaper’s but whose general desired ends do 
(Balch and Balabanova 2011: 901).  
When it comes to the voluntary organisations involved in immigration politics, such as 
NGOs and charitable bodies, as well other such pressure groups some of which have 
developed a more media-centric and PR-oriented approach over time (Schlesinger and 
Tumber 1994, ch. 3), those which are most able to fund ‘information subsidies’ such as 
press releases and publicity events (Gandy 1982 in Deacon 1996: 191-192) are most likely 
to secure privileged media access (Deacon 1996: 191). Even without large economic 
resources pressure groups can ‘make use of their human resources and apply strategies 
that integrate well with journalistic routines’ and hence disrupt the ordinary victories of 
‘official’ sources (Davis 2000: 55). However, organisations (e.g. trade unions) whose 
affiliations place them ‘in opposition to the dominant value system’ and/or which are 
‘intrinsically controversial or unpopular’, as well as those seen as ‘advocates’ rather than 
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‘arbiters’, are likely to find that journalists source them less readily (Deacon 1996: 179, 
192). 
The role of journalism 
The terms ‘representation’ and ‘mediation’ each contain more than one meaning. The 
news represents and mediates the issue of immigration and electoral politics in 
important ways in regards to both.  
In the first sense of both terms – depiction – the news provides information to citizens 
about social phenomena beyond the experiences of their everyday lives (van Dijk 2012: 
27, Hall et al. 1978: 56, Hartmann and Husband 1974). During election campaigns, news 
audiences (including those who govern) come to be informed about the various social 
and political facets of issues such as immigration – about the impact it may have on the 
lives of the citizenry as well as those of other people, including would-be immigrants – 
and as citizens (and governments) (re)act accordingly. This may be with regards to which 
aspects of immigration they think about (i.e. agenda setting), how they think about them 
(in terms of the ‘scripts’ and narratives that they understand ‘immigration’ by), or what 
they think about them (in terms of their attitudes towards immigration issues). According 
to liberal democratic conceptions of the role of the press, citizens require an adequate 
informational ‘diet’, comprising relevant details and scrutiny of their prospective 
representatives’ plans and record as well as recognition of a range of views and interests, 
in order to be able to make informed civic choices (Street 2001: 253). This entails the 
avoidance of bias which, though an elusive concept, for news content constitutes the 
avoidance of misrepresentation (e.g. of people’s views, values or cultural affiliations) and 
misinformation (e.g. about society or a set of political options), both of which present 
fundamental dangers to the functional participation and cognizant judgement of citizens 
(ibid.: 257).  
The behaviours that the available ‘diet’ of information might influence are myriad. 
Crucially for some newspaper readers, however, such behaviours could include actions 
with respect to their vote at the ballot box on polling day or (importantly in the case of 
politicians) in their position on immigration policy. Meanwhile, politicians have an 
incentive to appeal to potential voters through the mass media in order to persuade the 
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electorate that they are fit to govern and to communicate their policies effectively. 
Hopeful of visibility and favourable coverage, the judicious politician might feel obliged to 
adapt the presentation of their message in order to fit the demands of news production.  
If this perspective prescribes news organisations with a crucial democratic responsibility 
(in particular when approaching elections), in the second sense of their definitions these 
terms are a reminder of the related, social consequences of the press coverage of 
immigration.  
The second sense of the term ‘representation’ means to ‘stand for’ or ‘speak for’ 
somebody else, such as governments claim to on behalf of the nation or people (Billig 
1995: 98). Since the end of the nineteenth century and the developments characterised 
as the ‘New Journalism’, the British press has claimed a role in this sense as the ‘Fourth 
Estate’ and a champion of the people, defined by Mark Hampton as a ‘representative 
ideal’ (2004). Previously, the ‘educational ideal’, an ideal consonant with the notion of a 
public sphere, politics-by-public-discussion norm, had been the ascendant and enduring 
‘idiom’ used to define the expected role of the press. From the establishment of the 
‘representative ideal’, however, the expectation that the press should educate the 
masses and influence public opinion receded and was supplanted by one in which public 
opinion would be channelled through the press and conveyed to elites. This was driven, 
according to Hampton, by straightforward commercial imperatives more than a genuinely 
democratic awakening on the part of proprietors and editors. The expedience of this 
elision between the democratic representation of readers and the consumerist grounds 
upon which such representation is based should, therefore, be taken into consideration 
when assessing the authenticity of the press’ ability to speak for the public at large. 
Although the educational ideal has occasionally since been invoked (e.g. in the BBC’s 
mantra to ‘inform, educate and entertain’), the tabloid press in particular continue to 
claim representative status in the national political debate. 
The news media have, however, also been associated with other normative roles. One 
such role assigns a ‘social responsibility’ function to journalists (Siebert et al. 1956), a 
theory most associated with the journalistic ideal of ‘objectivity’ and claims of fact, 
balance and neutrality (Benson 2008). Objectivity is a professional norm so powerful, in 
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fact, to common understandings of good journalism that many journalists claim to 
navigate certain procedures in a ‘strategic ritual’ which allow them to safeguard the 
appropriate objective values against accusations of wilful or inadvertent bias (Tuchman 
1972). 
Even if not strictly a normative ideal, the role of the media is often seen as crucial in 
cultivating positive (or negative) relations between ethnic groups, due in large part to 
their role (discussed above) in depicting immigration to audiences who do not necessarily 
have direct, routine experience of immigration or contact with immigrants. This brings us 
to the second sense of the term ‘mediating’. The news (can) provide an ‘important 
mechanism in constructing and mediating relations between host and immigrant 
minorities’ (Gemi et al. 2013: 271). Since the news is largely controlled by and oriented 
towards an in-group likely to be affected by the consequences of immigration in a 
particular way, this is a delicate responsibility; the fostering of social cohesion is at stake. 
This responsibility provides an intrinsic tension. On the one hand, the mass media are 
perhaps morally (and in some respects legally) responsible for the social consequences of 
what they publish, but on the other, if a ‘free’ press is considered desirable then the press 
must be guaranteed the licence to publish provocative opinion and debate.  
Normative theories of journalism are various and often deployed in composite 
formulations, emphasising specific ideals more or less (Benson 2008: 2592). They are also 
in many respects artificial and interpretative constructs, rather than something 
journalists contemplate anew in every move they make (journalists being far more likely 
to routinize certain behaviours, as with the ‘strategic ritual of objectivity’, to satisfy 
expected norms). Nevertheless, normative theories have been invoked historically by 
media owners, journalists, politicians and commentators to describe not only an ideal of 
journalism, but on many occasions to describe the apparently existing journalism of the 
day (see Hampton 2004).  
The press can therefore variously be seen to possess informational, representative 
and/or potentially mediating functions in how they cover immigration issues at election 
time. The outcomes which may follow from each of these functions are of integral 
importance if the basic tenets of liberal democracy are to be supported and ultimately 
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sustained. On this set of assumptions there is, therefore, an empirical case to answer 
about whether and how the national press has, in regards to immigration coverage, 
fulfilled the normative democratic functions associated with the status its advocates 
claim for it.  
A national press 
Newspapers not only transmit information, they also ‘bring readers together as part of a 
community’ (Williams 2010: 10, citing Carey 1989, ch. 1) through ‘rituals’ which highlight 
the things newspaper audiences have in common rather than those they don’t. With the 
decline of the Radical press in the 19th century and the growing influence of the London-
based press (Williams 2010: 6-7; Conboy 2004: ch. 5), the national character of the press 
has increasingly corresponded with an orientation towards national concerns (Harris 
1996: 51 in Conboy 2004: 1; Seymour-Ure 1991: 16-21). Despite the elitist and 
commercially expedient nature of this focus on the nation (constructed, increasingly, by 
‘global communications conglomerates’ whose primary allegiances are to power and 
profit), it must be narrated in terms which find resonance with a popular audience 
(Conboy 2006, ch. 3). 
Anderson has argued that the rise of ‘print capitalism’, which introduced mass-produced 
books and newspapers to the populace, played a large part in constructing the image of 
‘the nation state’ in the minds of its inhabitants during its formative stages (1991/1983). 
With this, the national newspaper reader grew to know that ‘the ceremony he [sic] 
performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose 
existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion’ (ibid.: 35). 
The reader knows this because he or she will see exact replicas of their own newspaper 
of choice in various places familiar to them and ‘is continually reassured that the 
imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life’ (ibid.: 35-36). 
Readers need not look further than the contents of the newspaper itself in order to 
‘imagine’ the nation, however. As Billig (1995: 118) notes, the separation of international 
news and ‘home’ news (a separation he calls ‘news apartheid’) helps to recurrently 
inscribe the centrality of the nation as something of major social importance through the 
structural organisation of the newspaper. This ‘banal’ form of nationalism, in contrast 
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with the more recognisable ‘hot’ nationalisms of separatists and fascists, elides the 
ideological contentiousness of the nation as a way to imagine and organise social 
communities politically (i.e. it makes ‘common sense’ of the nation).  
Newspaper readers are even encouraged to ‘imagine’ the nation and accept its unique 
importance through the subtleties of the language and rhetoric of the news. As De Cillia 
et al. (1999: 165) suggest, metonymy, synecdoche and personification can be used to 
construct discursively unity or division, and thus to construct what it means to be a 
member of the nation. Examples include the ‘particularizing synecdoche’ (pars pro toto) 
such as with ‘the foreigner’ or ‘the Brit’ to generalise and essentialise characteristics to 
whole groups or the ‘generalizing synecdoche’ (totum pro parte) such as with ‘Britain’ to 
personify the nation and represent the actions of some individual(s) (e.g. elite politicians) 
as though they were the consensual actions of the nation’s inhabitants (ibid.).  Focusing 
on deixis and pronouns, Billig reveals that not only are words such as ‘here’, ‘we’, ‘our’ 
(not to mention their opposites) regularly deployed across the British press (particularly 
in editorialised content) in ways which assume that ‘here’ will be interpreted as meaning 
‘Britain’ and ‘we’ as ‘us Britons’ (1995: 114-115), but that the use of the definite article 
(as in ‘the Prime Minister’ or ‘the country’) presupposes that the subsequent noun could 
only be referring to the British version unless otherwise stated (ibid.: 116).  
The implications of the nation-centric outlook of the news for immigration reporting are, I 
would argue, highly significant. As Pickering has suggested,  
‘nationalism has profoundly shaped our sense of belonging and 
the symbolic boundaries constructed around it. Nations of course 
have literal boundaries, where we have to show our passports and 
maybe a visa if we want to cross over them...But these literal 
boundaries do not in themselves define our different identities for 
us; they only inform our different identities once they have 
become symbolically defined. Symbolic boundaries are ways of 
demarcating what is perceived to be different from ‘us’, in our 
relative sameness and so of heightening ‘our’ sense of this 
sameness by providing a place for ‘our’ identity’ (2001: 83).  
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Hence, while the ‘nation-building’ or ‘anthropological’ narrative of media history is one 
which suggests that a major consequence of the media’s output has been ‘greater social 
inclusion’ and the (eventual) recognition of Britain as a multi-ethnic community (see 
Curran 2002: 26-33), and while expressions of nationalism may have recently shifted from 
a strident ‘ethnic nationalism’ to a more cosmopolitan ‘civic nationalism’ (Billig et al. 
2005), it cannot be denied that with inclusion (despite its expanding contours) comes 
exclusion. As Hall et al. (1978: 55-56) claim, news relies on the assumption (and forging) 
of consensus – whether because news audiences share the same language or, more 
problematically, when they are claimed to share the same interests and values 
(reconcilable, at least, in a ‘broader basic framework of agreement’) despite possessing 
fundamentally conflicting class or group interests.  
Maintaining this consensus necessarily relies on the identification and marginalisation or 
condemnation of difference and deviance. According to Hallin (1986) in his study of 
television news coverage of the Vietnam War, there are three ‘spheres’ at work in news 
debates, which categorise the legitimacy of various perspectives. His model includes the 
‘sphere of legitimate controversy’, the ‘sphere of deviance’ and the ‘sphere of consensus’ 
(1986: 117), which he claimed could alter in size under conditions of elite political 
dissensus. Journalists, in employing the model to categorise some points of view as more 
legitimate than others, therefore claim different duties of ‘objectivity’ with regard to the 
ideas of each sphere. For example, he labelled the sphere of legitimate controversy the 
‘province of objectivity’, being the ‘region of electoral contests and legislative debates’ 
(ibid.: 116) and other areas of contention for which journalists feel obliged to present a 
‘balanced’ outline of the views of both or multiple ‘sides’. In contrast, the sphere of 
consensus is ‘the region of “motherhood and apple pie”’, containing views so 
uncontroversial to journalists that they are even compelled to advocate or celebrate 
them (ibid.: 116-117), while the sphere of deviance contains ‘views which 
journalists...reject as unworthy of being heard’ in which journalism ‘plays the role of 
exposing, condemning or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or 
challenge the political consensus’ (ibid.: 117). As the following two chapters will illustrate, 
elite and public opinion on immigration politics since the introduction of immigration 
control have essentially centred on a debate about the limits and effects of such control, 
36 
 
rather than their absolute legitimacy, which for many is a taken-for-granted assumption 
of national sovereignty. This (though by no means comprehensively) provides some idea 
of the perspectives available in the spheres of consensus and legitimate debate in 
immigration debates and their elasticity.  
As for the remaining sphere, multiple deviants or deviant views have variously been the 
targets of press attention or marginalisation, which help to reinstate the boundaries of 
the other spheres as a result. For example, Hall et al. (1978) documented the complicity 
of the press in the construction of a moral panic around ‘mugging’ in the 1970s, which 
was overwhelmingly cast as the crime of young black men and which articulated the elite 
response to a ‘crisis of hegemony’ that had arisen in Britain since the 1950s. More 
recently, in the introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Stanley 
Cohen identifies refugees and asylum seekers as one of several ‘objects’ of contemporary 
British moral panics (2011: xxii-xxvi; see also Banks 2012; Philo et al. 2013; Bailey and 
Harindranath 2005; Buchanan et al. 2003; Mollard 2001; Matthews and Brown 2012; 
Kaye 1998, 2001). Two consequences of the representation of asylum seeking as a crisis 
came with the delegitimization of the notion of asylum and the augmenting of the term 
‘asylum seeker’ to effectively become a ‘racist epithet’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Pickering 2001: 203, Schuster 2003a: 244), without necessarily affronting social norms 
regarding racist expression (Greenslade 2005: 8). Yet another contemporary example can 
be found in the coverage of Muslims and Islam in the press. Following the Gulf War and 
the events of 9/11, Islam has increasingly captured the attention of the press, while 
Muslims themselves have been treated as a homogenous group overwhelmingly 
associated with terrorism, political extremism, and religious or cultural difference and 
therefore as a ‘threat’ and a ‘problem’ (Moore, Mason and Lewis 2008; Richardson 2004, 
2009; Poole 2006; Nickels et al. 2012; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013). 
The key to the linguistic representation of deviancy and the demarcation of ‘us’ from 
‘them’ may lie in a set of strategies identified by Teun van Dijk, which he has termed the 
‘ideological square’. The ideological square comprises four main ‘moves’:  
1. Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us. 
2. Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them. 
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3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about 
Them. 
4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us 
(van Dijk 1998: 267). 
Van Dijk argues that these moves work at micro and macro dimensions of texts, from 
lexicon and syntactic structures to the pragmatic functions of a text (Richardson 2004: 
55). Perhaps the most obvious examples come in terms of syntactic structures and 
transitivity; studies of news output using critical linguistics methods have suggested that 
members of out-groups are often constructed at the sentence level as active in ‘bad’ 
actions while members of in-groups are often constructed as active in ‘good’ actions or 
‘de-agentialised’ where their actions could be construed as ‘bad’24 (e.g. Fowler 1991: 70-
79; Richardson 2007: 58-59). In maintaining a broad social consensus, therefore, the 
ideological square is an important device in constructing a Positive Self Presentation and 
a Negative Other Presentation (Richardson 2007: 51).  
When deviancy is not met with condemnation (i.e. ‘hypervisibility’25), it is likely to be met 
instead with marginalisation (i.e. ‘invisibility’). Some migrants are at a particular 
disadvantage in airing their opinions in the press, not only because they may lack social or 
economic capital in contrast with elite social actors (van Dijk 1996, 2000) and because 
journalists may see them as what Deacon and Golding refer to as ‘advocates’ rather than 
‘arbiters’ (1994) but, for those from non-English-speaking countries, because of a lack of 
language skills26 (Gemi et al. 2013: 277). Migrants may therefore have to rely indirectly 
and impersonally on representatives to make their case for them, such as NGOs and 
advocacy organisations, lawyers and politicians (van Dijk 1991: 154). Condemnation and 
marginalisation may even fruitfully combine to give an overall picture in which migrants 
                                                     
24 Consider, for instance, the examples provided by van Dijk (1988: 11): ‘Police kills demonstrator’ vs. 
‘Demonstrator killed by police’ vs. ‘Demonstrator killed’. These syntactic constructions, according to van 
Dijk, assign different levels of responsibility to the police. In the final example, the role of the police in the 
action would be unrecoverable. 
25 These terms are used in Moon and Rolison (1998: 129). 
26 The logic driving this is that if translators are required to locate those best-placed to remark upon the 
experiential aspects of immigration, then the costs in time and money to facilitate this inevitably leads to 
journalists eschewing such input. It is also possible that migrants may fear prejudicing the outcome of an 
ongoing legal case, or be suspicious of the consequences of speaking to the media (Buchanan et al. 2003: 
41), and therefore refrain from volunteering to speak to journalists for these reasons also.  
38 
 
are ‘mostly represented in the news as speechless actors involved in negative acts’ (ter 
Wal 2002: 428).  
A national consensus must also be built on a hegemonic narrative of the national past 
and its political outlook. The construction of this national past (the ‘collective political 
history’ of the nation) relies on the propagation of ‘myths of genesis and origin, mythical 
figures, political triumphs, times of flourishing and prosperity, decline, defeat and crisis’ 
(De Cillia et al. 1999: 158). Conboy, for example, shows how the anniversaries of certain 
nationally-significant events (e.g. D-Day) offer opportunities for the press to draw upon a 
particular and partial history to form a narrative of national heritage (2006, 2007a: 170-
172, 2007b). Nostalgia and myth-making therefore serve to confound the ordinarily 
ephemeral status of news to produce a populist history – to the marginalisation of 
counter-narratives. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, this narrative of the national past 
tends not to allow for acceptance of the historical role of immigration in the building of 
the nation (or of extant indigenous communities in the histories of settler nations) 
(Castles and Miller 2009: 79; Runnymede Trust 2000: 18). The cultural ‘amnesia’ (Hall 
1978: 25) which forgets the history and character of Empire may even provide for the 
creation of a victimhood which ‘presents the British themselves as the ultimate tragic 
victims of their extraordinary imperial successes’ (Gilroy 2004: 103) without the 
necessary back-story.  
Further, the national narrative is able to provide a link not only between the nation and 
issues of immigration, but also to ‘race’, in addition to other concerns of certain sections 
of the press. As Gilroy notes, the novelty of newer forms of racism ‘lies in the capacity to 
link discourses of patriotism, nationalism, xenophobia, Englishness, Britishness, militarism 
and gender difference into a complex system which gives ‘race’ its contemporary 
meaning’ (1987: 43). Specifically for (parts of) the press, this has emerged in the form of a 
‘populist outrage’ which has sought to suggest that perceived progressive political 
endeavours (e.g. anti-racist initiatives and an allegedly ‘open door’ immigration policy) 
were welcomed by a metropolitan ‘liberal elite’ caring little about their supposedly 
oppressing and ‘self-destructive’ effects on the rest of the population (Kundnani 2001: 
56; van Dijk 1992: 104; Hall et al. 1978: 164). The ‘imagined dangers’ associated with 
these developments included ‘political correctness’, Britain (especially England) as a ‘soft 
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touch’ (for example, in relation to asylum seekers or the judiciary), the erosion of ‘our 
way of life’ and Britain’s declining global influence (Kundnani 2001). Consonant with 
Gilroy’s observation, Kundnani argues that ‘these apparently disparate issues are stitched 
together into a single fabric of nationalist reaction’ that bears the legacy of Enoch 
Powell’s novel linkage of immigration, Unionism and European integration (for which he 
too blamed an elite minority government) (ibid.: 56). Much immigration coverage 
therefore (at least contemporarily) fits into a general ideological framework which is 
simultaneously coherent, complex, conspiratorial and combative. The focus and structure 
of this framework will differ between newspapers depending on the social, economic and 
cultural concerns of its assumed readership, but this nationalist reaction was common to 
much of the right-wing press during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Murray 1986, van 
Dijk 1991, Searle 1989, Conboy 2007a: 153-154, Gordon and Rosenberg 1989). 
The reporting of immigration 
The ‘imperial legacy’ 
If the patterns and policies of immigration have been determined in large part by Britain’s 
colonial legacy (and the related political solutions that emerged with the relinquishing of 
Empire) (see Chapter 3), then the dominant, racist representational patterns of colonised 
people which helped to legitimise Empire27 have reflected this, providing their own 
legacy in resultant discourses. It is therefore worth pausing to briefly consider the 
influence of racist ideology in its various forms on the news reporting of immigration 
issues. 
The contours and features of racism, as with many systems of thought, have evolved (and 
continue to evolve) over time, ‘resuming in news forms and configurations’ (Berkeley et 
al. 2005: 28) depending on political and social circumstances. For example, Hall claims 
that the ‘indigenous racism’ of the 1960s and 1970s was different in form and effect from 
the racism of the ‘high’ colonial period: ‘it is a racism at home, not abroad; it is the 
racism, not of a dominant but of a declining social formation’ (1978: 26). As the Guardian 
journalist Gary Younge (2014) recently and polemically observed, ‘racism is a hardy virus 
                                                     
27 Pickering (2001: 30) insists that racist ideologies came as a justificatory result of colonial expansion, 
rather than the other way around (‘as a means of laying down a foundation of values and beliefs that could 
then be used as a basis for constructing the imperialist edifice’).  
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that mutates to adapt to the body politic in which it is embedded. You can't wipe it out 
with a single shot because by the time you've dealt with the last strain, a new one has 
developed resistant to previous remedies’. Past racisms are thus ‘remediated’ (Titley 
2014), their ‘traces...still to be observed, reworked in many of the modern and up-dated 
images’ and built upon and facilitated by ‘a very ancient grammar’ (Hall 1990: 16, 
emphasis in original). This applies especially to the press: racist ideas live on in the 
‘cultural repertoire of present-day Britain, and form part of the perspective through 
which we view contemporary events’ (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 29). Therefore, 
despite developments in the acceptability and form of racist expression over time (and 
since Hartmann and Husband formed their conclusions) (see below), overtly racist 
representations of immigrants and other minorities may sometimes surface and erupt in 
new configurations in the pages of national newspapers long after they have been 
deemed to have been consigned to the past.  
For example, Gordon and Rosenberg (1989: 34-38) showed that the cartoons available in 
national newspapers when writing in the late 1980s ‘borrow freely from the racist 
imagery that was popularised in the heyday of the British Empire to justify its subjugation 
and exploitation of ‘natives’, and bring that imagery to bear on people’s perceptions of 
the issues affecting black people in Britain today’28. In news coverage from 1990, 
Brookes, in her analysis of coverage in the Guardian and Telegraph showed that, despite 
their editorial differences, they presented a ‘stereotypical, naturalized and dominant 
representation of Africa’29 (1995). The features of this discourse, such as a reliance on 
topics associated with chaos (e.g. civil war) and helplessness (e.g. Western loans 
described as ‘aid’)30, bear much in common with the prevailing assumptions of the 
pseudoscientific racism of the late 19th century, in which colonised people were claimed 
to be hopelessly reliant on European governance (the ‘white man’s burden’) (Curtis 1984: 
66). 
                                                     
28 See also Searle (1989), who came to similar conclusions based on the coverage (including cartoons) of 
events and people in and from Africa and Asia. 
29 In a comparison of texts from both newspapers, each juxtaposed the ‘normal’ (‘suit, tie and celebration’) 
with the ‘paranormal or macabre’ (‘juju and the smell of rotting corpses’) (Brookes 1995: 484), while the 
most archetypical metaphoric constructions in a number of headlines depicted Africa as a place of 
‘darkness’ (ibid.: 473-474). 
30 See also Fair (1993) for an analysis of the American press which reached similar conclusions regarding the 
reductive framing of Africa and Africans in news coverage. 
41 
 
The ‘New Racism’ 
Despite evidence for the lingering influence of past forms of explicit racism, following the 
horrors of the Holocaust, the entry by Western colonial powers into their ‘post-colonial 
phase’, the Civil Rights Movement in America and ‘changes in white liberal thinking’ 
during the latter half of the twentieth century, the overt and blunt forms of racism which 
had largely been previously deemed unproblematic in Western societies began to 
become far more ‘suspect’ and intolerable (van Dijk 1993a: 162, Cottle 2000a: 5). Van 
Dijk argues that these were surface-level changes which did little to ‘fundamentally affect 
the basic relations of ethnically based power’ (1993a: 162) while Cottle believes that 
positive, ‘multiculturalist’ portrayals of ethnic minorities now often come instead through 
a superficial focus on cultural festivals, individual successes and cultural exotica which 
serve to reinforce stereotypes and ignore ongoing disadvantage and inequality (2000a: 
11). Nevertheless, one important result of these changes came with the introduction of 
what has come to be termed the ‘norm against prejudice’ (Billig 1988: 95) – that is, a 
social norm against airing explicitly racist views.  
Since prejudice has become associated with irrationality, it is ‘important to present one’s 
views as reasonable, rational and thoughtfully arrived at’ (Augoustinos and Every 2007: 
127). The norm against prejudice therefore compels people (including journalists) who 
wish to make interpretably racist arguments to deny the possibility of racist meaning in 
their communication through a variety of strategies. Such strategies include (van Dijk 
1992, 1993b, 2012; see also Lynn and Lea 2003; Goodman 2010; Goodman and Burke 
2010; Augoustinos and Every 2007): 
• introducing arguments with phrases such as ‘I’m not racist but...’ (plus disclaimers 
and ‘transfer’ moves which claim that somebody else , such as a news source, is 
the responsible party for the belief in question31); 
• making counter-accusations about intolerant or exaggerated anti-racism (i.e. ‘the 
pretence of censorship’ [van Dijk 1992: 105]); 
                                                     
31 In news discourse, this strategy often finds voice in the ‘argument from genuine fears’ (a concept that 
can be related to the notion of the elite appeasing of an allegedly ‘racist public’), which must be appeased 
regardless of whether the object of ‘ordinary’ people’s fears is real, for their fears are genuine and 
therefore it is immaterial as to whether they have any basis in fact (Barker 1981: 14-16). It is therefore a 
specifically-advanced version of the argumentum ad populum argumentative fallacy. 
42 
 
• denying racist intention as an excuse;  
• euphemising or defining racism in narrow terms (or similarly by using scare quotes 
around the word ‘racism’ and using speech verbs such as ‘claim’ or ‘allege’ to 
attach doubt to accusations of racism); 
• redistributing (i.e. victim-blaming) or concealing agency for racist acts (e.g. 
through transitivity choices);  
• justifying the propagation of arguments on the grounds that they are simply 
reporting ‘the truth’ (the defence of some newspapers which ‘repeatedly and 
prominently publish reports about minority crime’, for example [ibid.: 92]); 
• and referring to moral and legal prohibitions on racist behaviour as signalling that 
racism as a ‘structural characteristic’ of society or the state no longer exists. 
Racism thereby becomes a ‘thing of the past’, the domain of the far-right or the 
socially deprived or something that happens ‘elsewhere’ (van Dijk 1992: 93, 
1993b: 182-183; Crawford 2011), which helps to consolidate a positive self-
presentation (van Dijk 1992: 103).  
Significantly, another related development postulated to have developed alongside the 
‘new racism’ has been termed ‘discursive deracialisation’ (Augoustinos and Every 2007: 
133-134). Within this phenomenon, the ‘category of nation’ rather than ‘race’ might be 
used to ‘sanitize and deracialise racist discourses’ (ibid.), but otherwise speakers may 
draw on economic issues and other seemingly ‘reasonable’ grounds to make what 
amount to racially-motivated arguments by proxy (Goodman and Burke 2011). The 
expression of racist belief has therefore assumed subtle and covert qualities (Teo 2000: 
8) in becoming reflexive and adaptable to contemporary social norms32.  
Despite prohibitions on explicit expressions of racism, Stuart Hall’s notion of ‘inferential 
racism’ helps to explain how racist assumptions may persist subtly, implicitly and 
unconsciously in discourse, and may therefore mean that inferential racism is ‘in many 
ways more insidious because it is largely invisible even to those who formulate the world 
in its terms’ (Hall 1990: 13). In contrast with ‘overt racism’, which comes in the form of 
                                                     
32 Indeed, even people who espouse fascist ideas recognise such norms, adapting their messages to allay 
the private ‘hardcore’ coterie while simultaneously concealing their true beliefs from prospective 
supporters in the public sphere, in what Richardson has termed a ‘Janus-faced’ propaganda technique 
(2011, see also Billig 1978). 
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recognisably and openly racist arguments, inferential racism occurs through the 
‘apparently naturalised representations of events and situations relating to race, whether 
‘factual’ or ‘fictional’ which have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a 
set of unquestioned assumptions’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Hall provides as an 
exemplar a hypothetical television programme concerning a ‘problem’ in ‘race relations’ 
which, despite the probably honourable intentions of the programme makers and the 
maintenance of ‘scrupulous balance and neutrality’ in questioning people for the 
programme, is ‘impregnated with unconscious racism’ because it is ‘predicated on the 
unstated and unrecognized assumption’ that black people are ‘the source of the problem’ 
(ibid., emphasis in original). Recurrent recourse in the press to debate concerning 
immigration control, ‘numbers’, the collocation of immigration and crime, problems of 
reception, public resentment, illegal entry, etc. (c.f. van Dijk 2000: 38), contend to subtly 
provide a link between ‘their’ presence and ‘our’ problems in a ‘sanitized’ but 
inferentially racist framework (Bailey and Harindranath 2005: 280), even if migrants or 
pro-immigration groups are provided with right of reply.  The concept of inferential 
racism therefore provides an explanation for how ordinary news routines (e.g. news 
values and the ‘strategic rituals’ of news objectivity [Tuchman 1972]) and apparent 
progress into a ‘post-racial’ phase may provide fertile conditions for the continued 
inscribing of negative associations with immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, even if 
this were not the intention of journalists. 
However, the emergence of the ‘new racism’ is not solely based on its subtle adaptation 
to social norms and political circumstances; it is also rooted in providing a response to the 
de-legitimation of earlier, pseudoscientific (i.e. biological) ideas about ‘race’ and the 
(therefore necessary) supplanting of such ideas with a focus on essentialised cultural 
difference and unsubstantiated socio-biological notions of ‘human nature’ as the 
justification for disassociation (Barker 1981).  In the ‘new racism’, a commitment to 
genetic hierarchy is ostensibly therefore not a necessary feature. For example, Barker 
makes reference to a televised interview between David Frost and Enoch Powell in 1969, 
in which Frost pressed Powell to admit a belief in racial hierarchies (1981: 40-41). Powell 
would not be drawn to do so; for him, immigration was supposedly a problem of ‘culture 
and assimilation’ rather than ‘race’, and (due apparently to reasons of fatalistic ‘human 
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nature’) ‘the people of England will not endure it’ (ibid.: 39). The ‘new racism’ is therefore 
strongly related to ‘differentialist’ or ‘ethnopluralist’ racism, which ‘tries to legitimise 
strict segregation and discrimination by claiming that multiculturalism threatens ‘cultural 
and ethnic purity’ and leads to ‘contamination’, ‘degeneration’, and ‘decline’’ (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001: 10). Despite the prima facie eschewing of hierarchy within these forms of 
racism, there is therefore an implicit ‘inferiorisation of the culture of the ‘others’’ (ibid.) 
intrinsic to concerns related to predictions of contamination, degeneration and decline, 
for these dramatic consequences would not logically follow if there were not33.  
A focus on essentialised ‘cultural difference’ also serves to naturalise social problems in a 
‘common sense’ framework of ‘how things are’ and ought to be, and therefore eradicates 
a need to consider how exclusion, disadvantage and discrimination are rooted in social 
structures and issues of social justice (Alexander, 2014: 1787; Cottle 2000a: 11). 
Disadvantage thus become an issue of personal responsibility and explained through 
discussion of ‘choices, practices, ‘ways of life’ and identities’ (Alexander, 2014: 1787), 
rather than explained as a failure of collective social responsibility or the responsibility of 
the state. 
The new racism thesis therefore helps to explain the subtleties of how immigrants and 
other ethnic minority groups may become stigmatised and othered in contemporary 
discourse in seemingly ‘acceptable’ ways. For instance, since exponents of the new 
racism/inferential racism avoid ‘explicitly racist labels’, ‘codewords’ which assign negative 
properties or actions to minority groups can be productively used to imply the problems 
associated with them34 (van Dijk 2000: 39).  
Even more recently, there has been an acknowledgement of a form of racism directed at 
people who are ostensibly ‘white’, such as asylum seekers and economic migrants from 
                                                     
33 For the same reason, contemporary concerns about the ‘imminent threat of Minority White 
Cities...associate a White majority with a superior value and a society that is more governable than a 
diverse one’, and therefore reveal their implicit racism (Finney and Simpson 2009: 143-146). 
34 The use of ‘codewords’ can be related to what has been called ‘dog whistle politics’ or ‘dog whistle 
journalism’ (Ward 2002: 28 in Bailey and Harindranath 2005: 276), i.e. ‘the discussion of policy issues in an 
outwardly reasonable language, but one using words and phrases that are calculated to carry a different 
message to the target audience’. An example of this can be found in the Conservative Party’s use of slogans 
during the 2005 election campaign which asked ‘Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking?’ and insisted ‘It’s 
not racist to impose limits on immigration’ thereby anticipating accusations of ‘playing the race card’ 
(Pitcher 2006) but inviting accusations of ‘dog whistle’ racism by their critics (Banks 2012: 297). 
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less wealthier nations (Fekete 2001). This was dubbed ‘xeno-racism’ by Ambalavaner 
Sivanandan, who described it as   
‘a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from 
the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the 
displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at 
western Europe’s doors, the Europe that helped to displace them 
in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-
coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore 
passed off as xenophobia, a ‘natural’ fear of strangers. But in the 
way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or 
expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the 
old racism. It is racism in substance, but ‘xeno’ in form’ (quoted in 
Fekete 2001: 23-24, my emphasis).  
Fox et al. (2012), in a study owing much to this concept, analysed the political and media 
response to Hungarian and Romanian migrants in the 2000s, concluding that such 
migrants were ‘racialized’ in the tabloids, driven by a ‘culturalist discourse as a basis of 
exclusion’ (ibid.: 685)35. From another angle, Bates (2010) identified the invocation of a 
‘white working class’ category in mediated discussions of the immigration issue in the 
2010 general election campaign, which helped to conflate ‘white’ with ‘British’ and 
‘exclude other Europeans from the ideal of “white” national belonging’ (ibid.: 16).  
However, it is not completely without historical precedent that white migrant groups 
have been subjected to prejudiced and ‘racialised’ representation. Pickering 
demonstrates the ways in which Irish stereotypes in the 19th century drew on extant, 
racist images of African people to disparage Irish people for their allegedly ‘disorderly, 
debased, backward, [and] inferior’ characteristics (in contrast with the opposite 
characteristics attributed to ‘Britishness’) particularly following the famine of the 1840s 
and the concomitant forced migration of large numbers of Irish immigrants to the UK 
                                                     
35 This was particularly prominent and negative in the case of Romanian migrants because, the authors 
argue, Romanians were already economically and socially marginalized (making it ‘easier to discursively 
marginalize them as well’) and because this fitted into an extant narrative about Romanian migrants which 
was originally shaped in the 1990s (Fox et al. 2012: 689-690). 
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(2001: 142-143, see also Curtis 1984). In a similar vein, some criticism of the concept of 
the new racism has centred on a contention as to whether the new racism is truly new; 
earlier pseudoscientific racisms ‘always included a reference to the cultural or national 
‘character’ and ‘uniqueness’’ (Rattansi 1994: 55 in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 9).  
Previous studies of the news coverage of ‘race’ and immigration 
Given the above discussion, it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the work on the 
representation of immigration in the news media can be found as a constituent of studies 
concerning first and foremost racism and discriminatory representations of (usually non-
white) people in the media, and in the press especially. The main reason for this can be 
related back to what was perceived and constructed as a crisis of ‘race’ in the mid-
twentieth century (see Hall 1978) and the corresponding politicisation of migration from 
non-white countries, especially from the countries of the New Commonwealth. Prior to 
the gang-led and racism-fuelled attacks of 1958 in Nottingham and Notting Hill (often 
referred to as ‘race riots’), parts of the press (e.g. the Daily Worker and the London 
Evening Standard) had in fact welcomed the ‘Windrushers’ in 1948 and subsequently 
ostensibly entered a period of ‘self-imposed censorship’ on the basis that such migrants 
had played their part in the Second World War, that negative coverage would be 
‘dangerous to racial harmony’ and in recognition of Britain’s labour demands36 (Ainley 
1998: 3-5, see also Greenslade 2005: 17-18). Little systematic work was done previously 
on the press coverage of immigration, though Sharf’s (1964) retrospective account 
concerning the coverage in the British press of Jewish people under Nazi rule registered 
the hostility with which parts of the press greeted Jewish refugees in the late 1930s and 
the use of zero-sum arguments which suggest that ‘our’ tolerance requires the 
curtailment of ‘their’ immigration, later recycled to similar effect in discussions of Kenyan 
Asian migrants in the late 1960s (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 184-186).  
The politicisation of migration during the first decades after the Second World War came 
as a result of non-white migrants becoming problematised on the basis of their number 
and – crucially (for numbers arguments alone ought logically to have provoked concern 
                                                     
36 According to Ainley, only the Guardian sustained a balanced view after the 1958 riots, giving ‘space to 
black immigrants to articulate their views of life in Britain’ and presenting ‘both sides of the conflict so 
readers could make a more informed judgement of the situation’ (1998: 5). 
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also for the arrival of white immigrants) – their alleged difference. This led researchers to 
consider the portrayal of immigrants and immigration through the lens of racism and 
ethnicism rather than through the lens of the political categories of immigrants, refugees, 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants or immigration as a social process (at least, until 
more recently). The reason for the focus on racism rather than ‘race’ was outlined by 
Hartmann and Husband, who asserted that the reason they chose to call their 1974 book 
‘Racism and the Mass Media’ rather than ‘Race and the Mass Media’ was only partly due 
to problems associated with the falsely reifying consequences of the concept of ‘race’. 
Centrally, it was because, in their view of the then-contemporary situation, ‘racism not 
race is the basis of the British ‘racial problem’’ (1974: 205, emphasis in original). The crux 
of this was that ‘coloured people [sic] have not on the whole been portrayed as an 
integral part of British society. Instead the press has continued to project an image of 
Britain as a white society in which the coloured population is seen as some kind of 
aberration, a problem, or just an oddity, rather than as ‘belonging’ to the society’ (ibid.: 
145, emphasis in original).  
The study from which Hartmann and Husband drew this overall conclusion featured a 
content analysis of the Times, the Guardian, the Daily Express, and the Daily Mirror on 
193 days (sampled systematically on every thirteenth day) between 1963 and 1970 to 
analyse the volume and topics of ‘race-related material’ in the British press (1974: 127-
146 and 273-274; see also Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974). Quantitatively, the four 
newspapers overall regularly published ‘race-related material’ at an average of 4.6 items 
per day in the British context (as opposed to the ‘overseas’ context, for which 5.8 items 
per day were published). Two-thirds of this came in the Times and Guardian alone (1.3 
items per day and 1.7 items per day on average respectively) (1974: 273). ‘Immigration’ 
and ‘Race Relations’ dominated the topics associated with this coverage (see ibid.: 274), 
leading Hartmann and Husband to conclude that ‘[r]ace in Britain was portrayed as being 
concerned mainly with immigration and the control of entry of coloured groups, 
discrimination and hostility between groups, with legislation, and with the politician, 
Enoch Powell’37 (ibid.: 144). Notably, they observed thematic similarities across the press, 
                                                     
37 Hartmann and Husband note that, from 1968, Enoch Powell’s influence on the frames of reference in the 
‘race-related’ debate meant that ‘the press found it difficult to mention the subject without bringing Powell 
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but only when press material was aggregated (Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974: 164). 
In other words, there may have usually only been a partial overlap in the types of subject 
matter covered by the press on most days, but this partial overlap on a daily basis 
aggregated to a high degree of uniformity in the topics covered over time38. Therefore, 
despite the substantial differences in ‘tone, style, political orientation and apparent 
intention’ between newspapers such as the Guardian and the Daily Express, ‘they agree 
fairly closely about what the issues are and, apparently, about what kind of thing is 
newsworthy and what is not’ (ibid.: 164-165, Hartmann and Husband 1974: 132-133). 
Further, despite also an overall similarity in the thematic focus of coverage over time 
(with a coefficient of concordance in overall press topics across the years sampled of 0.56 
[Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974: 134]), they did identify a general shift during the 
1960s from a focus on ‘the relation of coloured people [sic] to the major social resources 
of housing, education and employment...towards the hostility itself and its 
manifestations, including the concern to keep coloured people out of the country and the 
concern to regulate hostility, by the various laws and machinery set up to these ends’39 
(Hartmann and Husband 1974: 144). Thus, in their view, over the period sampled, 
‘anything about race and colour that could be discussed in terms of immigration, of 
numbers, of the relations between white and black–particularly hostility between the 
groups–or of discrimination has increasingly come to be regarded as more newsworthy 
than material that requires a different frame of reference’ (Hartmann, Husband and Clark 
1974: 138). Further, they observed an overall similarity between the topics present in the 
press and the subjects recalled by questionnaire respondents when asked what they 
could recall reading about ‘coloured people’ [sic] in the press (Hartmann and Husband 
1974: 146). Their work was complemented over time by further studies which also came 
                                                                                                                                                                
into it’ (1974: 145). Similarly, Seymour-Ure’s analysis found that Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech had a 
transformative – if temporary – influence on the news agenda and the coverage of immigration in 1968 
(1974: 106-109). 
38 Hartmann and Husband observed a coefficient of concordance of .86 in all (i.e. British and overseas) 
material and of .70 in the British material (1974: 132). 
39 In a critical discourse analysis of a piece published in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1990, van Leeuwen 
observes that ‘reactions’ to immigration were attributed to Australians, the Australian government and 
people ‘concerned about’ or ‘resentful of’ immigrants in other countries; ‘[t]he reactions of immigrants, on 
the other hand, are not represented. Immigrants only provoke reactions’ (1995: 88). This seems to accord, 
much later and textually manifested, with the shift in focus in the press identified by Hartmann and 
Husband which began to dwell on the epiphenomenon of the responses of non-immigrants to immigration 
as the immigrant population in the UK increased. 
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to the conclusion that press coverage had, overall, constructed migration and immigrants 
themselves as a ‘problem’ and ‘threat’ (e.g. Hall et al. 1978; Troyna 1981; Gordon and 
Rosenberg 1989; Searle 1989).  
One of the most influential contributors to the study of media representations of ‘race’ 
and immigration in more recent times is Teun van Dijk. In keeping with what the 
‘ideological square’ would predict (as outlined above), van Dijk argues that ‘ethnic’ news 
in general focuses on ‘only a few main topics, which on the whole can be summarised as 
problem news’ and that, therefore, much of the potential debate is discarded40 (2012: 
22-23, see also 1991). The main aspects of such news are identified as follows:  
• the construction of non-European immigration as a ‘major problem [for the 
receiving society than for newcomers except in rare circumstances], if not as an 
invasion then as a threat’;  
• problems of ‘reception, housing, employment, and integration’ [again, for ‘us’ 
rather than ‘them’];  
• ‘crime and violence’ (including ‘illegal’ immigration). 
• Finally, depending on certain political and social conditions, ‘the political debate 
on immigration’ including legislative measures and public statements from 
politicians41 (ibid.). 
His content analysis and discourse analysis of news coverage over two periods in the 
1980s found that, though immigration was more prominent in 1989 than 1985 (1991: 88), 
the headlines of ‘ethnic news’ generally were less negative in 1989 than 1985 (ibid.: 70). 
The sub-topics of immigration news in van Dijk’s analysis centred on ‘immigration 
policies, decisions of non-admission and expulsion, repatriation, family reunion, illegal 
entry and residence, and the treatment of immigrants’ (ibid.: 95). These topics, according 
                                                     
40 Topics absent from ‘ethnic’ news discourse, according to van Dijk, include: ‘the problem the Others have 
entering the country, finding housing and work, integration in a new social and cultural environment, or 
everyday experiences with more or less blatant racism, such as exclusion, marginalization, and 
problematization’ (2012: 24). 
41 This largely concurs with Law (2010: 193 in Gemi et al. 2011), who distinguishes ‘four limited topics’, 
including ‘debates on numbers’ (including the ‘uncontrolled’ numbers of ‘illegal’ immigrants), ‘(racialised) 
crime’ such as drug offences and prostitution (‘which from an individual negative example, is usually 
generalised and attributed to entire ethnic groups’), ‘cultural difference’ (linked to ‘social problems’), and 
‘ethnic relations’, which becomes ‘newsworthy’ only when it comes to ‘extreme forms of discrimination 
and racist violence’ (ibid.). 
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to van Dijk, are ‘largely set in a framework of negative associations, such as political rows, 
numbers, luxury immigrants, costs to the ‘ratepayer’, fraud, illegal residence, and 
‘strange’ customs. As in earlier decades, the topics of immigration focus on problems, if 
not on threats against white Britons. It is not surprising that although forced repatriation 
is not advocated, it remains a legitimate option. It is not surprising either that the racist 
nature of many immigration restrictions and laws, as well as the treatment of new 
immigrants by the authorities, are seldom topicalized’ (1991: 97). 
However, Statham (2002: 396) claims that accusations of the media’s inherent racism, 
causative role in the perpetuation of racist violence and promotion of popular racist 
beliefs upon which the ‘racist media thesis’ had become based overstate the case by 
focussing excessively on examples that demonstrated the depths but not the 
representativeness of racist coverage, and further that this perspective may have lost 
some validity over time. Instead, Statham argues that there have been modest 
improvements insofar as racist coverage is concerned overall. He claims that newspapers 
such as the Sun – highly criticised in previous analyses (e.g. Searle 1989) – had likely made 
improvements to its coverage over time given the convergence in its coverage with 
patterns found in much of the rest of the press (2002: 405), that the general election of 
1997 and its coverage did not feature a particularly politicised discussion about ‘race’ (see 
Law 2002) and that news coverage in general often denounces overt expressions of 
racism (Law 2002: 75) and acknowledges the contribution of ethnic minority groups to 
society (Statham 2002: 406-407). However, such improvements have crucially not 
extended as far as to the coverage of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, especially 
in the tabloid and right-wing sections of the press (Statham 2002: 407-408). Minorities 
who were previously part of the ‘out-group’ (e.g. Black and Asian people) are therefore 
now to an extent ‘included in the ‘we’ who are defined in opposition to ‘them’ the 
foreigners’ (ibid.: 409). 
Overall, particularly in the ‘liberal’ broadsheet press such as the Guardian, but 
occasionally in more conservative quality newspapers, such as the Times, immigration 
issues tend to be covered in more depth and with more ‘background’ information (van 
Dijk 1991: 247; Law 2002; Statham 2002: 401), reporting ‘more often about topics that 
are relevant for minorities’, quoting minority spokespersons more often, and occasionally 
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even publishing ‘non-establishment, anti-racist views’ (van Dijk 1991: 247). Statham, 
maintains that, at least more contemporarily, the press is split between the centre-left 
and broadsheet press, which ‘carry more pro- than anti- immigrant themes’ (such as the 
‘civil society issues of combating racist acts in the public domain’) (Statham 2002: 403, 
407-408), and the centre-right press, which focus heavily on immigration and asylum 
issues (in the case of the Daily Mail and Daily Express as a ‘campaigning’ issue) and ‘take 
up a strongly anti-immigrant stance’ (ibid.: 407). But, importantly, van Dijk provides the 
caveat that newspapers such as the Guardian may have limited reach beyond ‘liberal 
elites’ and are overshadowed in circulation by the tabloid press and other conservative 
quality newspapers. Further, he claims, even this ‘liberal’ end of the press merely 
‘represents the more ‘tolerant’ wing of the ethnic consensus’ rather than being 
‘mouthpieces of an explicitly anti-racist perspective’, that the major topics of press 
discourse across the spectrum remain similar and that ‘the views of white authorities and 
institutions dominate the news about ethnic affairs’ regardless of editorial policy towards 
immigration (1991: 247-248).  
Law – writing over a decade later – argued that overall surface-level improvements go 
‘hand in hand with a significant core group of news messages which foster racism, 
animosity and hatred’ (2002: 160). Coverage specifically concerning immigration was 
found to be ‘often characterised by sloppy journalism with little attention to the real 
costs and benefits of complex migration flows’ (ibid.: 161). Law concluded, therefore, 
that the ‘great anti-racist show’ characterising the changes since the 1980s ‘may also be 
seen as an outward, empty attempt of mere display masking continuing normative and 
progressive whiteness in news organisations, racial and ethnic inequalities of power and 
employment, and a collective failure to provide appropriate quality news services for 
black and minority ethnic communities and consumers’ (ibid.: 76).  
Irrespective of the debate over the extent to which the media has become more positive 
or more negative, immigration patterns undoubtedly altered during this time (see 
Chapter 4) and with them, so did the focus of the press. As Berkeley et al. observe, media 
attention has generally shifted from ‘non-white’ Commonwealth immigration to ‘the 
anxiety over asylum seekers and migration from the new member states of the European 
Union and elsewhere’, though emphasis is still placed primarily upon a framework of 
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immigration control (2005: 25). In regards to this very recent period, the RASIM research 
group at Lancaster University have utilised corpus linguistics and critical discourse 
analysis techniques in order to examine the discursive representation of refugees, asylum 
seekers and immigrants (hence RASIM) in over 175,000 news articles in the British press42 
(including over 100,000 articles in the broadsheet press, 50,000 in the tabloid press and 
24,000 in the regional press) between 1996 and 2005 (Baker 2007; Gabrielatos and Baker 
2008; Baker and McEnery 2005; KhosraviNik 2009, 2010a, 2010b).  Their analyses tracked 
an incline of 62% in the volume of news coverage about ‘RASIM’ within the decade period 
of study (Baker 2007), with sharp spikes and falls in coverage. This incline gained 
particular momentum from 1999 onwards, including in March of that year when they 
recorded over 3000 articles across the press due to the NATO invasion of Kosovo and an 
ensuing refugee crisis (KhosraviNik 2009: 482), having previously counted less than 1200 
in any single month from 1996. This figure was not surpassed again within the timeframe, 
but from 2001 onwards the number of articles per month ranged between 1300 and 
2800. Some of the spikes during this period included September 2001 (‘the 9/11 attacks, 
issues of asylum seekers in Britain, the Australian ‘boat people’ case’), May 2002 (‘the 
second round of the French presidential election – LePen versus Chirac, the schooling of 
asylum seekers’ children, the assassination of Pim Fortyun’), March 2004 (‘the Madrid 
bombing, the asylum bill, East European immigration checks, the expansion of the EU’) 
and May 2005 (the UK general election) (ibid.). Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 20-21) found 
that the vast majority (86%) of words collocated with ‘RASIM’ words in their corpus fell 
under eight categories: provenance/destination/transit (e.g. Iran, Lebanon, UK, France), 
number (e.g. flooding), entry (e.g. arrive, come, enter), economic problem (e.g. benefits, 
jobs, working), residence (e.g. camp, housed, settled), return/repatriation (e.g. back, 
refused, return), legality (e.g. bogus, illegal, caught) and plight (e.g. fear, forced, escape). 
Further, the authors also found a frequent conflation between refugees/asylum seekers 
and (im)migrants in their collocate analysis (ibid.: 26, see also Philo et al. 2013: 57-62, 95-
104).  
In his own analysis, KhosraviNik identified several ‘topoi’ within negative portrayals of 
RASIM, including the topos of numbers, the topos of economic burden, the topos of 
                                                     
42 This included 19 titles, only two of which were regional newspapers. 
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threat, the topos of danger and the topos of law (2010b: 17). However, different 
newspapers featured these topoi in varying ways: the Times ‘seems to generally refrain 
from drawing on a common negative topoi directly and tries to incorporate a more 
‘creative’ version of argumentation’, possibly only alluding to the existence of such 
arguments rather than exploring them fully, while the Mail ‘comfortably reproduces the 
existing...labels in society’ without such qualms (ibid.: 18). In this sense, ‘broadsheet 
negative representation of RASIM is productive’ whereas tabloid negative representation 
is ‘reproductive’ (ibid.). The ‘liberal’ newspapers (e.g. the Guardian and the Observer) 
utilise topoi of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘justice’, especially in cases of asylum seekers, but 
in consolidating an ‘us/them’ narrative, KhosraviNik argues that this shows them to be 
‘best described as victimisation rather than positive representation’ (ibid.: 18-19). In his 
report of the research, Baker claims that ‘it became apparent that even the liberal press 
was slowly subscribing to more exclusionary rhetoric’ as the coverage increased (2007: 
29). 
Overall, then, although some progress may have been made in curtailing the most 
egregiously discriminatory forms of representation regarding ethnic minority groups and 
immigration, ‘many features of the earlier period remain stubbornly in place. Immigration 
is still discussed in terms of numbers and problems, ‘black’ families are still pathologised 
and ‘Asians’ in general only considered worthy of media interest if they can be shown to 
be 'culturally backward', if they are victims of racism or, less frequently, if they have 
made good as hard working immigrants’ (Alibhai-Brown 1998: 116 in Statham 2002: 397-
398). As Gemi et al. (2013: 266) similarly suggest of European media discourses, ‘positive’ 
reporting ‘tends to be presented as the ‘‘exception to the rule’’ and reflects processes of 
cultural assimilation with migrant individuals portrayed as successful and socially 
integrated if their creativity and achievements can be framed within the dominant 
culture’. 
Illustrating continuity in representational patterns, one feature key to shaping the 
narrative of immigration discourses which seems to have endured and which can be 
found in numerous contexts lies in the use of metaphors within coverage of immigration. 
Thus, numerous accounts have demonstrated that the movement of migrants and 
refugees are, in various temporal and national contexts and through various media and 
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political discourses, pejoratively related through metaphor usage to disease, military 
invasion and war, natural disasters (including the movement of water), pollution, 
animals/insects and the trade and transportation of goods (Baker and McEnery 2005; 
Charteris-Black 2006; Burke 2002; McLaughlin 1999; Buchanan et al. 2003; Mollard 2001; 
Santa Ana 1999; Cisneros 2008; Rasinger 2010; O’Brien 2003). Such metaphors, it is 
argued, serve to homogenise and dehumanise their target groups. 
A full(er) typology of such metaphors is provided by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 60), who 
list the major and most frequent stereotypical metaphors in German and Austrian 
discourses about migrants and ethnic minorities as follows:  
• natural disasters: immigration/migrants as avalanches or flood disasters. 
• dragging/hauling: illegal immigration as dragging or hauling. 
• water: immigration/migrants as a water-course/current/flood that has to 
be ‘dammed’. 
• fire: alleged effects of immigration/conflicts between ‘racialised’, 
‘nationalised’ and ‘ethnicised’ groups as smoulding fire. 
• thermostatics: effects of immigration as pressure within the pot and 
conflicts between ‘racialised, ‘nationalised’ and ‘ethnicised’ groups’ as 
bubbling. 
• plants and fertile soil: migration and effects of migration as 
transplantation/repotting, uprooting, or (alleged) causing of social conflicts 
as seeding. 
• genetic material: cultural and social traditions and ‘heritage’ as genetic 
material. 
• growth/growing: increasing immigration and increasing conflicts as 
growing. 
• pollution and impurity: intergroup contacts, exchanges and relations as 
pollution and impurity. 
• melting: intergroup contacts, relations, exchanges and assimilation as 
melting [e.g. the ‘melting pot’]. 
• body: racialised, nationalised, ethnicised groups are metaphorically 
ascribed ‘collective (racial, national, ethnicity) bodies’; outgroups are 
metaphorised as ‘foreign bodies’ or alien elements. 
• blood: immigration as bleeding white or bloodletting of the imagined 
‘collective bodies’; intergroup relations as blood impurity. 
• disease/infection: immigration/migrants as an epidemic; intergroup 
contacts and relations as an infection. 
• animals/animal-owning: immigrants/minorities as parasites, as ‘attracted 
like the moths to a flame’, as herded together. 
• war/fight/military: immigration as military activity/invasion. 
• goods/commodities and exchange of goods: migration as import and 
export of workers/workforce; migrants as ‘freight’. 
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• food: ‘good/welcome immigrants/minorities’ versus ‘bad/unwelcome 
immigrants/minorities’ metaphorised as the wheat that has to be 
separated from the chaff. 
• vehicle/boat/ship: effects of immigration as overcrowded boat. 
• house/building/door/gateway/bolt: the ingroups’ (e.g. ‘national’) 
territory as a house or building; stopping immigration as bolting the door. 
 
The usage of metaphors such as these cannot simply be regarded as trivial details which 
embroider the reporting of migration issues; they provide ‘a central part of the way that 
the story is composed and is intended for interpretation’ (Conboy 2006: 101). For 
example, in the case of water (or ‘fluidity’) metaphors, a narrative can be structured 
(whether over time or within a single text) in which migrants ‘first trickle in, then turn 
into streams and at last flood a peaceful country’ (Pohl and Wodak 2012: 206). They 
therefore offer a hyperbolic and vivid frame of reference by which audiences may be able 
to make sense of immigration processes (c.f. the ‘unambiguity’ news value) but, in doing 
so, evacuate the personal and individual experiences of immigrants and refugees from 
the framework. At their most polemic, such as with water-based imagery, they mean that 
‘immigration restriction thus becomes a matter of life and death’; ‘we’ may drown if 
nothing is done (van Dijk 2012: 26). Likewise, ‘immigration as military activity/invasion’ 
metaphors also invoke a need for drastic measures, implicitly suggesting repatriation as a 
desirable political solution (CCCS 1982: 85) just as the residents of an occupied country 
might wish to violently reject invading militant forces.  
Summary 
This chapter has explored a number of issues pertinent to understanding the features of 
the press coverage of immigration and asylum coverage in the context of the journalistic 
structures, routines and ideologies which shape them. However, despite the undoubted 
contributions of decades of media analysis concerning continuities and developments in 
the coverage of ‘race’, racism and immigration – as identified in this chapter – they have 
neglected to provide a sufficiently long-term focus, either individually or aggregately. 
Individually, even the most ambitious studies usually analyse news coverage over periods 
of ten or fewer years, while, aggregately, very little is known about the news mediation of 
immigration prior to the second half of the twentieth century.  Further, despite the 
general cross-temporal contrasts and comparisons which can be drawn from related 
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studies between the 1970s and 2010s, such studies seldom facilitate precise ‘like-for-like’ 
comparisons; invariably they differ in terms of their length of study, the news media 
under analysis, their criteria of inclusion, their methodological approach, the stage of the 
political cycle at which the research is undertaken, or in the aspects of the collated data 
focused upon. Moreover, the representations identified as bearing the influence of the 
‘imperial legacy’ sit in an uneasy, though not irreconcilable, tension with the heralded 
changes of the ‘new racism’ (even acknowledging their apparently superficial functions). 
Therefore, as Ferguson noted in 1998 about this research area, ‘[w]hat has to be studied 
is the extent to which underlying media discourses have moved or changed over time’ 
(1998: 153). It was Ferguson’s contention, for example, that ‘we are indeed in a period of 
change, but that there is little evidence to suggest that it is more than a surface 
transition’ (ibid.). This study has been designed in a way which can help to contextualise 
and explore the validity of meta-narratives such as that implied by the ‘new racism’ thesis 
– along with the empirical results of relevant studies – in a much needed longer-term 
view. In addition, the methodological approach of the study has been adapted in 
recognition of the potential opacity and flexibility which have been theorised by neo-
racism theses to have increasingly pervaded discussions of ‘race’ and immigration over 
time.  
In light of the debates explored in this chapter, it is worth returning to consider 
comments made earlier on in the chapter regarding the role of journalism, both in 
regards to election campaigns and in regards to immigration news. By variously claiming 
for themselves functions of information and representation, with all that these entail for 
the relationships of the press with politics and society, newspapers contribute 
importantly to the electoral process. As was noted, newspapers both represent in the 
sense of depiction, and represent in the sense of claiming to speak for others. How the 
press has depicted immigration and immigrants, and publicised the views and interests of 
various social actors (including electors, candidates, immigrants and other interested 
parties) during general election campaigns are questions of vital and ongoing empirical 
concern. Despite scholarly reservations about how commercially expedient newspapers’ 
claims to represent the wider society are, such questions remain of integral value in 
57 
 
determining the available debate to the citizenry during critical junctures such as 
campaigns.  
Questions such as these rely on understanding the definitions of reality promoted by 
social actors ordinarily privileged in news discourse in order to determine the extent to 
which they are reflected in press coverage. The next chapter attends to this in presenting 
a historical background of the political and social context of immigration to the UK over 
time.  
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3: The Politics and History of Immigration: Legislation and 
Definitions 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored various and sustained criticisms of the press in their 
coverage of immigration, in addition to issues relating to the ‘homocentric’ and 
‘ethnocentric’ application of news values and the consequences of the nation-centric 
outlook of the daily national press on its output. These issues invite consideration for 
how the press’s coverage of immigration may promote a set of definitions, values and 
symbolic boundaries in regards to who belongs in ‘our’ society. However, these 
definitions, values and boundaries are not constructed in a vacuum, nor will they have 
necessarily emerged solely within the press. Exploring their political manifestations is a 
valid exercise in itself, since it establishes the political and social context within which 
press coverage was published. But this also helps to understand the underlying factors 
which shape common sense constructions of ‘our’ rights and responsibilities towards 
various groups of migrants, because the construction of these obligations and duties is 
inextricable from the political context from which they emerge and which they help to re-
shape.  
The following two chapters will consider various aspects of the politics of immigration to 
the UK since the beginning of the twentieth century. This comes firstly in terms of the 
governance, legislative history and definitions of immigration to the UK in this chapter 
and secondly in terms of the demographic history and public attitudes towards 
immigration in the next. These chapters therefore provide the required context against 
which the role of the press as an important mediator and participant in the politics of 
immigration can be assessed. To be sure, although the focus of this chapter is the 
legislative climate and part of the next is concerned with the ‘public debate’, the news 
media’s role in driving and shaping these environments has also to be appreciated. 
As Hay explains, the power of ‘media influence’ resides not in ‘direct ideological 
indoctrination’ but in the ability to ‘frame the discursive context within which political 
subjectivities are constituted, reinforced and reconstituted’ (1996: 261 in Lynn and Lea 
2003: 429). The press therefore has its own part to play in ‘approving’ (Lynn and Lea 
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2003: 429) the immigration of some categories of migrants over others and thus 
inherently of helping to establish the expectations which accompany migrants’ entry, 
membership and reception. Journalists thus wield considerable symbolic resources in re-
shaping the political debate in their own terms, even if they tend to index the elite 
mainstream debate (Bennett 1990) and are led to an extent by their sources (Gans 1980). 
This has allowed journalists to demand political action while simultaneously claiming to 
champion their readers’ own wishes. The post-1997 governing Labour Party, for instance, 
was routinely led in its presentation (if not its formulation) of immigration and asylum 
policy by the demands of a highly active and adversarial conservative press (Carvalho et 
al. 2015; Dean 2012). 
However, the question of whether in the case of immigration it is the news media which 
forces the political agenda versus whether it is the political agenda driving the media 
agenda43 may ultimately be beside the point. In the case of longer term cycles of spin, 
intrusion and cynicism, for example, Deacon points out that identifying cause and effect - 
and therefore original blame - fails to acknowledge that it is the competitive dynamics 
within as well as between media and political systems which fuel these processes (2004). 
In terms of immigration politics, for their part politicians recognise that they may in the 
short-term win 'points' for making bold promises in the press (Spencer 2011: 13), but the 
need within the Labour and Conservative Parties to usurp or fend off the prospects of 
their competitor's ownership of the immigration issue is undoubtedly a contributory 
trigger in their courtship of press attention. The news media, on the other hand, may well 
be led to sensationalise immigration politics if editors believe that this leads to increased 
or sustained circulation, above and beyond a serious and primary inclination to direct the 
substantive immigration policy debate. Overall, the situation may be better seen as one 
in which the immigration issue spirals in terms of attention and tone and in which the 
original responsibility of politicians or the media is difficult to extricate, rather than one in 
which we can assume that the 'political' or 'media' tap can be turned off to halt the flow 
of attention. 
                                                     
43 Jessika ter Wal (2002) concluded in an EU-wide survey of racism/cultural diversity in the media that the 
news agenda had up to that point followed the political agenda in regards to immigration in Britain. This 
dynamic has been observed in the influence of Powell on the media debate in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Seymour-Ure 1974, ch. 4), the transformation of the mediated asylum debate in the 1990s (see Kaye 1998, 
2001) and general election coverage in 1997 (Law 2002). 
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In light of these observations, this chapter begins with a discussion of the role of various 
social actors and structures who and which materially affect immigration processes 
through their institutional power, reflecting issues discussed in the previous chapter 
concerning who is able to symbolically define events in the news media and to consider 
the responsibilities their status entails.  Correspondingly, it is also necessary to outline 
how immigrants have historically and contemporarily been categorised in both a legal 
and scholarly sense, in order to provide the necessary ‘definitional’ background to 
immigration to the UK. From this, a typology of immigrants pertinent to the later analysis 
is provided, due to the important part that categories play in the politics of 
representation, and in order to help distinguish between the varying experiential features 
of immigration. This comes in recognition of the fact that migrants with varying degrees 
of freedom and who migrate for a variety of reasons ask different ethical duties of the 
receiving country.  
The Politics of Immigration: The State and its Responsibilities 
A state-centric political issue 
Immigration control policy helps to determine immigration patterns which, in turn, have 
a significantly influential impact on the demography, culture, economy and politics of a 
state (Meyers 2000: 1245). The power to determine the entry and membership criteria of 
the nation is therefore both legally and symbolically powerful. As Pickering suggests 
(2001: 83), the ‘literal boundaries’ of nations ‘do not in themselves define our different 
identities for us; they only inform our different identities once they have become 
symbolically defined’.  However, as he also points out, they determine if, where, and the 
terms upon which we have to account for our identity (by showing our passports, visas, 
work permits, etc) if we wish to gain entry to the national territory, since our rights to 
enter a country legitimately depend on entry criteria set by the powerful elites of the 
nation state. These criteria usually contain hierarchies of legal entitlements to enter 
borders (from automatic rights of entry based on native statehood to few or no rights 
based on a variety of exclusionary dimensions) as well as conditions on the entitlement to 
attain citizenship and exercise certain civic and social rights once resident within the 
nation.  
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Despite being a global and international phenomenon, migration is recognised as 
something that is administratively managed at the national level (in Clayton 2010: 39), 
rather than chiefly through international or global governance44. This is observable both 
in domestic statutory policy and in international law, and largely continues to be the case 
despite claims that state sovereignty has weakened more recently and therefore that the 
nation state ‘can no longer be properly regarded as the ultimate legal authority’45 
(Clayton 2010: 29-30, my emphasis). 
States have seized, in effect, a monopoly over the legitimate means of long-distance 
movement (Torpey 1998). The rationale for their monopoly is based on the notion of the 
state as a ‘political community’ bearing a right to self-determination (Fine 2013). 
Ethically, this perspective is concerned with citizens’ rights and freedoms to ‘disassociate’ 
(contra to the freedom to associate), ‘to decide which direction [political] institutions will 
pursue, and to decide who will make these sorts of decisions in the future’ by controlling 
the shape of the citizen body (ibid.: 258, 260). The sovereignty of the state has thereby 
widely come to be regarded as a ‘common sense’ and essential function, both legally and 
morally, of the state to establish its own ‘membership rules’  and exclude foreigners at its 
borders46 (Carens 1987: 251; Fine 2013: 254). Hence, immigration law and its definitions 
come in pursuit of the national interest, even in instances where that interest conflicts 
with the entry of ‘peaceful, needy foreigners’47 (Carens 1987: 251).  
                                                     
44 A critical result of this is that statutory immigration control only ever addresses the symptoms, rather 
than the root causes, of international migration (in Clayton 2010: 39; Castles 2004). 
45 On the one hand some scholars argue that state sovereignty has weakened in the face of international 
and domestic legal obligations (e.g. EU rules on freedom of movement, the 1951 UN Convention/1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Human Rights 
Act 1998, court rulings) (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 197) and globalisation (e.g. increasing irregular migration) 
(Sassen 1996). On the other hand, Statham and Geddes (2006) argue that states still reserve significant 
scope to control their borders and are restrictive. For instance, international human rights agreements are 
usually enacted on the basis of states opting in, with limited inducements to make their enactment or 
faithful implementation compulsory (Joppke 1998: 269). 
46 By way of example for how widespread this common sense view has become, consider that polling 
organisations tend not to ask the public ‘should the state control immigration or not?’ but ‘should 
immigration be reduced a lot, be reduced a little, stay the same, be increased a little, be increased a lot?’ 
with the agent of these various actions, the state, deleted and, therefore, assumed. 
47 This is the case even to the extent that states mostly bear the initial decision-making power to grant 
asylum or not – the only obligation of the state being to consider an asylum seeker’s case – not necessarily 
to admit them (Zolberg 2012: 1217). This constitutes the ‘partial’ (Gibney 2004) or ‘particularist’ (Schuster 
2003b) view of the state’s ideal role. This can be contrasted with the ‘impartial’ (Gibney 2004) or 
‘universalist’ (Schuster 2003b) view – which impels the state to observe utilitarianist outcomes for 
everyone affected by its actions rather than in its own interests (Schuster 2003b: 44; Carens 1987). 
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Statutory immigration policy has also become intertwined with, if not a facet of, broader 
social policy and population policy. The stated objectives of immigration control are 
usually concerned with maintaining public order, protecting labour and housing markets, 
preserving the welfare state (Vedsted-Hansen 1999) and promoting economic growth for 
a capitalist economy. In British immigration politics, some of these aims have been 
particularly prominent, for example in the consistent use of arguments claiming that 
‘good race relations’ rely on restrictive immigration controls48 (Layton-Henry 1994: 275-
276). Immigration controls are therefore ‘widely viewed as essential to protect the 
material prosperity and social fabric of the host society’ (Wray 2006: 305). As immigration 
to the UK has increased, particularly from the latter quarter of the twentieth century 
onwards, there has been significant, telling pressure on successive governments to, in the 
words of the Home Office, ‘reduce and keep new immigration to a small and inescapable 
minimum subject to the rights of dependents and the needs of the economy dealt with 
through the work permit system’ (in Coleman 1996: 195). Immigration policy is therefore 
derived from instrumental rationales (e.g. economic migration policy) in addition to 
moral rationales rooted in humanitarian rights (e.g. family reunification). Sometimes 
policy may constitute a hybrid of motivations, as, for example, with the so-called 
‘European Volunteer Workers’ of the mid-twentieth century, who had been ‘displaced’ by 
the events of the Second World War and were recruited into industries experiencing 
labour shortages from 1946 (Kay and Miles 1988). 
Importantly, state sovereignty is deemed legally and morally defensible only in the case 
of immigration, which Zolberg claims exposes the ‘striking asymmetry’ of the liberal 
world order (2012: 1217). While states are expected to set entry requirements, it is not 
considered permissible for them to control emigration or to set quotas or conditions for 
exit49. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), for example, 
introduced the notion of an unconditional entitlement to exit one’s country, but it did not 
                                                     
48 This argument may in fact have exacerbated social tension when employed in the 1960s in suggesting 
that the presence of the New Commonwealth immigrants already settled in the country was in some way 
problematic (Layton-Henry 1994: 275-276). 
49 The freedom to exit was mostly observed across the world in the twentieth century with the exception of 
some Communist nations, but see Carter et al. (1987) for an overview of how departments of 1950s UK 
governments may have breached the terms of Article 13 in pressuring colonial governments to delay or 
disrupt colonial subjects’ passage to the UK, as a form of immigration control (Hayter 2004: 47).  
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include one to enter another50 (Zolberg 2012: 1217). Furthermore, ‘everyone has the 
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state’ (UN 1948). 
In other words, it is only mobility from outside the borders of a nation to inside the 
borders of a nation that has become legitimately contestable and controllable on the part 
of the state. 
The ‘common sense’ view of state sovereignty in immigration issues has only translated 
into immigration control legislation and the widespread usage of passports relatively 
recently, however (Hayter 2004: 1) – close, in fact, to the start of the time period studied 
in this thesis. The first major and sustained piece of immigration control legislation in the 
UK came in 1905 with the Aliens Act, while passports became compulsory for Britons 
wishing to travel internationally with the introduction of the Defence of the Realm Act in 
1915 amid the heightened tensions of the First World War (O’Byrne 2001). It has since 
been observed that the introduction of the 1905 Act provided symbolically the 
‘irreparable breach in the principle of free movement which permitted all [immigration 
control] that came after’ (Wray 2006: 303). 
The previously liberal, laissez faire approach to immigration policy had ostensibly been 
maintained and motivated by two main causes. First, mass emigration to the colonies 
necessitated a replenishing of the labour force to meet the demands of the industrial 
revolution (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 52). Second, allowing the freedoms of the 
individual enabled the maintenance of a moral superiority driven by racial theories which 
placed North Europeans ‘at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of ‘races’’ (Schuster and Solomos 
1999: 53). Immigration control was therefore considered ‘irrelevant, unnecessary – a 
symbol of national decline’ (Foot 1965: 84). The strength of these factors was eroded 
when ‘British capitalism entered a period of decline, and economic crisis and high 
unemployment diminished the demand for labour’ (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 53). 
Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees arrived having escaped from pogroms 
in Russia and eastern Europe, and were met with hostility and proposals for legislation 
driven by fascist organisations (Hayter 2004: 21-22; Holmes 1988: 70; Cohen 2006: 27-
29). Particularly in the early years of state control, the case for restriction gained modest 
                                                     
50 ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his [sic] own, and to return to his country’ (UN 
1948).  
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support (Torpey 1998: 250), but helped by legislative expansions in 1914 and 1919 state 
sovereignty became deeply embedded within public expectations of state behaviour and 
now forms the core premise of mainstream political debate (Layton-Henry 1994: 273; 
Sales 2002: 471).  
Nevertheless, it remains the case that immigration restrictions necessarily rely on 
coercion51. As Joseph Carens succinctly puts it, ‘borders have guards and the guards have 
guns’ (1987: 251). Taking this into account, some scholars argue that the state’s exercise 
of territorial sovereignty is not only invalid, but actively harmful, with its resulting effects 
experienced on a widespread scale among the present or prospective immigrant 
population (Huemer 2010; Hayter 2004; Carens 2013, ch. 11). In this view, exclusion (and 
the way in which it is practiced) are both constitutive and generative of 
disempowerment, disenfranchisement and disadvantage, encompassing inter alia 
‘insecurity and harassment from state agencies,...deportation, detention without trial, 
family separation, shuttlecocking, interminable delays, and all the associated personal 
suffering and indignities, of which the ‘virginity tests’ revealed publicly in the Guardian (1 
February 1970) are only the most extreme’52 (Ben-Tovim and Gabriel 1982: 146).  
From territorial exclusion to social exclusion 
Beyond these grievances, for those able to become resident within the state, migrants 
are also subject to various other forms of social exclusion, including racist and 
discriminatory behaviour, which become manifest in their being generally under-
represented, underemployed, underpaid, under-rated and underprivileged (van Dijk 
1991: 32) through ‘routine or familiar practices in everyday situations’ (Essed 1991: 52). It 
would be fair to assume that this has largely remained the case in the longue durée. 
                                                     
51 This coercion may be realised in ‘active’ or ‘passive’ form. Active forms include the interception of 
refugees, the construction of physical barriers and deportation; passive or ‘pre-emptive’ forms include visa 
requirements, carrier sanctions and financial requirements for the sponsors of family ‘dependents’ (Stern 
2014: 27). The usage of passive forms may be more appealing to politicians and publics alike since they ‘act 
as deterrents rather than as experienced obstacles’ and it is therefore difficult to assess how many people 
they affect (ibid.). 
52 Since this claim was made we might add physical assault and deaths in the custody of immigration 
officials and contractors (Fekete 2011: 89), of which the Angolan asylum seeker Jimmy Mubenga’s in 2010 
is a notable and recent case. Mubenga died while being restrained by three G4S guards during an attempt 
to deport him at Heathrow airport. On a related note, notable incidences of migrant deaths either in transit 
or after arrival in recent years include the discovery of the bodies of 58 Chinese migrants in a lorry in Dover 
in 2000 and the deaths of 23 Chinese cockle-pickers who were working illegally at Morecambe Bay in 2004. 
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Indeed, Holmes claims in a discussion of British immigration history from 1871 to 1971 
that ‘even if opposition was not universally persistent, the cumulative evidence of 
expressions of hostility cannot be ignored. In considering the years from 1871 onwards, 
opposition surfaced at the level of ideas, whether in spoken or written form. It resulted 
sometimes in discrimination. It influenced outbreaks of collective violence. The weight of 
such evidence qualifies the widely-held view of Britain as a tolerant country’ (1991: 100). 
Accordingly, there is a wealth of evidence which shows the ways in which immigrants and 
ethnic minority groups in Britain have been subject to institutional discrimination and 
disadvantage. Taking employment as just one example, despite some variation in the 
labour market position of certain migrant groups (such that some groups of migrants 
tend to be employed and paid similarly to the ‘white British’ average contemporarily), 
(especially non-white) immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than the ‘native-
born’ population and tend to have a lower occupational status (Castles and Miller 2009: 
226-227; Dustmann and Fabbri 2005). This has led Castles and Miller to suggest that 
ethnic inequality has become a ‘long term feature of the labour market’ (2009: 227). A 
‘dividing line’ between white and non-white immigrants in the receipt of wages means 
that, while white immigrants tend to have higher wages than British born workers of the 
same skill group, all groups of non-white immigrants tend to have lower wages. Indeed 
some racialized groups (e.g. Bangladeshi workers) earn substantially less than their white 
British counterparts (Dustmann and Fabbri 2005: 458, see also National Equality Panel 
2010). Further, these disadvantages hold when factoring in variables such as educational 
attainment and skill (Richardson 2004: 30; Runnymede Trust 2000: 193, 197).  
This pattern has developed despite the introduction of legislation which has sought to 
eliminate institutional discrimination, for example in the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 
1968, 1976 and its 2000 Amendment Act, and the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010. 
Which political elites control policy? 
Since the legal and symbolic power to set the terms of national belonging are closely 
linked, it is important to consider how the entry and membership criteria of the nation 
defined legally may have a productive or reproductive relationship with the symbolic 
definition of national belonging in the national press. As discussed in the previous 
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chapter, the findings of decades of research suggest that it is elites who are often best 
positioned to shape the terms of media debate. It is also largely the same elites who 
shape the terms of entry and membership of the nation. The role of such elites will now 
be considered in more detail in regards to the UK context. 
Immigration touches upon a wide range of potential policy areas, so it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a number of governmental departments and committees are involved 
in the formation and implementation of immigration policy. This has in the past included 
departments as diverse as those concerned with employment, health, ‘colonial relations’, 
the treasury, education and even rural affairs (Spencer 2011: 19-20). These departments 
may promote competing interests when it comes to immigration policy53, but the 
dominant department in exercising the executive power of immigration control overall 
has been the Home Office (ibid.: Clayton 2010: 27).  
Accordingly, the Home Secretary has held a particularly prominent role in the 
administration of immigration policy. Below the Home Secretary in the executive 
hierarchy are members of the civil service, immigration officers and entry clearance 
officers (Clayton 2010: 27). The Home Secretary’s role comes most importantly in the 
exercise of discretionary powers, which allow for more variable and expansive 
interpretations of the law than would the application of specific rules (ibid.). This feature 
is recurrently found in immigration law and is central to many of the sustained criticisms 
aimed at such legislation (ibid.). Further, statutory law contains ‘none of the specific 
provisions which govern whether a person may gain entry to the UK or leave to remain’ 
which are, instead, contained within the Home Office-designed Immigration Rules (ibid.: 
31; Moore and Wallace 1975; Sachdeva 1993). The immigration rules are voluminous, 
frequently amended, govern nearly every immigration case (and have an impact on 
asylum cases) and crucially therefore ‘contain the practical substance of immigration law’ 
(Clayton 2010: 31). The rules are subject to very limited, or no, parliamentary scrutiny 
(Moore and Wallace 1975: 9; Clayton 2010: 32) and serve an ambiguous legal role, such 
                                                     
53 This can be seen, for example, in the formation of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. The Colonial 
Office wished to preserve positive relations with governments in former colonies, while the Treasury 
‘argued that there was no economic justification for restrictions on immigration’, but the Home Office 
strongly opposed further immigration ‘believing it likely to lead to unrest’ (Spencer 2011: 24, see also Smith 
1991).  
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that their misapplication is not necessarily contestable as a point of law (Bevan 1986: 13-
14). In addition, internal instructions guide civil servants in their (discretionary) 
application of the law in individual cases (Clayton 2010: 34-35; Bevan 1986: 14). This 
guidance has only relatively recently begun to be published online (Clayton 2010: 34). The 
volume, imprecision, secrecy and complexity of immigration law are problematic issues 
for the delivery of due process in the field of immigration in their own right54. But they 
also leave immigrants and the public alike with little accessible information upon which 
to guide their behaviour and perceptions of the immigration system, and are also 
therefore deleterious to the prospects of an open, accessible public debate. 
With the introduction and expansion of carriers’ liability and sanctions (dating back to the 
Aliens Act 190555), the externalisation of appeals to outside the UK (Sachdeva 1993: 25), 
and ‘internal controls’ (dating back to the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 but which have 
since accelerated56), the British state’s executive power and surveillance has extended 
outwards and inwards from the border. This has effectively placed the responsibilities of 
immigration control in the hands of airline, rail and shipping staff, lorry drivers, marriage 
registrars, employers, the police, healthworkers, local authority workers, voluntary sector 
workers and staff within educational institutions (Gordon 1985; Sachdeva 1993; Cohen 
2006, ch. 8; Sales 2007: 173-176). This is executed either through the imposition of 
penalties on such people if they fail to check the immigration status of those they come 
into contact with professionally or as an integrated part of their job responsibilities. 
Major effects of this include the exclusion of people deemed to have a questionable 
immigration status from social benefits (Clayton 2010: 14) and the denial of legal travel 
                                                     
54 See, for example, Sachdeva (1993), Moore and Wallace (1975), Smith and Marmo (2011), Souter (2011) 
and Jubany (2011) for discussions regarding the harmful effects which the exercise of discretionary power 
and a ‘culture of disbelief’ within state decision-making bodies have had on the application of immigration 
and asylum law and, ultimately, an often abusive and negligent reception for immigrants. 
55 The Act made shipping companies legally liable not only to a fine for the transport of passengers who 
arrived without leave to enter, but also to the recovery of costs within six months for the return journey  of 
any expelled migrant who had been brought on a company’s ship (Clayton 2010: 224). Carrier sanctions 
were significantly expanded following the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987, and have since been 
expanded to cover the arrival of immigrants without documentation by sea, plane, rail or car, even if they 
remain ‘undetected’ during transit (ibid.). 
56 The Act introduced a requirement for all aliens to register with and report to the police on a regular basis 
(including registering changes of address or occupation [Gordon 1985: 11]), a measure which was renewed 
annually until the introduction of the Immigration Act 1971 (Holmes 1988: 113). A more recent example 
came with the introduction of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which required employers to check 
the immigration status of prospective employees and which may have had discriminatory consequences as 
a result (Ryan 1997). 
68 
 
for refugees, who perhaps unsurprisingly are unable to obtain sufficient travel 
documentation from the authorities which persecute them57 (Hayter 2004: 75; Schuster 
and Solomos 1999: 60-61). Perhaps more subtly, however, whether in having to prove 
one's eligibility to work to a prospective employer or in showing one's passport to airline 
staff at the airport, immigration controls have become banal  (c.f. Billig 1995) – an 
ordinary and mundane part of daily life for many people, whether experienced as 
workers or as citizens. Further, the Home Office has begun to encourage and rely on 
information provided by members of the British public regarding individuals living in their 
community whom they suspect of being involved in irregular migration. Over 100,000 
allegations are received a year and the information is used to carry out raids on 
properties and places of work (Dzenovska 2014). For immigrants, this all means that ‘the 
border effectively follows them inside’ (Bosniak 2006: 2-4 in Spencer and Pobjoy 2011: 
13). 
It has been argued by some that the politics of immigration have opened up to external 
pressures, in the form of social actors who seek to shape policy in their own interests. For 
example, Sassen argues that the ‘numbers and kinds of political actors involved’ in 
immigration policy grew sharply in the latter stages of the 20th Century in the USA, 
Western Europe and Japan, and that although the policy process was never wholly 
confined to a ‘narrow governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction’, 
public opinion and political debate have become ‘part of the arena wherein immigration 
policy is shaped’ (Sassen 1996: 74).  
For example, Studlar (1974, 1980) has suggested that the restrictive policy which marked 
the immigration politics of the 1960s may have been due to the constraining influence of 
public opinion. In his view of the then-contemporary situation, ‘when public opinion is 
more evenly divided…there is much more freedom for political elites to act’ (1974: 376). 
Similarly, Dummett argues that the response of politicians has, since the politicisation of 
immigration in the 1960s, been characterised by an elitism which considers the ‘British 
masses’ to be racist and compellingly demanding of restrictionism (1973: 244). With the 
                                                     
57 Measures such as this ‘[contravene] the spirit, if not the letter, of Article 31 of the 1951 [UN] Convention 
[Relating to the Status of Refugees], which prohibits the imposition of penalties for unlawful entry’ 
(Schuster and Solomos 1999: 61). 
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addition of a weak-but-seemingly-threatening influence from far right, anti-immigration 
parties, politicians have been led to firmly believe that anti-immigration politics have the 
potential to mobilize the electorate (Layton-Henry 2004: 332). Nonetheless, at the 
parliamentary and executive level, it is political elites who ultimately continue to wield 
decisive authority in the formation of immigration policy (Statham and Geddes 2006). 
Due to a need to meet economic or labour market objectives, it has therefore been 
claimed (at least in regards to skilled migration) that politicians are ‘content to provide 
anti-immigration rhetoric while actually pursuing policies that lead to more immigration’ 
(Castles 2004: 214).  
Finally, in terms of the power of the courts to determine policy, there have been 
‘important British cases, where courts have rejected restrictionist immigration legislation 
introduced by a government’ (Statham and Geddes 2006: 255). Keyes remarks that, 
especially since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (but also to some extent 
prior to its introduction), British courts have had a ‘tradition of judicial activism in the 
development and interpretation of asylum law’ (2004: 411). The imposition of 
international human rights constraints by the courts on the executive in asylum policy has 
been described by Michael Tolley as a process of ‘juridification’, in which ‘a political 
system comes to rely more on law and courts than ordinary politics as a mode of 
governance’ (2012: 14). Despite criticisms from some quarters that this process is 
undemocratic, Tolley argues that it is in fact enabled by legislation (e.g. the Human Rights 
Act), and therefore by parliamentary approval (ibid.). Ironically, despite the apparent 
approval from parliament for the increased intervention of the courts in asylum policy, 
the process nevertheless generates tension between a restrictive political sphere and the 
judiciary, which is ‘visible and expansionist within limits’ (Statham and Geddes 2006: 
254). As a result governments have frequently introduced primary legislation in order to 
reverse higher court decisions and to reassert their direct executive dominance in the 
immigration field (Clayton 2010: 15). The recurrence of this influence (enabled by the 
absence of a bill of rights in the UK) leaves the British courts relatively inert and reactive 
in the long-term direction of policy and means that sovereignty lies overwhelmingly with 
parliament (especially the executive), leaving minorities ‘extremely vulnerable to the 
whims of the majority’ (Joppke 1998: 288-289).  
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The responsibilities of the receiving country 
The notion that the state has the right to exclude outsiders provides a prism through 
which the related and encompassing issues pertaining to immigration are viewed. If 
immigration control is ‘common sense’, then press debate is left to focus on secondary 
issues: what selection criteria may be employed, who ought to be subject to control, 
what are ‘our’ duties to immigrants, which of the consequences of immigration are 
significant, how should ‘we’ deal with these consequences and what may ‘we’ demand of 
immigrants (see Fine 2013: 255). Some of these issues thereby invoke both ‘our’ rights as 
well as ‘our’ responsibilities and, correspondingly those of immigrants. 
For immigrants, numerous rights are affected in the course of a state exercising its 
sovereignty in immigration matters, including rights to life, to move, to a home and 
protection, to justice and due process, to non-discrimination, to marry and to family life, 
to work, to liberty, to full political and civil status and to privacy (Bevan 1986: 3-4). 
However, in migration debates, these rights are often presented as if depending 
necessarily on the honouring also of set of responsibilities on the part of a migrant. The 
construction of a ‘social contract’ of immigration is, for example, evident in debates 
surrounding multiculturalism, integration and assimilation, and is based on the notion 
that to migrate is to implicitly accept the values and customs prevalent within the 
receiving society in exchange for the opportunities associated with migration (Rose et al. 
1969: 662). Citizenship policies have been enacted (e.g. in the 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act) which have compelled migrants to demonstrate their 
language skills and knowledge of British culture in order to prove that they ‘deserve’ 
citizen status58. Citizenship is thus depicted as something to be earned (Clayton 2010: 
26), rather than simply awarded upon application. Indeed, the 2009 Borders, Citizenship 
and Immigration Act introduced the possibility of being awarded ‘points’ for performing 
certain civic duties which could reduce the time taken to acquire citizenship. 
Further, the existence of a variety of different types of immigration, and therefore 
immigrant, mean that there is a range of issues to which the state must attend in the kind 
                                                     
58 This echoes the demands placed upon immigrants with the introduction of the British Nationality and 
Status of Aliens Act 1914, which meant that those seeking naturalization had to convince the Secretary of 
State of their ‘good character’ and ‘adequate knowledge of the English language’, also taking an oath of 
allegiance (Panayi 2010: 211). 
71 
 
of political solutions it pursues. For those they admit, issues of citizenship and therefore 
of civic and political rights are of great importance if immigrants are to aspire to 
participate in society on parity with other residents. Some argue that states also have 
duties in some respects to those they refuse to admit and even to those present without 
authorisation (Fine 2013: 255). To further complicate matters, it might be argued that 
states bear special responsibilities to certain categories of migrant, including refugees, 
people from their former colonies, family members of citizens and residents, long-term 
irregular migrants and/or prospective immigrants from poor countries (ibid.). How these 
issues have been addressed in the UK legislatively is the focus of the next section. 
Defining migration 
Competing definitions 
As the previous section illustrated, immigration policy matters, both in the sense that it 
legally awards or denies freedoms to prospective migrants and therefore shapes the size 
and character of migratory movements, and in the sense that it empowers political elites 
symbolically in the politics of immigration. This section will consider how these issues 
converge within cultural understandings and categorisations of immigration and 
immigrants.  
A first point to note is that immigration legislation has invariably been produced 
reactively, rather than pro-actively, in response to problems postulated to be associated 
with various migratory patterns and therefore migrant groups (Bevan 1986: 22-23; 
Sachdeva 1993: 13). Even for legislation produced in general terms, concerns about 
immigrants in several respects are evident in the consistent embedding of these 
assumptions in statutory provisions. For example, assumptions that migrants may 
represent an inordinate threat to public funds, the health of others, or as criminals are 
reflected in current requirements for all categories of entrant to convince immigration 
officials that they will not be reliant on public funds, to possibly undergo medical 
examination and to accept that serious criminal activity may give grounds for deportation 
(Clayton 2010: 8). Legislation itself thereby appears to give legitimacy to rarely 
substantiated concerns (ibid.; Sales 2007: 132-133) which circulate in parliamentary or 
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extra-parliamentary debate prior to the passing of legislation about the inordinate 
threats presented to the country by prospective immigrants. 
Policy also helps to construct the political categories associated with immigration, across 
dimensions of legality, permanence and corresponding rights (Cornelius and Rosenblum 
2005: 112; Kivisto and Faist 2010: 50). Policy decisions and the categories and definitions 
they produce are therefore important for the way they structure the conditions of 
migration. For example, migrants denied legal status (i.e. irregular migrants) are 
inevitably unable to exercise rights in relation to employment, health care or home 
ownership and may therefore consequently suffer certain hardships in relation to this 
(ibid.). In establishing names for legal categories which correspond strongly with certain 
migration experiences, the definitions created by policy are likely to resonate more 
widely due to their explanatory appeal.  
The power of political elites to determine the terms and bounds of the public debate 
concerning immigration is not necessarily hegemonic, however. The previous section, for 
example, outlined the uncertainties of immigration law and the immigration process. 
Certainly, as will be discussed in further depth in the next chapter, the public do not 
always view immigration in the same framework as the government, to the extent that 
the public’s ‘imagined immigration’ can be contrasted with ‘statistical immigration’ 
(Blinder 2013). Ultimately this might be one reason ‘why states may find themselves 
unable to fulfil public demands for restrictive immigration policy’ (ibid.: 2). 
‘Official’ definitions: How has the state legislated for immigration? 
United Kingdom statutory law does not actually technically designate anyone as ‘an 
immigrant’, as there is no such legal definition. Instead, there is a ‘key distinction 
between those who have the ‘right of abode’ in the UK...and those who do not have this 
right’, also known as ‘Persons Subject to Immigration Control’ (Anderson and Blinder 
2014: 3). 
Further, the UK has for most of its history made no distinction between subject and 
citizen (Layton Henry 1984: 12), traditionally being based on what Castles and Miller call 
the ‘imperial model’ of citizenship (2009: 44). The main distinction made between people 
has historically therefore been between ‘subjects’ and ‘aliens’  – aliens being those owing 
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no allegiance to the British Crown59 (Layton Henry 1984: 12). Prior to 1948, the 
distinction was binary: those with right of abode were British subjects; those subject to 
immigration control were aliens (Clayton 2010: 71). The rights conferred on subjects 
‘came to be subsumed under the grandiose notion ‘Civis Britannicus sum’ and became 
part of the ideology which legitimised’ Empire60 (Layton Henry 1984: 12). The history of 
British immigration law is thus bound up with the history of its nationality law (see 
Appendix A). 
Perhaps the most crucial change associated with the categories of subject and alien in 
recent UK history concerns Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth and what is 
now known as the European Union. When Britain joined the European Economic 
Community in 1973, European citizens gained labour and residence rights. In the prior 
years, the UK’s relationship with the Commonwealth had shifted unalterably, 
accompanied by a curtailment in the rights of Commonwealth subjects amid a highly 
politicised debate about the effects of their immigration to the UK. Between 1945 and 
the 1970s, then, European citizens hereby regarded as aliens switched places with 
Commonwealth subjects to enjoy rights of residence and employment in the UK – while 
the status of the former subjects was ‘largely reduced to that of aliens’61 (Spencer 2011: 
25). This was achieved through a re-definition of the categories of people able to obtain 
British passports and those subject to immigration control, through both immigration and 
nationality law62. Overall and most importantly, from 1968 legislation was introduced 
which began a shift from the jus soli (right of the soil), culminating in a hybrid form of the 
jus sanguinis (right of blood) (Clayton 2010: 72-73). Put simply, a parental (or grand-
parental) connection to the UK essentially became a requirement for the acquisition of a 
                                                     
59 Note that the contemporary citizenship process produces British citizenship, rather than English, Scottish, 
Welsh or Northern Irish citizenship. 
60 The key to this approach, it is argued, is that it ‘veils the dominance of a particular ethnic group or 
national over the other subject peoples’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 44). 
61  The Immigration Act came into force on the same day as the UK formally joined the EEC, a set of 
circumstances which symbolically concluded the replacement of a sense of obligation towards the citizens 
of the Commonwealth with a vision of Britain as an integral part of Europe (Holmes 1988: 263). 
Interestingly, the current population of EU citizens able to live in the UK is approximately 500 million, 
comparable to the 600 million Commonwealth subjects who could move to the UK until restrictions were 
introduced (Bloom and Tonkiss 2013: 1067).  
62 Those currently subject to immigration control range across several categories, including:  ‘Aliens’, (most) 
‘Citizens of Commonwealth countries’, ‘British Dependent Territories citizens’ and ‘British Overseas 
citizens’, leaving only British citizens and Commonwealth citizens (with right of abode as of 1 January 1983) 
to automatically have right of abode (Clayton 2010: 73). 
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British passport, a connection which became known as ‘patriality’ in the 1971 
Immigration Act (Anderson 2013: 40).  
These shifts were triggered by concerns on the part of the public as much as on the part 
of politicians about the level of immigration from the non-white countries of the New 
Commonwealth (Spencer 1997). This is reflected across the modern history of the 
immigration debate, in which a twin focus on numbers and ‘race’ (and the general 
avoidance of the positive economic case until relatively recently63 [Freeman 1994: 298; 
Bevan 1986: 6-7]) has recurrently combined to produce the argument that ‘there are too 
many people of particular races and classes’ (Finney and Simpson 2009: 49; Mynott 2002: 
13). A focus on particular groups in different periods means that there are several 
identifiable ‘phases’ of statutory UK immigration control, summarised by Sales (2007: 
131) as comprising: the ‘control of mainly Jewish migration’ from 1905 until circa 1945 
(see Pellew 1989; Wray 2006; Mynott 2002), ‘controls on New (black) Commonwealth 
immigration’ from the 1960s onwards (see Spencer 1997), ‘controls on asylum seekers’ 
from the late 1980s onwards (see below) and the period of ‘managed migration’, 
constituting ‘greater selectivity in labour migration’ and ‘stricter controls on asylum’, in 
the 2000s. Appendix A outlines and summarises the legislation which has marked these 
main phases of control.  
Prior to the 1990s, a bipartisan consensus on immigration had already effectively been 
established (Bevan 1986: 24-25), albeit with intra- and inter-party conflicts. This meant 
that, ultimately, although the Labour Party and the Conservative Party each had their 
own essentially distinct broad policy agenda, by the publication of Labour’s 1965 White 
Paper the leadership of both parties were in agreement that restrictive immigration 
control was necessary64. The Labour Party did, however, ‘soften the blow’ by introducing 
                                                     
63 In contrast with the case against immigration on economic grounds, which usually centres on arguments 
that immigration depresses the wages of lower-skilled workers and reduces ‘native’ employment through 
competition in the labour market (see Castles and Miller 2009: 230-233 for the issues surrounding this 
ongoing debate), the case for includes ‘economic advantage, capital investment, expanding the labor force, 
international contacts and trade, and the acquiring of enterprise and entrepreneurial skills’ (Layton-Henry 
1994: 276), to name a few. 
64 An obvious example of this lies in the fact that the Labour Party followed the Conservative Party’s 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 (Somerville 2007: 17). 
For the Labour Party, this represented quite a reversal of their position following the 1958 riots in 
Nottingham and Notting Hill, comprising ‘total opposition towards immigration controls for Commonwealth 
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– albeit in ‘piecemeal fashion’ – race relations law in 1965, 1968 and 1976 (ibid.: 25). On 
immigration control, backbench – and the occasional front-bench (e.g. Enoch Powell) – 
dissent could be expected, but legislation has reflected intricate discussion about the 
limits of control and its effects rather than more fundamental differences (Sales 2002: 
471).  
Particularly since the 1990s, however, the introduction of immigration control legislation 
has intensified. This has entailed more frequent and more comprehensive legislation. The 
Labour Party, for instance, introduced seven major pieces of legislation between 1999 
and 2009 (plus many other pieces of legislation with an immigration dimension [Mulvey 
2010: 439]), created 84 immigration offences within six of these acts whereas only 70 had 
previously been created since 1905 (Aliverti 2013) and made 47 changes to the 
Immigration Rules between 2004 and 2009 (Spencer 2011: 13). These measures were 
subsequently criticised for their reactivity and populism (Mulvey 2010: 439). The ‘political 
hyper activism’ (Spencer 2011: 13) which has marked them is, in fact, one suggested 
cause of policy failure, whereby the political expediency of gaining ‘points’ from the 
media and elsewhere for new proposals and legislative acts outweighs the substantive 
work of ‘efficient implementation or in evaluating past initiatives’ (Dunleavy 1995: 61 in 
Spencer 2011: 13) and may simply invite political pressure to extend legislation further by 
fuelling an immigration problematic. 
Party politically, there has been a historical tendency for parties to retain their 
opponent’s policies upon election to government, even despite vocal criticisms while in 
Opposition (Spencer 2011: 20). This is likely because being in Opposition affords parties 
the chance to promote a set of policy proposals that do not necessarily have to be 
delivered but which can remain true to the party’s basic ideological commitments, a 
luxury that is lost upon election when the logic of political crises, international obligations 
and economic imperatives takes over (Bale 2013: 33-34). This tendency can be observed 
in the early-twentieth century with the Liberal Party’s reluctant enforcement of the 
Aliens Act 1905 (Pellew 1989), in the mid-twentieth century with the Labour Party’s 
abandonment of opposition to Commonwealth immigration controls once in power (Foot 
                                                                                                                                                                
subjects, strong support for the ideal of a multiracial Commonwealth, and support for legislation to combat 
racial discrimination’ (Layton Henry 1992: 74, see also Foot 1965, ch. 8). 
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1965: 186) and in the late-twentieth century with the transition from Conservative 
asylum policy to New Labour asylum policy (Spencer 2011: 20; Schuster and Solomos 
2004).  
Further, Studlar notes that ‘however much party policies on immigration may diverge 
during the course of a particular Government, the approach of a general election induces 
a convergence of policy’ (1980: 213). This strategy reputedly attempts to appease the 
middle-ground of public opinion and anticipate criticism of policy in what has become a 
highly divisive debate. For the Labour Party, it is claimed that this has meant not only 
muting its prior criticisms of immigration policy but also its discussion of immigration 
politics generally; while the Conservative Party leadership attempts to minimize the 
electoral influence of its anti-immigrant members and supporters and appeal to more 
numerable moderate voters (ibid.). 
Due in large part to the influence of Enoch Powell, the Conservative Party have secured 
an image of being 'tougher on immigration' than their Labour opponents since the 1960s 
(Saggar 2003: 180, 183). It is for this level of dominance that Layton-Henry claimed, 
writing in 1992, that the Conservative Party had ‘dictated immigration policy since 1962’ 
(1992: 176), something that the Labour Party attempted to change during their years in 
government from 1997. Nonetheless, while the Conservative Party’s lead amongst the 
public as the ‘best party on immigration’ has narrowed from the heights of 54% in 1970 
(Saggar 2003: 180) over time, it remained 23% in 2010 (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 109). 
A notable and related issue to this dynamic is in the establishment of overwhelming 
ethnic minority support for the Labour Party in the post-1945 era (measured at 
approximately 80 per cent between the October 1974 election and the 1997 election), 
such that ethnic minority voters (which included increasing numbers of New 
Commonwealth immigrants during this period) have become considered to be amongst 
their ‘safest constituencies’ (Saggar 1998: 26). This support remained relatively 
unchanged in the 2010 election; reductions in ethnic minority support (from 82% in 1997 
to 69% in 2010) can be compared with larger reductions in majority ethnic Labour 
support (from 47% in 1997 to 29% in 2010) such that ethnic minority voters ‘now 
constitute a larger share of Labour voters than they did in 1997’ (Heath et al. 2011: 265-
266). 
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Legislatively, regardless of the party in government, immigration law has frequently been 
oriented towards stopping the immigration of certain racialised groups.  Governments 
have naturally been eager to construct immigration control policy in ways which could 
not be construed as having been based on arbitrary, racialised – and, therefore, 
illegitimate – categories (Mynott 2002: 13; Hayter 2004). The motives for immigration 
controls have therefore often been cloaked by discrimination along surrogate dimensions 
which are deemed to constitute acceptable criteria, such as through, or at the 
intersections of, nationality, class (Joshi 2002) or concepts such as ‘patriality’. This 
applies, of course, in relation to a rationale for immigration control to meet the demand-
side needs of the capitalist economy, meaning that the immigration control system is 
perhaps best described as a ‘filter’ rather than as a ‘rigid barrier’, allowing migrants 
deemed desirable in and obstructing the remainder (Smith and Marmo 2014: 348). 
In 1905, for instance, immigration officers checked incoming passengers at designated 
ports, rejecting the 'undesirable', i.e. anyone 'unable to show that he [sic] was capable of 
'decently' supporting himself and his dependants'65 (Pellew 1989: 373). This criterion 
applied especially strongly to impoverished Jewish migrants who had become the source 
of much contemporary debate (Mynott 2002: 14), but nowhere was this association 
explicit in the text of the statute. Similarly, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
introduced work vouchers in three categories for those wishing to enter the UK: Category 
A was reserved for those who had a job to come to, Category B was reserved for those 
possessing special skills in short supply and Category C was reserved for a ‘large 
undifferentiated group’ of unskilled workers ‘whose numbers would be set according to 
the labour needs of the UK economy' (Spencer 1997: 129). The racist impact of the Act 
can be deduced in two main ways. Firstly, Irish immigration was again exempt from 
immigration control despite comprising the largest group of immigrants at the time66 
                                                     
65 The established rule of thumb defined this as the possession of ‘five pounds with two additional pounds 
for each dependent’ (Pellew 1989: 376-377), which was applied only to ‘steerage’ passengers on ships 
carrying more than twenty people, thus exempting those in first- or second-class. 
66 The position of Irish immigrants has historically been exceptional in that they have occupied a ‘middle-
ground’, ‘acknowledged to be sufficiently similar to gain entry into the territory, yet identified as 
sufficiently different to be ever known as Irish’ (Paul 1997: 91). The UK and Ireland have so far opted out of 
rules governing the Schengen area of large parts of Europe, but together (along with the Isle of Man and 
the Channel Islands) share a similar partnership known as the ‘Common Travel Area’, which ensures 
freedom of travel for UK and Irish citizens within the British Isles. The Common Travel Area has been the 
norm for ‘most of the period since the Irish Free State was founded on 6 December 1922’, essentially 
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(Hartmann and Husband 1974: 12). Secondly, it had been expected that A and B vouchers 
would go to skilled white workers from the Old Commonwealth, and that C vouchers – 
later abolished entirely by the Labour Party’s 1965 White Paper ‘Immigration from the 
Commonwealth’ (Patterson 1969: 26) – would apply particularly to those in the New 
Commonwealth, i.e. non-white immigrants67 (Sales 2007: 140; Hayter 2004: 47-48). 
Moreover, the 1962 Act was the culmination of years of disproportionate political 
attention and restrictive elite attitudes towards New Commonwealth immigration since 
the arrival of the Empire Windrush. In fact, it merely instituted into formal policy certain 
informal though widespread administrative measures which were designed to delay and 
obstruct New Commonwealth immigration during the late 1940s and throughout the 
1950s (see Carter et al. 1987; Spencer 1997; Layton-Henry 1992: 28-36). The 1962 Act 
was therefore introduced on the very basis that it provided the appearance of non-
discrimination (Spencer 2011: 24) while converting the often de facto denial for New 
Commonwealth immigrants to assert their rights to migrate to the UK into de jure policy 
(Carter et al. 1987: 337).  
The racism which animated these political responses to immigration does not, however, 
appear to be the explicit driver of contemporary legislation.  Instead, the UK has entered 
an era of ‘managed migration’, in which migrants are valorised (even more than 
previously) according to their perceived economic utility, which has coincided with the 
emergence of a more ‘technocratic’ mode of argument in the political debate (Anderson 
2013: 57). In contemporary immigration law, this has meant that immigrants are 
stratified within a ‘points-based system’ when applying for work visas. Currently, the first 
‘tier’ of this system enables migrants from several categories to apply for a visa, including 
as ‘entrepreneurs’, those with ‘exceptional talent’, ‘highly skilled migrants’, ‘graduate 
                                                                                                                                                                
continuing prior practice (Ryan 2001: 856). The arrangement has meant that Ireland has historically been 
the largest source of migrants to the UK until the 2011 census, having been well established in the 
nineteenth century (see Panayi 2010: 44; Holmes 1988: 20). 
67 The then Home Secretary, Rab Butler, was later quoted (in documents released under the 30-year rule) 
as telling Cabinet colleagues in 1961: ‘The great merit of this scheme is that it can be presented as making 
no distinction on grounds of race or colour...Although the scheme purports to relate solely to employment 
and to be non-discriminatory, the aim is primarily social and its restrictive effect is intended to, and would 
in fact, operate on coloured people almost exclusively’ (Hayter 2004: 47, see also Spencer 1997: 116).  
The British Nationality Act of 1948 had entrenched the rights of Commonwealth migrants to take up 
employment without the restrictions placed on others. European workers, in contrast to British subjects 
from the Commonwealth, were ‘subjected to strict labour controls and could be prosecuted or deported if 
they broke their conditions of recruitment’ (Layton-Henry 1984: 20).  
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entrepreneurs’ and ‘investors’68 (gov.uk, n.d.). Meanwhile, Tier 5 is reserved for a variety 
of temporary workers and young adults wishing to live and work in the UK for a maximum 
of two years. This is the basis for the assessment that the immigration regime constructs 
‘welcome outsiders’ (e.g. non-European business executives), who are not ‘kith and kin’ 
like ‘welcome insiders’ (e.g. people of British and Irish descent), but who are viewed as 
‘more assimilable or bringing essential capital investment and managerial skills’ (Layton-
Henry 1994: 273-274). Therefore, despite the fact that the rationale behind immigration 
control may have become less conspicuously racist in intention, the fact that the global 
distribution of capital and skills has not fundamentally altered since the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Acts were introduced means that the effects of legislation in its construction 
of who can immigrate to the UK are likely to be similar. Indeed, the ‘segmented labour 
market’ theory of migration posits that the structural demand of advanced economies for 
highly skilled workers (employed in finance and management roles, for instance) and 
lower-skilled manual workers (employed in menial production or service roles) (Castles 
and Miller 2009: 23) has caused ‘economic polarization’ within recent decades, especially 
so in ‘global cities’ such as London. Those in the first group are likely to be a member of 
the majority ethnic group, male and to have attained legal migration status, while those 
in the second group are more likely to be a member of a minority ethnic group, female 
and work illegally (ibid.: 23-24). 
Alongside the ‘managed migration’ era, there has been an increasing political interest in 
the distinction between immigrants and refugees, associated with a considerable rise in 
the number of asylum applications during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 
introduction of a substantial amount of related statutory legislation69. Centrally, the 
debate comes down to questions about state responsibility and its limits (Rajaram 2013: 
681). On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged internationally that political refugees 
ought to be prioritised ahead of economic migrants (Zolberg 2012: 1220; UN 1948, Article 
                                                     
68 The last of these categories is reserved for people who wish to migrate to the UK and who are prepared 
to invest £1 million in government bonds, share capital or loan capital; these migrants are able to apply to 
settle in the UK earlier if they invest more capital (after 2 years if investing £10 million or after 3 years if 
investing £5 million). 
69 Each of the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987, Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, Asylum 
and Immigration Act 1996, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Act 2006 contained important implications for the application of asylum (see Appendix A). 
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14). Nevertheless this does not come without disagreements regarding who should be 
counted as a refugee (Zolberg 2012: 1220). Such disagreements have often been driven 
by strategic self-interest, either for reasons to do with foreign diplomacy70 (Sales 2007: 
70; Bloch and Schuster 2005: 499-500) or in order to suppress refugee admission71, but 
are enabled by the divergent potential interpretations of the refugee definition provided 
by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Keyes 2004: 401; Mulvey 
2011: 1479–1480). 
Historically, the political significance of asylum and its limits have therefore undergone 
significant semantic and practical shifts over time, which has marked the narrowing of the 
associated set of eligibility criteria and entitlements for refugee status (Zetter 2007: 180). 
Since borders were virtually open prior to the twentieth century, no legal distinction was 
necessary for the formal allocation of refugee status. It had therefore been used only in a 
non-institutional and expansive sense in the British context with the arrival of the 
Huguenots (Sales 2007: 76) and came as a product of an emergent political liberalism and 
moral superiority (Shaw 2012; Schuster 2002). No formal, institutional distinctions were 
even made during the inter-war period in favour of aliens seeking asylum compared with 
other aliens, despite the fact that many of these aliens had fled religious or political 
persecution (Schuster 2002: 53). In fact, it was not until the introduction of the 1993 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act that asylum applications were handled distinctly 
from immigration applications and the 1951 Refugee Convention formally incorporated 
into British statutory law (Stevens 1998: 208; Schuster and Solomos 2001).  
From the arrival of Tamil refugees in the 1980s – characterised as ‘bogus’ or ‘economic’ 
refugees (Runnymede Trust 2000: 212-213; van Dijk 1997), an increase in concern on the 
                                                     
70 As early as 1904, Arthur Balfour commented that ‘Britain is always ready to extend political asylum to 
those with whose politics her governing party agrees’ (paraphrased by Foot 1965: 107). Sales points out 
that it was for this reason that a Conservative government refused to accept refugees from General 
Pinochet’s Chile in 1973, only some of whom were later accepted by a Labour government (2007: 70). The 
more recent creation of ‘white lists’ of supposedly ‘safe’ countries to arbitrarily determine asylum cases as 
‘unfounded’ also bears such diplomatic motives (ibid.). 
71 For example, Dean notes an interview conducted by Jeremy Paxman on Newsnight in early 2003 with 
then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in which Blair said ‘I would like to see us reduce it [asylum numbers] 
by 30 per cent to 40 per cent in the next few months and I think by September of this year we should have 
halved it’, adding ‘I think we can get below that in years to come’ (in Dean 2012: 211). As Dean comments, 
arbitrary targets such as this breach the principles of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. 
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part of the government saw the process of seeking asylum become increasingly 
criminalised and deterred by lawmakers seeking to assuage and capitalise on related 
public concerns (c.f. Banks 1998; Malloch and Stanley 2005; Aliverti 2012; O’Nions 2006; 
Hassan 2000; Morris 2002: 416-418). The chief result of this has been what Zetter calls 
the ‘fractioning’ of the refugee label at the bureaucratic level for instrumental, political 
reasons, which has produced ever nuanced and elusive entitlements to refugee status 
(e.g. with the rise of the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker) (Zetter 2007; Morris 2002: 416-418; 
Gibney 2004; Schuster 2003b). As Zetter points out, this strategy has produced more 
labels, but fewer refugees72 (ibid.).  
While refugee status has become an ever-elusive entitlement, these political and 
linguistic developments – abetted by hostile press coverage (Kaye 1998) – have produced 
a dichotomy between the ‘bogus’ (or perhaps ‘undeserving’) asylum seeker, and the 
‘genuine’ (or perhaps ‘deserving’) refugee (Sales 2002). The refugee label in its originally 
more expansive and non-discretionary sense is therefore now used only by some NGOs 
and international rights organisations73. According to Flynn, the disparity between the 
promotion of ‘managed migration’ and the deterrence of asylum during this time is 
consistent with the promotion of a view in which ‘in the new world of globalised reality, 
the concept of ‘rights’, if it is applicable at all, should be reserved for those who have 
made themselves useful to the needs of a growing and dynamic world economy, and who 
are actively contributing to its further development’ (Flynn 2003: 2 in Anderson 2013: 
57). In contrast, there is now a ‘widespread perception of asylum as an act of charity and 
not as a right’ (Jubany 2011: 85). 
Nonetheless, the institution of asylum remains intact, albeit in diminished form. Why 
might this be? Gibney (2014) offers three possible reasons for its resilience despite often 
strong public and political opposition: offering asylum helps to affirm the legitimacy of 
immigration controls by providing the exception to the general rule (see also Carens 
                                                     
72 Indeed, between the 1980s and the 1990s, refugee admission rates were dramatically reduced from 
approximately 80 per cent to approximately 20 per cent (Runnymede Trust 2000: 214, see next chapter). 
73 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees allocates refugee status ‘collectively rather than on 
a case-by-case basis and it is done prior to refugees seeking settlement in a safe country’ (Kivisto and Faist 
2010: 53). This contemporary usage of the term in its wider sense is designed to encourage an international 
humanitarian response to provide essential aid to large groups of people (often sheltered in makeshift 
refugee camps) displaced by persecution, civil war, and so on without the semantic and technical delays in 
determining the status of each refugee. 
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2013: 194), offering asylum reinforces the state as a ‘community of value’ rather than as 
a random collection of individuals (see also van Dijk 1992: 109-111; Stern 2014; Schuster 
1998, 2002: 55, 2003b: 173-174), and that the paradox of offering asylum despite the 
opposition of the demos is anyway an intrinsic, fundamental tension between the rights 
of the individual and democratic rule in liberal democratic states.  
A final point to consider with regards to immigration categories is that some distinctions 
are made between immigrants and others in terms of their rights within the receiving 
society. Further, as residency, settlement, the granting of citizenship or naturalisation 
entail differentially meaningful relationships with the state, immigrants and refugees are 
still subject to distinct categories in terms of their associated rights even after 
immigration. Those granted full citizenship ‘belong’ in the nation and are afforded 
‘superior and exclusive’ rights (Runnymede Trust 2000: 206). Commonwealth immigrants 
have the right to vote and stand in general elections, for instance. This has made 
Commonwealth immigrants a considerable voting ‘constituency’, in contrast with EU 
citizens, who can vote only in European and local elections. Kivisto and Faist (2010) 
therefore separate the legal status of immigrants into ‘alienship’, ‘denizenship’ and 
‘citizenship’ (see Figure 3.1), with aliens holding the least rights and citizens the most.  
Figure 3.1: Categories of legal status 
Legal status Immigrant categories 
Alienship 
• Migrants with temporary residence and 
work permits (e.g. seasonal workers) 
• Asylum seekers, ‘de facto refugees’ 
• Irregular migrants 
Denizenship 
• Labour migrants with permanent 
residence status and their dependents 
• Recognised refugees 
Citizenship 
• Citizens of immigration nation-states 
• Citizens of EU member states 
• (Citizens of autonomous regions) 
Adapted from Kivisto and Faist (2010: 226). 
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Normative definitions: How else are immigrants defined? 
As noted earlier, by establishing the parameters that determine entry status states not 
only have a monopoly on ‘who is and who is not an immigrant’ (at least in the sense of 
who is subject to control), but they also ‘define types of immigrants’ (Kivisto and Faist 
2010: 50) – so sociological and popular typologies never stray too far from the 
definitional frames imposed upon them by legal categories.  
Moreover, the legislative climate of immigration politics may have partially helped to blur 
apparently differing types of immigration together, providing a self-perpetuating and 
justificatory logic to the creation and construction of such categories as ‘bogus asylum 
seekers’. For example, the labelling of asylum seekers whose claims are subsequently 
refused as ‘illegal immigrants’ (e.g. see Kenyon 2010: 14) relies on the apparently self-
evident assumption that, despite asylum refusals constituting an arbitrary artefact of 
policy, they provide ‘proof’ that asylum claims must necessarily be fraudulent (Bloch 
2000: 35). As refusal rates increase, so too apparently does the evidence that asylum 
seekers are ‘bogus’. Other such artefacts of policy include the possible creation of the 
‘asylum-immigration nexus’ in which it becomes difficult to distinguish the motives for 
migration (Sales 2007: 75), as a result of the establishment of voluntary routes and 
sources of migration which are then used by refugees and migrants alike; increased 
irregular migration, in order to circumvent policies deterring asylum (Koser 1998; Gibney 
2008: 151); and increased asylum applications, in order to circumvent the closure of 
‘primary immigration’ routes (Stevens 2004: 92). 
Whereas the orderly legal categories imposed upon migrants by states bear witness to 
the instrumental (ideological and bureaucratic) purposes of control, sociological 
typologies are broader, focussing on the lived experiences and conditions of various types 
of immigration. ‘Voluntary versus forced migration’, for instance, ‘ought to be treated as 
a continuum rather than in dichotomous terms’ (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 43), which affords 
a more nuanced consideration of structure and agency than the demarcations of 
international and domestic law ordinarily allow.  
Addressing the above concerns, Anthony Richmond has proposed a multivariate typology 
which considers migrants in terms of the extent to which their decisions are reactive or 
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pro-active, as well as how far they are based on political or socio-economic factors 
(1988). This manages to therefore make distinctions not only on the level of structure and 
agency but to acknowledge that political and economic causes of migration can be 
difficult to disentangle, which state definitions neglect to account for74 (Turton 2003: 9). 
In Richmond’s typology, pro-active migrants include ‘retirees, transilients, returnees, 
reunited families and ordinary ‘emigrants’ along with spies; whereas reactive migrants 
include ‘UN Convention refugees, stateless persons, slaves and forced labourers’ 
(Richmond 1988: 20). Figure 3.2 illustrates the matrix along the reactive-proactive and 
economic-sociopolitical dimensions75.  
Figure 3.2: Richmond's matrix of international migrants (1988: 20) 
 
                                                     
74 As Turton argues, ‘those who starve in a famine do so because they have insufficient entitlement to food, 
a political issue, not because there is insufficient food available’ (2003: 9, emphasis in original). Likewise, 
Sivanandan and Gonzalez note that ‘resistance to economic immiseration is inseparable from resistance to 
political persecution. The economic migrant is also the political refugee’ (2001: 88; see also Philo et al. 
2013: 14).  
75 For Richmond, ‘the vertical axis represents decision-making on a continuum from maximum to minimum 
autonomy. The horizontal axis represents the interaction of economic and socio-political forces, reflecting 
that they come full circle as internal and external state powers converge’ (1988: 20). Turton criticises the 
lack of agency the model affords the most reactive migrants, claiming that ‘even at the most ‘reactive’ or 
‘involuntary’ end of the continuum, people probably have a lot more choice than we might think…[t]hey 
may have choices not only about whether but also about when, where and how to move which cannot be 
encompassed by continua of this kind’ (2003: 10).  
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A typology of immigration to the UK 
Despite the difficulties of extricating some flows of migration from others, the following 
normative typology helps to group some types of migrant together and identify at which 
points the distinctions between groups become experientially significant. This precludes 
analysis from treating, for instance, ‘the IT person leaving the high-tech sector in 
Hyderabad for Silicon Valley’ and ‘the peasant fleeing drought conditions in the Sahara’ 
the same76. The key to recognising that there are somewhat discrete points on a 
continuum comes due to the distinct but malleable political and moral responses to 
immigration of differing causes and consequences. 
‘Voluntary’ migration 
Voluntary migration relates to the movement of ‘discretionary migrants motivated by 
economic or family considerations’ (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 102). Although 
describing all forms of such migration as ‘voluntary’ is questionable since migration 
theories tend to suggest that there are forces of compulsion as well as attraction involved 
in immigration processes (see Castles and Miller 2009: 20-33 and Kivisto and Faist 2010: 
33-45), it can be used to describe many of the migrants on the ‘pro-active’ side of 
Richmond’s typology. Immigration in this sense is defined by the International 
Organisation for Migration as ‘a process by which non-nationals move into a country for 
the process of settlement’ (IOM 2004: 31). The aspect of ‘settlement’ (of at least several 
months, if not one year) is considered integral to distinguishing between people 
notionally considered to be immigrants and those considered to be non-immigrants who 
nevertheless cross borders, such as tourists, ambassadors and border officials (Kivisto and 
Faist 2010: 49). Particularly since the Second World War, the most significant forms of 
immigration to the UK have been ‘voluntary’, comprising labour (or ‘economic’) 
migration, migration for family reunification77 and student migration (Spencer 2011).  
                                                     
76 Examples provided by Kivisto and Faist (2010: 43). 
77 In the UK context, much of this came in the aftermath of the attempted closure of primary immigration 
from the New Commonwealth in the legislation of the 1960s and 1971. This type of migration includes not 
only the staggered migration of a single person who is subsequently joined by their family, but also ‘family 
formation’ in which someone is joined by a partner from abroad whom they intend to marry and ‘whole 
family’ migration when the entire family moves at once (Kofman 2004 in Spencer 2011: 130).   
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 ‘Forced’ migration 
In contrast, forced migrants have a far smaller degree of agency (though their mobility is 
not completely without agency), and many can be placed on the ‘reactive’ side of 
Richmond’s typology. There are three main groups of political refugees, related to the 
reasons for which they are persecuted. These are: ‘activists’ who ‘flee the regimes to 
which they are opposed’; ‘targeted refugees’ who are persecuted due to membership of 
a particular group and ‘victims’ who are ‘accidentally caught in a violent situation’ 
(Zolberg 1989: 269 in Richmond 1993: 9). Beyond this there are also other kinds of 
refugees, such as those escaping natural disasters.  
As noted in the previous chapter, much of the political and press attention surrounding 
refugees and asylum seekers from the mid-1980s has suggested that asylum seekers are 
essentially ‘economic migrants’ and make a calculated and cynical distinction between 
the merits of claiming asylum in Britain compared with other countries, heading for the 
so-called ‘soft-touch’ UK as a result (Buchanan et al. 2003; Mollard 2001; Lynn and Lea 
2003; Kaye 1994, 1998; Philo et al. 2013; Matthews and Brown 2012; Gibney 2008). In the 
terms of migration studies scholarship, they have essentially been constructed as an 
augmented version of anticipatory refugee movements, rather than acute refugee 
movements78 (Kunz 1973). As Kunz puts it,  
‘The anticipatory refugee... leaves his [sic] home country before 
the deterioration of the military or political situation prevents his 
orderly departure. He arrives in the country of settlement 
prepared; he knows something of the language, usually has some 
finance and is informed about the ways by which he can re-enter 
his trade or profession’ (ibid.: 131-132).  
Kunz claims that situations such as these, despite superficially resembling voluntary 
migration, should still be classified as refugee movements (ibid.: 132). However, the 
‘fractioning’ (Zetter 2007) of the refugee label has essentially restricted common 
understandings of refugee situations to an ideal which fits the ‘acute’ model, in which 
                                                     
78 Day and White add the ‘blocked return’ scenario, in which an asylum application is made well after entry 
due to changes of circumstance in the place of origin (2002: 18). 
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‘the 'push' motive is overwhelming, and...follows only after the refugee's situation 
deteriorates to the point where he [sic] finds it intolerable to stay any longer’ (Kunz 1973: 
132). Nonetheless, research has shown that many asylum seekers do tend to broadly fit 
the acute refugee scenario, relying on limited or non-existent information about their 
country of destination (whether in regards to systems such as those which determine 
welfare support and asylum determination, or even generally) and often, therefore, also 
on the decisions of expensive agents (i.e. ‘smugglers’) to determine their route for them 
(Crawley 2010; Day and White 2002; Gilbert and Koser 2006; Hayter 2004: 100). Of those 
who are able to exercise agency in deciding where to go, family or social networks are a 
key influence in that decision-making process (Crawley 2010; Gilbert and Koser 2006), in 
addition to English language proficiency of some kind (Day and White 2002). These 
factors, as in other areas of immigration to the UK, seem to underline the importance of 
Britain’s historical, cultural and ultimately colonial links with people around the world. 
For the receiving country, the sudden arrival of a number of refugees means that they are 
‘forced to respond rapidly, and immigration can rarely be phased’ (Peach et al. 1988: 
601). 
Having felt compelled to leave their nation of birth or residence, asylum seekers are 
almost by definition one of the most enduringly disempowered groups in society upon 
arrival (Goodman and Speer 2007: 166). Their journeys have becoming increasingly 
dangerous if not fatal as the states of the ‘Global North’ have attempted to deter their 
journeys (Banks 1998; Malloch and Stanley 2005; Aliverti 2012; O’Nions 2006; Hassan 
2000; Bloch 2000; Spencer 2011). Upon arrival, they are then subject to various forms of 
‘exclusion’ by the state, whether through deportation, detention or dispersal (Schuster 
2007), and thus occupy an ‘interstitial’ position in society (especially while waiting for a 
decision about their application) (Stewart 2005). 
Undoubtedly the most important definition for the allocation of refugee status by 
international humanitarian standards comes from the UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 1951 (and its 1967 Protocol), of which the UK is a signatory. 
Signatory states are expected to at least consider each case for asylum individually79 and 
                                                     
79 This has been called into question in the UK in recent years with various politicians committing to 
arbitrary reductions in successful asylum applications, the creation of ‘white lists’ in 1996 and 2002 
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have a duty to not return refugees to places where they will be persecuted, a key idea in 
refugee law known as non-refoulement (Spencer 2011:  46).  
The Convention defines a refugee as ‘any person who is outside the country of his [sic] 
nationality…because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group and 
is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the 
country of his nationality’ (UNHCR 1951). The definition provided by the Convention does 
not offer protection for people increasingly displaced by natural disasters (e.g. floods, 
volcanoes), environmental change or human-made disasters (e.g. deforestation, climate 
change and industrial accidents) (Philo et al. 2013: 14).  
A typical definition of asylum seekers defines them as ‘persons seeking to be admitted 
into a country as a refugee and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status 
under relevant international and national instruments’ (IOM 2004: 8). 
 ‘Irregular’ Migration 
‘Irregular’ migrants straddle the pro-active/reactive divide, given the numerous 
configurations of possible irregular status. Such migrants are not necessarily ‘rule 
breakers intent on living and working in Britain without permission’ (Spencer 2011: 158) 
or helplessly passive victims of circumstance80. Migrants gain ‘irregular’ (or ‘illegal’ in 
media and parliamentary parlance81) status in a number of ways: by clandestine entry 
(including by evading border officials and deception such as by using false documents), by 
overstaying the date agreed in their original or revised terms of entry, by ‘semi-
compliance’ with their terms of entry (such as by working without permission), through 
being born to parents with irregular status or through retrospectively-applied 
                                                                                                                                                                
legislation which have enabled the Home Secretary to summarily reject applications from selected 
countries ‘in which it appears... there is in general no serious risk of persecution’ (in Stevens 1998: 211-
212), the ‘fast-tracking’ of selected cases and ‘passive’ methods of interdiction such as visa requirements 
and carrier sanctions which impede the presentation of asylum cases (Stern 2014: 27).  
80 Moreover, normatively distinct processes such as ‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ are not necessarily as easily 
demarcated in practice, despite the confident definitions of government officials (c.f. Geddes 2005: 327) 
81 ‘Irregular’ is the preferred term in scholarly and NGO discourse due to its lack of association with 
established policy positions, in recognition of the fact that irregular migrants may have ‘differing degrees of 
departure from legal status’ and for its distancing from the criminalizing connotations  of terms such as 
‘illegal immigrant’ (Spencer 2011: 158). For many people, the term is preferred because ‘defining people as 
illegal denies their humanity: a human being cannot be illegal’ (Koser 2007: 54). 
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administrative measures (Spencer 2011: 163; Geddes 2005: 326; Jahn and Straubhaar 
1998: 18-19). Irregularity may therefore be a shifting status that migrants move into or 
out of quite fluidly, whether into or out of ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ migration statuses82.  
In living beyond the reach of the state, they are highly vulnerable to ‘poverty, social 
exclusion and exploitation’ (Spencer 2011: 161). Further, states view their obligations 
towards irregular migrants minimally (in comparison to other types of migrant) in 
response to what they see as violations of their sovereignty on the part of irregular 
migrants83 (Hovdal-Moan 2012), while they hold few legal protections in international 
politics (Morris 2002: 421).  
The political significance of irregular migration comes with a tension between, on the one 
hand, its unpopularity and its contribution to perceptions that migration is ‘out of 
control’ (Spencer 2011: 161; Geddes 2005: 330) and, on the other, the fact that it is 
administratively unmanageable, owing to its intractable set of supply and demand forces 
(i.e. the ‘shadow economy’) and intrinsically illicit characteristics (Jahn and Straubhaar 
1998). Policies therefore tend to focus on counteracting irregular migration from within 
the borders of the state using methods of internal control, which are cheaper methods 
than implementing ‘complete’ border control and can intercept those who become 
irregular beyond the border (ibid.: 28, 31). 
Summary 
This chapter has shown how the politics of immigration structure the conditions of 
immigration, and therefore in many respects what the categories, definitions and 
boundaries are that people come to know immigration by. In other words, examining the 
politics of immigration helps to provide a background regarding the ways in which the 
state ‘sees’ immigration, which may find themselves privileged in news accounts of 
immigration. 
                                                     
82 Examples of this provided by Koser (2010: 183) include: an irregular migrant who successfully applies for 
asylum, a migrant who enters through legal means before overstaying their visa, and an asylum seeker 
whose application is rejected but who subsequently remains in the country without authority. 
83 This logic is summarised by the ‘implicit’ claim that ‘since the state could, given the chance, have 
excluded these immigrants at the territorial border, it can also deny them certain liberties and exclude 
them from the social rights associated with legal stay in the state’s interior’ (Hovdal-Moan 2012: 1227, 
emphasis in original). Indeed, terms such as ‘legal migration’ and ‘illegal migration’ depend upon the state’s 
right to decide who is a legitimate migrant (Geddes 2005: 326). 
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More specifically, the chapter has provided a profile of the way in which certain groups of 
immigrants to the UK have been welcomed or rejected by immigration policy historically, 
and therefore what the political climate has been in respect to a range of types and 
groups of immigration. The importance of the media’s role in potentially engendering, 
entrenching, approving or contesting the assumptions and consequences of this climate 
cannot be presumed but it also surely must not be ignored. The ramifications of the 
relationship between legislative, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary definitions of 
immigration and media representations of immigration form an important basis upon 
which to assess the data presented in the analytical chapters of the thesis. 
However, the politics of immigration are not restricted to the world of political and media 
discourse. Immigration is a phenomenon ‘out there’, which is experienced and perceived 
by migrants and public alike. The next chapter briefly explores this in relation to the 
patterns of immigration and the response of the public.  
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4: The Politics and History of Immigration: Demography and Public 
Opinion 
Introduction 
The patterns of immigration and the public reaction to immigration are inseparable from 
the political and media discourses to which they are responsive and productive. These 
aspects provide a further backdrop to the debates already considered, and seek to show 
that important changes have taken place over time in the profile of immigration to the 
UK, but that there have been sustained features of the policy preferences demonstrated 
by the general public. They therefore bear important ramifications for an adequate 
understanding of the media coverage produced over the sampled time frame in terms of 
both representation and reception. Placing these issues together draws attention to the 
linkages between them as ‘real-world indicators’ and invites comparison between the 
level and nature of immigration coverage and these facets of immigration politics. 
The chapter begins by providing a broad overview of the demographic changes in 
immigration which have occurred over the sample period. This section contextualises 
immigration to the UK historically and internationally, considers some of the most 
significant changes in the character of immigration to the UK since the middle of the 
twentieth century and provides some specific information about patterns relating to 
different types of migration. This is followed by a section focussing on the ‘public debate’. 
Through a discussion of the history of opinion polls relating to immigration and ‘race’, 
certain conclusions are made about public preferences in immigration politics and what 
the democratic implications may be for these preferences. Since audiences are 
constituted by the public, this section also contextualises the readership preferences of 
newspaper audiences. 
Demographic Patterns 
As so much of the political and media debate has focussed on the ‘numbers game’ and 
the politics of immigration control, it is essential to measure the context against which 
this framing has taken place. This section will provide a chronological overview of the 
patterns which have marked immigration to the UK since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Firstly, it examines which groups of migrants were already established prior to 
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1918, before outlining the long-term patterns of continuity and change which took place 
between 1918 and 2010. Given the extent to which immigration to the UK and global 
migration have changed over the past fifty years, this period has been focussed on in 
particular. Finally, due to the prominence and exceptional status of issues relating to 
forced migrants and irregular migrants in political and media debate, the patterns of 
immigration of these groups will be considered in isolation from wider developments. 
The ‘Pre-History’: Prior to 1918 
As suggested in the Chapter 1, immigration has played a considerable role in the 
formation of the UK and its history. Castles and Miller argue, however, that the ‘denial of 
the role of immigrants in nation-building has been crucial to the creation of myths of 
national homogeneity’ (2009: 79). Stuart Hall relates this in the British case to the spectre 
of Empire, describing a ‘profound historical forgetfulness…a kind of historical amnesia’ 
(1978: 25) adopted within British culture about race and Empire in or by the mid-
twentieth century, which attempted to efface the uncomfortable history of Empire and 
deal with the trauma of surrendering colonial gains in power and territory. It also helped, 
in his view, to sever the past from the present and extricate the past actions of the once-
colonial power from its post-colonial responsibilities (see ibid.: 24).  
Defined in the broadest terms, ‘migrants’ have in a sense existed in Britain (or Britannia) 
for millennia. Significantly, though, 1066 provides the symbolic rupture at which point 
population movement into Britain could no longer be classified as ‘invasions’, heralding 
instead relatively peaceful migrations into an inchoate society (Panayi 2010: 12). This 
stemming of invasions, along with Britain and Ireland’s separation from the rest of 
continental Europe thousands of years previously, has also contributed to the hegemony 
of national myths which suggest that Britain possesses ‘multiple, unbroken connections 
between past and present’ (Runnymede Trust 2000: 18). It is from this point that the 
entry of ‘aliens’ and (albeit occasional and unsuccessful) restrictions on their entry, 
whether through crown prerogative or statute, began84 (Panayi 2010: 13). Thereafter, the 
                                                     
84 For example, Edward I expelled all Jews from England in 1290, a measure which was not officially 
repealed until 1656 (Holmes 1988: 5-7), Elizabeth I expelled or imprisoned Irish people in the late sixteenth 
century (Clayton 2010: 7) and recommended that black people present within the country – trafficked as 
slaves into Britain at that time by people involved in the triangular trade – be expelled from the land (Hall 
1978: 23). Thereafter, parliamentary legislation dealt ineffectually and sporadically with deportation, or 
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movement of ‘continental tradesmen, bankers and craftsmen’ in the ‘high and late 
middle ages’, ‘religious refugees, economic migrants and slaves’ from 1500 to 1650 and 
economically-based migration from circa-1650 to the beginning of the nineteen century 
marked the major periods of early immigration in the more recognisable form in which it 
is now conceptually defined85 (ibid.).  
Migratory patterns sharpened considerably in the late nineteenth century, such that, 
leading into the twentieth century, the number of aliens recorded by the Royal 
Commission on Alien Immigration was 135,640 in 1881, 219,523 in 1891 and 286,925 in 
1901, many of whom lived in London (Layton Henry 1994: 281; Foot 1965: 90). However, 
this put the ‘alien presence’, upon which so much political attention was now focused, at 
.69% of the total British population, compared with corresponding figures of 
approximately 1.4% in Germany, 2% in Austria, 2.7% in France and 9.6% in Switzerland 
(Foot 1965: 90).  
By this time several migrant groups had been well established. By far the most numerous 
were Irish migrants (crucially not considered ‘aliens’ by the earliest immigration laws), 
who were well established in Britain by the late nineteenth century, particularly in 
London, Lancashire and Scotland (Holmes 1988: 20). The Irish migrant community had 
declined from the heights of roughly 727,000 in 1851 and 806,000 in 1861, and by 1911 
was recorded as 550,040 people (1% of the total population of England and Wales, and 
3.7% of the total population of Scotland) (ibid.: 21). Far less numerous though certainly to 
become of more political interest, the Jewish community numbered 51,250 in 1875 
(Holmes 1988: 26); these people were joined in Britain, due mainly to anti-Semitic 
pogroms and repression in eastern Europe, by approximately 120,000 Jews between 
1875 and 1914, many of whom settled in the East End of London (Foot 1965: 86). The 
1911 census also recorded 95,541 Russian Polish migrants (of some overlap with the 
                                                                                                                                                                
even simply with registration; this included the Aliens Act 1793, the Aliens Act 1826, the Aliens Registration 
Act 1836 and the Removal of Aliens Act 1848 (Hayter 2004: 37-38; Foot 1965: 83). Indeed, from 1825 to 
1905 ‘not a single immigrant of any nationality was deported by order of the central political authorities’, 
characterising the ‘almost total indifference’ of politicians towards the issue (Foot 1965: 82). 
85 Beyond the migrant communities mentioned in the previous footnote, other groups included Dutch and 
Belgian refugees from the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, an estimated 50,000 French Huguenots 
in the late seventeenth century and 10,000 Palatine refugees in the early eighteenth century (Hayter 
2004:14; Foot 1965: 80-81). Additionally, it has been estimated that there were 15,000 black people in 
London in 1770 as a result of the slave trade (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 10). 
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Jewish community) in England and Wales in 1911 (.3% of the population) (Holmes 1988: 
26), 53,324 German migrants (.1% of the population) (ibid.: 23) and 20,389 Italian 
migrants (ibid.: 30). Beyond these groups there were also much smaller immigrant 
populations in London and beyond, including Chinese, Indian, French, Spanish, Czech and 
American communities (ibid.: 32-36). 
Broad patterns, 1918-2010 
At the start of the twentieth century, the UK was well established as a ‘net exporter’ of 
population (Hicks and Allen 1999: 7). Indeed, one set of estimates claims that between 
1871 and 1931, Britain saw a mass emigration, mostly to various places in its Empire, of 
over 3 million people (Foot 1965: 80; see also Layton-Henry 1992: 2), while another 
claims that the total number of emigrants between 1846-1924 numbered approximately 
17 million people, which would have made the UK by far the country of the most 
emigration in Europe during this time (Ferenczi 1933: 436). Figure 4.1 shows that this was 
reversed during the interwar years, ‘as many migrants returned home to ‘weather the 
storm’ of the depression years’ (Hicks and Allen 1999: 7). No census data was recorded in 
1941 due to the Second World War, but the 1949 Report of the Royal Commission on 
Population estimated that net migration between 1931 and 1940 was +650,000 overall 
(Layton-Henry 1992: 2). The net emigration of the 1970s and 1980s is explained by the re-
establishment of British migration to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Hicks and 
Allen (1999: 7), though this was relatively short-lived. A decline in the emigration of 
British citizens and a rise in the immigration of foreign citizens in the 1990s produced a 
pattern of net inward migration again, though consistently so only from 1994 (see Hatton 
2005: 721-722). The first decade of the twenty-first century saw net migration soar to an 
average of almost +200,000 a year, with estimates of immigration itself breaching 
500,000 in 2002 and numbering between 567,000 and 596,000 a year from 2004 to 2010 
(see Spencer 2011: 31; Vargas-Silva 2014a). 
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Figure 4.1: Estimated average annual net migration in the UK (thousands), 1901-2010 (in 
Hawkins 2013: 886) 
 
Contemporary patterns 
The rapid alteration of immigration patterns seen in the 1990s and 2010s provides an 
important context to the legislative developments of the 1990s onwards as discussed 
above. Interestingly, however, the deployment of the ‘numbers game’ pre-dates this rise 
(Bevan 1986: 34), while the political debate has long been reliant on recurrent arguments 
either in favour of or against immigration (see ibid.: 6-12), which have been informed by 
and adaptive to these changing patterns but ultimately remain intact.  
Importantly, these patterns can be placed in the context of wider, global patterns of 
migration. Indeed, the period after 1945, especially from the 1980s onwards, has been 
called the ‘age of migration’87 by migration scholars Stephen Castles and Mark Miller 
(2009), who claim that the mass, mostly transatlantic migrations of the period 1850-1914 
can be contrasted with the unprecedented migrations of the contemporary age, which 
                                                     
86 Caution must be exercised when assessing estimates such as this, since figures prior to the introduction 
of the International Passenger Survey in 1964 rely on inferences made based on census data, by ‘measuring 
the proportion of population change that is not attributable to recorded births and deaths’ and calculating 
the mean average for the years between censuses to give an annual estimate (Hawkins 2013: 8). However, 
‘not all the population change that is unaccounted for is necessarily due to long-term international 
migration’ (ibid.). 
87 This period has alternatively been dubbed the ‘new migration’ in relation to Europe (Koser and Lutz 
1998). 
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they say affect all regions of the world, which have expanded exponentially and which are 
having ‘enormous economic and social consequences’ (ibid.: 2-3). They identify several 
general tendencies across the globe which characterise this age of migration, including 
the globalization of migration, the acceleration of migration, the differentiation of 
migration, the feminization of migration88, the growing politicization of migration89 and 
the proliferation of migration transition90 (ibid.: 11-12). I will now briefly consider the first 
three of these due to their important interconnections with the UK experience. 
The ‘globalization of migration’ refers to the expansion in the number of receiving and 
sending countries around the world, ‘so that most countries of immigration have entrants 
from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds’ (Castles and Miller 
2009: 10). Globalization is reputedly driven not only by the movement of people, but also 
by the ‘cross-border flows’ of ‘finance and trade, [...] democracy and good governance, 
cultural and media products and environmental pollution’ (ibid.: 51). This process has 
therefore challenged state sovereignty ‘from above and below’ (ibid.: 12), be it from 
obligations towards global or supra-national institutions, or from large, sometimes 
undetectable, migrations with seemingly implacable causes (Sassen 1996). It is suggested, 
then, that globalization has both motivated immigration ‘flows’, such as those of asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants, and challenged the state’s capacity to address them 
through legislative means. 
Further, Vertovec argues that, along with the reversal of net migration from emigration 
to immigration, the multiplicity in migrants’ places of origin (along with other markers 
such as language and religion) since the 1990s means that Britain is now characterised by 
‘super-diversity’ (2004: 1029). This is emphasised by the expansion in the range of 
migrants’ places of origin which have no particular historical (e.g. colonial) links with 
                                                     
88 This relates to the way in which patterns of migration have moved from being male-dominated to 
constituting increasing numbers of female migrants, such as with labour migration and refugee movements 
since the 1960s (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). 
89 This corresponds to the way in which ‘domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national 
security policies of states around the world are increasingly affected by international migration’ and the 
corresponding degree of attention paid to solutions based on global governance and ‘cooperation between 
receiving, transit and sending countries’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). 
90 This refers to the evolution of countries traditionally associated only with emigration to countries 
predominantly of transit migration and, perhaps eventually, immigration (e.g. Poland, Spain, Mexico, 
Turkey, South Korea) (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). 
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Britain, in addition to new links such as with the EU. For example, in 1971 Old 
Commonwealth countries accounted for 30% of immigration to Britain, New 
Commonwealth immigration accounted for 32%91, EEC citizens accounted for 10% and 
those from the ‘Middle East and Other92’ data category in government statistics 
accounted for 16%. By 2002 people from Old Commonwealth countries accounted for 
17% of immigration, New Commonwealth immigration accounted for 20%, EU migration 
accounted for 17% and people from the ‘Middle East and Other’ accounted for 40% (ibid.: 
1029; see also Berkeley et al. 2005).  
Since the accession to the EU of the A8 countries93 in 2004, upon whose citizens the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden imposed no  transitional controls unlike elsewhere in the EU94, the 
proportion of EU immigration has risen considerably, peaking at 34% and consistently 
outnumbering migration from the ‘Other’ category95. However, between 2004 and 2010, 
EU immigration was less than combined (i.e. ‘New’ and ‘Old’) Commonwealth 
                                                     
91 New Commonwealth immigration increased considerably during the 1950s, often in a close correlation 
with labour demands (see Rose et al. 1969: 74-75), and rapidly so in the build-up to 1962 as people 
attempted to ‘beat’ the imminent introduction of what was highly-anticipated legislation. In absolute 
terms, estimated net immigration from the New Commonwealth rose from 42,650 in 1955 (of which 27,500 
was from the West Indies) to 57,700 in 1960 (of which 49,650 was from the West Indies), and to 136,400 in 
1961 (of which 66,300 was from the West Indies), while immigration from India rose from 5,900 in 1960 to 
23,750 in 1961 and immigration from Pakistan rose from 2,500 in 1960 to 25,100 in 1961 (Layton-Henry 
1994: 13). The Commonwealth Immigrants Acts did manage to curtail immigration from the West Indies, 
but essentially instituted the family migration which came after (Hansen 2000: 123-124; Spencer 1997). 
92 The ‘Other’ category in government statistics includes people from Eastern Europe (prior to EU 
accession), South America, Central America, non-Commonwealth African countries, South-East Asia, China, 
Japan and others (Berkeley et al. 2005: 10). 
93 These comprised Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Cyprus and Malta also joined but were already members of the Commonwealth. 
94 Upon the accession of the A2 countries, Romania and Bulgaria, in 2007, this time the UK did place 
transitional controls on Bulgarian and Romanian migrants’ opportunities to move to the UK as workers. This 
restricted A2 immigration to the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme scheme in place at the time, skilled 
workers with a job unable to be filled by a resident worker, low-skilled workers under the Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and Sector Based Scheme (SBS) and students. Between 2007 and 
2013, the population of A2 nationals increased by 148,000 (40,000 Bulgarian, 108,000 Romanian) (Gower 
and Hawkins 2013: 5, 7). 
95 Total annual immigration from the EU (excluding British citizens) had been maintained below 70,000 
since 1999 having peviously reached a peak of 82,000 in 1998, but immigration from the A8 countries alone 
was (approx.) 53,000 in 2004, 76,000 in 2005, 92,000 in 2006, 112,000 in 2007 (peak year), 89,000 in 2008, 
68,000 in 2009 and 86,000 in 2010. This contributed to all EU immigration reaching 130,000 in 2004 (22% 
share of all immigration), 152,000 in 2005 (27%), 170,000 in 2006 (28%), 195,000 in 2007 (34%), 198,000 in 
2008 (34%), 167,000 in 2009 (30%) and 176,000 in 2010 (30%) (Migration Observatory n.d.-a; Vargas-Silva 
2014).  
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immigration in all years except 2007 and 200896 (Vargas-Silva 2014a). Corresponding with 
the long-term diversification of immigration to the UK, the population of the top 10 
foreign-born nationality groups as a percentage of all foreign-born residents has reduced 
from 66% in 1961 to 45% in 2011 (ONS 2013).  A notable effect of all this is that, as 
immigration to the UK has comprised an ever broader spectrum of people, much of the 
political focus has centred on its secondary effects, as with issues of citizenship, 
multiculturalism, social integration and community or ‘race’ relations’, and with Britain’s 
foreign policy, specifically its relationship with the EU. 
The ‘acceleration of migration’ relates to the quantitative growth in the volume of 
international migration ‘in all major regions at the present time’ which ‘increases both 
the urgency and the difficulties of government policies’, though does not completely 
preclude governmental action (Castles and Miller 2009: 11). This has become the case 
due to factors such as ‘falling transportation costs, increasing economic integration, path-
dependent migration linkages, structural demand for labor within host states, and global 
demographics’ (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 106). Due to population change, the 
proportion of the world’s population who are migrants has remained largely unchanged 
for the last two decades, at around 3% (Spencer 2011: 6). However, numerically, the 
acceleration of migration has meant that the global number of international migrants 
increased from 76 million in 1960 to 191 million in 2005 (an increase of 151%), the 
number of international migrants in ‘more developed regions’ increased from 32 million 
in 1960 to 115 million in 2005 (an increase of 259%) and the number of international 
migrants in Europe increased from 14 million in 1960 to 64 million in 2005 (an increase of 
357%) (Castles and Miller 2009: 5). This has coincided with a marked increase in the 
number of foreign-born residents in the UK during this time, which has increased from 
1.9 million in the 1951 England and Wales census, to 2.3 million in 1961, 3.1 million in 
1971, 3.2 million in 1981, 3.6 million in 1991, 4.6 million in 2001 and 7.5 million in 2011 
and who therefore now comprise 13% of the population (ONS 2013). The increase in the 
                                                     
96 Commonwealth immigration was recorded as 215,000 in 2004 (37% share of all immigration), 180,000 in 
2005 (32%), 201,000 in 2006 (34%), 174,000 in 2007 (30%), 165,000 in 2008 (28%), 171,000 in 2009 (30%) 
and 187,000 in 2010 (32%).  
‘Other’ immigration was recorded as 155,000 in 2004 (26% share), 137,000 in 2005 (24%), 143,000 in 2006 
(24%), 131,000 in 2007 (23%), 142,000 in 2008 (24%), 132,000 in 2009 (23%) and 135,000 in 2010 (23%) 
(Vargas-Silva 2014). 
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foreign-born population between the 1961 census and 2005 figures (Finney and Simpson 
2009: 55) was 135%97, a smaller comparative rise than patterns globally, in developed 
regions and in Europe. This does, however, mean that almost half (45%) of the population 
increase in England and Wales between 1951 and 2011 was due to migration (ONS 2013). 
Nevertheless, similarly to patterns at the start of the twentieth century, and despite 
significant levels of immigration during the rest of the century, the proportion of the 
foreign-born population is presently smaller in the UK than in many other countries, 
including 16 other OECD countries98 (OECD 2013) though slightly above the European 
average (Vargas-Silva 2014b). In absolute terms, however, the UK is sixth behind USA, 
Germany, Canada, Russia and Saudi Arabia (OECD 2013).  
The ‘differentiation of migration’ refers to the expansion in different types of migration 
which countries receive, from refugees, to labour migrants, to ‘family migrants’ (Sales 
2007: 34), to student migrants, to temporary migrants, and so on. This process 
complicates the role of national and international policy makers (ibid.), whose focus has 
had to widen to consider fundamentally diverse causes of migration and their obligations 
towards different groups. Chains of migration, which help to establish support networks 
and infrastructure related to the culture and socio-economic development of the 
diaspora (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 29), can evolve from constituting one form to several, 
regardless of legislative intervention (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). For the UK, however, 
this global trend must be seen in light of the legislation introduced since the 1960s, which 
has attempted to attract skilled migration to meet the demands of its economy, to limit 
immigration from the New Commonwealth to family migration (Hansen 2000: 228), to 
thereafter limit family migration (Bevan 1986: 37), to suppress refugee admission and to 
attract student migration as a lucrative ‘export’ (see Spencer 2011, ch. 3). The 
curtailment of major routes of immigration through legislation combined with a sustained 
pre-occupation in public debate about the ‘numbers game’ has seemed only to invite 
attention towards those forms of immigration which remain, even if this proves difficult 
to impossible to achieve (Bevan 1986: 37). For example, the UK government has had little 
                                                     
97 For completeness, from 1961 to 2011 the growth in the foreign-born population was 226%, and from 
1951 to 2011 it was 295%. 
98 In order of largest proportion of foreign-born population: Luxembourg, Switzerland, Australia, New 
Zealand, Israel, Canada, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Estonia, Slovenia, Spain, Germany, Norway, and 
USA. 
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control over EU migration (also including British return migration) and the irregular 
migrant population can only be estimated within a fairly wide range, let alone 
successfully addressed by policy. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the diverse range of purposes given in official statistics for voluntary 
immigration between 1991 and 2011. Immigration for people to study or for those with a 
job offer have each increased significantly over these twenty years, from a low of 
(approx.) 42,000 in 1992 to a high of 238,000 in 2011 for formal study immigration and a 
low of (approx.) 48,000 in 1992 and 1993 to a peak in 2007 of 171,000 for those with a 
definite job offer (Migration Observatory, n.d.-b). The ‘looking for work’ category has also 
seen an increase in this time, from (approx.) 21,000 in 1991 to 80,000 in 2005 and 81,000 
in 2010, while family migration (‘accompany/join inflow’) and those not stating a reason 
have remained relatively steady.  
Figure 4.2: Immigration by reason 1991-2011 
 
(Migration Observatory, n.d.-b) 
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Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
The UK is currently home to 1.1% of the world’s refugees and .35% of the UN’s estimated 
total global population of concern (including asylum seekers, the internally displaced and 
the stateless) (UNHCR 2014) and ranks 16th for asylum applications per capita among the 
EU27 countries (corresponding to five asylum applications per 10,000 people in the UK 
and eight as an average in the EU27) (Hawkins 2014: 12; see also Messina 2007: 118 for 
data relating to select Western European countries 1995-2002). In relation to 
immigration figures generally, recent figures show that asylum seekers made up 
approximately 4.5% of total ‘immigrants’ to the UK in 2012 (Hawkins 2014: 3) while 
refugees comprise 0.3% of the population (Vargas-Silva 2014b). Figure 4.3 shows the total 
applications for asylum (excluding dependents) from 1979 to 2010. The chart for this 
period shows that asylum applications increased dramatically between 1988 and 1991 
and again between 1996 and 2002 (in line with the rest of Europe [see Bloch and Schuster 
2005: 492; Spencer 2011: 49]), before decreasing considerably again between 2003 and 
2007.  
Figure 4.3: Applications for asylum (excluding dependents), 1979-2010 
 
Sources: Layton Henry 1994: 278, Schuster and Solomos 1999: 62 (1979-1983, n.b. 1979-1981 are approximate); 
Home Office Immigration Statistics, October to December 2013, Asylum Tables Volume 1, Table as_01 (1984-2010). 
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Figure 4.4 shows the outcome of initial decisions for asylum seekers (excluding 
dependents and decisions made on appeal). The UK has had an initial asylum acceptance 
rate of less than 30% for over 10 years, compared with countries such as Finland and 
Switzerland where the rate is over 70% (ibid.: 5; Refugee Council 2013). This is a reversal 
of the situation prior to 1991, at which point refusal rates were as low as 13% in 1989. As 
Figure 4.4 shows, at about the time of high asylum application rates (i.e. 2000 and 2001), 
refusal rates were numerically very high (89,308 in 2001), though were proportionally 
higher in many other years (substantially so between 1994 and 1997 and 2003 and 2006), 
reaching a peak of 88% in 2004. Of the three-quarters of asylum seekers who appealed 
their decisions after initial refusal between 2004 and 2012, approximately a quarter were 
successful (Hawkins 2014: 8).  
Figure 4.4: Initial Decisions of Asylum Applications 1984-2010 
 
n.b. Decisions do not necessarily relate to applications made in the same year, due to system delays. 
 
Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics, October to December 2013, Asylum Tables Volume 1, Table as_01. 
 
Slightly over a fifth of asylum seekers are detained at some point in the asylum process 
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approximately 30,000 people are detained annually (Silverman and Hajela 2013). A small 
minority of asylum seekers are detained for up to several months or for more than a year 
(ibid.). The widespread use of detention without trial was once only contemplated in 
times of crisis or emergency (such as in wartime or to otherwise contain immediate 
threats to the state), but since the early 1990s has become an ordinary and integral part 
of the administrative management of immigration and asylum (Bloch and Schuster 2005). 
Irregular migrants 
Irregular migration ‘stocks and flows’ are inherently difficult to measure since irregular 
migrants are understandably reluctant to make themselves known to the authorities 
(Koser 2010: 183), and because of the shifting ways in which people attain or lose 
irregular status (see previous chapter). The data available regarding the number of 
irregular migrants resident in the UK is therefore subject to dispute, re-calculation and 
relatively wide margins of error compared to other migrant groups. In the UK, the Home 
Office estimated that in 2001 the number of irregular migrants in the UK was between a 
range of 310,000 and 570,000, with a median estimate of 430,000 (ibid.: 186). This figure 
was updated to between 417,000 and 863,000, with a central estimate of 618,000 for 
2007 (Gordon et al. 2009), but a recent estimate, based tentatively on an extrapolation of 
data collected in the course of the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Operation Nexus’ (in which 
immigration officers were stationed in custody suites across London in order to check the 
immigration status of arrestees), puts the irregular migrant population at ‘about 70,000’ 
(Portes 2012). The irregular migrant population of the UK is therefore estimated to be in 
the region of between 0.1% and 1% of the total population. 
The importance of the figures discussed in this section of the chapter for policy is related 
to the way in which policy enables and circumscribes these migrations, and how it might 
provide conditions for hospitability and hostility towards the various migratory groups 
that it allows to ‘filter’ into the country. What is interesting about such figures for the 
media debate is the level to which the media makes such linkages and to what extent 
audiences are able to make sense of demographic change due to migration. The next 
section will therefore give an indication as to what the public knows and thinks about 
immigration to the UK as mostly demonstrated by public opinion poll data.   
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The Public Debate 
Public Opinion 
Whether migrants face hospitality or hostility upon arrival in the UK has much to do with 
the receptiveness of the rest of the general population. How this translates into the 
political domain is important for both the health of democracy but also for the rights of 
the individual. On the one hand it is important in a democratic society for the policy 
preferences of the public to be sufficiently represented in official policy, but on the other, 
the non-immigrant population has historically far outweighed the immigrant population, 
whose rights may be curtailed by a ‘tyranny of the majority’ if heavily restrictive policy is 
enforced. For this reason, public opinion is taken seriously by scholars, politicians and the 
press as a crucial element in the politics of immigration. Hospitality and hostility can, of 
course, emerge through various means – resentment can come in the form of 
discrimination or violence, for instance – but opinion poll data is predicated on its more 
representative demonstration of the attitudes of the public (and, therefore, the 
electorate)99.  
Indeed, the ‘racist public’ thesis claims that elite politicians in the 1960s were ‘responsive 
to the public’ rather than autonomous on immigration policy (including Enoch Powell, 
who it is claimed ‘articulated the feelings of the public’ [Studlar 1974: 381] rather than 
pioneered a new perspective). In this view, the public are and were (viewed as) so 
strongly negative towards immigration that no politician or political party would 
jeopardise their chances of electoral success by announcing policies at odds with public 
opinion (Studlar 1980: 217). On the other hand, politicians may feel a responsibility to 
refrain from ‘playing the race card’, while some theorists have posited that, in fact, a 
democratic deficit exists between the public’s highly restrictive demands and official 
policy, known as the ‘gap hypothesis’ (see Cornelius et al. 1994; Joppke 1998). A further 
danger lies in the possible exploitation and manipulation of public opinion data when it is 
simplistically interpreted and reified as ‘the will of the public’ in order to legitimise pre-
existing policy options. 
                                                     
99 ‘When conducted according to accepted professional standards, polls and surveys are reliable as 
snapshots of public opinion, at least for the questions that pollsters or academics choose to pose to the 
public. But interpreting them always requires care and caution, for they have important limitations and 
flaws’ (Blinder 2011: 2). 
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Regarding the press, although it is virtually impossible to identify causality in the 
relationship between newspaper readership and attitudes towards immigration, there 
are distinct differences between the attitudes and perceived importance of immigration 
among readers of different newspapers, at least contemporarily. On the one hand, this 
could be because people seek out information which confirms their existing attitudes, 
and on the other their attitudes could be shaped by the information available to them, or 
a combination of both. The result of this is that, because citizens of the ‘imagined’ 
national community (Anderson 1991/1983) cannot expect to meet the vast majority of 
the immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers upon whom they might base their opinions 
about immigration100, the general tendency for the public to favour restrictions on 
immigration means there is a ‘basic business case for anti-immigration content’ (McNeil 
2014). Even for news media which ‘champion liberal policies’, it is argued that they are 
simply ‘presenting what will be appealing to their readers’101 (ibid.). In a 2011 study, 
readers of the Guardian were found to be least likely to favour reductions in immigration 
(46% responding that they wished to see immigration ‘reduced a lot/a little’), with 
readers of the Times (68%) and Daily Telegraph (78%) favouring more reductions, and 
readers of the Mirror (83%), Sun (85%), Mail (89%) and Express (89%) considerably 
supportive of reductions (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 93). This hierarchy of attitudes has 
also been generally observed in these readers’ perceptions of the importance of 
immigration/race relations as an issue in Issues Index surveys (ibid.: 94), though these 
disparities grew drastically between 1996 and 2013102 – suggesting that differences in 
attitude and perceived levels of importance are not unchanging over time. 
The press have increasingly commissioned opinion polls regarding immigration 
themselves, emphasising the major (or at least amenable) findings in headlines and front-
                                                     
100 This is possibly implicated in the discrepancies between people’s concern about immigration at the 
national level versus immigration at the local level: ‘Voters seem to perceive migration as something which 
causes problems elsewhere’ (Ford 2011a: 2, c.f. Saggar 2003). For regions in which immigrants are more 
likely to settle (or asylum seekers dispersed) concerns are likely to be higher, except when such areas are 
highly diverse already (Duffy & Frere-Smith 2014). 
101 ‘The Financial Times takes a liberal line on immigration because business leaders tend to see 
immigration as a key tool in a global free market; The Guardian does so because its readers – such as 
teachers and university staff – are often concerned about human rights’ (McNeil 2014). 
102 From a difference of only a few percent in 1996, the difference in the perceived importance of 
immigration/race relations was over 35% in 2013 between readers of the Express (over 50% placed 
immigration/race relations in their ‘top three’ issues facing the nation) and the Guardian (approximately 
15%) in 2013 (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 94). 
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page articles and framing them as calls for political action. Despite this, ‘audiences are 
rarely informed about the question design, sampling techniques or analysis methods of 
these surveys’ (Finney & Peach 2004: 13). These aspects of survey data have the potential 
to yield dramatically different findings depending on the design of the research, a fact 
which survey commissioners might be keen to capitalise on: ‘newspapers and other 
organisations concerned with problematising the issue of migration, such as 
MigrationWatch UK, may seek to commission a poll that ‘proves’ this issue is of primary 
concern to the British public, while refugee rights organisations may use polls to expose 
the level of ignorance about asylum issues, or reveal more tolerant views than are 
commonly expected’ (ibid.: 14). The overall picture, however, is that in general journalists 
rarely make specific reference to independent opinion polls in their reporting, and often 
rely on unsystematic evidence, whether through anecdotal inferences of the ‘public 
mood’ or through the use of vox pops (Lewis and Wahl-Jorgensen 2005). A further 
problem in engaging citizens in the news comes in the lack of opportunities citizens are 
generally given to make direct suggestions about policy and actively participate in public 
deliberation (ibid.: 105). Citizens in news coverage are therefore often shown giving or 
failing to give support for the policies of political leaders (ibid.) – a problem which might 
be compounded in relation to opinion polls, since opinion polls are usually structured in 
ways which do not retain the nuances of public opinion upon the compilation and 
presentation of the associated data.  
A restrictive and concerned public 
The 1960s arguably marks the decade in which immigration and its related issues, via the 
lens of ‘race’, first became of sustained legislative and electoral importance in the UK103, 
and it was on the cusp of that decade that the first surveys about public opinion on 
immigration – and ‘race relations’ – began to be taken104. A subsidiary though no less 
important artefact of its politicisation at that time came with the collapsing of 
immigration questions in such polls with those of ‘race’ and ethnic diversity – a product 
                                                     
103 As evident in the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, the 1964 general election (Singham 
1965: 360-368) and Labour’s 1965 White Paper. 
104 The first polls were carried out in the context of the aftermath of the 1958 riots in Notting Hill and 
Nottingham (Wybrow 1989: 55). Asked in September 1958, 55% of respondents to a Gallup poll wanted 
restrictions on ‘coloured’ immigration, with 49% saying the same for white immigration. ‘One in three said 
they would consider moving if coloured people came to live next door, rising to three in five if the coloured 
people were in great numbers’ (ibid.). 
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of immigration being ‘effectively a codeword’ during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s for New 
Commonwealth migration (Saggar 2003: 181). The collapsing of immigration and ‘race’ 
has remained the case in some surveys (e.g. Ipsos-MORI’s ‘Issues Index’), ‘making it 
impossible to isolate public concern over immigration in particular’ for such data (a 
problem when taking into consideration changing sources of immigration flows, such as 
with the growth in EU migration in recent years) (Blinder 2011: 5). 
During the inaugural years of polling from the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, 
respondents to Gallup polls overwhelmingly approved of the control of immigration – 
couched in terms of immigration from the Commonwealth. The mean level of 
restrictionist responses to questions variously put to respondents about government 
plans for immigration control was 69.5% across eight polls between November 1961 and 
September 1972 (Studlar 1974: 375), reaching a high during this time of 87% in August 
1965 and a low of 57% in September 1972105. This was compared with a mean of 18% for 
those disagreeing with limits and 12.6% for ‘don’t know’ responses (ibid.). 
In general, the public as a whole has since continued to demonstrate overwhelmingly 
restrictionist views towards immigration. Figure 4.5, however, indicates that ‘demands 
for reduced migration’ bear little relationship with the level of immigration (Ford 2011a). 
It would appear that for large sections of the public, immigration at almost any level 
during this period constituted ‘too much’. Due to differences in question-wording and 
response options over time, the trend line relating to restrictionist attitudes ‘should not 
be taken as evidence of a decrease over time’ (Blinder 2011: 4) but, nonetheless, the 
percentage of respondents opposing immigration has remained above 50% in all 
iterations of such surveys since the 1960s106. 
                                                     
105 Questions varied, though always applied to Commonwealth immigration specifically or in general, and 
included: ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the measures the Government intends to take in controlling 
immigration from Commonwealth countries?’ (November 1961 [1], November 1961 [2] and December 
1961), ‘A strict limitation on the number of immigrants allowed from the Commonwealth is being applied. 
Do you approve or disapprove of this restriction in their numbers?’ (August 1965), ‘Do you approve or 
disapprove of the measures the Government are taking in controlling immigration from Commonwealth 
countries?’ (March 1968), ‘There are a number of Asians in Kenya holding full British passports. Do you 
think there should or should not be any limitation on their entry into this country?’ (January 1969), ‘Do you 
approve or disapprove of the Government's new Immigration Bill?’ (March 1971), ‘Do you think we should 
or should not let the Uganda Asians settle in this country?’ (September 1972) (Studlar 1974: 375). 
106 The data shown here do not include the Gallup poll results. 
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Figure 4.5: Proportion of survey respondents claiming that there are ‘too many’ 
immigrants compared with grants of settlement for immigrants (Ford 2011a). 
 
Despite the consistency with which the public have been opposed and restrictive towards 
immigration, the perception of its importance as a political issue has fluctuated – only 
growing markedly in the 2000s after relenting in the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 4.6). 
While there is little relationship between the level of immigration and restrictionist views, 
there has been a correlation between an increase in net migration and public concern 
about immigration/race relations as a political issue107. It would, however, appear that 
there was a minority of people who considered immigration an issue even during a period 
of zero net migration or even net emigration108. Between the late 1980s and the turn of 
the twenty-first century, however, the number of respondents who regarded 
immigration/race relations as an important political issue remained very low, only 
growing from 2001 onwards after a sharp rise in net migration at the end of the 1990s.  
                                                     
107 On a monthly basis, pollsters for Ipsos-MORI’s Issues Index ask respondents to name the nation’s ‘most 
important issue(s)’ and ‘any other important issues’ without any further prompting (Blinder 2011: 5); the 
responses to this question are categorised within one of 47 categories (one of which is ‘immigration/race 
relations’). Responses are usually aggregated for an issue’s appearance in the ‘top 3’ issues of a poll. 
108 Interestingly, the small spike in the number of people for whom immigration/race relations was an 
important issue in the late 1970s came in the same month (January 1978) that then Leader of the 
Opposition Margaret Thatcher voiced her concerns in a Granada World In Action interview that people 
were afraid that the UK might be ‘swamped’ by ‘people with a different culture’. 
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Figure 4.6: ‘Immigration as an important issue by UK net migration, 1974-2013’ (Duffy 
and Frere-Smith 2014: 8) 
 
Further, public concern about immigration and its salience on the public agenda in the UK 
over the past decade has been shown through various studies to supersede that of 
concern in other countries, including in Europe (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014, Blinder 
2011, Ford 2011a). 
Public confusion 
Polling data also shows that many people generally lack a great deal of understanding 
about the size of immigration levels, often grossly over-estimating the proportion of the 
population consisting of immigrants by several times109 and estimating on average that 
the UK receives up to ten times more of the world’s asylum seekers than it does (Crawley 
2005: 24-25). One of the reasons for such over-estimation may lie in a phenomenon 
known as ‘emotional innumeracy’, whereby people’s concerns (their ‘directional goals’) 
affect their ability to estimate accurately (their ‘accuracy goals’) (Duffy and Frere-Smith 
2014: 27). Blinder terms the distinction between actual and perceived levels of 
immigration ‘statistical immigration’ and ‘imagined immigration’ respectively (2013: 2).  
Such misperceptions are, for many respondents, key to understanding their policy 
preferences. When presented with official estimates, almost half of the respondents from 
                                                     
109 In a recent poll for Ipsos-MORI, the mean estimate of the foreign-born population of the UK was 31%, 
compared to an official estimate of 13% (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 22). This phenomenon has been 
observed elsewhere: respondents across Europe in a survey conducted in 2002-2003 believed that their 
country attracted more immigrants than others in Europe; 19% said ‘far more people come to live here’ and 
38% said ‘more people come to live here’, with respondents from every country surveyed overestimating 
the foreign-born population of their country (Sides and Citrin 2007: 486-487). 
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one study who had over-estimated by at least twice the official estimate responded by 
rejecting the official figures outright (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 24). In another, the 
proportion of respondents who had demanded a reduction in net inward migration 
lowered by 15% when they were presented with official estimates (Ford 2011a: 1). These 
responses suggest, as Ford argues, that ‘a significant portion of current opposition to 
migration stems from exaggerated views of the situation’ (ibid.). As Sides and Citrin add, 
a more-informed public would likely have a reduced opposition to immigration and less 
commonly self-report perceived threats from immigration (2007: 501). The implications 
of such misperceptions and (possibly corresponding) levels of concern on both the policy 
debate and on public perceptions regarding government performance are therefore 
potentially critical (Gallagher 2014; Blinder 2013).  
What constitutes ‘immigration’ or ‘an immigrant’ may, however, differ from person to 
person. In other words, respondents often have different things in mind when asked their 
opinion about immigration. Overall, there is some contagion in the public imagination 
between various groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, immigrants and asylum seekers) (Saggar 
2003: 185; McLaren and Johnson 2007: 728), possibly related to differing and sometimes 
ambiguous official definitions of each category (Anderson and Blinder 2011). This may 
have an impact upon the results of surveys which ask about immigration or immigrants in 
general. For example, when respondents are asked about which type of people they have 
in mind when they think about immigration, asylum seekers and refugees are mentioned 
more often than any other group (versus immigrants for work, for study, or for family 
reunification), despite being the least common form of immigration (Duffy and Frere-
Smith 2014: 76, Blinder 2013: 9). The contrary is true for immigration for the purposes of 
study, which is contemporarily the most common type of immigration, but the least 
commonly mentioned. 
However, respondents also demonstrate variegated policy preferences when explicitly 
asked about immigration from different places in the world, which suggests that treating 
attitudes to immigration as though people regard various types and groups of immigrants 
as an ‘undifferentiated mass’ (Ford 2011b: 1018) would be inaccurate. For instance, 
immigrants seen as more ‘culturally different’ are more likely to be opposed than those 
regarded as ‘culturally similar’ (Ford 2011b; Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 80; Ivarsflaten 
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2005). People also have variegated policy preferences depending on the type of migrant 
in question and their perceived value or threat to the society. For example high-skilled 
workers are favoured by respondents while asylum seekers, people seeking extended 
(rather than nuclear) family reunification and low-skilled workers are opposed (Duffy and 
Frere-Smith 2014: 77). Nonetheless, it would seem that cultural ‘threats’ are perceived as 
more pressing in concern than economic ones – a trend seen across European publics in a 
study of responses in the early 2000s (Sides and Citrin 2007). 
There is some evidence that public concern and perception is correlated with political 
developments regarding the management of immigration. Ford observes, for instance, 
that ‘sharp increases in public concern followed the widely reported ‘crisis in the asylum 
system’ (2001-3) and unanticipated levels of immigration from European Union Accession 
8 countries (2004-6)’ (2011a: 3), concluding that it was the ‘political management’ of 
these migrations (rather than these events in and of themselves) that contributed to 
these increases in negative opinion. Combined with a lack of public understanding of 
immigration patterns (for which politicians may be just as culpable as media coverage), 
‘over-promising and under-delivering’ to a restrictive public appears to produce both 
distrust (ibid., Saggar 2003: 194) and calls for even more ambitious measures to realise 
the objectives of previous policies – perpetuating an impression of ever-diminishing 
returns. Poor impressions of the political management of immigration are exacerbated 
further by the long-term nature of immigration processes lying in direct conflict with the 
short-termism of political demands and the political cycle (Castles 2004: 223), while the 
public very often express their wish to see immigration flows (e.g. EU immigration) 
reduced which are difficult if not impossible to stop due to foreign policy or legal 
commitments (Anderson 2013: 52). 
Summary 
The implications of the issues identified in this and the previous chapter for the news 
coverage of immigration are manifold. The relative recency of immigration policy, 
especially in relation to the earlier election campaigns of the study, means that it is 
possible that there may have been an evolution in expectations and perceptions about 
inter alia the aims and limits of government control, the rights of migrants and the 
importance of public consultation in the formation of policy. Further, the increasing 
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frequency by which legislation has been introduced, the politicisation of both 
immigration and asylum politics, the development of a bipartisan and essentially 
restrictive political agenda, the questionable grounds upon which distinctions have been 
made regarding the groups of migrants subject to control, and the relative normalisation 
of immigration control in multiple facets of everyday life may have not only helped to 
entrench the ideological basis upon which immigration policy is understood (and 
therefore limit the possibility for fundamental criticisms of immigration policy), but also 
have structured  the terms of meaningful debate and thereby (re)constructed the 
boundaries of belonging more generally. The press have been critically involved in the 
long-term in relaying and re-shaping a political climate such as this.  
The second section of this chapter illustrated the lack of success the mass media has had 
in helping to produce an informed citizenry. There is ample evidence that the public’s 
estimates of the extent to which Britain has received immigrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers bear little relation with reality. These misperceptions appear to be central to the 
grounds upon which the ‘basic business case’ (McNeil 2014) for negative news coverage 
towards immigration are based. Certainly, the consistently negative presentation of 
immigrants and immigration identified by previous studies, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
correlates with the strongly restrictive attitude towards immigration displayed by the 
public over time. Particularly for the conservative press, audiences are provided with, and 
possibly seek, coverage of immigration which provides for a highly restrictive and 
disdainful view of immigration. Importantly, despite the existence of strongly restrictive 
public attitudes almost regardless of immigration patterns, the strong positive correlation 
between public concern over immigration and net migration levels contemporarily 
suggests that the public are to some extent aware of fluctuations in the demographic 
patterns of immigration and that this may be plausibly due to the mediation of 
immigration by the mass media.  
With some immigration scholars claiming that policy follows, or at least is constrained by, 
public opinion, the role of the press in escalating public concern, reinforcing stereotypes 
and encouraging the adoption of ever-more restrictive and coercive policies is potentially 
critical. It is of course difficult to know definitively whether the developments discussed 
in these past two chapters are as a result, or indeed generative, of the frequency or 
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content of media coverage, but they provide an essential background to understanding 
the nature of the environment within which press coverage of immigration was produced 
during the time-span of the coverage investigated in this thesis. 
It is against this background of long-term trends of continuity and change in the politics 
and representation of immigration that the findings of this study will be assessed. Before 
these findings can be presented, however, it is essential to provide some detail about the 
research design and some relevant operational concepts of the study. 
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5: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research methodology chosen in the completion of this study 
and the rationale for the decisions made in this process. The first part of the chapter 
discusses those decisions made in the collection of the data sample, including the 
selection of newspapers studied, the temporal range of study, the qualifying criteria for 
the sample, the unit of analysis and the key research questions to which the study 
orientates. The second and third parts of the chapter briefly examine the justifications 
behind the research methods chosen, namely content analysis and critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). These methods were chosen, it is argued, in order to provide a 
complementary combination between their respective methodological strengths. As such 
they have been implemented according to a mutually reinforcing logic, in which the 
corpus chosen for qualitative analysis was drawn systematically from the sample created 
through the quantitative analysis. Both methods are outlined with regard to their 
methodological principles and their application to the research objectives of the study, in 
addition to the necessity of a dual methodological approach. 
Research Questions 
This research is oriented towards studying representations of immigration in the British 
national daily press in election campaigns. Importantly, this study comes in the form of an 
historical analysis which seeks to place these representations in their temporal context 
and to assess whether the observations of news studies scholars, whose work has rarely 
analysed news coverage of immigration beyond the short-term or historically, are fixed or 
variable. Recurrences, fractures, reformulations and developments in news discourses of 
immigration therefore enable conclusions to be made about how these discourses are 
constructed in the short-term and how we may situate them in relation to historical 
traditions, in terms of continuities and/or contrasts.  
Further, the selection of the British national press entails the analysis of several news 
outlets, each holding their own editorial perspective, style and format, all of which are 
subject to shifts or profound transformations over longer distances of time. In selecting 
several news outlets, not only do aggregate presences and absences in coverage become 
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apparent (at least, at an intra- level), but ‘alternative depictions of reality’ are able to be 
confronted, along with the identification of ‘the specific discursive traits of a given news 
outlet’ (Carvalho 2008: 171-172). Carvalho refers to this as ‘comparative-synchronic 
analysis’, an approach which complements the ‘historical-diachronic analysis’ approach 
taken, of producing ‘a history of media constructions of a given social issue’ (ibid.).  
As Titscher et al. note, ‘the routes to be followed in empirical research will be decided 
initially by the general research questions’ (2000: 6). Several research questions were 
therefore decided upon based on the broader research objectives above to constitute the 
primary interrogations of this study:  
1. To what extent has immigration been a part of electoral discourses in the UK 
press over time and, moreover, what does this say about how the news value of 
immigration issues has fluctuated and developed over time? 
2. Which social actors are most prominent in coverage over time? What is the place 
of migrants in this? 
3. Which social actors are able to gain most news access over time? How does news 
access compare with news presence, particularly with regard to migrants?  
4. Which perspectives are most likely to gain access to the news, particularly with 
regard to supportive or critical attitudes to immigration? 
5. Which topics (i.e. themes) are most associated with immigration, i.e. what is 
immigration ‘about’ during campaigns? What is the thematic plurality of the press 
debate? 
6. How are migrant groups discursively constructed? 
7. How are migrations and their social effects discursively constructed? How are 
‘our’ rights and responsibilities contrasted with those of migrants? 
Sample 
Several areas must be addressed when formulating a sampling strategy. Firstly, the 
sampling strategy should be approached with the research questions in mind. As Deacon 
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et al. contend, the population to which any data sample corresponds is defined by the 
research objectives of the study in question (2007: 47). The rationale for the selection of 
the population of the study will therefore be outlined here first (the ‘why’ question). 
Secondly, the details of the sampling strategy and the sample ultimately drawn from this 
strategy can thereafter be given (‘what’ and ‘when’). In more detail, the practicalities of 
the research and the more microcosmic elements of the data gathering process will then 
be briefly outlined (‘how’).  
The focus of both the content analysis and CDA on the British national press comes partly 
because the press, unlike other media sectors, has existed throughout the sampling 
period and for which archival material is generally accessible for media scholars. 
Importantly, this approach also recognizes the power of the press to set the broader 
agenda for media coverage in Britain and the unfettered partisanship which has 
dominated its representation of political and social affairs and meant that a range of 
ideological content can be found across the pages of several newspapers. Due to the 
greater reach and significance of the national press, but also due to substantial 
differences in editorial agenda, audience profile and the accessibility of archive material, 
the local and regional press was omitted from the study. Also omitted were the Sunday 
equivalents of the daily titles sampled, partly due to the limited level of access the 
researcher had to such material, but also due to the significant differences in format and 
editorial agenda the Sundays have traditionally represented. 
Further, the study involves a detailed, manual and visual review of microfilm newspaper 
content. This is necessary due to difficulties in accessing digital or physical archives of a 
large majority of the press and because keyword searches of digital archives may produce 
validity and reliability concerns (Deacon 2007). A validity concern which applies in 
particular to keyword searches in the media analysis of social issues as semantically 
complex as immigration lies in the potential for false positives and false negatives (ibid., 
Soothill and Grover 1997). For example, terms elementary to a study of immigration 
coverage such as ‘migration’ and ‘asylum’ will inevitably produce false positives wholly 
unrelated to the topic of interest. With regards to false negatives, immigration and 
asylum are issues which over extended periods of time may well have been discussed in 
variable ways, and therefore for which some flux in the referential strategies and 
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rhetorical tropes found in newspaper discourse can be expected. Chapter 2 identified a 
number of ways in which the expression of racist ideas has altered in response to moral 
prohibitions on prejudice, while the widespread usage of metaphors in discourse about 
immigration may obscure in certain respects what is being talked about. A manual review 
can eliminate these issues from affecting the sample. 
Sample identification and size 
The sample was prepared according to considerations of two ‘vectors’ (Deacon et al. 
2007: 122), essentially of breadth and depth: ‘how far backwards or forwards’ the 
sampling period should range and the extent to which data should be sampled across the 
‘population’ (ibid.). As Deacon et al. argue, the statistics generated from appropriate 
sampling in content analysis enable inferences to be made ‘about the processes and 
politics of representation’ (ibid.: 119). In order to acquire the degree of 
representativeness necessary to make such claims, the research adopted a systematic 
sampling approach. As the focus of the research was on the newspaper coverage of 
immigration in election campaigns longitudinally, the selection of 1918 as the departure 
point was made due to the considerable temporal distance over which analysis could be 
undertaken (with 25 elections between and inclusive of 1918 and 2010), but also due to 
its symbolic significance following the substantial extension of the franchise to married 
women and those of independent means over the age of 30 following the Representation 
of the People Act 1918 (Harmer 2012: 111). Further symbolic importance is attached to 
the period in relation to immigration because it comes on the cusp of the introduction of 
immigration legislation (the Aliens Restriction Act 1919) regarded as having definitively 
abandoned the laissez-faire approach of the Victorian age in immigration policy (Holmes 
1988: 114).   
A pilot study was undertaken to determine, in part, an appropriate number of sample 
days within each campaign (collecting and coding a month of coverage of the Daily Mirror 
in 1935, 1959 and 2010). It was determined that a month of coverage in each election 
would take an unfeasible amount of time, but that coding a week of each campaign 
across seven newspaper titles would be practicable and sufficient to produce a large 
dataset. In each campaign, the dates of coding were therefore determined as comprising 
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the week (not including the Sunday, i.e. 6 editions) leading up to and including polling 
day. The full dates of coding can be found in Appendix B. 
In terms of depth, the seven national newspapers chosen were deliberately selected in 
order to obtain a comprehensive portrait of the editorial diversity of the national press 
during the sample period. The newspapers selected for the study were the Guardian, 
Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Herald (until the 
1964 campaign) and Sun (from the 1964 campaign when the Daily Herald was re-
launched under its new name). These titles were selected due to their longevity and mass 
appeal over time, but also because they can be located across a relatively broad political 
spectrum during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, despite notable shifts in the 
editorial positions of the Daily Mirror and Daily Herald/Sun within this time. Over 25 
election campaigns, the selection of these seven newspapers for six days of each 
campaign week provided approximately 148 weeks (or slightly less than 3 years) of 
equivalent continuous newspaper coverage. 
The majority of this research was conducted in the Social Sciences department at 
Loughborough University, after the Loughborough Communications Research Centre 
(LCRC) acquired a substantial historical news archive. In conjunction with access provided 
by the University library to the ‘full view’ digitalised archives for the Daily Mirror, 
Guardian and Times for nearly all of the sample period, access to the LCRC archive 
provided microfilm copies of the reporting for all the other national titles listed above, for 
almost every election campaign. Editions which were unable to be accessed through 
either of these forms were then sought from the British Newspaper Library at Colindale, 
London110.  
This method of sampling generated 1147 items for analysis (see Table 6.1 for a 
breakdown of these items by newspaper title). 
Unit of Analysis 
For the purposes of coding, newspaper coverage must be divided into units for analysis, 
otherwise known as newspaper ‘items’. Different elements of these items were then 
                                                     
110 This included editions from the Daily Telegraph in February 1974, 1983, 1987, 1992, 2001 and 2010, the 
Times in 2010, the Sun in 2001, the Mail in 1983 and 2001, the Guardian in 2005 and the Express in 2005. 
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coded according to a set of variables and variable values defined as part of a coding 
frame for the content analysis and the headlines and lead paragraphs recorded for the 
purposes of CDA. 
In most cases, each item had its own headline. However, other features such as lines of 
demarcation and by-lines were also observed to determine where one complete 
newspaper article ended and another started. Photographs and pictures were counted if 
accompanying text met the qualifying criteria; the text would then be coded. Sport, 
business/city, ‘celebrity’/‘showbiz’, advertisement, obituary, letters to the editor and 
book review items were omitted due to differences in their function as part of the 
newspaper, as well as for considerations of time and scope. This was offset against an 
expectation that many of these areas of the newspaper would be unlikely to feature 
much discussion of immigration issues in any case, based on observations made during 
the pilot study. This approach nonetheless left a significant degree of news, comment and 
editorial material for coding. 
Qualifying Criteria 
Having defined the units of analysis, establishing qualifying criteria for their identification 
further systematises the sampling of data. As an amorphous and semantically complex 
sociological phenomenon, ‘immigration’ is an inherently difficult issue to define, 
particularly in a historical study for which constructions of its causes, consequences and 
linguistic representation are subject to potential variation over time. A particular set of 
criteria was therefore developed to accommodate this difficulty. An item was defined as 
an ‘immigration item’ if it made reference to one of the following:  
• a person or group of people’s immigration or asylum/refugee status, 
• immigration or ethnic demography patterns/processes (including processes 
particular to the experiences of immigrants such as naturalisation or deportation), 
• or to the state apparatus or policy of immigration control. 
‘Immigration’ and ‘immigrants’ (or ‘asylum seekers’/’refugees’) were taken here to be 
terms used to refer to the processes or actors involved in the cross-border movement of 
people into the United Kingdom, for the purposes of residence, prolonged stay or, if 
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given, of settlement spanning more than 3 months. In this way, those described as having 
migrated previously, currently in the process of migrating or with intentions to migrate to 
the UK were all included but, for example, tourists and visitors were not. 
This set of criteria also acknowledges the issues discussed in Chapter 3, in that while 
‘immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees technically and inherently refer to different 
groups of people…the general macro-structure surrounding these groups bear overall 
identical evaluations hence, the technical distinctions do not come to be crucial in the 
production and interpretation of their discourse’ (KhosraviNik 2010b: 21-22). 
In order to chart fluctuations in the routine and background presence of immigration 
issues in mediated campaign debates, and contrary to many content analysis studies, 
passing references to immigration were coded as part of the study as ‘peripheral’ 
immigration items (see Chapter 6 for findings related to this aspect of coverage). 
Items about the election itself were also coded in order to contextualise the place of 
immigration within wider electoral discourses which focus on other public policy areas 
and social issues. Further, revealing the quantity of immigration coverage which is 
apparently not, at least overtly, related to the election gives an indication of, for example, 
the contemporary news value and accompanying news topics of immigration matters, 
even if not articulated according within the rubric of party or electoral politics. An item 
was defined as an ‘election item’ if it made reference to one of the following: 
• the UK election campaign process (i.e. the poll itself, canvassing, party manifestos 
and policies, campaign trails, candidate selection, etc), 
• or parliamentary candidates either by name or post (e.g. ‘the Prime Minister’). 
The second of these criteria ensured that the definition of an ‘election item’ for the 
purposes of the research would be very broad. It is my claim, however, that the activities 
of politicians, though not always apparently conceived of as ‘campaign events’, 
nonetheless often invoke evaluations of their probity and ability irrespective of the 
degree of agency to which the politician may wield influence over their mediation. For 
this reason, items were counted as election items if politicians were mentioned or quoted 
at party events, in their executive/legislative roles, in their private affairs, and so on. This 
121 
 
was also done in the knowledge that this definition would remain throughout the data 
sample, thereby ensuring reliability.  
Although the focus of the study is located within the frenetic logics of the final week of 
general election campaigning, both election oriented and non-election oriented 
immigration articles were taken into consideration, partly because of the way that 
ordinary issues sometimes gain symbolic import during the campaign period (Seymour-
Ure 1974: 225), but also to acknowledge such issues' wider, mundane and possibly 
incidental appearance in the news during these period. This therefore also allows for 
comparison and contrast between the features of electorally oriented and non-electorally 
oriented coverage. Electorally oriented items are hereby referred to as ‘immigration-as-
electoral-issue’ (IAE) items, the qualifying criteria of which combined those of both 
‘immigration items’ and ‘election items’. Of the 1147 ‘immigration items’, 781 were ‘IAE 
items’111 (see Table 6.2). In total, 28341 election items were counted. 
This distribution of coverage and the relationship between each set is represented as a 
Venn diagram in Figure 5.1 below (scaled proportionally to the size of each set overall)112: 
Figure 5.1: Sample sets 
 
 
                                                     
111 In rare instances (n=7), items may have been coded as an immigration item and as an election item but 
not as an IAE item if qualifying mentions of immigration and the election were exclusive to eachother 
within an item. 
112 This diagram was generated using Google Charts.  
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In defining the sample, the utilisation of these qualifying criteria therefore contributed to 
charting the frequency of coverage and answering the first research question.  
Methods 
Methodological Framework 
As will be argued, for differing reasons, the research questions selected lent themselves 
particularly well to the application of content analysis and CDA. An appropriate 
combination of methods such as these means that ‘the weaknesses of any single method, 
qualitative or quantitative, are balanced by the strengths of other methods’ (Williams, 
Rice and Rogers 1988: 47 in Deacon et al. 2007: 117). This dual approach allows 
researchers to generate both ‘extensive perspectives’ as well as providing ‘intensive 
insights’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 45, citing Maykut and Morehouse 1994: 56).  
The research approach taken operates in accordance with two dimensions of news 
coverage: the ‘interpretative’ dimension and the ‘evaluative’ dimension, adapted from 
the approach outlined in Golding (1990) and Deacon and Golding (1994: 19), originally 
designed to address media responses to policy change. According to Deacon and Golding, 
the interpretative dimension asks ‘what is this issue about?...what aspects…are rendered 
visible, named and promoted?’, while the evaluative dimension asks questions of 
fairness, objectivity and impartiality (i.e. ‘is the report pro or anti some policy, party or 
initiative?’) more conventionally associated with assessing the adequacy of news reports 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, as Golding suggests, the interpretative dimension can also 
‘introduce indirect evaluation by linking a policy with preset responses to key issues’ 
(1990: 97). Hence, while the interpretative dimension is concerned primarily with what is 
‘rendered visible, named and promoted’ rather than with the balance of coverage per se, 
it is still essential to consider that dominant and persistent patterns of presence in 
coverage (e.g. in ‘agenda balance’) can nonetheless lend themselves to a ‘preferred 
reading’ (Hall 1980) of coverage. 
Chapter 7 attends most overtly to the evaluative and interpretative dimensions 
respectively through a discussion of the ‘fairness’ and ‘fullness’ of mediated debate. In 
terms of fairness and the evaluative dimension, assessing the range of attitudes 
expressed by actors afforded news access within the press gives an insight by proxy into 
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the extent to which coverage is critical or supportive towards immigration. In terms of 
fullness and the interpretative dimension, examining which themes dominate coverage 
and which are absent provides an understanding as to what immigration is deemed to be 
most fundamentally about for the press and which frames of understanding are deemed 
to be beyond discussion or incongruous with the values and formats of press reporting.  
This is complemented by an overview of common terms found within coverage in 
Chapter 7 and a critical discourse analysis of three key themes in Chapter 8, from which 
conclusions regarding both dimensions can be drawn.  
Content Analysis 
There are several reasons content analysis is particularly suitable for the aims of this 
research, which come in tandem with a set of methodological objectives established 
since the method’s emergence and in its subsequent development. The definition of 
content analysis provided by Berelson claims that it is a ‘research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication’ (Berelson 1952: 18), a definition which has ‘subsequently been widely 
adopted as the definitive description of quantitative content analysis’ (Richardson 2007: 
16, emphasis in original), despite concerns over the impossibility of maintaining an 
‘objective’ perspective in research. As Deacon et al. note, ‘content analysis is a directive 
method; it gives answers to the questions you pose’ (2007: 119) and is therefore at the 
mercy of the subjectivities of the researcher. Nonetheless, the systematic and statistical 
nature of its results mean that ‘if…you want to establish patterns of representation in 
media content over a given period of time – several months, say, or even several years – 
content analysis provides you with a suitable method for doing so’ (ibid.: 138). For this 
reason, content analysis can be considered ideal for a study of this type. 
More specifically, Berelson (1952) outlines three assumptions that content analysis 
makes, and which make content analysis especially suitable for the study of a large 
sample of historical material: 
1. ‘Content analysis assumes that inferences about the relationship between intent 
and content or between content and effect can validly be made, or the actual 
relationships established’ (1952: 18). 
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Along with a requirement for content analysis to be systematic, the method provides the 
making of ‘replicative and valid inferences from data to their context’ (Krippendorff 1980: 
21). As Deacon et al. put it, the statistics which emerge from quantifying the ‘salient and 
manifest features’ of a large number of news reports can be used to make ‘broader 
inferences about the processes and politics of representation’ through ‘delineating 
trends, patterns and absences’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 119). In this way, content analysis is 
able to provide ‘a systematic procedure for establishing both what is relatively constant 
and what might change’ across a longitudinal timeframe (ibid.: 139). 
2. ‘Content analysis assumes that study of the manifest content is meaningful. This 
assumption requires that the content be accepted as a “common meeting-
ground” for the communicator, the audience and the analyst’ (Berelson 1952: 19).  
In other words, ‘when you and I read the same paper we not only understand it in the 
same way but also understand it in the way intended by the producer of the text’ 
(Richardson 2007: 17). This potentially problematic assumption is therefore most 
appropriately applied to ‘denotative’ rather than ‘connotative’ meaning, encouraging the 
content analyst to code as far as possible features of the data which can be considered 
‘evident or unmistakable’ (ibid.). This is linked to the definition of content analysis as a 
method for studying manifest rather than latent content, such as ‘aesthetic or rhetorical 
nuances’ within texts (Deacon et al. 2007: 119). 
3. ‘Content analysis assumes that the quantitative description of communication 
content is meaningful. This assumption implies that the frequency of occurrence 
of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the 
communication process’ (1952: 20).  
As Richardson points out, however, textual frequency and co-location are not able to 
indicate the agency of social action (2007: 18), so frequencies within texts must therefore 
be carefully analysed as a product of the researcher’s approach and, where applicable, as 
the starting point for focused qualitative work. To this end, features of texts can be 
targeted where changes in frequency, rather than form, are in themselves important 
indicators of changes in discursive practices. As an example, a quantitative change in the 
extent to which news about a defined social issue, such as immigration, appears on the 
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front pages of the national press over multiple comparative time frames might be used to 
make an inference about a fluctuation in its news value.  
Variables 
The coding frame recorded a number of variables, each created with the methodological 
considerations mentioned above in mind (see Appendix C for a full list). Several 
elementary features, such as the date, newspaper title and page of each report could be 
coded prior to examining its contents in detail. Macro-textual features could often be 
coded secondarily, after a cursory glance at the entire article and following the decision 
for its inclusion. These included the type of article (e.g. ‘hard news’, ‘editorial’, 
‘interview’, etc) and the degree of focus on immigration issues in the article (whether or 
not the item was mainly or secondarily about such issues). Next, the item was read 
through and a number of further details could be coded. These included whether or not 
the item was ‘electorally oriented’ according to criteria mentioned above and the 
‘themes’ of the article, up to a maximum of 3 theme codes from a range of 27 broadly-
defined theme values (see Chapter 7 for a complete list). Themes were prioritised from a 
primary to a tertiary theme according to prominence and positioning, but were 
aggregated in the content analysis.  
Further, five actors were coded per item from an extensive list of values, in addition to 
the presence of any pressure groups in the report. Again, positioning and prominence 
(respectively) were used to determine inclusion in this list of five actors and to order 
them, but these were again aggregated in analysis. Actors were included on the basis of 
being an ‘active subject’ within the story, in other words ‘either being quoted, pictured or 
described independently of other actors’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 123). It was therefore not 
enough for an actor to appear ‘only in the context of other people’s comments’ (ibid.). In 
order to differentiate between news presence and news access, the direct quotation (in 
words) of actors was also coded. Additionally, in order to track the ‘evaluative features’ 
(Deacon et al. 2007: 124) of media access, the ‘tone’ of actors was coded as supportive, 
critical, mixed, neutral or indeterminate with regards to the immigration issue at hand or 
in general. In general terms, this meant that an explicitly restrictive attitude towards 
immigration control or the arrival of immigrants could be counted as critical, while 
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attitudes explicitly sympathetic to a relaxation in immigration control or the arrival of 
immigrants would be counted as supportive. 
Finally, in order to further track interpretative features of coverage, several more aspects 
of texts were coded inductively. These relate to the news presence of migrants not 
included as actors, either because they came outside the first five actors of the item or 
because they had a passive role in the report. Though they dealt with news presence, 
another key factor lay in the evaluative dimension of news reports (Golding 1990; Deacon 
and Golding 1994). Tracking these presences through their lexicon, the positive, negative 
or benign connotations of lexical constructions of immigration and immigrants over the 
longue durée begin to reveal themselves (and invited further, qualitative analysis).  A 
‘descriptor’ variable tracked the terms by which migrations were referred to over time, 
whether through the use of verbs (such as those formed from ‘to come’, ‘to migrate’, ‘to 
swamp’, etc), nominalizations (e.g. ‘immigration’, ‘influx’), collective nouns (e.g. ‘hordes’, 
‘swathes’, ‘masses’, etc), and so on. The other two variables of this kind dealt with 
reference to the ethnicity, nationality, religion (e.g. through ethnonym) or provenance 
(such as through the use of the preposition ‘from’) of migrant groups in coverage, and 
reference to the type of migrants present in coverage (whether formally such as with 
‘refugee’, informally such as with ‘asylum cheats’ or by reference to appropriate 
processes such as with ‘claimed asylum’).  
Inter-coder reliability  
Reliability is a fundamentally important principle in carrying out credible research, so its 
testing is important in ensuring consistency and ‘repeatability’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 130). 
The use of a single coder over a long-period of data collection and coding means that 
issues of reliability are more likely to surface. To remedy these concerns, an inter-coder 
reliability test was performed by a second coder. This ensures that the concepts used in 
the coding frame are intelligible to other researchers and that the coding of data is 
consistent across the dataset.  
Table 5.1 displays the percentage of agreement between the author and second coder for 
all variables used in the subsequent analysis across 52 articles (approximately 4.5% of the 
dataset).  
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Table 5.1: Inter-coder reliability results 
Variable Percentage Agreement 
Date 100% (52/52 responses) 
Newspaper 100% (52/52 responses) 
Page 100% (52/52 responses) 
Type of Article 92.3% (48/52 responses) 
Is item IAE? 96.2% (50/52 responses) 
Focus 90.4% (47/52 responses) 
Themes (aggregated) 89.1% (139/156 responses) 
Actors (aggregated) 85.4% (222/260 responses) 
Sum direct quotation 2074 / 1963 
Actor tone 87.7% (228/260 responses) 
Descriptor terms 89.1% (139/156 responses) 
Immigrant group terms 89.7% (140/156 responses) 
Immigration type terms 96.2% (150/156 responses) 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Proponents of critical discourse analysis frequently define it as an ‘approach rather than a 
method’, and as a research programme/school of likeminded scholars, with a set of 
shared assumptions, principles and goals (see, for example, Meyer 2001; Wodak and 
Meyer 2009: 5; Titscher et al. 2000: 144-146; van Dijk 1993c). The methodological 
diversity of CDA therefore allows for an array of techniques to be used from a variety of 
sub-approaches, which include van Dijk’s ‘sociocognitive approach’, the ‘corpus 
linguistics’ approach, van Leeuwen’s ‘social actors approach’, Fairclough’s ‘dialectical-
relational approach’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 25-27) and the ‘discourse historical approach’, 
of which Ruth Wodak has been a central pioneer. CDA research is often orientated 
towards concerns with social problems, power in and over discourse, the production, 
reproduction and transformation of society and culture, the ideological use of language 
and the historical context of discourse (Titscher et al. 2000: 146). 
Since content analysis looks at ‘aggregated meaning-making across texts, the methods 
tends to skate over complex and varied processes of meaning-making within texts’ 
(Deacon et al. 2007: 119). As Richardson argues, this means that the ‘context that 
surrounds the formation of content’ is ignored (2007: 20).  In response, CDA can ‘offer 
interpretations of the meaning of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and 
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deriving meaning from this; situate what is written or said in the context in which it 
occurs, rather than just summarising patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that 
textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and 
consumer rather than simply being ‘read off’ the page by all readers in exactly the same 
way’ (ibid.: 15, emphasis in original). Further, content analysis – being directive – may 
lead researchers to neglect to answer questions they don’t pose at the outset of the 
research. CDA, on the other hand, due to its analytical procedure of moving between 
data collection and analysis ‘[meets] the requirements of grounded theory’ (Titscher et al. 
2000: 167) and, it can be argued, offers opportunities to ‘explore texts in order to 
develop ideas and insights’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 119) that content analysis does not. 
Utilising content analysis and CDA together is therefore useful because by sequencing the 
methods suitably it is possible to study news coverage in great volume and in necessary 
detail and move beyond the inadequacies of each method, thereby providing a ‘general 
picture’ of the object of research (Bryman 1992: 60-61). In fact, the quantitative analysis 
assists the qualitative analysis, since the qualitative research ‘may facilitate the 
interpretation of relationships between variables’ (ibid.). 
It is essential to demonstrate the historical contingencies of news discourses through a 
critical perspective. This is because an unfortunate consequence of critical research which 
takes a short-term approach is that in privileging the study of contemporary 
manifestations of hegemonic power and assuming that contemporary discourses have 
prevailed historically, they neglect to imagine which alternative constructions were 
available to those responsible for the creation of the ‘first draft of history’ and to connect 
which others were marginalised or included cross-temporally. As Richardson puts it, ‘the 
difference with a more interpretative (and some would say critical) textual analysis is that 
the analyst examines the text in terms of what is present and what could have been but is 
not present’ (Richardson 2007: 38). 
The CDA approach chosen for this study was the Fairclough model (see Fairclough 1989, 
1995; Titscher et al. 2000), supported by the analytical insights of Richardson (2007), van 
Leeuwen (1995, 1996, 2008) and Conboy (2007). Fairclough’s approach, in which texts, 
discursive practices and social practices exist in an ongoing ‘dialectical-relational’ 
relationship, is particularly conducive to an application of CDA to historical material. As 
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Titcher et al. point out, Fairclough’s ‘historical foundation is that texts are good indicators 
of social change’ (2000: 152). The model can be illustrated using Figure 5.2 below: 
Figure 5.2: The Fairclough model of CDA (Fairclough 1995: 98) 
This model, Fairclough contends, defines the dimensions of ‘each discursive event’ 
(Titscher et al. 2000: 150) which are in an interactive relationship due to the contention 
that ‘language is not only socially constitutive, but is also viewed as socially determined’ 
(ibid.: 149). In terms of each dimension (Titscher et al. 2000: 150-151):  
• ‘at the textual level content and form are analysed’ and are considered 
‘inseparable’. Richardson feels ‘it is best to start with the text itself, gradually 
building outwards to include more complex discursive and social practices’ (2007: 
37); 
• ‘discursive practice…is to do with the socio-cognitive aspects of text production 
and interpretation’ which ‘leave so-called cues in a text and interpretation takes 
place on the basis of textual elements.’ At this level, Fairclough emphasises 
intertextuality in a manner which owes a debt to Bakhtinian dialogism (see 
Fairclough 1992); 
• ‘social practice relates to the different levels of social organization: the situation, 
the institutional context, the wider group or social context. Questions of power 
Dimensions of discourse Dimensions of discourse analysis 
Text 
Process of production 
Process of interpretation 
Discourse practice 
Sociocultural practice 
(Situational; institutional; societal) 
Description (text analysis) 
Interpretation (processing analysis) 
Explanation (social analysis) 
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are of central interest; power and ideologies may have effect on each of the 
contextual levels’. 
One implication of this approach is that CDA offers an emancipatory examination of ‘the 
role that journalism plays in maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities’ 
(Richardson 2007: 38) and therefore ‘seeks to have an effect on social practice and social 
relationships’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 147). This comes in response to the way that 
inequalities can be concealed through the representation of transient but dominant (i.e. 
hegemonic) ideologies as ‘eternal, natural, inevitable or “rational”’ (Jones 2001: 227 in 
Richardson 2007: 34) to the suppression or containment of alternatives (Fairclough 1989: 
91). This response is applied by critical discourse analysts particularly to ‘relationships of 
disempowerment, dominance, prejudice and/or discrimination’ (Richardson 2007: 26). 
This part of the research design therefore takes as central to its conceptualisation the 
functionalist definition of discourse as ‘language in use’ (ibid.: 23-24). This definition is 
most associated with Halliday, who argues that ‘the particular form taken by the 
grammatical system of a language is closely related to the social and personal needs that 
language is required to serve (1970: 141 in Titscher et al. 2000: 170, n. 1).  
A criticism sometimes aimed at critical discourse analysts is that their analysis may be 
directed by pre-existing researcher bias, in which (at it most vehemently expressed) 
‘interpretation in support of belief takes precedence over analysis in support of theory’ 
(Widdowson 1995: 159). This may lead to ‘cherry-picking’ examples, a problem best 
avoided by ‘integrating quantitative and qualitative methods’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 
11), as here. The way in which this is done within this study is by selecting themes in 
coverage of high quantitative frequency, and analyzing the linguistic features of their 
headlines and leads. The presentation of this analysis can be found in Chapter 8. The next 
short section will discuss the particular ideological and stylistic features of headlines and 
leads. 
Headlines 
Headlines and lead paragraphs are an exceptionally important unit of qualitative analysis, 
for their stylistic conventions as much their ‘pragmatic’ function (Iarovici and Amel 1989: 
441-443 in Richardson 2007: 197). 
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Firstly, the position and size of headlines draw the initial attention of the newspaper 
reader to the article, and therefore structure the reader’s understanding of the article 
which follows (van Dijk 1991: 50). They invariably contain grammatically incomplete 
clauses (e.g. the routine deletion of the definite article) in paring multiple 
processes/events down to a single ‘main’ event (Bell 1991: 187) for reasons of brevity, 
necessarily producing partial representations of the complexities involved in social 
actions and events. Tabloid headlines, in particular, are often constructed as simple noun 
phrases instead of full clauses (Richardson 2007: 203).  
The paring of multiple events down to single events is the product of the discursive 
practices of the newsroom, according to what is seen (usually by a sub-editor) to be the 
most important aspect of the story. Headlines can therefore ‘upgrade’ or ‘downgrade’ 
topics (van Dijk 1991: 51) depending on the subjective decisions of newspaper staff, who 
come to produce one of a myriad of potential constructions. Whether by referential or 
syntactic choice, headlines therefore supply an indication of a ‘preferred reading’ of a 
story to newspaper audiences (van Dijk 1988: 40), demonstrating to a significant degree 
the newspaper’s ideological preferences and socio-cultural orientation (Conboy 2007: 
58).  
These choices are also reliant on news values, whether in general or specifically for a 
particular newspaper in the context of its market position and expected stylistic register 
(ibid.: 15). In general, for example, news values tend to mean that political figures, 
officials, celebrities, sportspersons, professionals and other public figures, criminals and 
the accused, human interest figures and participants in news events (e.g. victims and 
witnesses) are placed first in headlines in active positions (Conboy 2007: 15, citing Bell 
1991: 194). Indeed, reference is made to such people so frequently in this way in some 
newspapers that they may be categorised into one of a number of noun phrases (e.g. 
‘Honest Taxpayers’, ‘Soccer Star’, ‘Health Bosses’) which ‘act as a distillation of the news 
value of the actor to the newspaper in question’ (Conboy 2007: 15). When it comes to 
news reports involving political elites and other officials, news values may dictate that the 
headline and article will be concerned primarily with what they say or do simply because 
their high status and power is assumed to be of self-evident importance to the audience. 
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The first – or ‘lead’ – sentence (or paragraph) of news articles, in turn, elaborates on and 
clarifies the headline, by providing the ‘wh-‘ details of the news report (i.e. the who, 
what, when, where, why and/or how), and is also therefore organised as part of the 
‘summary’ of the article along with the headline (van Dijk 1988: 15). The lead is, in fact, 
written prior to the headline by the journalist responsible for the article, whereas the 
headline is written by the sub-editor (Bell 1991: 186). The major descriptive details 
featured in the lead are followed by extra or further elaborative details deemed to be of 
lesser importance thereafter, a convention commonly known as the ‘inverted pyramid’ 
structure of hard news reports. Again, the information found here is the product of a 
strict process of selection, subtly condensing the values of the newspaper into as succinct 
and coherent narrative as possible (Conboy 2007: 17). They, too, therefore bear 
ideological implications. 
The next chapter introduces the findings of the content analysis. 
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6: The Quantity of Coverage and the Actors in Coverage 
Introduction 
This chapter and the next will examine quantitative patterns of frequency and form in the 
press coverage of immigration issues across the final week of the 25 election campaigns 
from 1918 to 2010, in order to assess key continuities and changes in these issues’ 
representation.  
The chapter will address two elements of coverage. First, it will examine the quantity, 
frequency and depth of coverage over time and across the sampled newspapers, and 
further in terms of the extent to which immigration coverage has appeared in electoral 
coverage and the extent to which it has appeared in various news formats.  Second, it will 
provide an assessment of the level of news presence and news access of social actors 
in/to the news, also over time and across the sampled newspapers. This chapter is 
therefore oriented towards answering the first three research questions identified in 
Chapter 5 and elaborating on the issues identified in the initial theoretical chapters.  
Firstly, it is important to assess to what extent and when immigration stories have been 
the domain of the quality, mid-market and/or popular press in the longue durée. This 
enhances not only a general understanding of the character of the coverage, but 
assessing quantitative differences in their coverage helps to determine in what ways 
issues of immigration are able to be problematised and articulated in terms coherent and 
meaningful to various audiences at particular junctures.  
Secondly, identifying recurrences, fractures, reformulations and more general 
developments in the coverage over time will enable further conclusions to be drawn 
about how these discourses are constructed in the short-term and how we may situate 
them in relation to historical conditions. These conclusions will consequently inform the 
latter qualitative stages of analysis. 
Quantity and frequency: How much and when? 
The quantity and frequency of items coded about a certain issue in a content analysis 
gives an indication of the extent to which the issue is able to satisfy a variety of ‘news 
values’ and therefore its perceived importance to news audiences. The hyper-
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competitiveness of the final week of election reporting means that at this point in time 
critical issues might find heightened news value to the marginalisation of those not seen 
to be so crucial. When ‘immigration’ is present on the news agenda during a campaign 
week, it can therefore be inferred that in that particular period immigration issues are 
able to readily fit into a narrative which satisfies a number of news values and that 
immigration is deemed to be an issue of significance in the political landscape of the day. 
The first part of this section of the chapter gives an overview of the amount of 
immigration coverage that featured within the press over time and across newspapers.  
The number of immigration items and the campaigns in which they were published is 
shown in Figure 6.1. It illustrates the points at which all 1147 immigration items appeared 
during the 25 election periods from 1918 to 2010. The mean number of items per edition 
was 1.10 and 1039 editions were coded in total113. Notable peaks in the coverage include 
the 1918 campaign in the inter-war period, and the 1970, 2001, 2005 and 2010 
campaigns in the post-1945 period. The majority of interwar campaigns and the first 
post-Second World War campaigns featured little coverage of immigration issues.  
  
                                                     
113 In 1918, the Daily Herald was published only on Saturdays, so the number of cases for the 1918 
campaign was 37; in 1979, an industrial dispute suspended publication of the Times, so the number of 
cases for the 1979 campaign was 36. Further, the 8th and 9th June 1970 were used for all newspapers 
instead of the 12th and 13th June due to strike action by printers, and the Daily Telegraph of the 21st 
February 1974 was used instead of the 28th due to strike action by journalists at the Daily Telegraph. 
The mean number of items for the 1918 and 1979 campaigns is therefore higher than would be suggested 
by Figure 6.1, due to the fewer number of editions published during these campaigns. 
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Figure 6.1: Sum total of immigration items per campaign 
 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the overall number of immigration items by publication, in 
addition to the mean number of items published per edition in each. Of the 1147 items 
coded, the Guardian contained the most immigration items, while the Daily Mirror 
contained the fewest. Four of the seven publications, including all three ‘quality’ 
newspapers, contained an average of more than one immigration item per campaign day.  
Table 6.1: Sum total and mean number of immigration items by newspaper 
Newspaper Sector Title of publication Sum Mean 
‘Quality’ Guardian 243 1.62 
‘Quality’ Times 210 1.46 
‘Quality’ Telegraph 231 1.54 
‘Mid-market’ Mail 161 1.07 
‘Mid-market Express 116 .77 
‘Popular’ Mirror 83 .55 
‘Popular’ Sun/Herald 103 .71 
 Total 1147 1.10 
 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the frequency with which items were published across three 
newspaper sectors by campaign. The data shows the sum total of items (in Figure 6.2) 
published within the ‘quality’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘popular’ press for each campaign period, 
0
50
100
150
200
250
Su
m
 
Campaign 
136 
 
with the mean value (in Figure 6.3) providing an average of items per published edition 
(which therefore adjusts for missing editions and the broader ‘quality’ sector, which 
includes three newspapers rather than two). Over the totality of coverage, the data 
shows that 684 items were published in the ‘quality’ press (or 1.54 per edition), 277 items 
were published in the ‘mid-market’ (‘mids’) press (or .92 per edition) and 186 items were 
published in the popular (‘pops’) press (or .63 per edition).  
The data demonstrates that the large expanse in coverage of immigration issues which 
has occurred in the post-Second World War period has been led, at least numerically, by 
the quality press. This is likely due in part to the wider ‘newshole’ of the quality press, 
which tends to contain more pages than the newspapers of other sectors and which until 
format changes between 2004 and 2006 were far larger than their tabloid and mid-
market counterparts (see Lewis et al. 2008a; Williams 1976: ch. 3). However, despite this 
caveat, the links made within a number of studies between racist and discriminatory 
coverage of issues relating to ‘race’ and immigration with the red-top tabloids and the 
mid-market press (as discussed in Chapter 2) has not meant that these are the areas 
where the most coverage of immigration can necessarily be found. Indeed, in some 
election campaigns, such as in 1970 and 2005, the quality newspapers overwhelmingly 
dominated the discussion of immigration in the press. Meanwhile, the popular press 
produced very little immigration coverage compared with the other two sectors in 
campaigns such as 1997 and 2005, and have rarely surpassed the levels found in the mid-
market newspapers in the post-war era.  
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Figure 6.2: Sum total of immigration items across press sectors by campaign 
 
Figure 6.3: Mean number of immigration items per edition across press sectors by 
campaign 
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There are, nonetheless, some notable exceptions to this general domination by the 
quality press. As is shown, far fewer immigration items were published in most 
campaigns during the interwar period than in those from the 1950s onwards. The 1918 
campaign did, however, produce a relatively high degree of immigration coverage114. 
Though driven mainly by a higher number of items in the quality press sector, Figure 6.3 
demonstrates that the popular press published more immigration items in 1918 on 
average than the other sectors (in the Mirror’s six editions and the Herald’s single 
Saturday edition). This pattern was echoed in the later 1922 and 1935 campaigns, in 
which the popular press again averaged a larger number of immigration items. 
Regardless, after the 1918 campaign the mean number of immigration items never 
surpassed one item per edition in any sector again until the 1964 campaign. 
Despite limited private concerns about immigration within central government after the 
arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948 and the post-hoc (if accurate) attachment of 
seismic symbolism to the passage of the British Nationality Act 1948 (see Spencer 1997; 
Hansen 2000), the press were yet to seriously address immigration issues by the 1950 
campaign, and barely had in the 1945 campaign. The issue also failed to arise as it had on 
previous occasions, such as in 1931 and 1935, in which any possible political implications 
of the issue’s presence were not made explicit – its appearance being an artefact of the 
typical and incidental way in which issues such as immigration happen to appear at 
critical times. 
Overall, immigration coverage has grown markedly during the 2001-2010 era, with a 
notable peak also in 1970. From a limited depth of coverage in the interwar period, 
coverage relented to a virtual or total absence immediately following the Second World 
War. Thereafter, it quickly grew over several campaigns to the then-peak of the 1970 
campaign, before stabilising to lower levels for several campaigns. From the 2001 
campaign onwards, immigration coverage grew continuously and rapidly at a rate not 
previously seen in any period in the previous several decades. The quality press has been 
at the forefront of much of these developments. Some caution should be exercised in 
                                                     
114 The vast majority of the coverage from 1918 concerned the presence of German migrants in the country 
and proposals on the part of politicians (such as David Lloyd George) to forcibly repatriate all such so-called 
‘enemy aliens’. 
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assessing inclines in the volume of coverage of political issues given the two-to-threefold 
increase in the pagination of the national press, especially since 1985 (Lewis et al. 2008a: 
35-37), but this can also be offset by a gradual decline in political (and parliamentary) 
coverage (Negrine 1999: 332). Regardless of these caveats, the degree to which 
immigration coverage has seemingly exploded on the news agenda since the 2001 
election demands closer attention on the circumstances of this trend. 
Two dimensions of the coverage are obscured by a perspective focussed on coverage in 
its totality. Firstly, the coverage needs to be considered in terms of the extent to which 
fluctuations in coverage, such as the post-1945 expansion and that of the 2000s, are due 
to a focus on immigration primarily or whether in fact its appearance is predicated on its 
infiltration into discussions of other topics, as a subsidiary issue. Secondly, the coverage 
ought to be considered in terms of when immigration is explicitly associated with the 
politics of the election and when it appears as a residual and un-politicised issue.  
Focus of coverage 
While immigration issues may have become a prominent part of the campaign 
environment, it might also be said that they are an ambient part of this environment. In 
other words, their rise in prominence may not be the result of a move to the centre of 
mediated political debate – they may instead play a peripheral role in campaign debates 
as a subsidiary electoral issue. In order to assess the intensity and depth of coverage 
beyond measures of its quantity and frequency, therefore, the notion of ‘focus’ may be 
applied to separate coverage which discusses immigration in depth from coverage which 
examines it superficially in the course of discussing other issues. 
A binary distinction divides the coverage into ‘main’ focus items, whereby items 
prominently and predominantly featured immigration issues, and ‘secondary’ focus 
items, whereby items featured immigration issues on parity with several other issues, 
secondarily to other issues or peripherally. 
Figure 6.4 shows the depth of focus within all immigration items by campaign. Across all 
1147 items, 520 (or 45.3%) of the 1147 total immigration items were of main focus, and 
627 (or 54.7%) were of secondary focus.   
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Figure 6.4: The focus of immigration items (raw counts) by campaign 
 
Despite a large expansion in immigration coverage overall which culminated in the levels 
of immigration coverage found in 2005 and in 2010, much of this expansion can be 
accounted for by an unprecedented growth in immigration items of secondary focus that 
began with the 2001 campaign, with only a fairly modest growth between 1997 and 2010 
in coverage which dealt centrally with immigration. In fact, the 2010 campaign (47 items) 
was third to the 1970 campaign (70 items) and the 1987 campaign (51 items) in terms of 
main focus immigration coverage.  
Exploring patterns of focus distributed according to newspaper type, Figure 6.5 shows the 
mean distribution per newspaper title of immigration items of main focus across the 
quality, mid-market and popular press sectors over time, while Figure 6.6 shows the same 
but for immigration items of secondary focus. 
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Figure 6.5: Mean distribution across press sectors of main focus immigration items over 
time 
 
Figure 6.6: Mean distribution across press sectors of secondary focus immigration items 
over time 
 
Figure 6.5 reiterates that the quality press have generally tended to dominate the 
discussion of immigration in the post-1945 era, including more in-depth coverage. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ea
n 
Campaign 
quality
mid-market
popular
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ea
n 
Campaign 
quality
mid-market
popular
142 
 
However, the mid-market press has on occasion contained more main focus immigration 
items than the quality press, such as in 1992 and 2010.  
Interestingly, no sector dominated the inter-war period in discussing immigration. 
Overall, only during the 1922 and 1935 campaigns did the popular press produce more 
immigration items of main focus than either of the other two press sectors. Figure 6.6 
illustrates that both the mid-market and popular press sectors saw a large increase in 
secondary focus immigration items in 2010, but it was the quality press which accounted 
for the most secondary focus items in 1970 and which saw a steep rise in such items 
during the 2000s, not just in 2010. Overall, dividing coverage into ‘main focus’ and 
‘secondary focus’ coverage has shown that the dominance of the quality press in 
reporting immigration affairs is less substantial than it would appear at first glance. 
Although these newspapers have rarely been surpassed by the newspapers of other 
sectors in the quantity of their immigration coverage, the quality press produced less 
discussion of immigration issues in 2010, while much of its dominance and its increases in 
immigration coverage overall are primarily due to the discussion of immigration as an 
issue secondarily to others.  
The overall growth of coverage which features discussion of immigration secondarily to 
other issues suggests that immigration has been established politically as an issue which 
needs no introduction and which can be considered in relation to a number of other 
issues. In other words, it has become something of an ordinary and ‘touchstone’ political 
issue. This argument will be explored in more detail in relation to IAE coverage below. 
As an electoral issue 
As suggested previously, it is important to know in analysing the news coverage of an 
issue in electoral periods how much of the coverage of the issue is specifically related to 
discussion of policy and electoral fortunes. On the one hand, this enables inferences to be 
made about the political and electoral importance of the issue (for IAE coverage), while 
on the other hand it gives an indication as to the extent to which the issue is an ambient 
part of ordinary news coverage (for non-IAE coverage).  
Table 6.2 shows the level of immigration and IAE coverage over time. The table shows 
that, of 1147 immigration items 781 were IAE items. This means that 68.1% of all 
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immigration coverage was connected in some way to the election. This provides an 
average of .75 IAE items per edition across the entirety of coverage. 
Table 6.2: Sum and mean number of ‘immigration items’ and ‘IAE’ items per campaign 
Campaign  1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Immigration 
items 
Sum 39 18 9 11 8 
Mean 1.05 .43 .21 .26 .19 
IAE items 
Sum 20 10 6 5 1 
Mean .54 .24 .14 .12 .02 
  
Campaign  1931 1935 1945 1950 1951 
Immigration 
items 
Sum 6 18 2 0 8 
Mean .14 .43 .05 .00 .19 
IAE items 
Sum 0 0 1 0 6 
Mean .00 .00 .02 .00 .14 
 
Campaign  1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 
Immigration 
items 
Sum 11 24 51 58 116 
Mean .26 .57 1.21 1.38 2.76 
IAE items 
Sum 2 11 29 39 78 
Mean .05 .26 .69 .93 1.86 
 
Campaign  1974a 1974b 1979 1983 1987 
Immigration 
items 
Sum 53 30 65 39 67 
Mean 1.26 .71 1.81 .93 1.60 
IAE items 
Sum 32 15 26 25 33 
Mean .76 .36 .72 .60 .79 
 
Campaign  1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Immigration 
items 
Sum 46 24 77 149 218 
Mean 1.10 .57 1.83 3.55 5.19 
IAE items 
Sum 39 19 55 123 206 
Mean .93 .45 1.31 2.93 4.90 
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While the amount of immigration coverage has expanded in recent years, Table 6.2 
suggests that this is due in the most part to a large rise in the extent to which 
‘immigration’ has grown as an almost exclusively electoral issue in those campaigns.  
To demonstrate this, the data from Table 6.2 can be shown in the form of another table, 
Table 6.3, which displays the percentage of immigration items which were also election 
items (i.e. IAE items) in each election. This data shows that the proportion of IAE 
coverage grew towards the latter campaigns of the sample, a trend which is especially 
apparent from 1992 onwards, from which point the proportion of IAE items consistently 
exceeded 70%. During the 1992, 2005 and 2010 campaigns, the proportion of IAE items 
of total immigration coverage reached 84.8%, 82.6% and 94.5% respectively. These 
figures are somewhat higher than those found for the campaigns in the 1960s during 
which time immigration (and ‘race’) became a highly politicised issue, and are in stark 
contrast with other campaigns such as the 1931 and 1935 campaigns, the immigration 
coverage of which featured no reference to the election.  
Table 6.3: The percentage of immigration items coded as IAE items per campaign 
campaign % 
Total 
immigration 
items 
 campaign % 
Total 
immigration 
items 
1918 51.3 39  1966 67.2 58 
1922 55.6 18  1970 67.2 116 
1923 66.7 9  1974a 60.4 53 
1924 45.5 11  1974b 50.0 30 
1929 12.5 8  1979 40.0 65 
1931 0.0 6  1983 64.1 39 
1935 0.0 18  1987 49.3 67 
1945 50.0 2  1992 84.8 46 
1950 N/A 0  1997 79.2 24 
1951 75.0 8  2001 71.4 77 
1955 18.2 11  2005 82.6 149 
1959 45.8 24  2010 94.5 218 
1964 56.9 51  Mean 53.7 1147 
 
One way to perceive these results is that, in some elections, the presence of immigration 
on the news agenda ostensibly results from the co-incidence of the ordinary news cycle 
with the campaign week. Nonetheless, the consistent establishment of an electoral 
element to immigration news in campaign week is suggestive of a trend in which 
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immigration has increasingly become an issue that is barely ever able to transcend its 
association with the election. Immigration may have been covered to some degree as an 
issue of electoral import in earlier campaigns, but it is the increased consistency and 
depth to which it has become articulated in these terms which distinguishes recent 
campaigns from their earlier counterparts. In short, it has become an election issue. 
This can be explored from another angle by placing IAE coverage in the context of 
election coverage in general. This helps to broadens the overview provided so far to 
assess to what extent the ebb and flow of IAE coverage can be explained by wider 
fluctuations in editorial priorities and resources vis–à–vis political and electoral news 
coverage and to what extent immigration issues have been established amongst a range 
of other issues which come to the fore during campaign periods.  
To this end, Figure 6.7 shows a comparison between the mean number of election items 
per edition and the mean number of IAE items per edition in each campaign. The results 
show that, across all 25 campaigns, the mean number of election items per edition was 
27.3. However, this figure has deviated from the mean considerably over time. Most 
notably, the number of electoral items changed dramatically between the interwar 
period and the post-1945 period. During the campaigns of the early 1920s, in particular, 
the average number of election reports reached distinct peaks: 38.3 per edition in the 
1922 campaign, 41.8 per edition in 1923 and 55.4 per edition in 1924. The lowest number 
of election items for any campaign in the interwar period was 26.7 items per edition in 
the 1918 campaign, comparable to the peaks of the post-1945 period. Indeed, from 1945 
onwards, the number of election items per edition ranged from 18.4 in 1945 to 27.3 in 
1959. The marked difference between the level of election coverage between the 
interwar and post-1945 periods can be attributed to at least some extent to changes in 
the unitisation of news between these periods rather than wholly because these 
newspapers featured more substantial discussion of electoral politics. Further, the low 
number of items in 1945 can be attributed to the rationing of newsprint, which reduced 
the size of newspapers to four pages in this campaign (Wieten 1988; Williams 2010: 176-
177). These considerations are important in assessing the limits of what Figure 6.7 can 
say about the level of election coverage over time, but since it is the comparison between 
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election coverage and IAE coverage that is of note here it is not essential to standardise 
these factors across time to understand the comparison. 
Comparing the two figures for each campaign, the level of IAE coverage in relation to the 
level of election coverage in the interwar period renders immigration issues a barely 
visible aspect of the wider election news agenda during this time. The mean number of 
IAE items per edition was 0.5 in the 1918 campaign, 0.2 in the 1922 campaign and 0 for 
the 1931 and 1935 campaigns, a fraction of the election coverage in these campaigns (the 
1931 campaign featured 36.9 election items on average per edition while the 1935 
campaign featured 30.7 items on average). After the continuation of this trend in the first 
few elections of the post-1945 era, the level of IAE coverage grew within a few campaigns 
from 0.3 per edition in the 1959 campaign to 0.7 in 1964, 0.9 in 1966 and 1.9 in 1970, 
before diminishing to 0.8 and 0.4 in the two 1974 campaigns. In the 2000s, this figure 
reached 1.3 in 2001, 2.9 in 2005 and 4.9 in 2010, thereby coming to comprise a sizeable 
proportion of total election coverage. 
Figure 6.7: The mean number of election items per edition compared with the mean 
number of IAE items per edition by campaign 
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As Figure 6.7 indicates, increases or decreases in election items do not necessarily 
translate to increases or decreases in IAE items. In fact, the Pearson correlation co-
efficient for the entire time period is -0.37 and for the campaigns from 1945-2010 the 
Pearson correlation co-efficient is -0.33. This means that there is a weak negative 
correlation between the number of election items and IAE items over time. In other 
words, it would appear that immigration issues have risen in prominence in campaign 
coverage despite an overall stagnation in the amount of election coverage produced 
across the press in the post-1945 era. 
Figure 6.8 reformulates the same data, showing what proportion of all election coverage 
was IAE coverage, as a percentage. 
Figure 6.8: Percentage of election items counted as IAE items 
 
Figure 6.8 pronounces further the steep, recent incline in immigration’s cache as an 
electoral issue, replicating patterns identified elsewhere over some of the more recent 
campaigns (e.g. Billig et al. 2005). Nonetheless, the 1970 campaign is notable for the 
salience of immigration as a contemporary electoral issue, exceeding even the 2001 
campaign in this regard. Even earlier, the 1918 campaign can reasonably be compared in 
this sense to some of the campaigns between the 1960s and 1990s. The 2005 and 2010 
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campaigns, however, show an even further entrenchment of immigration as an electoral 
issue than any prior campaigns, with 15% and 22.5% of all election coverage respectively 
containing some reference to immigration issues.  To a large extent, the rise in this 
statistic between 2005 and 2010 can be accounted for by the drama generated by the 
‘bigot-gate’ incident which came late into the 2010 election campaign. Much of the news 
interest for this incident came in its intrinsic newsworthiness as a ‘gaffe’ and for its 
symbolic importance as part of Gordon Brown and the Labour Party’s bid for election. 
Nevertheless, it can also be seen as an incident fuelled by the contemporary importance 
of the main issue raised by Duffy – immigration – to which it was widely assumed Brown’s 
‘bigot’ comment related. The residual news value of immigration – intertwined with the 
wider immigration and party politics of the preceding years – therefore quite conceivably 
accounted not only for a substantial amount of immigration coverage during the 
campaign but also for the propulsion of the bigot-gate incident on the news agenda. 
Beyond the quantity of items, the placement of items in a newspaper gives an indication 
of their newsworthiness and presupposed importance. While a page number closer to 
the front of the newspaper does not necessarily provide categorical evidence of an item’s 
potential ranking in terms of importance, when taken in relation to the total coverage of 
that issue during a week of coverage it more reliably indicates the significance of that 
issue on the news and electoral agenda. Table 6.4 shows the number of immigration 
items and IAE items located on the front page per campaign, in addition to these 
numbers as a proportion of all immigration items and IAE items. It is important to note 
here that the significance of front page status only became widespread across national 
newspaper titles in the 1960s; the front page of The Times until the 1960s and the Daily 
Mail until the 1930s, for example, featured only classified ads rather than news stories, 
while there were also a number of general changes in newspaper design between 1918 
and 2010. 
The results shown in Table 6.4 suggest that the prominence of immigration coverage 
generally reflects the quantity of total coverage. Results from the 1970, 1987 and 1992 
campaigns are of interest in particular, though, for the level to which IAE coverage 
featured on the front page during these campaigns. During the 1970 campaign, for 
example, immigration coverage was quantitatively high, which was reflected in the level 
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to which it made the front page. In this sense, it was both prominent and pervasive. In 
1992, on the other hand, total immigration coverage was relatively low, but it made the 
front page proportionately more than in most other campaigns. In this sense, then, 
immigration coverage during the 1992 campaign can be characterised as highly 
prominent more than pervasive. Recent campaigns are also notable for an emerging 
consistency with which IAE coverage features on the front page, at between 4% and 6% 
of all IAE coverage in 2001, 2005 and 2010.  
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Table 6.4: Front page immigration and IAE items by campaign 
campaign 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
 
Number 
of front-
page 
items 
% of 
total 
items per 
category 
Number 
of front-
page 
items 
% of 
total 
items per 
category 
Number 
of front-
page 
items 
% of 
total 
items per 
category 
Number 
of front-
page 
items 
% of 
total 
items per 
category 
Number 
of front-
page 
items 
% of 
total 
items per 
category 
immigration 
items 0 0.0% 1 5.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
IAE items 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
 
campaign 1931 1935 1945 1950 1951 
immigration 
items 1 16.7% 3 16.7% 0 0.0% 0 N/A 1 12.5% 
IAE items 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0.0% 0 N/A 1 16.7% 
 
campaign 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 
immigration 
items 1 9.1% 2 8.3% 3 5.9% 3 5.2% 12 10.3% 
IAE items 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 3.4% 1 2.6% 10 12.8% 
 
campaign 1974a 1974b 1979 1983 1987 
immigration 
items 2 3.8% 1 3.3% 3 4.6% 1 2.6% 17 25.4% 
IAE items 1 3.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 4.0% 8 24.2% 
 
campaign 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
immigration 
items 4 8.7% 0 0.0% 3 3.9% 6 4.0% 12 5.5% 
IAE items 4 10.3% 0 0.0% 3 5.5% 5 4.1% 12 5.8% 
 
Total 
 Number 
of front-
page 
items 
% of 
total 
items per 
category 
immigration 
items 76 6.6% 
IAE items 47 6.0% 
 
 
Table 6.5 cross-tabulates the focus of items (i.e. items of main focus vs. Items of 
secondary focus) against their electoral orientation (i.e. IAE items vs. non-IAE items), 
demonstrating that a large proportion of items of secondary focus were electorally-
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oriented (84.1%), in contrast with the proportion and number of main focus items which 
were electorally-oriented (48.8%).  
Table 6.5: Focus of immigration items by electoral orientation 
 IAE non-IAE Total 
focus 
main 
254 266 520 
48.8% 51.2% 100.0% 
secondary 
527 100 627 
84.1% 15.9% 100.0% 
Total 781 366 1147 
Percentages are row percentages. Percentages are rounded so may not total 100%. 
 
This disparity between the two focus categories and their electoral orientation might be 
explained as indicative of the embedding of immigration issues into general campaign 
narratives, so that a large number of immigration items in the latter campaigns might not 
have centred mainly on immigration issues but were related to the election. Figure 6.9 
provides a temporal overview of the depth of focus in IAE items by campaign. 
Figure 6.9: The focus of IAE items (raw counts) by campaign 
 
Figure 6.9 thereby accounts for the volatility inherent in the presence of non-IAE 
coverage during campaigns, which might centre on events coincidental to the campaign. 
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The 1970, 1979 and 1987 campaigns, particularly, contained a large amount of non-IAE 
coverage. Figure 6.9 shows that the 1970 and 2010 campaigns contained the most IAE 
coverage of main focus at 41 items each and that each campaign was preceded by a 
gradual incline in prior campaigns in the level of main focus IAE items. The major 
difference between these two campaigns lies, therefore, in the extent to which IAE 
coverage of secondary focus featured heavily in the 2010 campaign, only a fraction of 
which featured comparatively in 1970. 
The following set of examples illustrates how the peripheral appearance of immigration 
in electoral news manifested itself textually in the 2010 campaign: 
‘WHATEVER you do, wherever you are on Thursday, it is your duty 
to vote. You don’t have to be interested in politics but, if you care 
about schools, hospitals and fighting crime, it’s your duty to vote. 
If you care about the minimum wage, immigration, the war in 
Afghanistan, it’s your duty to vote.’ 
Fiona Phillips’ column: ‘Do Your Duty’, The Daily Mirror, 1 May 
2010. 
‘In the document [the Conservative Party manifesto], the Tory 
leader sets out the promises he intends his government to deliver, 
including slashing wasteful spending, fighting crime and, crucially, 
controlling immigration.’ 
Now Cameron sets out his key pledges for a new Britain, The 
Daily Express, 1 May 2010. 
 ‘Surprisingly, he [Gordon Brown] slammed Mr Clegg on 
immigration – the subject that will be carved on his political 
tombstone. But he simply could not give us a convincing reason 
why, after 13 years, Labour should win yet another chance.’ 
Tory chief looks like a real PM in waiting, The Sun, 30 April 2010. 
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‘...the debate seemed to be the same one we’d had twice before: 
immigration, tax, schools, “fairness” and “unfairness”.’ 
The winner is...the BBC, with a good gig in Brum, The Times, 30 
April 2010. 
Therefore what appears at first glance to be an explosion in coverage of immigration 
during the election campaigns of the 2000s is mostly explained due to the way in which it 
has leaked into other domains of electoral coverage, becoming part of the contextual 
environment in which electoral discussions are held. Nevertheless, it is important not to 
dismiss the smaller rise in more focussed discussion of immigration which has 
accompanied this trend and which invites comparison with the extent to which 
immigration featured in press during the 1970 campaign at the height of Powellism. The 
dramatic and potentially crucial impact of ‘bigot-gate’ undoubtedly transformed the 
electoral agenda unpredictably during the 2010 campaign, but there were no comparable 
dramas in 2001 and 2005 and yet the pattern seen here began to emerge. 
Formats of coverage 
The forms of journalism within which immigration appears contend to shape the extent 
of the descriptive and evaluative contours of immigration reporting, and therefore the 
nature of the political debate on its issues generally. Table 6.6 demonstrates that the 
reporting of immigration issues was not insulated from wider developments in journalism 
in the UK over the twentieth century. During this time, and particularly in its latter years, 
the national press increasingly allocated space to commentary and opinion journalism, in 
what Brian McNair has termed ‘the columnar explosion’ (2008: 117). Regarded as a highly 
cost-effective means of filling expansions in news space, McNair notes that the 
commentator is able to complement the news reporter’s ‘this is what happened’ with 
their own ‘this is what I think about it’ (ibid.: 115), while their capacities of persuasion are 
limited only by their perceived expertise, insidership and passion for the subject. 
Meanwhile, the editorial and op-ed pages have given newspapers a chance to air their 
editorial stance towards various political issues, immigration among them. As Wahl-
Jorgensen notes, ‘editorials are designed not only to influence governments or parties, 
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but also the newspapers’ readers, who are presumed to draw on the information 
contained in the editorials for their political knowledge and judgements’ (2008: 73). 
Table 6.6 shows that, as immigration issues have received more prominent coverage, 
editorials, commentary and analysis about such issues have proliferated to comprise in 
combination over half of all coverage in the campaigns from 1992 to 2010. Meanwhile, 
the appearance of immigration in hard news stories has not increased as much in 
absolute terms despite expansions in coverage and therefore has proportionally eroded 
to constitute approximately a third of immigration coverage in the campaigns since 1992 
(from well over half of all immigration coverage previously). 
Table 6.6: Types of immigration stories over time 
 
Type of story 
Total ‘Straight 
News’ 
Editorial/ 
Comment/ 
Opinion/ 
Column 
Analysis/ 
Background
/Facts & 
Figures/ 
Feature/ 
Profile 
Interview Visual/Other 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Period 
1918-
1929 72 84.7 11 12.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.4 85 100 
1931-
1951 31 91.2 1 2.9 1 2.9 1 2.9 0 0.0 34 100 
1955-
1970 162 62.3 25 9.6 68 26.2 3 1.2 2 0.8 260 100 
1974-
1987 148 58.3 26 10.2 72 28.3 2 0.8 6 2.4 254 100 
1992-
2010 172 33.5 152 29.6 172 33.5 14 2.7 4 0.8 514 100 
Total 585 51.0 215 18.7 313 27.3 20 1.7 14 1.2 1147 100 
Percentages are row percentages. Percentages are rounded so may not total 100%. 
 
Dividing coverage into IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage reveals an interesting 
difference in the types of article in which immigration appears in each. Almost 85% of 
non-IAE coverage was ‘straight news’ coverage. This is the case for only approximately 
35% of IAE coverage, while 25% of IAE coverage was categorised as 
Editorial/Comment/Opinion/Column, 37.7% was categorised as 
Analysis/Background/Facts & Figures/Feature/Profile, 1.8% was categorised as Interview 
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and .3% was categorised as Visual/Other. Although this may be a result of the way in 
which election issues are reported in general, the effect of this means that there are 
critical differences in the range of ways in which immigration is discussed depending on 
whether it is being discussed in relation to the impending election or not. IAE coverage is 
effectively spread out over the pages of the newspaper, and editorialised coverage 
provides for a significant proportion of its appearance. In comparison, editorialised (i.e. 
Editorial/Comment/Opinion/Column) coverage accounts for just 3.2% of non-IAE 
coverage. 
The increase over time in the extent to which newspapers have editorialised the issue, 
particularly in IAE coverage, suggests a growth in prominence of their role as political 
actors in the debate. This seems to corroborate data showing that the prominence of 
(restrictive) claims on immigration made in newspapers by the media grew from the late 
1990s to rival the prominence of claims made by government figures (Carvalho 2015: 
167). Although the rise of editorialised immigration coverage does not give definitive 
proof that such debate will necessarily have a significant impact on the political debate 
(or on public opinion), it suggests that as immigration has become more politicised the 
news media have become far more confident in attempting to not only report on but 
intervene into and steer the public debate by presenting definitions, explanations and 
evaluations in regard to the situational context (van Dijk 1989). 
The findings identified in this section suggest that immigration has established itself as a 
prominent part of the campaign. It has become an embedded electoral issue and an 
ordinary part of the political environment. The growth in discussion of immigration in the 
campaigns of the 2000s has, however, to be seen as often rather superficial in its depth, 
alongside a core element of discussion which rivals the extent to which it has appeared in 
election campaigns before, such as in 1970. It has also been established that the ‘rise of 
the commentariat’ (possibly acutely in election coverage) has had an impact upon the 
extent to which immigration has become subject to increased editorialised and columnar 
discussion.  
The next section outlines the extent to which various actors appear within immigration 
coverage.  
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‘Who was the coverage?’ Presence and Access 
Which social actors appear in news coverage is a question of significant interest in many 
contemporary news studies, such has been its ability to critically assess the variable 
capacity of individuals and groups in society to define the media debate and have their 
perspectives aired in the press. On the other hand it enables researchers to illuminate the 
marginalisation of disempowered groups and to assess whether their presence in the 
news is matched by their access to the news. Comparing these facets of coverage is 
essentially to ask ‘who is talking about whom?’ 
‘Who appears in the coverage?’ and ‘who gets to speak?’ are thus linked but separate 
issues. Notions of ‘news presence’ and ‘news access’ can be deployed to provide a 
strategy for distinguishing between these two forms of representation. Deacon defines 
news presence as ‘the frequency with which the actions and opinions of individuals and 
organisations (‘news sources’) are the subject of editorial discussion’ and news access as 
‘the extent to which particular sources interact directly with journalists to provide 
information and convey their opinions’ (2008: 124). The typical contemporary example 
Deacon gives is that of the terrorist organisation, who ‘often command considerable 
news presence through their threats and actions’, but ‘opportunities to justify directly 
their actions, explain their demands and so on’ (i.e. their news access), remain ‘negligible’ 
(ibid.: 125).  
As Deacon goes on to suggest, news presence is more straightforwardly operationalised 
than news access; news presence can be assessed in one regard by measuring the 
frequency of mentions/quotations of social actors in reports, but  
‘it is less easy to use such a comparison to measure news access as there 
can be occasions when powerful sources exert surreptitious influence 
‘behind the scenes’. Nevertheless, the frequency with which sources are 
directly quoted in coverage does provide a telling, if imperfect, indicator 
of the availability and/or perceived credibility of news sources by 
journalists’ (ibid). 
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News Presence 
Table 6.7 shows the news presence of 13 categories of social actors across all campaigns. 
A maximum of five actors were coded per news item, placed in order of appearance or, 
where more than five actors were present, by prominence (based primarily on length of 
direct quotation in words where applicable). The table illustrates that the news presence 
of opposition actors was higher than actors from any other category, although incumbent 
party plus other government actors were slightly more numerable if combined. When 
combined, the citizenry were also highly prominent (n=797), although if divided into 
categories comprising non-migrant citizens and migrant citizens it is revealed that this is 
mostly though not overwhelmingly due to the presence in the news of migrant citizens. 
Not all migrant actors appeared in the news as citizens, but the 482 migrant citizens who 
appeared in coverage comprised 79% of the 611 actors who were counted in total as 
migrants in news reports (this is not shown by Table 6.7). Thus, migrants appear mostly 
as citizens in the news rather than in other capacities.  
Judiciary and police actors were also somewhat prominent, while immigration pressure 
groups received a fairly minor amount of news presence. Lastly, despite the implications 
of international migration to the UK for other nations and supranational bodies, 
international political actors received a relatively insubstantial news presence. 
Table 6.7: The news presence of actors 
Actor Incumbent party 
Other 
government Opposition 
International 
political 
Other 
political 
Public 
professionals 
and 
celebrities 
Media 
N 413 181 576 92 69 58 81 
% 15.3 6.7 21.3 3.4 2.6 2.1 3 
 
Actor 
Other 
private 
sector 
Non-
migrant 
citizenry 
Migrant 
citizenry Other civil 
Immigration 
pressure 
groups 
Judiciary 
and police Other Total 
N 39 315 482 47 52 208 93 2706 
% 1.4 11.6 17.8 1.7 1.9 7.7 3.4 100 
Percentages are row percentages. Percentages are rounded so may not total 100%. 
 
The news presence of these actor groups may, nonetheless, vary across time. Table 6.8 
shows the count for the news presence of the five most prominent actors in each 
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campaign period. The results demonstrate that the prominent news presence of migrant 
citizens has been a perennial aspect of press coverage of immigration, and they were 
frequently the most prominent type of actor. However, from 1992 their presence was 
somewhat backgrounded by the prominence of political party actors, especially the 
opposition in 2001, 2005 and 2010. 
The salience of opposition actors was nevertheless not an exclusively modern 
phenomenon, but their prominence and predominance often arose during campaign 
periods yielding the largest quantity of coverage (e.g. 1970, 2005, 2010) and they 
consistently found news presence after the 1959 campaign. This suggests that as 
immigration has become a more prominent issue, and especially when immigration is a 
particularly salient issue in a campaign, the speech and actions of the opposition have 
become considered to be of increasing importance. Beyond the frequent presence of 
party political actors, those from the judiciary and courts also obtained recurrent 
visibility, appearing in the top five actors in 12 of the 25 campaigns. 
It is also interesting to note that there is little evidence for an increase in the news 
presence of immigration-related pressure groups in recent campaigns – their only 
appearance in the top five actors for any campaign came in 1966. This suggests that 
election news reporting is an environment in which political parties rather than pressure 
groups have a better chance of securing a news presence in the field of immigration, even 
as pressure groups have expended more resources on news media activities. 
Table 6.8: Five most prominent actors per campaign (raw count of appearances) 
1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
incumbent 
party 17 
migrant 
citizens 13 
judiciary and 
police 20 
judiciary and 
police 6 
migrant 
citizens 
7 
non-migrant 
citizens 14 opposition 9 
migrant 
citizens 9 
migrant 
citizens 5 other 
2 
migrant 
citizens 12 
judiciary and 
police 6 
incumbent 
party 4 
incumbent 
party 3 
incumbent 
party 
1 
other private 
sector 9 
other private 
sector 5 
non-migrant 
citizens 3 
non-migrant 
citizens 2 opposition 
1 
other 
government 5 
non-migrant 
citizens 4 N/A opposition 1 
non-migrant 
citizens 
1 
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1931 1935 1945 1950 1951 
migrant 
citizens 10 media 13 other 3 N/A 
other 
government 8 
judiciary and 
police 9 
international 
political 9 
incumbent 
party 1 N/A 
incumbent 
party 5 
international 
political 1 
judiciary and 
police 5 
non-migrant 
citizens 1 N/A 
non-migrant 
citizens 3 
N/A migrant citizens 5 
migrant 
citizens 1 N/A 
migrant 
citizens 2 
N/A non-migrant citizens 4 N/A N/A opposition 1 
 
1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 
non-migrant 
citizens 9 
migrant 
citizens 19 
migrant 
citizens 26 
incumbent 
party 30 opposition 91 
migrant 
citizens 9 opposition 14 opposition 25 opposition 30 
migrant 
citizens 61 
other 
government 2 
incumbent 
party 8 
non-migrant 
citizens 14 
migrant 
citizens 25 
incumbent 
party 32 
other private 
sector 2 
non-migrant 
citizens 7 
incumbent 
party 10 
immigration 
pressure 
groups 
11 non-migrant citizens 29 
judiciary and 
police 2 
other 
government 4 
public 
professionals 
and 
celebrities 
8 non-migrant citizens 7 
other 
government 27 
 
1974a 1974b 1979 1983 1987 
opposition 28 opposition 20 migrant citizens 52 
migrant 
citizens 27 
other 
government 64 
migrant 
citizens 27 
migrant 
citizens 17 
judiciary and 
police 25 opposition 12 
international 
political 43 
non-migrant 
citizens 19 
non-migrant 
citizens 10 opposition 20 
non-migrant 
citizens 11 
incumbent 
party 27 
incumbent 
party 8 
incumbent 
party 8 other 15 
incumbent 
party 10 
migrant 
citizens 25 
other political 8 judiciary and police 6 
other 
government 11 
judiciary and 
police 10 opposition 12 
 
1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
incumbent 
party 36 
incumbent 
party 21 opposition 39 opposition 82 opposition 143 
opposition 31 opposition 13 non-migrant citizens 30 
migrant 
citizens 45 
incumbent 
party 130 
migrant 
citizens 13 
migrant 
citizens 11 
migrant 
citizens 25 
incumbent 
party 37 
non-migrant 
citizens 82 
other 10 judiciary and police 9 
incumbent 
party 13 
non-migrant 
citizens 36 
migrant 
citizens 36 
non-migrant 
citizens 8 media 4 
judiciary and 
police 10 
judiciary and 
police 17 other political 19 
 
As stated above, the migrant citizens category does not account for all migrants within 
coverage. The question over to what extent migrants appear within immigration 
coverage remains. This is an important aspect of coverage not only because news access 
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is necessarily predicated upon news presence, but also because it reveals the extent to 
which migrants are tangibly present within press debate rather than marginalised and 
obscured behind immigration as a social process and issue.  
Table 6.9 shows that, across all campaigns, 27% of actors were identified as being 
migrants, whether through the use of nouns (e.g. ‘immigrant’) or verbs (‘[the actor] 
migrated to the UK/sought asylum in the UK’, etc.)115.  
Nonetheless, Table 6.9 demonstrates that the presence of migrant actors ranged widely 
between 1918 and 2010, equalling or exceeding 50% of all actors in the four campaigns 
from 1929 to 1945. Their presence of more than 40% of actors during the 1979-1987 
campaigns, likewise, indicates a high prominence of such actors during this period. 
Subsequently, however, migrants’ news presence did not exceed 25% during the 
campaigns from 1992 to 2010, and reached lows of 15.9% and 9.8% in 1992 and 2010 – 
campaigns notable for the prominence of immigration on the electoral agenda.  
Therefore, despite huge increases in the quantity of immigration and IAE coverage during 
the 2005 and 2010 campaigns, they were not accompanied by a rise in migrants’ news 
presence. This suggests an increasingly abstracted political debate, in which migrants are 
intangibly ‘othered’ rather than directly and personally engaged with. 
  
                                                     
115 This measure applied only to actors considered to refer to people rather than to institutions, as either 
‘migrants’ or ‘non-migrants’, which explains the lower number of total actors cited by this measure. 
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Table 6.9: News presence of migrant actors versus non-migrant actors by campaign 
Campaign  Migrant(s) Non-migrant(s) Total 
 
Campaign  Migrant(s) Non-migrant(s) Total 
1918 N % 
12 
17.6 
56 
82.4 68 
 
1966 N % 
30 
30.0 
70 
70.0 100 
1922 N % 
13 
40.6 
19 
59.4 32 
 
1970 N % 
69 
27.3 
184 
72.7 253 
1923 N % 
9 
25.0 
27 
75.0 36 
 
1974a N % 
32 
29.6 
76 
70.4 108 
1924 N % 
5 
27.8 
13 
72.2 18 
 
1974b N % 
19 
27.9 
49 
72.1 68 
1929 N % 
7 
58.3 
5 
41.7 12 
 
1979 N % 
61 
44.2 
77 
55.8 138 
1931 N % 
10 
50.0 
10 
50.0 20 
 
1983 N % 
33 
41.8 
46 
58.2 79 
1935 N % 
19 
54.3 
16 
45.7 35 
 
1987 N % 
73 
42.9 
97 
57.1 170 
1945 N % 
3 
60.0 
2 
40.0 5 
 
1992 N % 
14 
15.9 
74 
84.1 88 
1950 N % 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A N/A 
 
1997 N % 
16 
25.0 
48 
75.0 64 
1951 N % 
6 
33.3 
12 
66.7 18 
 
2001 N % 
28 
23.0 
94 
77.0 122 
1955 N % 
10 
37.0 
17 
63.0 27 
 
2005 N % 
50 
22.4 
173 
77.6 223 
1959 N % 
22 
35.5 
40 
64.5 62 
 
2010 N % 
41 
9.8 
376 
90.2 417 
1964 N % 
29 
28.2 
74 
71.8 103 
 
Total N % 
611 
27.0 
1655 
73.0 2266 
All percentages are row percentages. 
 
Finally, another set of actors it is worth some deeper investigation into lies within the 
identity of pressure groups present (and sometimes quoted) within coverage, despite 
their general inability historically to rival the news presence of party political actors. In 
recent years, as Table 6.10 suggests, the anti-immigration pressure group Migrationwatch 
have enjoyed episodes of access to conservative sections of the press that, it has been 
argued, have employed Migrationwatch’s research findings to advance a case for a 
restrictive immigration policy (Balch and Balabanova 2011), doing so through the use of a 
‘technocratic mode of justification’ (Boswell 2009: 127).   
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However, in others areas of public policy reporting, journalists have been described as 
distinguishing between sources on the basis of their roles as ‘arbiters’ or ‘advocates’ 
(Deacon and Golding 1994: 15). Arbiters might be defined by their ‘expertise’ within 
particular fields, whereas ‘advocates are the sources that journalists recognize as having 
explicit, vested political or professional interests which frame and inform their 
contributions’. Indeed, although arbiters appear less frequently, their ‘perceived 
expertise is highly valued by journalists’ and they are therefore approached with a far 
lower degree of scepticism (ibid.). Some pressure groups (Migrationwatch being a good 
example) may on occasion play the part of both in what Deacon and Golding term a 
‘covert advocate’ role (ibid.: 16). For the most part, though, the ‘immigration pressure 
groups’ counted within news reports in Table 6.10 may be largely regarded as assuming 
the role of overt advocates, representing either groups of migrants or citizens with 
concerns about migration to the UK116.  
To a large extent Table 6.10 shows that pressure groups have been marginal and sporadic 
figures in immigration coverage during campaign periods, but MigrationWatch have been 
the most prominent overall, managing to gain mainstream traction in 2005 which was 
consolidated in 2010. This represents a departure from the lack of success for pressure 
groups previously. The four next most-sourced immigration pressure groups were ethnic 
minority representation groups whose successes in this regard were exclusive to the 
campaigns 1966 to 1983. During the 1992-2001 campaigns no pressure groups were 
counted as sources, while prior to the 1966 campaign only the White Defence League in 
1959 and the Birmingham Immigration Control Association in 1964 were present (none 
were coded prior to 1959). Prominent members of organisations such as the White 
                                                     
116 An ‘immigration pressure group’ was defined for the purposes of Table 6.10 as any named group in an 
article whose presence in the story was explicitly predicated on the furthering of the political views of a 
larger set of people concerning the immigration issue at hand without being an established political party. 
Discrepancies between the total pressure groups found here and in the ‘immigration pressure groups’ actor 
category are the result of several causes: the grouping of several pressure groups as one actor where they 
were represented by one spokesperson (e.g. in 1966 the Indian Workers’ Association, the Pakistani Welfare 
Association and the West Indian Standing Conference were often represented by one source), the lack of 
nominal identification for groups identified only as pressure groups in general, the appearance of multiple 
spokespersons per pressure group (e.g. in a story in the 1970 campaign the Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants [JCWI] was represented by the patron and the secretary of the organisation), and occasions on 
which pressure groups were not present within the five actors coded but did appear in the article (e.g. in 
one instance in 1970 the JCWI appeared beyond the first five actors). 
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Defence League, the Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration and the British Campaign 
to Stop Immigration were involved in the organisation of the National Front (Troyna 
1982: 262-264), which demonstrates the limited successes of far-right activist groups to 
attract attention regarding immigration during election campaigns. 
Table 6.10: The presence of ‘immigration pressure groups’ 
 
 Campaign(s) present 
Responses 
N                % 
Migrationwatch 2005 (5), 2010 (8) 13 19.7% 
Indian Workers' Association 1966 (7), 1974a (1), 1979 (1) 9 13.6% 
West Indian Standing Conference 1966 (6), 1979 (1), 1983 (1) 8 12.1% 
Pakistani Welfare Association 1966 6 9.1% 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 1970 3 4.5% 
Citizens UK 2010 2 3.0% 
Committee on U.K. Citizenship 1970 2 3.0% 
Confederation of Indian Organisations 1983 2 3.0% 
League of Overseas Pakistanis 1970 2 3.0% 
White Defence League 1959 2 3.0% 
Anglo-West Indian Conservative Society 1979 1 1.5% 
Birmingham Immigration Control Association 1964 1 1.5% 
British Campaign to Stop Immigration 1974a 1 1.5% 
Brixton Immigrant Action Group 1970 1 1.5% 
Central Committee of Indian Organisations 1970 1 1.5% 
Channel 1979 1 1.5% 
English Rights Association 1966 1 1.5% 
Federation of Bangladeshi Orga 1983 1 1.5% 
Latvian Legation 1974a 1 1.5% 
Muslim Association of Britain 2005 1 1.5% 
Pakistani Overseas Forum 1979 1 1.5% 
Pakistani Youth Council 1970 1 1.5% 
Refugee Council 2005 1 1.5% 
UK Tamil action committee 1987 1 1.5% 
Ukrainian Association 1974a 1 1.5% 
Union of American Exiles 1970 1 1.5% 
Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration 1970 1 1.5% 
Total  66 100.0% 
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News presence, however, does not necessarily indicate that sources had significant news 
access. The depth of the news presence of migrant actors, in particular, must be assessed 
in relation to the depth of their news access in order to understand how far their news 
presence translates into news access and the contribution of migrants’ voices in the 
public debate. In other words, were migrants seen but not heard? Likewise, the same 
questions can be asked of other groups. The following section therefore progresses the 
discussion in terms of news access. 
News Access 
News access, and the depth and breadth of voices in the news, is defined here in terms of 
the direct quotation of various groups, taken as the number of words attributed to actors 
in direct speech in news reports. Taking access in this way, its importance lies in the 
discursive privileges it presents to its recipient(s), who is or are able to contribute to the 
definition of the issue at hand and to rhetorically advance their arguments, and therefore 
also the diversity of views available to audiences. Debates around, for example, 
‘soundbite culture’ and the rise of the mediator’s voice are thus implicated here. As 
suggested above, it answers the question ‘who gets to speak?’  
Figure 6.10 charts the temporal distribution of a total of 40,395 words quoted by the first 
five actors in each item by campaign. The total amount of direct quotation on 
immigration matters increased rapidly between 1950 and 1970 and again between 1997 
and 2010, with an equally dramatic decrease between 1970 and 1974. However, the 
amount of direct quotation is strongly linked to the number of immigration items per 
campaign; the Pearson’s correlation co-efficient for the number of immigration items per 
campaign correlated with the number of directly quoted words per campaign is 0.97.  
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Figure 6.10: Sum number of directly quoted words per item in each campaign 
 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the total sum of direct quotation for each actor category between 
1918 and 2010. Opposition voices were directly quoted on a larger amount of words than 
both incumbent party sources and other government sources put together. Further, 
citizen voices (comprising both migrant and non-migrant citizens) were quoted on in 
excess of 9000 words in news reports, rivalling or exceeding party political voices in this 
regard. Migrant citizen actors accounted for 46.2% of this figure, indicating that migrant 
citizens secured a significant degree of news access and that this was also the case for 
other, non-migrant citizens (though see Table 6.13 which shows the proportion of 
migrant actors’ news presence versus their news access). 
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Figure 6.11: Sum direct quotation (words) per actor category 
 
Table 6.11 elaborates on Figure 6.11 by presenting the percentage of news presence and 
news access each actor category received by campaign. Hence, it becomes possible to 
compare the proportion of news presence of an actor category (i.e. mentions in news 
reports) with their corresponding proportion of news access by direct quotation, and to 
assess the extent to which certain groups of actors are given the opportunity to speak as 
well as appear in immigration coverage. 
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Table 6.11: News Presence and News Access by campaign (percent) 
 
Incumbent 
party 
Other 
government Opposition 
International 
political 
Other 
political 
Public 
professionals 
and 
celebrities 
 P A P A P A P A P A P A 
1918 23.3 30.2 6.8 7.3 5.5 11.1 1.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 
1922 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.9 46.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 
1923 11.1 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1924 16.7 3.7 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 65.6 
1929 7.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1931 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1935 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.3 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1950 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1945 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1951 23.8 9.1 38.1 79.7 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1955 3.4 15.5 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.4 10.4 0.0 0.0 
1959 11.6 4.9 5.8 26.6 20.3 11.9 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.4 5.8 6.3 
1964 8.8 8.8 6.2 1.0 22.1 31.5 0.0 0.0 6.2 1.7 7.1 13.3 
1966 24.2 24.9 1.6 0.9 24.2 38.5 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 4.8 8.9 
1970 10.7 15.8 9.1 3.5 30.5 51.2 3.4 2.1 1.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 
1974a 6.6 3.7 5.7 1.7 23.0 25.8 0.8 0.7 6.6 0.0 2.5 3.3 
1974b 10.4 9.7 0.0 0.0 26.0 29.5 5.2 2.0 2.6 6.5 3.9 6.1 
1979 4.7 1.7 6.4 3.1 11.7 8.8 2.3 5.7 1.2 0.0 2.3 0.0 
1983 11.0 6.2 3.3 0.0 13.2 11.7 2.2 11.9 3.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 
1987 12.6 12.4 29.8 31.0 5.6 4.2 20.0 5.5 1.4 0.9 2.3 6.8 
1992 30.8 43.1 3.4 1.8 26.5 33.4 1.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 
1997 27.6 12.6 1.3 3.8 17.1 9.4 2.6 9.1 0.0 0.0 3.9 8.6 
2001 8.7 7.9 4.7 5.8 26.2 19.4 1.3 0.9 3.4 4.4 1.3 0.0 
2005 12.7 6.6 4.8 1.0 28.1 26.8 1.4 0.0 3.1 2.6 1.7 4.3 
2010 26.2 29.6 2.8 4.6 28.8 21.0 1.0 1.0 3.8 3.0 1.6 2.1 
Mean 
(unweighted) 13.2 14.7 5.8 7.2 14.5 15.9 3.2 2.1 1.8 1.2 2.1 5.2 
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 Media Other private sector Citizenry Other civil 
Immigration 
pressure 
groups 
Judiciary and 
police Other 
 P A P A P A P A P A P A P A 
1918 1.4 0.0 12.3 25.1 35.6 16.4 1.4 3.7 0.0 0.0 5.5 1.5 4.1 3.7 
1922 2.3 0.0 11.6 19.5 39.5 2.5 2.3 14.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 17.4 0.0 0.0 
1923 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 14.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.6 79.8 0.0 0.0 
1924 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.9 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 22.1 0.0 0.0 
1929 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 15.4 0.0 
1931 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 35.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.0 64.1 0.0 0.0 
1935 35.1 31.4 0.0 0.0 24.3 19.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 37.5 0.0 0.0 
1945 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 
1950 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1951 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.8 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 6.4 
1955 0.0 0.0 6.9 22.3 62.1 48.9 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.9 0.0 3.4 2.9 
1959 1.4 0.0 1.4 2.2 37.7 36.4 0.0 0.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 9.4 1.4 0.9 
1964 0.9 0.0 4.4 6.0 35.4 19.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 12.5 7.1 4.9 0.0 0.0 
1966 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.0 25.8 6.2 1.6 3.4 8.9 9.1 1.6 6.5 4.8 0.3 
1970 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 30.2 13.5 1.0 1.2 4.0 6.0 7.4 3.5 1.3 2.8 
1974a 1.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 37.7 36.1 6.6 7.3 2.5 2.0 5.7 13.4 0.8 3.1 
1974b 5.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 35.1 37.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.3 3.9 7.6 
1979 6.4 6.8 0.0 0.0 36.3 26.5 2.9 3.2 2.3 6.4 14.6 17.0 8.8 20.9 
1983 4.4 26.1 0.0 0.0 41.8 11.7 4.4 4.9 0.0 0.0 11.0 25.5 4.4 1.9 
1987 1.4 7.2 0.5 0.1 15.3 18.4 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.0 5.1 3.5 4.2 8.9 
1992 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.5 17.9 9.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 8.5 9.8 
1997 5.3 0.4 5.3 14.2 18.4 7.0 3.9 19.4 0.0 0.0 11.8 1.7 2.6 13.9 
2001 2.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 36.9 39.6 4.7 5.7 0.0 0.0 6.7 10.6 4.0 4.8 
2005 5.1 6.4 2.4 2.9 27.7 36.4 1.4 0.5 2.4 4.3 5.8 3.8 3.4 4.4 
2010 3.2 3.1 0.2 0.0 23.8 26.4 0.4 0.3 2.0 1.0 3.6 5.6 2.4 2.3 
Mean 
(unweighted) 3.4 3.6 2.0 4.0 34.3 19.9 1.6 2.7 1.2 1.8 11.7 13.7 5.4 8.1 
All figures represent row percentages per category (P and A). P represents News Presence (mentioned in the first 5 actors of a coded report), A represents News Access 
(directly quoted words). N/A is used where a category totals 0%.
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For much of the interwar period from 1923 onwards (and the few campaigns shortly after 
1945), the new access of the opposition in comparison to incumbent party and 
government sources was non-existent. However, the opposition were ‘over-accessed’ 
(Hall et al. 1978: 58) in terms of direct quotation acutely in the 1964, 1966, 1970 and 
1992 campaigns, during which the proportion of their news access notably exceeded that 
of their news presence. Indeed, from 1964 onwards, opposition sources were frequently 
the recipients of greater access than presence in comparison with incumbent party and 
other government sources. On the other hand, incumbent party and other government 
sources received a disproportionate level of news access in the 1918, 1992 and 2010 
campaigns, during which such sources were highly prominent in the immigration debate.  
Contrary to expectations of a strong ‘incumbency bonus’ in political news (Brandenburg 
2006: 166; Tiffen et al. 2013: 382-383; Hopmann et al. 2011), for immigration news it is 
the opposition who have been routinely sourced over and above the level of incumbent 
party sources in the post-1945 period. This indicates that the politics of immigration are 
problematised in a way which offers opportunities to opposition parties to challenge the 
competence and credibility of incumbents. This modern trend is in stark contrast to 
earlier campaigns when incumbent party and other government sources could expect 
very little challenge from opposition sources. 
Beyond the news access of party sources, immigration pressure groups also received a 
high degree of news access comparable to their news presence most notably in 1964, but 
also in 1970, 1979 and 2005, while their ability to maximise the potential of their 
presence was diminished distinctly within the 2010 campaign. 
The coverage can be characterised in another way by comparing news access across press 
sectors. It becomes apparent from Table 6.12 that the opposition’s traditional successes 
in defining the immigration issue came in no small part thanks to a disproportionate level 
of news access in relation to news presence in the quality press, along with, to some 
extent, the mid-market press. Nevertheless, the popular press led in providing an over-
accessing of the news to incumbent party sources.  
The citizenry were under-represented in terms of news access to news presence across 
all three sectors, but found the most marginalisation in this sense in the quality press. 
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The mid-market and popular press, however, despite a proportionate under-
representation of citizen voices in comparison to their presence within the news, the 
securing of almost one-third of all news access by citizen actors confounds the usual 
overwhelming marginality and trivialization of citizen voices in the news (Lewis and Wahl-
Jorgensen 2005).  
Table 6.12: News Presence and News Access by newspaper sector (percent) 
 sector 
 quality mid-market popular 
 P A P A P A 
Incumbent party 14.1 12.5 16.3 16.8 18.4 31.4 
Other government 6.8 7.2 7.1 4.2 5.5 2.0 
Opposition 23.5 29.7 18.1 21.8 17.4 13.9 
International political 3.2 1.9 4.0 2.1 3.5 1.2 
Other political 3.2 2.0 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Public professionals and 
celebrities 2.0 2.2 2.1 4.1 2.7 6.8 
Media 3.0 4.5 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.7 
Other private sector 1.2 1.6 2.0 3.8 1.5 2.4 
Citizenry 28.2 18.1 29.8 28.5 34.1 29.5 
Other civil 2.3 3.2 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 
Immigration pressure groups 2.1 3.5 2.1 2.8 1.0 1.1 
Judiciary and police 7.4 8.3 7.9 6.4 8.5 6.0 
Other 3.0 5.4 4.1 4.6 4.0 2.2 
All figures represent column percentages per category (P, A). P represents News Presence (mentioned in 
the first 5 actors of a coded report), A represents News Access (direct quotation). Figures may not total 100 
due to rounding. 
A final question lies in the extent to which migrants were able to define migration issues 
themselves. As mentioned above, migrant citizens contributed to a significant proportion 
of all citizen actor news access, but this was markedly different between sectors of the 
press. Proportionally, 54.2% of citizenry news access in the quality press, 41.9% of 
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citizenry news access in the mid-market press and 29.2% of citizenry news access in the 
popular press was due to the news access of migrant citizens.  
Table 6.13 takes the same principles of news presence and access as in Table 6.12 but re-
applies them to migrants’ news presence and access as a subset of the news presence 
and access of all actors, in order to compare their representation within the press across 
newspaper titles117.  
Table 6.13: News Presence and Access of migrant actors by newspaper title 
Title P A 
Guardian 20.5% 15.4% 
Times 19.6% 14.6% 
Telegraph 23.0% 16.3% 
Mail 23.8% 20.1% 
Express 23.3% 20.2% 
Mirror 30.0% 13.5% 
Sun/Herald 25.0% 13.2% 
Total 22.6% 16.6% 
 
Overall, the news presence of migrants surpassed their news access in every newspaper. 
Nevertheless, in the mid-market press migrant actors achieved an almost proportionate 
amount of news access to news presence, while in the popular press they received news 
access to approximately half the level to which they received news presence. The press as 
a whole, though especially the popular press, can therefore be said to have engaged with 
migration in a way which to some extent alienates and abstracts migrants themselves 
from the debate, with migrants unable to substantively voice their experiences of and 
attitudes towards migration in coverage. 
                                                     
117 As opposed to Table 6.9, news presence here is taken from all actors including institutions – for which 
migration status was invariably coded as N/A. This enables for comparison between the depth of presence 
and access of migrants when all actors are taken into consideration (as institutions often receive news 
access via spokespersons). 
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Summary  
The two overall foci of this chapter have centred on issues of quantity/depth of items and 
presence/access of sources in a quantitative account of immigration news in the final 
week of the 25 election campaigns from 1918 to 2010.  
The evidence shown indicates that immigration has become more central to the 
mediation of the campaign, especially recently. The greatest peaks in coverage occurred 
in 1970 and the 2000s, with the quantity of coverage in 1970 exceeding that of many 
later campaigns including 1992 and 2001. 
This rise in the quantity of coverage is largely due to a rise in IAE coverage, so that when 
immigration is mentioned it is increasingly inevitably cast within an electoral rubric, while 
election coverage in general has increasingly featured immigration issues proportionate 
to other issues.  
The data shows that the new, greater resurgence in immigration and IAE coverage of 
2005 and 2010 has, in fact, predominantly arisen from a significant increase in a number 
of items only marginally concerned with immigration. Though IAE coverage has become 
an increasingly larger constituent of election coverage, this is predominantly due to the 
extent to which immigration has become an entrenched electoral issue among a whole 
set of policy issues. Moreover, in 2010, the political cache of immigration impregnated 
the ‘Bigot-gate’ incident in a way which suggested that immigration now arguably has the 
capacity to play a part in ‘electoral process’ coverage as well as policy coverage.  News 
about immigration during the campaign has therefore become, at least for now, a routine 
and predictable facet of campaign reporting, even if the circumstances in which it 
emerges change with the influence of various contemporary factors each time. 
Much of the campaign coverage of immigration came within the quality press, contrary to 
the issue’s association with the popular and mid-market press. This is the case for both 
immigration coverage which is primarily about immigration and immigration coverage 
which is not. All three sectors have, though, contributed substantially to the recent 
expansion in references to immigration in coverage primarily about other issues. 
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In terms of patterns of sourcing, opposition sources received the most news access 
overall, indicative of the way that immigration offers opposition parties opportunities to 
criticise government competence. This has, naturally, led to a stymieing of ordinary 
expectations of ‘incumbency bonus’ on the part of incumbent party sources. 
The relatively new, emergent appearance of pressure groups whose presence in the news 
is predicated on assumptions as to their technocratic credibility (e.g. MigrationWatch), 
rather than their commitment to the representation of minority groups (e.g. Indian 
Workers’ Association) or far-right politics (e.g. White Defence League), potentially 
indicates a shift in the kinds of pressure groups that are able to influence the news 
agenda on matters of immigration.  
Citizens have tended to be quite prominent in debate, but citizens found particularly 
substantive expression in campaign news only in more recent campaigns, having 
previously been marginalised in this sense in the campaigns of 1970 and 1992.  
While migrant actors received an often substantial minority proportion of news presence 
(between approximately 20% and 30% of all actors), their opportunities for news access 
were more limited, though they fared best in this sense in the mid-market press. Further, 
migrants’ news presence declined after reaching a peak in the 1980s, suggesting that the 
media debate around immigration has begun to engage less directly with migrants and 
more with immigration as an abstracted issue. The effect of this may be to construct 
migrants as an ‘othered’ and intangible group of people. This accords with prior research 
into immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, which have suggested that, for instance, 
refugees and asylum seekers ‘are only quoted when they themselves are the subject of a 
report and rarely contribute directly to the policy debate’ (Buchanan, Grillo and 
Threadgold 2003: 9), while migrants in general are ‘mostly represented in the news as 
speechless actors involved in negative acts’ (ter Wal 2002: 428, see also van Dijk 1991, 
1993a, 1996). 
Many of these findings require further investigation. A growth in immigration coverage 
and its increasing electoral association might not have necessarily translated into an 
increasingly negative treatment of immigration issues. Likewise, the news access received 
by opposition sources may not have converted into extensively or uniformly negative 
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quotation in press coverage. The ‘stopwatch balance’ of news access needs to be 
complemented by an examination of coverage in terms of ‘agenda balance’ and 
‘directional balance’ (Norris et al. 1999: 20), while the lexicon of coverage can be 
explored to help to understand to some extent how immigration is discussed in the press, 
beyond the extent to which it appears. 
The next chapter therefore addresses these issues, focusing on the interpretative and 
evaluative dimensions of coverage in order to add to the data discussed in this chapter.  
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7: The Evaluative and Interpretative Dimensions of Coverage 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored fluctuations in the volume of campaign-based immigration 
coverage, the intensity of coverage and the news presence and news access of social 
actors in coverage. The following will elaborate on these findings to explore the coverage 
in terms of the ‘fairness’ and ‘fullness’ of coverage.  
Insofar as the media debate is characterised by a diversity of perspectives and even-
handedness towards them it can be said to be fair. The national press, free from the 
regulatory imperatives of due impartiality that broadcast news outlets are subject to, 
exist along a spectrum of editorial positions. Nonetheless, balance and neutrality are 
among the most common measures by which the performance of the news media is 
understood by both journalists and audiences alike, with conspicuous bias and partiality 
regarded as unfair symptoms of inadequate or compromised journalism. A press debate 
characterised by fairness could be assumed to grant more-or-less equal news access to 
competing perspectives and consistently retain this balance regardless of fluctuations in 
the volume of coverage (c.f. Norris et al. 1999). This concern is therefore focussed on the 
‘evaluative dimension’ of coverage and asks essentially ‘whether the media account is pro 
or anti the…matter being described’ (Golding 1990: 97). This chapter will therefore 
explore the tone and terms of coverage.  
Insofar as the media debate is characterised by a comprehensive exploration of the 
numerous areas of public life in which immigration is socially, politically and culturally 
meaningful it can be said to be full. As John Berger has observed: ‘the migrant is not on 
the margin of modern experience – he [sic] is absolutely central to it’ (Berger and Mohr 
1975, front cover). Is this centrality reflected in media representations of ‘the migrant’? 
Does coverage represent immigration as pervading all manner of topics to a similar 
degree, or are there imbalances in the depth of coverage afforded to some aspects of the 
debate over others? A press debate characterised by fullness would discuss immigration 
in terms of its relationship to a range of issues, in sufficient depth so as to impart nuance 
and detail to their coverage. Further, in the case of an increase in the volume of 
coverage, a full debate would conceivably offer space for more diversity in the range of 
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themes discussed, especially as the wider and indirect consequences of immigration 
become established. This set of considerations can be located within the ‘interpretative 
dimension’ of coverage, which asks ‘what aspects…are rendered visible, named and 
promoted’ (Deacon and Golding 1994: 19). Further, asking ‘what is included and what is 
excluded, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded, what is thematized and what 
is unthematized, what process types and categories are drawn upon to represent events, 
and so on’ (Fairclough 1995: 103–4) is to answer to what extent the coverage is as full as 
its potential, with respect to presences as well as absences. Further, ‘indirect evaluation’ 
may be introduced in this dimension (Golding 1990: 97), in this case by the establishment 
of a framework in which immigration and its concomitant issues are routinely addressed 
within the bounds of certain thematic categories. This chapter will therefore explore the 
‘agenda balance’ of coverage (Norris and Sanders 1999: 20), i.e. the extent to which the 
coverage is attendant to a range of issues over time and across newspaper and press 
sectors. 
In order to bridge these areas of analysis and to provide a systematic analysis of the 
terms of debate, the lexicon of reporting is examined in order to illustrate the ways that 
immigration is constructed by journalists over time, which can be used to both illuminate 
the kinds of migrants that the coverage is about and infer the favourability or 
unfavourability of such constructions. 
As shown in the previous chapter, there has demonstrably been a rise in the volume of 
immigration coverage during recent campaigns as well as in 1970. Further, immigration is 
increasingly a significant issue not just on the press agenda but also on the electoral 
agenda during campaign periods. In particular, from 2001 onwards, the amount of 
immigration coverage increased dramatically. Alongside this development, the 
gravitational pull of election campaigns on immigration coverage was such that it became 
overwhelmingly linked with the electoral implications of immigration issues from 1992 
onwards, while there was a correspondingly dramatic rise in the proportion to which 
overall election coverage featured IAE coverage from 2001. However, it was also shown 
that the major quantitative difference between the peak of 1970 and the peaks of the 
2000s was largely due to expansions in the amount of coverage which only dealt with 
immigration as a subsidiary issue. To what extent can it be said that these short-term and 
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long-term increases in coverage have given rise to a more expansive and pluralistic 
debate? In other words, is there more and more coverage dealing suitably with more and 
more substance? Or is there more and more about less and less? 
Moreover, contemporary media coverage of immigration is frequently seen to be 
negative in tone, with peaks in coverage apparently the manifestation of a 
problematisation of immigration issues on the part of politicians and the press. Based on 
data from the previous chapter, it would therefore be expected that the 1970 and 2000s 
campaigns, particularly, would contain a large amount of negative quotation and that the 
press’ vocabulary of immigration would grow to become more pejorative over time. An 
additional question lies in how the electoral implications of immigration coverage during 
election campaigns have been manifest directionally and thematically.  
Regardless of the direction in tone of coverage, linking attitudes to the actor groups 
responsible for their expression will also enable deeper insights into some of the data 
shown in the last chapter. For instance, to what extent is the high news access that 
opposition sources have received negative in tone? Do incumbent party and other 
government sources defend their record on immigration by providing positive quotation, 
or do they attempt to ‘appear tough’ in a bid to outflank their political opponents? Is the 
high news access of citizens representative of disaffection with immigration policy and 
trends, either positively or negatively? Finally, are migrants more likely to provide 
support for immigration, and what can be said for the tone of immigration pressure 
groups – do advocates dominate over arbiters (Deacon and Golding 1994)?  
The Fairness of Coverage: Directional Balance and Lexicon 
Directional balance 
The balance of attitudes expressed towards immigration and the lexicon used by 
journalists and actors to construct immigration groups and processes in coverage over 
time and across newspapers and press sectors are both important factors in assessing the 
extent to which the media account of immigration has been ‘pro or anti’ over time, and 
by implication how ‘fair’ the coverage has been towards immigration issues.  
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In terms of attitudes, ‘supportive’ and ‘critical’ voices in news reports are assumed to 
correspond with the notions of ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-’ within the evaluative dimension (Golding 
1990) and a suitable measure of the directional balance of debate (Norris et al. 1999: 20). 
These categories are supplemented by a ‘neutral’ category and a ‘mixed’ category 
(comprising quotes from sources in which there was both approximately equal supportive 
and critical content). The link between supportive/critical and pro/anti is suggestive as 
the access of certain perspectives to the news does not necessarily translate into 
favourable treatment of those perspectives. Though journalists often attempt to 
construct coherent and ‘balanced’ news reports by establishing presupposedly conflicting 
perspectives in what they see as equal or proportionate measure, there are abundant 
means by which strongly and extensively expressed views might be intentionally or 
unintentionally subverted by the circumstances of their inclusion. Nevertheless, the 
measure provides a general picture of the attitudinal landscape over time, and it would 
be reasonable to expect that the ‘directional’ trend of media accounts would be manifest 
in any systematically disproportionate accessing of either supporting or criticising 
sources118.  
Utilising the notion of ‘directional balance’ goes further than that of ‘stop-watch balance’ 
(Norris et al. 1999: 20) in measuring the number of seconds of television coverage, 
newspaper column inches or, as was the case here, directly quoted words given over to 
the views of relevant social actors and for which significant variation in such measures 
between competing political parties might be assumed to be constitutive of partiality or 
bias. As Norris and Sanders argue, ‘in this familiar perspective, which draws on classical 
liberalism, news is defined as impartial if even-handed towards the pros and cons of any 
argument’ – directional balance is ‘one of the commonest ways for journalists to 
understand objectivity’ (1998: 4). Like studies of ‘stop-watch balance’, though, those 
concerned with ‘directional balance’ are often pre-occupied with observing the level of 
neutrality in coverage in a party political framework (ibid.). Directional balance is 
therefore re-applied here to immigration as an issue, rather than to party advantage.  
                                                     
118 The ‘supportive’ tone was used for each of the (up to) first five actors in each item whereby the actor 
was directly quoted and, overall, their quotation was explicitly supportive, ‘tolerant’ or favourable towards 
the presence of all migrants, of a group of migrants or of individual migrants (where their migration status 
was material to the actor’s quotation) or towards the impact of immigration processes on general social 
developments or institutions, and vice versa for ‘critical’. 
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As outlined in Chapter 2, prior research contends that news coverage about immigration 
and its related issues is overwhelmingly negative in tone. These accounts suggest that 
immigration news is partial, favouring perspectives which negatively represent 
immigrants as ‘threats’ or ‘problems’. It would be expected, therefore, that actors critical 
of immigration will have been sourced more frequently and at greater length. Further, as 
has been shown in the previous chapter, opposition sources were more frequently 
present and accessed over the entirety of the coverage (i.e. the opposition ‘win’ in 
‘stopwatch’ terms). The strategic value of criticising incumbents’ immigration policies 
during the campaign might therefore lead to the expectation that the disparity in access 
would translate, or at least contribute, to a more negative trend in the tonality of 
coverage. 
Table 7.1 shows the total amount of direct quotation by tone over the entire coverage in 
words. Taking the proportion of neutral quotation and mixed quotation together, they 
comprise 54.1% of the total. 
Table 7.1: Direct quotation by actor tone 
 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
More importantly, however, the table shows that critical quotation was almost twice as 
likely to appear in the coverage as supportive quotation, at 30.5% to 15.4%. 
It is important to know whether there are any major differences between IAE coverage 
and non-IAE coverage in order to understand whether the disparity between critical 
quotation and supportive quotation overall is driven by differences between these types 
of coverage. Dividing the coverage in this way produces Tables 7.2 and 7.4. 
Tone Neutral Mixed Supporting Criticising Total 
Total 
direct 
quotation 
(words) 
18757 3095 6227 12316 40395 
% 46.4 7.7 15.4 30.5 100.0 
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Table 7.2 demonstrates that, in IAE coverage, the proportion of critical quotation was 
even higher than across the total coverage, with a ratio of critical to supportive quotation 
of 2.8 to 1 in IAE coverage compared with almost 2 to 1 overall.  
Table 7.2: Direct quotation by actor tone in IAE items 
 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
Nonetheless, this disparity was caused not by a substantial loss in the proportion of 
supportive quotation within IAE coverage, but by a loss in the proportion of neutral 
quotation of almost 12%. Additionally, the proportion of mixed quotation was 10.7% in 
IAE coverage compared with 7.7% in total immigration coverage. 
In other words, the sum total of quotation by actors critical of immigration was likely to 
be greater when immigration was covered with regard to its electoral implications than 
otherwise, and the IAE debate may be characterised as containing less neutral tonality 
overall compared with the immigration debate at large. 
Further, Table 7.3 shows that 127 more critical actors were sourced in IAE coverage than 
supportive actors, but also that actors whose tone was either critical or mixed were likely 
to be quoted at greater length (i.e. more words per actor) than those whose tone was 
supportive. Actors whose tone was mixed, particularly, were likely to be sourced at even 
greater length, indicative of a greater discursive authority and the increased 
requirements of space for actors pursuing arguments which contain both supportive and 
critical statements. 
  
Tone Neutral Mixed Supporting Criticising Total 
Total 
direct 
quotation 
(words) 
9139 2831 3783 10727 26480 
% 34.5 10.7 14.3 40.5 100.0 
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Table 7.3: The number of quoted actors by tone category in IAE items119 
Tone Neutral Mixed Supporting Criticising Total 
N 466 60 167 294 987 
% 47.2 6.1 16.9 29.8 100.0 
Quoted 
words per 
actor 
19.6 47.2 22.7 36.5 26.8 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
Critical actors therefore appear to have had a two-fold advantage over their supportive 
counterparts in IAE coverage: they were more likely to appear and when they did they 
were quoted at greater length.  
In contrast, as Table 7.4 shows in relation to non-IAE coverage, when the electoral 
element was absent, supportive quotation outweighed critical quotation. 
Table 7.4: Direct quotation by actor tone in non-IAE items 
 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
Contrary to the balance of tonality in IAE coverage, then, where immigration coverage 
contained no electoral relevance, critical quotation comprised a fraction of total 
quotation, at 11.4%. Instead, neutral quotation was by far most frequently sourced at 
69.1% of all quotation, but supportive sources also received more space than critical 
sources. In short, the sharply critical voices found in IAE news were more-or-less blunted 
in non-IAE items (i.e. when immigration is a social issue but not politicised as an electoral 
issue), while it can be said that the debate was premised on a greater degree of neutrality 
overall. 
                                                     
119 A number of actors were not quoted; they therefore do not appear in Tables 7.3 and 7.5. 
Tone Neutral Mixed Supporting Criticising Total 
Total 
direct 
quotation 
(words) 
9618 264 2444 1589 13915 
% 69.1 1.9 17.6 11.4 100.0 
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Table 7.5 shows similar data to that presented in Table 7.3, but for non-IAE items. In 
contrast to the differences between the amounts of quotation per actor by tone category 
found in IAE coverage, the data shown here indicate that differences between tone 
categories in terms of total quotation in non-IAE coverage can more easily be accounted 
for by the number of actors sourced. Nonetheless, supportive and critical voices tended 
to be quoted on a proportionately higher number of words on average compared with 
neutral or mixed voices. 
Table 7.5: The number of quoted actors by tone category in non-IAE items 
Tone Neutral Mixed Supporting Criticising Total 
N 358 9 71 44 482 
% 74.3 1.9 14.7 9.1 100.0 
Quoted 
words per 
actor 
26.9 29.3 34.4 36.1 28.9 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
Figure 7.1 reiterates the differences in directional balance between IAE coverage and 
non-IAE coverage. It demonstrates that their differences can be accounted for by the 
absence of critical voices in non-IAE coverage and the proliferation of neutral or mixed 
voices, rather than a large difference in the proportion of supportive quotation, which is 
negligibly different between the two forms of coverage. Overall, IAE coverage can be 
characterised as constituting a far more divisive debate in which the directional balance 
of debate is highly partisan towards anti-immigration attitudes, while non-IAE coverage 
was dominated by less impassioned voices on either side of the debate and offered more 
space for pro-immigration attitudes than anti-immigration attitudes. 
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Figure 7.1: Comparing the directional balance of IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage 
 
‘Other’ combines the Neutral and Mixed values. 
The next section examines the extent to which the tonality of coverage has fluctuated 
over time, in order to help understand whether expansions in coverage have occurred 
alongside more positive or negative attitudes in coverage.  
Balance over time 
Figure 7.2 shows the total quotation in words by tone in each campaign for IAE coverage. 
The depth of availability of critical opinion across the press in all immigration coverage 
has certainly risen dramatically in recent campaigns, and was also prominent in 1970. 
Indeed, the 1970, 1992, 2005 and 2010 campaigns collectively comprised 70% of all 
critical quotation in IAE coverage, while there was also a large disparity between critical 
and supportive quotation in 1918 and in the second 1974 campaign.  
The dominance of critical voices in IAE coverage overall was not, though, a trend which 
was uniform across all campaigns. In fact, as Figure 7.2 shows, supportive quotation in 
IAE items outnumbered critical quotation during five campaigns in the post-war period 
(1974a, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 2001).   
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
IAE
non-IAE
Percentage 
Supporting
Other
Criticising
184 
 
Figure 7.2: Total direct quotation in words by actor tone over time (IAE items) 
 
‘Other’ combines the Neutral and Mixed values. 
During the interwar period, supportive quotation was almost entirely absent in 
comparison to critical or other quotation in election-related items. After 1945, however, 
supportive voices were mobilised more effectively in the press. The period from 1979 to 
1987, in particular, represents something of a reversal of the norm, as the depth of 
critical voices from the 1970 and second 1974 campaign relented. 
Following the 1992 campaign, the 1997 and 2001 campaigns contained little coverage 
and consequently little quotation overall, but of the voices present within coverage most 
were neutral or mixed (i.e. other).  
These campaigns were followed by a huge incline in the amount of critical and other 
quotation in 2005 and 2010. The accompaniment of non-partisan quotation along with 
critical quotation is new to recent campaigns; previous campaigns containing large spikes 
in critical quotation (as can be seen in 1970, 1974b and 1992, for example) contained far 
less neutral quotation.  
Further, this incline is largely only a reflection of the expansion of immigration coverage 
during this period, as Figure 7.3 demonstrates. By taking the mean number of directly 
quoted words for each tone category per item, Figure 7.3 adjusts for the peaks and 
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troughs in coverage and therefore enables for comparisons between campaigns in the 
level to which news reports were anti- or pro-immigration on average. 
Figure 7.3: Mean directly quoted words by actor tone per item over time (IAE items) 
 
The figure illustrates that, while the breadth of coverage in the 2010 campaign translated 
into an unprecedented degree of critical quotation regarding immigration issues, several 
prior election campaigns contained more critical quotation per item – though the 2010 
campaign also contained far less supportive quotation per item than in many of those 
campaigns, too. Taking into consideration a disparity such as this, 2010 IAE items 
featured on average 5.8 times as much critical quotation as supportive quotation. In 2005 
this figure was 3.9, in 1992 it was 2.9, in the second 1974 campaign it was 7.8, in 1970 it 
was 4.4 and in 1964 it was 2.4. This suggests that, although there are campaigns in which 
critical attitudes are generally subdued, there have been several campaigns in which 
hostile attitudes to then-current immigration circumstances surfaced dramatically, and 
provided an overwhelmingly negative balance of attitudes in coverage dealing with 
immigration as an electoral issue. On the contrary, supportive quotation has decreased 
slightly as an average over time and there have been no such breakout campaigns for the 
pro-immigration case.  
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Critical quotation has, however, surfaced slightly less dramatically within both peak 
campaigns since 1974b (1992 and 2010)120. Indeed, several121 campaigns contained more 
critical quotation on average per item than the 2010 campaign (although the data for the 
average quotation within interwar campaigns was more volatile due to their lower 
number of cases). It is difficult to know if this is related to longer-term compressions in 
quotation time and ‘soundbite culture’, but it is also possible that this trend may be due 
to critical voices having become an established and normalised part of the debate 
beginning with the 1959 to 1970 period. The grounds for believing that this may be the 
case rest on an argument that certain, hegemonic perspectives – in this case critical 
viewpoints – begin to ‘dominate and direct public discourses, until they become 
“common sense”’ (Jacomella 2010: 92). Certain key phrases thereafter became shorthand 
for broader and more sophisticated ideas and the onus on actors critical of immigration 
to elaborate on their objections and criticisms gradually diminishes.  
Focusing on non-IAE items, Figures 7.4 and 7.5 demonstrate the extent to which neutral 
quotation has largely prevailed in non-IAE items throughout the sample period, though 
also the disparity between supportive and critical quotation. 
  
                                                     
120 The mean average number of words of critical quotation per item was 18.9 words in 1964, 30.7 words in 
1970, 34.9 words in 1974b, 26.6 words in 1992 and 14.2 words in 2010. 
121 1918, 1924, 1929, 1959, 1964, 1966, 1970, 1974b and 1992. 
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Figure 7.4: Total direct quotation in words by actor tone over time (non-IAE items) 
 
Figure 7.5: Mean directly quoted words by actor tone per item over time (non-IAE items) 
 
As Figure 7.5 shows, supportive quotation peaked most notably in 1959, 1974b, 1997, 
2005 and 2010. In the interwar period, on the other hand, critical quotation was more 
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likely to be found, in 1931 and 1935. The almost complete absence of supportive 
quotation in the interwar period is therefore common to both IAE and non-IAE coverage 
and suggests either or perhaps both that pro-immigration sources were unorganised and 
failed to mobilise media responses prior to the late 1950s and/or that such sources were 
not deemed of significance to the debate by journalists. 
As noted earlier, making sense of patterns across campaigns is difficult with regards to 
non-IAE items, as the impetus for this kind of coverage is largely incidental and is 
therefore subject to less consistent logics than those which might contribute to patterns 
in IAE coverage. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to assume that the results for each 
campaign shown in Figure 7.4 are particular only to their contemporary conditions and 
thus wholly discrete from each other when considering the directional balance of 
coverage. This is the case not least because news values (along with journalists’ notions 
of objectivity) are unlikely to shift dramatically from one campaign to the next. 
Overall, this kind of coverage serves as a counterpoint to the highly critical features of IAE 
coverage, and is indicative of an approach on the part of the press to consult a more 
sanguine range of voices on immigration issues when debate moves beyond immigration 
as an electoral issue. The disparity between supportive and critical quotation is, however, 
far more pronounced in IAE coverage and it is arguable as to whether the potential 
counterbalancing effects of the higher degree of supportive quotation than critical 
quotation in non-IAE items are able to have an impact during election campaign weeks in 
which campaign coverage is highly prominent and, where relevant to immigration, 
contains highly critical voices. 
Differences between actors 
Who was responsible for these critical voices? Figure 7.6 shows the quotation by tone for 
categories of actor in the coverage, revealing to what extent certain kinds have been 
critical or supportive (as well as neutral or mixed) towards immigration.  
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Figure 7.6: Sum quotation by tone of actors in all immigration coverage 
 
Overall, much of the dominance in quotation of neutral and mixed voices came from 
citizen, incumbent party, opposition, judiciary/police and other government actors. 
Opposition sources were vocally critical of immigration, while incumbent party sources 
were also highly critical in tone (collectively contributing to 67.9% of all critical 
quotation). It can be suggested that this is a product of the gravitational pull of 
opposition voices on incumbent party sources, who might wish to respond in kind to 
critical opposition voices in order to maintain a perception that criticisms of immigration 
policy have been recognised and in an attempt, therefore, to appear ‘tough’ on 
immigration.  
Citizen voices were critical and supportive in almost equal measure, with the vast 
majority, over 70%, of their total quotation being of mixed or neutral tone. This largely 
corresponds with the conclusions drawn by Lewis et al. (2005: 34) who claimed that 
citizens’ lack of clear expressions of partisan opinions in the news means that citizens are 
often represented as being ‘apolitical about manifestly political issues’.  
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For their generally subdued depth of news access, pro-immigration pressure groups were 
given virtually the same space to advance their arguments as their anti-immigration 
counterparts. 
Several kinds of actors were, albeit slightly, more supportive than critical overall, 
including other government, international political, public professionals and celebrities, 
media, citizenry and other sources, with some of these responsible for hardly any critical 
quotation at all. The lack of critical quotation (and the presence of supportive quotation) 
from other government and international political sources, in particular, is unsurprising 
given that motives to electioneer are absent for these actors compared with incumbent 
and opposition party sources122. Their news access is perhaps, instead, predicated on 
their role as ‘arbiters’ (Deacon and Golding 1994: 15-17) and the authority that their 
administrative responsibility and expertise affords them. 
In terms of the quotation of migrant actors, Table 7.6 shows that very little of their 
quotation was negative towards immigration issues. A larger minority of quotation was 
supportive, but over 80% was mixed or neutral in tone.  
Table 7.6: Sum quotation by tone of migrant actors 
 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
The reason for a lack in quotation critical of immigration on the part of migrant actors is 
self-evident, but it can be suggested that a relative lacking in supportive quotation (at 
least in comparison to neutral and mixed quotation) is the result of a combination of two 
factors: reticent or ambivalent attitudes on the part of migrant actors and/or a 
positioning and marginalising of migrant actors in news reports which enables merely 
blunted support towards immigration or other immigrants. Together with the findings 
regarding news access from the previous chapter, Table 7.6 demonstrates a general 
                                                     
122 ‘Other government’ sources comprise, for example, civil servants and government department 
spokespersons who are not permitted to express partisan attitudes towards issues of policy, while 
‘international political’ sources comprise, for example, other international governments and foreign 
diplomats who are unlikely to have strong opinions about immigration to the UK. 
 Critical Supporting Other 
N 157 1173 5374 
% 2.3 17.5 80.2 
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inability for immigrants to express firm opinions or to provide support for immigration, 
providing further proof of their marginalisation from the definition of their own 
circumstances or of immigration politics generally. 
Differences between newspapers 
Differences in the ideological and market positions of newspaper titles may potentially 
generate differences between titles and press sectors in their evaluative treatment of 
immigration issues, including the availability of critical and supportive voices in 
immigration coverage. Figure 7.7 compares the directional balance of each newspaper by 
focussing on mean quotation per item by tone across each title. 
Figure 7.7: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers 
 
The data demonstrates, primarily, that newspaper titles cannot necessarily be 
characterised in this regard according to their market position – differences within press 
sectors are in many cases greater than those between sectors (for example in the mid-
market and popular press). The Sun/Herald, for example, had more in common with 
regard to the proportion of directional balance with the Express than with the Mirror, 
which in turn had more in common with the Mail than the Sun/Herald. Further, the 
Guardian included slightly more supportive than critical quotation overall, at 27.4% to 
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26.3% of all quotation (or 9.6 to 9.2 words per item on average) and was therefore 
unique among the quality press and indeed all titles in its superior affordance of 
supportive voices compared with critical voices across all immigration coverage. 
Meanwhile, the difference between critical and supportive quotation was far less 
pronounced in the Telegraph than in the Times. 
Overall, for each title, neutral/mixed (i.e. other) quotation surpassed that of both critical 
and supportive quotation. The amount of critical quotation was, on average, highest in 
the Daily Express, and lowest in the Daily Mirror, while the amount of supportive 
quotation was highest in the Guardian and lowest in the Mirror. There was more than 
twice as much critical quotation as supportive in each of the Times, the Mail and the 
Mirror, while there was over 4 times as much critical to supportive quotation in the 
Express and the Sun/Herald. 
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 elaborate on Figure 7.7 to explore the disparities in directional 
balance within IAE coverage and in non-IAE coverage. Figure 7.8 shows the mean number 
of directly quoted words per item by tone in each newspaper in IAE coverage, while 
Figure 7.9 shows the same data for non-IAE coverage. 
Figure 7.8: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers in IAE coverage 
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The results show the pervasiveness by which critical quotation was higher than 
supportive quotation across the press. This disparity was most acute in the Sun/Herald, 
Mirror, Times and Express, demonstrating that where immigration had an electoral 
element, critical attitudes were afforded more space independent of factors of market 
position. For the Guardian and Telegraph, on the other hand, the ratio of critical to 
supportive quotation was 1.5 to 1 and 1.8 to 1, far less than the almost 10 to 1 of the 
Sun/Herald.  
Figure 7.9: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers in non-IAE coverage 
 
As is clear from Figure 7.9, the presence of neutral and mixed (i.e. other) quotation in 
non-IAE coverage was proportionally much higher than in IAE coverage. In the Express, 
for instance, other quotation comprised 85.7% of all quotation. In terms of the directional 
balance between critical and supportive quotation, though, supportive quotation was 
greater on average than critical quotation in 5 of the 7 newspaper titles, with the 
Guardian displaying a particularly large disparity in favour of supportive quotation at a 
ratio of slightly over 10 to 1 quoted words compared to the more modest disparities of 
the other 4 such titles (between 1.5 to 1 and 3.2 to 1). These results reinforce the 
significance of immigration as electoral issue: in terms of which voices prevail, the casting 
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of immigration within an electoral rubric is crucial to the directional balance of coverage 
in most of the press, even in those which can be characterised as relatively generous with 
the affordance of supportive voices, such as the Guardian. 
For the Mail and the Express, however, critical quotation surpassed supportive quotation 
even in non-IAE coverage – and, for the Express, the directional balance between critical 
and supportive remained of a similar ratio between both IAE and non-IAE coverage. In 
this sense, the mid-market press were unique in that they comprised the only market 
sector, and thus individually the only newspapers, to feature a disproportionate amount 
of critical to supportive quotation in both IAE and non-IAE coverage. Whereas other 
newspapers approached non-electorally significant immigration issues by providing the 
sort of platform for positive voices not seen in their IAE coverage, the mid-market press 
remained consistent in their marginalisation of these voices regardless of the electoral 
ramifications, ostensibly operating according to different logics of sourcing than other 
titles. 
Differences between newspapers across time 
It cannot be assumed that these results uniformly represent the directional balance of 
coverage across time, however. As the news value of immigration grew or contracted, 
and as certain actors came to the fore in media debates, it is conceivable that this would 
be reflected in fluctuations in the directional balance of coverage, both within individual 
titles and collectively as a national press. Moreover, the editorial politics of newspapers 
alter over time, too, potentially influencing reportorial practices in regard to a myriad of 
issues, immigration among them – and symptomatically the directional balance of 
coverage. The nuances of such developments for the histories of the Mirror and the 
Sun/Herald, for instance, are lost by simply providing a cumulative summation of the 
directional balance of these newspapers across several decades. 
Table 7.7 divides the 25 sampled campaigns into five quintiles, which periodise the 
directional balance of coverage by mean direct quotation per item across in each 
newspaper. The overall results show marked distinctions between periods of time: in the 
interwar and immediate post-1945 campaigns, supportive quotation was virtually (1918-
1929) or even completely (1931-1951) absent. Indeed, the 1922, 1929, 1931, 1935, 1945, 
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1950, 1951 and 1955 campaigns featured no supportive quotation whatsoever. In 
comparison, this was the case for critical quotation only in 1923, 1945, 1950 and 1955123.  
During the 1955-1970 period, however, supportive voices began to be established in the 
press, though critical quotation still outnumbered supportive on average by a ratio of 
over 2 to 1. The period from 1974-1987 was the only one in which supportive quotation 
outnumbered critical quotation, before the 1992-2010 period restored a similarly 
proportionate disparity in favour of critical quotation to that seen between 1955 and 
1970.  
Table 7.7: Mean direct quotation in words per item by tone across time in all coverage 
Title of 
publication Guardian Times 
Period 1918-1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
1918-
1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
Criticising 4.0 .0 20.4 8.1 4.7 9.2 13.7 22.0 31.6 2.0 1.8 11.1 
Supporting 1.5 .0 6.9 14.0 9.4 9.6 1.6 .0 9.4 1.1 3.9 4.5 
Other 13.9 28.0 15.1 14.8 17.5 16.2 26.0 2.7 14.2 17.5 15.1 15.7 
 
Title of 
publication Telegraph Mail 
Period 1918-1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
1918-
1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
Criticising 4.5 19.0 5.0 .7 9.1 6.0 20.0 27.3 2.9 7.9 10.3 10.5 
Supporting .0 .0 11.0 3.0 3.2 4.8 .0 .0 6.3 5.6 4.8 4.3 
Other 14.3 47.8 10.0 18.1 23.7 19.1 9.3 37.0 32.6 31.0 23.3 24.2 
 
Title of 
publication Express Mirror 
Period 1918-1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
1918-
1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
Criticising 9.5 12.3 15.5 2.4 41.8 24.0 6.8 11.0 7.9 1.3 5.4 5.7 
Supporting .0 .0 6.3 11.7 2.2 4.9 3.6 .0 .5 1.5 4.2 2.6 
Other .0 64.3 28.3 12.1 30.0 26.1 7.4 30.4 31.8 5.2 27.4 20.9 
                                                     
123 The 1950 campaign produced no immigration items, while the 1945 and 1955 campaign coverage 
included neutral and mixed quotation only. 
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Title of 
publication Sun/Herald Overall 
Period 1918-1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
1918-
1929 
1931-
1951 
1955-
1970 
1974-
1987 
1992-
2010 Total 
Criticising 20.8 .0 12.7 .2 19.2 13.4 12.2 14.1 15.9 3.8 11.1 10.7 
Supporting .0 .0 5.5 6.7 1.7 3.3 1.1 .0 7.6 6.8 4.7 5.4 
Other 14.6 25.8 18.2 13.2 13.9 15.1 12.5 33.6 18.3 16.9 20.6 19.1 
Figures represent the quotation of the first five actors, not of all quotation in coverage. 
 
In summarising directional balance across the press over time, three periods in general 
can be identified. During the interwar period, where actors were partisan they were very 
often critical in tone. Pro-immigration advocates were yet to emerge as sources in the 
press, but these groups had notable successes in some quarters of the press in several 
post-1945 campaigns, particularly between 1974 and 1987. While the presence of pro-
immigration voices did not entirely relent from 1992 onwards, critical voices became 
once again more prevalent in all but the Guardian and the Times, and were especially 
dominant in the Express and the Sun. The dominance of critical voices in the post-1992 
modern era echoes similar trends from earlier, interwar campaigns, though this is now 
accompanied by the presence of a more consistent, if somewhat muted, representation 
of supportive voices. 
The Lexicon of Coverage 
It is often argued that the terminology used to describe migrant groups and their 
movement is able to frame the way such groups and movements are perceived. As noted 
in Chapter 2, the use of metaphors in immigration coverage, for example, demonstrates 
the rhetorical and pejorative force of certain textual features to structure narratives 
about the issues involved and may work subtly enough to go unnoticed by many readers. 
Journalists might, on the other hand, deliberately seek to use quasi-legal or otherwise 
non-pejorative terms and phrases in order to avoid prejudicial descriptions of migrants 
and migration and to maintain a neutral, or even positive, portrayal of events. 
Counting the frequency of lexical choice, in terms of both descriptions of groups and 
movements, is therefore an important aspect of studying both the interpretative and the 
evaluative dimensions of immigration coverage. Further, charting change and continuity 
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in lexical use is also of paramount importance, as it is argued that the frequency of lexical 
choice can alter dramatically depending on political circumstances, even in the short term 
(McLaughlin 1999). In the longer term, and for a wider variety of reasons, certain terms 
might be subject to sustained usage, fall out of favour, gain currency, and so on.  
The terminology used to describe migrant groups 
With this in mind, Table 7.8 charts the usage of the 6 most frequently used terms for 
migrant groups in coded reports across the five broad periods of time between 1918 and 
2010. The usage of these terms by actors and journalists was separated, in order to 
recognise the higher threshold of endorsement afforded to a term when used by a 
journalist, as compared to the relative detachment that its presence in direct speech 
might bring. For this reason, the number of times a term was used by journalists appears 
in brackets underneath its total usage. For the most part, Table 7.8 demonstrates that it 
is rare for terms to be used exclusively by actors in reports and, therefore, that the terms 
shown are largely ‘endorsed’ by journalists in this regard. 
Table 7.8: Raw count of top six terms used for migrant groups in each period 
1918-1929 1931-1951 1955-1970 1974-1987 1992-2010 
alien(s) 36 (28) alien(s) 
11 
(11) immigrant(s) 
107 
(100) immigrant(s) 
61 
(57) immigrant(s) 
93 
(83) 
refugee(s) 6 (6) undesirable(s) 
1 
(1) alien(s) 
3 
(3) refugee(s) 
11 
(11) 
illegal 
(im)migrant(s) 
63 
(60) 
enemy alien(s) 3 (2) 
slave 
trafficker(s) 
1 
(1) refugee(s) 
3 
(3) 
illegal 
(im)migrant(s) 
8 
(8) 
asylum 
seeker(s) 
55 
(47) 
traveller(s) 2  (2)   migrant(s) 
3 
(3) alien(s) 
3 
(3) migrant(s) 
36 
(34) 
undesirable(s) 2  (2)   newcomer(s) 
3 
(3) 
boat 
refugee(s) 
3 
(3) refugee(s) 
27 
(27) 
immigrant(s) 1 (1)   traveller(s) 
1 
(1) migrant(s) 
2 
(2) 
economic 
migrant(s) 11 (7) 
Up to 3 terms could be coded per item. Each term could be coded once per item. Where a term was used by the journalist and 1 or 
more actors, the usage of the term by the journalist was coded only. 
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Figure 7.10 shows how usage of the 6 most frequently used terms overall (by either 
actors or journalists) fluctuated over time. 
Figure 7.10: Fluctuations in usage of terms over time (sum frequency of usage per 
campaign) 
 
The results illustrate the rise and fall (or vice versa) of several terms. The usage of the 
term ‘alien(s)’ was superseded in post-war coverage by the usage of the term 
‘immigrant(s)’. On a superficial level this reflects changes in the usage of both terms in 
legal and political discourses (e.g. the naming of Acts of Parliament concerned with 
immigration control), but this development may also reflect a growing discomfort at the 
pejorative connotative potential of the term ‘aliens’ and its incompatibility with the 
lexicon of a society which came to regard itself as more inclusive. 
The term ‘refugee(s)’ appeared in every period except for during the campaigns of 1931-
1951, and has been joined in recent years by the usage of the term ‘asylum seeker(s)’, an 
expansion that seems likely to be illustrative of the greater political and media focus and 
antipathy towards the issue of asylum during that time.  
Further, emergent concerns over irregular migration are reflected in the growth in usage 
of the term ‘illegal (im)migrant(s)’, particularly from 1992 onwards (it was the most 
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frequently used term in 2010), while the term ‘economic migrant(s)’ has surfaced too. 
The usage of many of the more frequently used terms shown in Table 7.8 can surely be 
attributed to their roots in contemporary legal and political discourses and presumably 
would appear to have been used in order to describe migrant groups relatively 
dispassionately and according to journalistic norms of neutrality.  
Those which owe less to their proliferation in legal and political domains (e.g. ‘enemy 
alien(s)’, ‘undesirable(s)’, ‘newcomer(s)’), on the other hand, prove more interesting with 
regard to assessing their evaluative implications, even if there is not always a consensus 
on their connotation. An example of the division which marks the politics of language 
surrounding immigration can be found in the contemporary use or lack of use of the term 
‘illegal immigrant’, for instance. Allen and Blinder (2013) found that UK newspapers use 
the term on a fairly regular basis, but the Associated Press stylebook now prohibits the 
term (AP 2013) and the Guardian has recently initiated a discussion via the newspaper’s 
readers’ editor to discuss the legitimacy of its usage (Elliott 2014).  
The 1992-2010 period contained three times as many individual formulations for 
describing migrant groups as in the 1918-1929, 1955-1970 and 1974-1987 periods (27 
terms were coded at least once from 1992-2010 compared to 9 in these three prior 
periods), and the 3 earliest periods were almost completely dominated by the most 
frequent term. Both of these trends indicate that there has been an expansion in the 
articulation of immigration in the latter period, a phenomenon referred to by critical 
linguists and critical discourse analysts as ‘overlexicalization’. As Richardson suggests, 
overlexicalization ‘should be taken to indicate an intense ideological preoccupation’ with 
the subject at hand (2009: 363). For terms relating to forced migration politics, this 
development can be seen in light of the ‘fractioning’ of the refugee label within the 
political domain (Zetter 2007), which may have transferred to the media domain. Further, 
Figure 7.10 shows that the 1970 campaign was dominated by the usage of the term 
‘immigrant’ to the almost total exclusion of other terms, while the latter campaigns were 
more diverse in the range of groups mentioned. 
While terms such as ‘immigrant(s)’ and ‘alien(s)’ were the most frequent overall, there 
are many more terms which may act as a guide towards the character of the lexicon of 
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the mediated immigration debate that are missed by a focus on the depth of lexical usage 
rather than its breadth. Further terms outside of the 6 most frequent from 1992-2010 
include, for example: ‘illegal(s)’ (8 times), ‘bogus refugee(s)’ (6), ‘genuine refugee(s)’ (5), 
‘failed asylum seeker(s)’ (5), ‘overstayer(s)’ (3), ‘bogus asylum seeker(s)’ (3), ‘genuine 
asylum seeker(s)’ (2) and ‘illegal asylum seeker(s)’ (2). This apparent preoccupation with 
the reliability of asylum seekers’ claims for refuge (including the dichotomised categories 
of ‘genuine’ vs. ‘bogus’ refugees) and the conflation of forced migration with irregular 
migration seem grounds for evidence of indirect evaluation, if not active criticism of 
refugees and asylum seekers.  
The terminology used to describe migration processes 
Of similar importance is the application of verbs and nominalizations which describe the 
process of immigration. Table 7.9 therefore shows the words used to describe the 
movement of migrants across time. This time, only the terms used by journalists were 
counted. Conjugations of verbs, as well as nominalizations, were usually conflated with 
the infinitives they were derived from. In rare instances, nouns were coded (e.g. ‘waves’), 
and nominalizations deemed significantly different and of sufficient interest were coded 
separately from similar terms (e.g. ‘mass immigration’). Further, in this case, due to the 
increased diversity of terms than in Table 7.8, up to the fifteen most frequent terms used 
per period are shown. 
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Table 7.9: Raw count of top fifteen terms used to describe migrants’ movements in 
reports 
1918-1929 1931-1951 1955-1970 1974-1987 1992-2010 
come 15 come 7 immigrate/ immigration 98 
immigrate/ 
immigration 56 
immigrate/ 
immigration 
278 
land 5 enter/entry 6 enter/entry 27 come 24 come 51 
immigrate/ 
immigration 4 influx 5 come 26 arrive 17 arrive 23 
return 3 immigrate/ immigration 1 arrive 19 fly 14 
mass 
immigration 19 
arrive 2 arrive 1 fly 19 stay 12 seek asylum* 17 
smuggle 2 flee 1 return 8 return 10 enter/entry 15 
domicile 2 settle 1 settle 6 join/rejoin 9 flee 14 
enter/entry 1 land 1 send 6 settle 8 stay 13 
invade/ 
invasion 1 traffic 1 influx 4 seek asylum* 7 migrate 13 
embark 1   land 3 flee 7 move/ment 13 
import 1   
admit/ 
admission 3 enter/entry 6 influx 9 
crawl 1   inflow 3 remain 4 remain 9 
swarm 1   flood 2 gain asylum* 4 flood 9 
    get into 2 reunite 4 bring 7 
    waves (of) 2 smuggle 3 allow in 7 
*’seek asylum’ also includes variants such as ‘ask for’, ‘claim’, ‘plead for’, etc.; ‘gain asylum’ also includes variants such as ‘be granted’.  
Up to 3 terms could be coded per item. 
Most notably, ‘immigrate/immigration’ itself was not the primary term by which inward 
migration to the UK was described by journalists prior to latter campaign periods, finding 
itself less frequently used than ‘come’ and ‘land’ between 1918 and 1929 and less 
frequently used than ‘come’, ‘enter/entry’ and ‘influx’ between 1931 and 1951. 
Thereafter, though, it became the dominant term by which migration was described.  
The most frequent terms in latter campaigns such as ‘immigrate/immigration’, ‘come’, 
‘arrive’, ‘stay’, ‘migrate’, ‘gain asylum’, and so forth, might reasonably, and similarly to 
the results found in Table 7.8, be described as containing neutral connotations. Some are 
simply indicative of the popularity of various modes of transport used to arrive in the UK 
(e.g. ‘land’, ‘fly’) according to developments in the accessibility of long-distance 
transportation during the twentieth century. Visible, too, is the prominence of ‘return’ 
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migration, with the attached rights of residency seemingly shaping the way this kind of 
migration was described by journalists (‘return’, ‘reunite’). 
Other terms, however, might be considered less neutral; some are reminiscent of the 
semantic fields of animal/insect movement (‘swarm’, ‘crawl’), trade (e.g. ‘import’, 
‘smuggle’, ‘send’, ‘bring’), war (‘invade/invasion’) and natural disaster (especially the 
movement of water) (‘influx’, ‘inflow’, ‘flood’, ‘waves’), which corresponds closely with 
the results found in a number of other studies. Moreover, the sudden emergence of the 
term ‘mass immigration’, almost non-existent prior to the 1992-2010 period, conceivably 
adds connotations of unmanageability and lack of control to the term ‘immigration’. 
Once again, the 1992-2010 period contained a broader range of terms than in any other 
period (53 individual terms to the 29 found in 1955-1970 and 27 found in 1974-1987), 
and more individual terms per article than in any other period (1.13 to 0.79 in 1974-1987, 
0.94 in 1955-1970, 0.71 in 1931-1951 and 0.46 in 1918-1929). 
Here, contemporary concerns about irregular migration were evidenced by further 
expansions on ‘immigration’ found in ‘illegal (im)migration’ (6 times) and ‘mass illegal 
immigration’ (1 time). Water-based terms found diverse expression in this period, too: 
‘floodgates’ (3 times), ‘waves’ (2 times), ‘tide’ (2 times), ‘swamp’ (2 times), ‘stream’ (2 
times), ‘inflow’ (1 time) and ‘pour (into)’ (1 time) were all present. Less frequently, the 
animal/insect-based terms ‘flock’ (4 times) and ‘infest’ (1 time), the war-based terms 
‘invade/invasion’ (2 times) and ‘hordes (of)’ (1 time), the organism/food-based term ‘be 
absorbed’ (1 time) and the trade-based terms ‘send’ (6 times), ‘smuggle’ (2 times), 
‘import’ (1 time), ‘(be) trafficked’ (1 time) and ‘(be) exported’ (1 time) were all 
nonetheless notable for the strength of their imagery. Notable, too, though for its 
unquestionably positive connotations, a single use of the term ‘(be) welcomed’ was 
found between 1992 and 2010.  
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The Fullness of Coverage: Themes 
With the onset of the macro-processes of late modernity, such as globalisation and trans-
nationalism, the argument that ‘the migrant’ resides at the core of modern experience 
rather than at the periphery (Berger and Mohr 1975: front page) would surely be made 
more forcefully now and in the intervening years than it had been in 1975. Along with the 
more recent effects of Britain’s transition to a nation of consistent net immigration, 
migration processes have seemingly come to demand consideration for their effects 
within all manner of public policy areas. Alongside these developments, if the migrant is 
to be centrally located in the functioning of society an adequate press debate might be 
suitably expected to focus on immigration as a social and political issue which is multi-
faceted and for which there have been competing and diverse perspectives with regard 
to its effects, problems and solutions. 
It has been argued, however, that ‘immigration control, fashioned through debates about 
numbers and quotas, constitutes the dominant policy concern for the media’ in recent 
years, which has the effect of constraining considerations of ‘labour market economics, 
human rights, anti-racism or justice’ from establishing a position in public discussion 
(Berkeley at al., 2005: 25). It has also been noted that immigration news usually consists 
of ‘a few main topics’ (van Dijk 2012: 22-23, 1991; Law 2010: 193). Nonetheless, despite 
the dominance of ‘the control frame’ and the limited set of topics which pervade much 
modern immigration coverage, it is important to assess how this may have changed over 
time, and to understand the place of contemporarily peripheral issues historically. 
Assessing the extent of coverage of issues such as housing, education, health and 
employment – often examined in such studies (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 129-131; 
van Dijk 1991: 80) helps to scrutinise the extent to which immigration coverage 
adequately interrogates both the breadth and depth of immigration as a social issue. This 
part of the study is therefore oriented to the interpretative dimension, in which 
researchers must ask ‘how full is the coverage’? Have campaign periods always been 
dominated by the ‘control frame’? Are certain issues disproportionately dwelt upon more 
than others, thereby introducing indirect evaluation (Golding 1990) and promoting the 
association of immigrants with problems of reception (van Dijk 2000)? Have expansions in 
coverage provoked interest in previously disregarded issues?  
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The Thematic Dimensions of Coverage 
Table 7.10 shows the frequency with which various themes appeared on the news 
agenda with regard to immigration over the entirety of immigration coverage sampled. 
The results show that, ordered by the frequency of themes in main focus coverage, 
articles featuring discussion of Immigration Services Procedure were ranked first, 
accounting for 12.5% of coverage124. Also highly frequent were the themes of Crime, 
Forced Migration, Numbers and the Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority 
Voters and Candidates. The dominance of Crime, Forced Migration and Numbers suggests 
that historically immigration news during election campaigns has formed part of an 
interpretative framework in which immigration is routinely associated with crime, in 
which certain routes of migration are focussed on disproportionately and in which 
arguments about the number of people immigrating into the UK are seen as of 
paramount importance to the exclusion of other considerations. Finally, the frequent 
presence of the ‘Influence…’ theme is indicative of the growth in the national 
constituency of migrant voters in the latter half of the twentieth century, whose 
increasing presence necessitated a discussion of their electoral participation.  
Table 7.10: The themes of immigration coverage 
Theme 
Main Focus Coverage All coverage 
Responses Responses 
N % Rank N % Rank 
Immigration Services Procedure 103 12.5 1 113 7.4 5 
Crime 73 8.9 2 102 6.7 7 
Forced Migration 68 8.3 3 114 7.5 4 
Numbers 64 7.8 4 118 7.8 3 
Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates 59 7.2 5 111 7.3 6 
Irregular Migration 56 6.8 6 91 6.0 8 
Social Cohesion 44 5.3 7 65 4.3 9 
Disillusionment with Political Response 42 5.1 8 122 8.0 2 
Employment/Trade 34 4.1 9 52 3.4 11 
General/Indeterminate 27 3.3 10 223 14.7 1 
Return Migration 26 3.2 11 40 2.6 13 
                                                     
124 This theme was defined as encompassing discussion of (i) the aptitude by which immigration officials are 
seen to implement government immigration policy and (ii) the interactional processes between migrants 
and state institutions and structures. It is therefore similar in definition to the way in which other such 
studies designate a ‘control’ frame/theme. 
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Theme 
Main Focus Coverage All coverage 
Responses Responses 
N % Rank N % Rank 
Racism 23 2.8 12 55 3.6 10 
Family Reunification 23 2.8 = 32 2.1 15 
Citizenship 22 2.7 14 28 1.8 16 
Security 21 2.5 15 24 1.6 18 
Health 17 2.1 16 19 1.2 22 
Voluntary Migration 16 1.9 17 26 1.7 17 
Resources and Structure of State Apparatus 15 1.8 18 47 3.1 12 
Repatriation 15 1.8 = 36 2.4 14 
Education 14 1.7 20 21 1.4 19 
Housing 14 1.7 = 20 1.3 20 
Cultural Integration 13 1.6 22 20 1.3 = 
Temporary Migration 12 1.5 23 12 0.8 23 
Welfare Provision 10 1.2 24 12 0.8 = 
The UK and the European Union/Europe 7 0.8 25 10 0.7 25 
The Economy 4 0.5 26 6 0.4 26 
The UK and the Commonwealth 2 0.2 27 2 0.1 27 
Total 824 100.0  1521 100.0  
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Up to 3 themes could be coded per news item from 27 possible theme 
categories. N corresponds to responses. 
The results also show stark differences between the rank of themes in main focus 
coverage and all coverage, i.e. including coverage for which immigration was one among 
a number of other subjects. The limited depth of expression that this kind of coverage 
affords to discussion of immigration elevates some issues at the expense of others, and 
can be related to the growth in immigration’s appearances as part of the general 
coverage of the campaign. For example, the ranking of themes in all coverage places 
General/Indeterminate, Disillusionment with Political Response and Numbers in the top 3 
themes (replacing Immigration Services Procedure, Crime and Forced Migration). The 
theme of Numbers is the only one of these which appears in the top 5 themes for main 
focus coverage as well as in all immigration coverage, indicative of the capacity of such 
concerns to be articulated in detail as well as briefly125.  
                                                     
125 By way of hypothetical example, an article might report the release of official government statistics and 
their perceived implications (main focus coverage) or, alternatively, the numerous campaign pledges of a 
party or candidate, one of which promises to introduce a quota on immigration numbers (secondary focus 
coverage). 
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In addition to notable presences, it is also important to consider notable absences. The 
results indicate that some of immigration’s related issues suffer a paucity of attention 
compared with others. The lack of focus on these less frequently present issues means 
that, as can be seen from the lower part of Table 7.10, discussion of the UK’s 
international obligations, the direct economic implications of immigration, routes of 
migration other than those relating to irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, 
the allocation of resources used to administer immigration controls and the cultural 
impacts of immigration are ordinarily left relatively un-discussed.  
In terms of the routes of migration, for instance, the thematic categories of Forced 
Migration and Irregular Migration comprised 8.3% and 6.8% of the themes for main focus 
coverage respectively, compared with 3.2% for Return Migration, 1.9% for Voluntary 
Migration and 1.5% for Temporary Migration (Education, related in part to student 
migration, accounted for 1.7%). This is suggestive of a perspective which normalizes 
certain forms of migration, deeming these less problematic and worthy of less attention. 
Voluntary migrants, for example, have historically constituted an overwhelmingly large 
proportion of all migrants to the UK, but their movements may be deemed unremarkable 
and lacking in newsworthiness precisely due to the permanency and perceived legitimacy 
of this status, while cyclical concerns about the illegitimacy of other routes are seen to 
require persistent attention. This is not to suggest that voluntary migrants do not appear 
in the news; voluntary migrants appear regularly in the news, but this aspect of migration 
is often not manifestly topicalised, likely because it is normalised or seen as a less 
problematic form of migration. 
Moreover, the themes of The UK and the European Union/Europe, The Economy and The 
UK and the Commonwealth were each present less than 1% of the time in main focus 
coverage. These three themes, in particular, are less conducive to the reporting of news 
which is very often episodic in scope, ostensibly requiring sufficient space for contextual 
detail. This is not to suggest, of course, that the macro-economic or geo-political 
implications of immigration might never be inferred from the way that immigration is 
reported, but simply that immigration ‘events’ are generally reported without coherent 
attendance to their structural and historical factors in any great detail. This reveals how 
news values may have an impact upon the thematic breadth of immigration coverage, 
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which provides episodic and personalised narratives that neglect the abstract and latent 
forces that play a part in the unfolding of immigration processes. 
Themes over time 
Over such an expansive period of time, it is questionable as to whether the dominant 
themes of debate shown above will have remained static. The dominant themes of any 
area of public policy are at the mercy of the influence of wider contemporary debates 
and are thus subject to fluctuation over time, and the major issues associated with 
immigration during the inter-war period, for example, might reasonably be expected to 
differ from those of more recent times. Nonetheless, the issues to which these varying 
priorities relate might also comprise perennial and generic concerns. In order to assess to 
what extent the priorities of discussion have changed, Table 7.11 shows the most 
common themes in main focus coverage in each quintile of time. 
 
 
Table 7.11: Themes of main focus overage over time 
 1918-1929 N % 1931-1951 N % 1955-1970 N % 
1 Crime 18 25.7 Immigration Services Procedure 15 35.7 
Immigration Services 
Procedure 28 11.1 
2 Immigration Services Procedure 7 10.0 Crime 8 19.0 
Influence and 
Mobilisation of 
Migrant/Minority 
Voters and Candidates 
25 9.9 
3 Employment/Trade = = Irregular Migration 7 16.7 Social Cohesion 21 8.3 
4 Citizenship = = Security 5 11.9 Disillusionment with Political Response = = 
5 
Influence and 
Mobilisation of 
Migrant/Minority 
Voters and Candidates 
6 8.6 Citizenship 4 9.5 Crime 18 7.1 
6-27 Other 25 35.7 Other 3 7.1 Other 139 55.2 
 Total 70 100.0 Total 42 100.0 Total 252 100.0 
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 1974-1987 N % 1992-2010 N % 
1 Immigration Services Procedure 29 14.5 Numbers 46 17.7 
2 Forced Migration 24 12.0 Forced Migration 33 12.7 
3 Crime 20 10.0 Immigration Services Procedure 24 9.2 
4 
Influence and 
Mobilisation of 
Migrant/Minority 
Voters and Candidates 
19 9.5 Irregular Migration 21 8.1 
5 Return Migration = = Social Cohesion Employment/Trade 
16 
= 
6.2 
= 
6-27 Other 89 44.5 Other 104 40.0 
 Total 200 100.0 Total 260 100.0 
Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Up to 3 themes could be coded per news item from 27 possible theme 
categories. N corresponds to responses. 
As can be seen from Table 7.11, Crime constituted by far the most frequent theme in 
earlier campaigns, and its subsequent reduced (though still substantial) frequency has 
only relented in proportion to other themes recently (between 1992 and 2010 there were 
9 stories for which Crime was a theme). The post-war periods saw much discussion of the 
democratic rights and representation of migrants, though the Influence and Mobility 
theme also appeared in 1922 (due entirely to the publication and denunciation of a 
forged ‘manifesto’ purportedly published by the Labour Party, which ironically 
encouraged Austrian and German residents in the UK to ‘vote Labour’ despite their 
inability to do so). Recent coverage has focussed on issues, among others, such as 
Numbers, Forced Migration and Irregular Migration. Though Forced Migration was 
present to a large degree in coverage during the period between 1974 and 1987, the 
frequency of Numbers and Irregular Migration coverage between 1992 and 2010 make 
these a stark and recent addition to debate, to the loss of Crime and Influence and 
Mobilisation stories. In short, though earlier periods often reduced discussion of 
immigration to issues of Crime, post-1945 coverage increasingly attended to the 
democratic implications of Commonwealth migration and the perceived indirect effects 
of migration (Social Cohesion, Disillusionment). Latterly, there has been a shift towards a 
focus on discussion of immigration control (Numbers, along with the perennially frequent 
Immigration Services Procedure), which has dovetailed and combined with discussion of 
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certain routes of migration to the virtual exclusion of others (Forced Migration, Irregular 
Migration) 126. 
The plurality of debate 
With fluctuations in the volume of coverage, it is important to assess whether the debate 
became ‘fuller’. In other words, did a small range of topics dominate discussion or did an 
increase in volume correspond to more pluralism in the range of themes available?  Table 
7.11 shows that there was a steady incline in the post-1945 era in the volume of coverage 
that the top 5 themes of each quintile comprised. In this sense, these results indicate that 
the dominant themes of coverage have come to dominate more sharply in each era 
during this time. Using a stacked bar chart, Figure 7.11 shows the extent to which the 
overall top 5 themes in main focus coverage (i.e. Immigration Services Procedure, Crime, 
Forced Migration, Numbers and Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters 
and Candidates) dominated coverage over all campaigns.  
Figure 7.11: The dominance of the five most frequent themes in main focus coverage 
 
                                                     
126 Between the 1992 and 2010 campaigns, there were 2 stories about Voluntary Migration, 2 about 
Temporary Migration and 0 about Return Migration. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Campaign 
Top 5 Themes
Other Themes
210 
 
It would be expected that, during campaign periods of particularly high volumes of 
immigration coverage, the proportion of the top 5 themes would need to decrease in 
order to make way for discussion of other thematic areas if the debate is to be regarded 
as fuller and more pluralistic, and vice versa for the discussion to be regarded as less full 
and constrained to a smaller range of thematic areas. Taking the four campaigns of 1970, 
2001, 2005 and 2010 into consideration as periods in which the volume of coverage was 
at its most expansive, in only 2001 did the top 5 themes exceed 50% of all coverage, 
while the rise in volume of coverage produced a slightly more plural debate. Nonetheless, 
the accumulated presence of other themes in 2010 was by no means relatively 
substantial, while the 1970 campaign was barely distinguishable in this sense from those 
which preceded and followed it. The general trend in the second part of the twentieth 
century and beyond was, in fact, of a growing dominance of the top 5 themes which only 
decreased for two or more consecutive campaigns relatively recently – and even then 
under-proportionately to a large corresponding increase in the volume of coverage. It can 
be suggested, therefore, that the debate has not become pluralistic proportionate to the 
volume of coverage. On the whole, the most frequent themes of coverage have been 
disproportionately present in coverage and have increasingly tended to dominate 
discussion, while other possible themes of coverage are overlooked or excluded. The 
Pearson’s correlation co-efficient for the correlation between the number of main focus 
immigration items and the proportion of top 5 themes among all themes was 0.02, 
suggesting that there is almost no relationship between changes in the volume of 
coverage and the level of thematic plurality of the debate. 
Themes by newspaper 
Table 7.12 disaggregates the general findings to show the top 5 themes coded in each 
newspaper across all 25 elections in main focus coverage. In terms of the degree of 
uniformity in the subjects available in the press overall, the coefficient of concordance for 
agreement between the themes of main focus coverage across all newspapers is 0.64 for 
Kendall’s W127, indicating a fairly strong degree of uniformity across the press in the 
extent to which similar themes were covered. It is observable from Table 7.12, for 
example, that many of the top 5 themes within individual newspapers were also present 
                                                     
127 Chi Square X2=117.2893, p=<0.0001, calculated using http://www.statstodo.com/KendallW_Exp.php. 
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within the top 5 themes overall, while almost all of those which weren’t were at least in 
the top 10 themes overall (e.g. Social Cohesion, Irregular Migration, Employment/Trade). 
The results show, then, that there was a limited degree of difference in the themes of 
discussion which have appeared in the press during campaigns. 
Nonetheless, there were at least some notable differences in the ranking of the most 
frequently covered themes between newspaper titles. Stories about Social Cohesion 
were more frequent in the Guardian than in any other newspaper, Irregular Migration 
was in the top 3 themes for every newspaper except for the Guardian and the Times (for 
which it was 12th and 13th respectively), while Employment/Trade was in the top 5 
themes in only the Express.  
Beyond these differences, however, smaller contrasts are also revealing.  In terms of 
intra-sector differences, the Times and the Mail contained more stories about Forced 
Migration than their market competitors. Meanwhile, the Guardian and the Telegraph 
focussed on the emergence of the minority vote to an extent that the Times did not. The 
Mail, Express and Mirror contained a greater proportion of Crime stories compared with 
other titles, though Crime stories were also somewhat present in the quality press. 
Finally, although the theme of Numbers was common to all titles except for the Mirror 
(for which there were 0 stories concerning Numbers), it was proportionately most 
prominent in the Times, the Mail and the Sun/Herald.  
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Table 7.12: Themes by newspaper in main focus immigration coverage 
 
Guardian Times Telegraph 
Theme N % Theme N % Theme N % 
1 Immigration Services Procedure 22 12.8 Immigration Services Procedure 29 19.1 Influence and mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates 23 14.9 
2 Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates 16 9.3 Forced Migration 18 11.8 Immigration Services Procedure 21 13.6 
3 Social Cohesion 16 9.3 Crime 12 7.9 Irregular Migration 13 8.4 
4 Crime 12 7.0 Numbers 11 7.2 Crime 12 7.8 
5 Forced Migration 11 6.4 Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates 8 5.3 Forced Migration 10 6.5 
6-27 Other 95 55.2 Other 74 48.7 Other 75 48.7 
 Total 172 100.0 Total 152 100.0 Total 154 100.0 
 
 
Mail Express Mirror Sun/Herald 
Theme N % Theme N % Theme N % Theme N % 
1 Numbers 16 12.7 Crime 13 13.1 Crime 7 15.6 Immigration Services Procedure 10 13.2 
2 Crime 13 10.3 Irregular Migration 10 10.1 Forced Migration 5 11.1 Numbers 10 13.2 
3 Irregular Migration 12 9.5 Immigration Services Procedure 9 9.1 Irregular Migration 4 8.9 Irregular Migration 8 10.5 
4 Forced Migration 10 7.9 Numbers 9 9.1 Return Migration 4 8.9 Forced Migration 7 9.2 
5 Immigration Services Procedure 9 7.1 Employment/Trade 8 8.1 
Immigration Services 
Procedure 
Disillusionment with Political 
Response 
3 
= 
6.7 
= 
Influence and Mobilisation… 
Disillusionment with Political 
Response 
6 
= 
7.9 
= 
6-27 Other 66 52.4 Other 50 50.5 Other 19 42.2 Other 29 38.2 
 Total 126 100.0 Total 99 100.0 Total 45 100.0 Total 76 100.0 
Percentages are rounded so may not total 100. Up to 3 themes could be coded per news item from 27 possible theme categories. N corresponds to responses. 
213 
 
Electoral themes 
Finally, an overview of which themes were most present in IAE coverage gives a more 
definitive insight into which aspects of immigration have been regarded as most electorally 
significant during election campaigns. Table 7.13 shows the frequency and proportion of 
themes in main focus IAE coverage compared with main focus immigration coverage, 
indicating the extent to which themes were covered with specific regard to the election. For 
example, the electoral implications of the Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority 
Voters and Candidates theme are self-evident, which explain why its appearance on 59 
occasions in immigration coverage generally were all in IAE coverage.  
Table 7.13: The frequency of themes in immigration and IAE coverage 
 
immigration 
coverage 
IAE 
coverage 
IAE as %  
of all 
immigration 
 N N 
Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates 59 59 100.0 
Numbers 64 53 82.8 
Disillusionment with Political Response 42 39 92.9 
Social Cohesion 44 38 86.4 
Immigration Services Procedure 103 35 34.0 
Forced Migration 68 24 35.3 
Racism 23 22 95.7 
General/Indeterminate 27 21 77.8 
Crime 73 20 27.4 
Irregular Migration 56 18 32.1 
Employment/Trade 34 16 47.1 
Resources and Structure of State Apparatus 15 13 86.7 
Repatriation 15 12 80.0 
Housing 14 11 78.6 
Security 21 10 47.6 
Citizenship 22 9 40.9 
Welfare Provision 10 7 70.0 
The UK and the European Union/Europe 7 5 71.4 
Return Migration 26 5 19.2 
Voluntary Migration 16 4 25.0 
Family Reunification 23 4 17.4 
The Economy 4 3 75.0 
The UK and the Commonwealth 2 2 100.0 
Temporary Migration 12 2 16.7 
Cultural Integration 13 2 15.4 
Education 14 1 7.1 
Health 17 0 0.0 
Total 824 435 52.8 
Up to 3 themes could be coded per news item from 27 possible theme categories. N corresponds to responses. 
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Beyond this, the themes of Numbers, Disillusionment with Political Response, Social 
Cohesion, Racism, Resources and Structure of State Apparatus, Repatriation and Housing 
were reported with their electoral repercussions sharply in focus, too. The politicisation of 
some of these, such as Repatriation and Numbers, can be explained by their placement on 
the electoral agenda by campaigning politicians, while others, such as Disillusionment and 
Social Cohesion might be more fittingly attributed to popular displays (or, at least, 
inferences) of disaffection on the part of sections of the public.  
Other themes, however, seem to have relatively avoided equivalent electoral association, 
such as the themes of Immigration Services Procedure, Forced Migration, Crime, Irregular 
Migration, Return Migration, Family Reunification, Temporary Migration, Cultural 
Integration, Education and Health. These issues are therefore either left relatively un-
discussed or un-problematised (at least in ways conducive to their electoral politicisation), 
although it might be the case that discussion of such issues is premised on taken-for-granted 
assumptions about their problematic status, leaving little need for overt association with 
politicians or the election. 
Migrants as ‘themes’ of coverage 
Another way to view ‘thematic’ patterns in the coverage in terms of interpretation is to 
assess which kinds of ethnic, regional, national or religious groups of migrants the coverage 
was about. 
Table 7.14 shows the ‘visibility’ of certain such groups by their origin over time. The data 
shown here has been pared down from a larger set of categories (from 114 to 34), which 
were originally coded as close to the terms used in reports as possible. These have been re-
categorised into categories relating to geographic regions, religious identity and ascribed 
skin colour/other (owing to the impossibility of conflating these three sets of category 
together). 
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Table 7.14: Top ten groups the coverage was about by time period (raw counts) 
Period 
1918-1929 1931-1951 1955-1970 1974-1987 1992-2010 
Central 
Europe 45 
Central 
Europe 19 ‘black’/‘coloured’ 58 
Western 
Asia/Middle East 37 
Eastern 
Europe 44 
Western 
Europe and 
Ireland 
13 
(8)* 
Eastern 
Europe 9 South Asia 38 South Asia 31 
Central 
Europe 23 
Eastern 
Europe 8 
Western 
Europe and 
Ireland 
6 
(2)* Eastern Africa 34 Asia (generally) 30 
Europe 
(general) 20 
East Asia 7 Jewish 1 Caribbean 32 Eastern Europe 23 South Asia 18 
Southern 
Europe 5 ‘white’ 1 
Commonwealth 
(generally) 19 ‘black’/’coloured’ 20 
Asia 
(generally) 17 
Jewish 2   
Western Europe 
and Ireland 
13 
(7)* British/English 20 
Western 
Asia/Middle 
East 
15 
Roman 
Catholic 2   Asia (generally) 11 East Asia 19 
South-East 
Europe 13 
Western 
Asia/Middle 
East 
1   Southern Europe 11 Caribbean 15 Caribbean 12 
Northern 
America 1   Africa (generally) 10 Central Europe 12 Muslim 12 
Central and 
South 
Americas 
1   British/English 8 Eastern Africa 10 East Asia 10 
Each article could be coded for up to 3 separate ethnic, regional, national or religious groups mentioned by journalists or actors. 
*The number in brackets refers to the subset of which relates to Irish migrants 
Principally, there are two main developments of interest shown by Table 7.14: firstly, there 
has been a recrudescence of the visibility of Central and Eastern European migrants in 
coverage, who were highly visible in the interwar period but whose re-appearance (along 
with South-East Europeans) was completed during the 1992-2010 era, albeit in altogether 
different circumstances than originally. Secondly, the indelible mark on British culture left 
by the arrival of ‘New Commonwealth’ migrants in the post-war period is reflected in post-
war patterns in the interpretative framework of immigration reporting during campaign 
periods (and perhaps generally). Indeed, from 1955 to 1987, large parts of the coverage 
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dealt with migrants from South Asia, East Africa and the Caribbean (as well as the 
Commonwealth in general and ‘black’/’coloured’ migrants).  
Further, the sudden appearance of Muslim migrants on the electoral news agenda in the 
1992-2010 period accords with the findings of a number of news studies which have charted 
the rise in visibility and problematisation of Muslims within news coverage generally and 
during election campaigns (e.g. Richardson 2009). Accompanying this coverage, a rise in and 
the normalisation of anti-Muslim prejudice and the construction of their outsider status on 
the basis of their allegedly ‘qualified patriotism’ (Field 2007) is, in many respects, similar to 
the features of anti-Semitism which prevailed in Britain in the first-half of the twentieth 
century (Linehan 2012). This background suggests that there may be some parallels 
between the patterns found in earlier periods and those found in latter periods regarding 
the visibility of Jewish and Eastern European migrants in the former and Muslim migrants in 
the latter. 
Along with other findings relating to the thematic profile of immigration coverage, the 
question of which kinds of migrants were present in coverage suggests that there are 
notable qualitative differences between contemporary coverage and previous coverage. 
Contemporary press debate during campaigns has been concerned with issues regarding 
‘numbers’, forced and irregular migrants and what was called ‘immigration services 
procedure’, a theme which has much in common with the ‘control frame’ identified as 
dominant in other studies of immigration news. In tandem with the findings of this section, 
there is a suggestion that much of the discussion of these issues is associated with what has 
been termed the ‘New Migration’ in Europe (Koser and Lutz 1998) and the replacement of 
an overwhelming focus on migration from the countries of the New Commonwealth (e.g. 
such as the ‘black’/’coloured’, South Asia, Eastern Africa and Caribbean categories) between 
1955 and 1970. As an increase in the volume of coverage has come alongside an expansion 
in the volume of global migration and immigration to the UK, so the themes of press debate 
as revealed here suggest that immigration coverage refracts recent changes in the profile of 
immigration to the UK and the social construction of such changes in quantifiable ways. 
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Summary  
During the course of this chapter, immigration coverage has been analysed in two main 
ways: according to its ‘fairness’ and according to its ‘fullness’. This analysis has added 
further detail to and consolidated on the findings of the previous chapter. The chapter has 
sought to expand upon the implications of issues regarding longitudinal patterns found in 
aspects of the coverage such as its volume, the context of campaign coverage generally and 
the news access of sources.  
In doing so, it has addressed whether press discourses have become more negative, 
particularly in light of increased press attention on immigration issues. This relates to the 
issue of ‘fairness’ of coverage, and in assessing the extent to which views critical and 
supportive of immigration were voiced in coverage, the ‘directional balance’ of immigration 
coverage has been shown to be largely critical. Recent coverage in particular has provided 
audiences with an increased availability of critical attitudes in the press – if simply by dint of 
increases in the sum volume of coverage.  
It appears that there is a dichotomy in the way that immigration is represented depending 
on whether or not electoral politics are at stake. Where immigration has been discussed in 
terms of its electoral relevance, ‘IAE’ coverage has been shown to have produced a large 
quantitative disparity between the expression of critical attitudes and supportive attitudes 
across the press at a ratio of over 2 to 1 directly quoted words by actors overall. In some 
newspapers (e.g. Sun/Herald, Express), this disparity was even greater, which ultimately 
meant in some newspapers that for every IAE immigration item there was very little positive 
sentiment expressed towards immigration at all. 
Coverage which is not politicised in relation to electoral politics has tended to offer a more 
neutral, even positive, picture. Specifically, ‘non-IAE’ coverage, as it has been referred to, 
features more neutral and mixed quotation (and in this sense can be characterised as a less 
divisively debated topic), a closer ratio between critical and supportive quotation which 
more aptly meets journalistic notions of balance than can be said for IAE coverage and, as 
supportive quotation was more prominent than critical quotation, that immigration was 
regarded in this sense as a subject which merited positive advocacy rather than automatic 
problematisation. This was true of all newspapers except for the mid-market press, which 
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remained a platform for more critical quotation than supportive quotation even in non-IAE 
coverage.  
Elite sources were by far most sourced for their critical perspectives, to an even higher 
degree than neutral and mixed quotation, accounting for over two-thirds of all critical 
quotation overall. While opposition sources were able to exploit and generate the 
opportunities that immigration issues provided space for, and thus received more space for 
critical quotation than incumbent party sources, incumbents attempted to respond in kind 
and contributed for their own part, too. Converse to the expectations of incumbent party 
bonus seen in campaigning generally, the reporting of immigration appears to reassign this 
bonus to opposition sources. This, however, seems to provoke a response from incumbent 
party sources presumably fearful that this will leave them exposed on the issue in the minds 
of a highly restrictive public.  
Who doesn’t get to define the issue is also of importance. Notably, migrant sources were 
shown in the previous chapter to receive more news presence than news access, and in this 
chapter that over 80% of their contributions to the debate were of neutral or mixed tone. 
Migrant sources are therefore unable (though possibly unwilling) to provide a 
counterbalancing effect of supportive quotation to the abundance of critical quotation in 
the press generally, with their lack of news access in general compounding this to the 
detriment of their involvement in the construction of immigration in the press. 
Bridging the dual concerns of the directional balance (i.e. fairness) of coverage and the 
thematic dimensions (i.e. fullness) of coverage, charting the terminology of coverage has 
not only given an insight into the lexical construction of immigration in its positive and 
negative terms, but is also indicative of the kinds of topics and groups of migrants through 
which immigration issues are most prominently associated. The findings illustrate that the 
lexicon of immigration coverage has proliferated (particularly more recently), and that this 
proliferation has coincided with an expansion in the range of terms including dehumanising 
metaphors and categories occupied with the generation of a ‘genuine’ vs. ‘bogus’ dichotomy 
in discussions of asylum seekers and refugees. However, certain terms not generally 
considered to be pejorative have tended to dominate the definitional aspect of debate. 
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The chapter has also assessed the extent of plurality in the immigration debate, in particular 
whether more plurality is associated with more immigration coverage. Overall, the top five 
themes in main focus coverage were Immigration Services Procedure, Crime, Forced 
Migration, Numbers and the Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and 
Candidates. These themes very often constituted the major areas of discussion, with little 
erosion in their prominence during campaigns of increased immigration coverage.  
Moreover, the dominant themes of media debate have been moderately uniform in their 
presence across the press, with minor differences between newspapers. Issues such as the 
UK’s relationships with the Commonwealth and the European Union in relation to 
immigration barely featured, while the economic context of immigration, its cultural impact 
and routes of migration other than forced and irregular forms as explicit topics were also 
largely ignored.  Indeed, during recent campaigns a focus on asylum seekers, refugees and 
irregular migrants has been in stark contrast to the lack of discussion of other routes of 
migration specifically. Finally, there has been a general shift in the focus of coverage on 
different migrants, beginning with migrants from Europe in the interwar period, to those 
from the countries of the New Commonwealth in the decades following the Second World 
War, to a predominant focus on European migration (with some residual focus on New 
Commonwealth migration) in the campaigns 1992-2010. 
The next chapter will focus on the qualitative features of the dominant themes of 
immigration coverage. In doing so it will explore how the press have constructed key 
elements of the ethics of immigration in regards to a framework concerning the 
representation of ‘our’ rights and ‘their’ responsibilities. 
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8: Negotiating Rights and Responsibilities: The Ethics and Politics of 
Immigration 
The previous two chapters have charted many of the quantitative features of immigration 
coverage during election campaigns, including the volume and frequency of articles, the 
news presence and news access of social actors, the ‘directional balance’ of coverage, the 
frequency of key terminology and the dominant themes of coverage, across the output of 
several newspapers. These findings invite elaborative analysis into how these patterns are 
manifest qualitatively. In particular, examining how the press has constructed the terms of 
citizenship for immigrants as immigration has risen as a political/electoral issue is integral to 
understanding its role in reshaping the terms of the ethics and politics of the immigration 
debate in general. Specifically, these are viewed through the dimensions of ‘our’ rights and 
responsibilities (i.e those of ‘us Britons’) versus ‘theirs’ (i.e. immigrants, asylum seekers and 
refugees), in a framework similar to the ‘us/them’ binary and the ideological square 
observed by a number of other scholars relating to representations of immigration and 
‘race’ (e.g. Sonwalkar 2005; van Dijk 1988, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2012; Richardson 
2004, 2007; KhsoraviNik 2010b). To this end, this chapter explores the headline 
constructions of three aspects of the coverage which attracted a large degree of attention in 
the press overall in order to uncover how the press has shaped the boundaries of belonging 
and promoted a set of values in relation to some of the most fundamentally important 
aspects of the politics of immigration. There are two main reasons for analysing these areas 
of coverage. 
First, qualitatively investigating the immigration news of campaigns of quantitatively high 
levels of coverage enables an insight into the ‘temporal evolution of media(ted) discourses’ 
(Carvalho 2008: 172) so points of quantitative intensity in the debate are of interest since 
they are assumed to index, in certain respects, a qualitatively intense debate. Such points of 
intensity are referred to as ‘critical discourse moments’ (Chilton 1987; Gamson 1992: 26; 
Carvalho 2008), in the sense that they reflect the escalation of contemporary ‘concerns’ and 
are sites of contest over the establishment of hegemonic narratives. These moments 
therefore invite the researcher to ask ‘did arguments change? did new/alternative views 
arise?’ (Carvalho 2008: 166). Choosing to analyse coverage of intensity in this respect 
therefore not only mitigates criticisms which suggest that qualitative analysts ‘cherry pick’ 
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examples (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 11), but also exposes continuities and contrasts within 
the media narrative of key thematic issues. 
Second, investigating the news presence and news access of social actors has suggested that 
elite political actors and citizens are privileged in terms of news access over other actors, 
while the news access of migrants fails to match that of their presence in the news. 
Pejorative terms have also proliferated (though not necessarily dominated) in the 
description of migrant groups in more recent campaigns and critical voices have been highly 
prominent in immigration coverage of electoral import. Discourse analysis can add further 
detail to these findings by asking, for example, which referential and predicational strategies 
social actors and their actions are subject to, how social relations are represented and how 
evaluations of actors, actions and events are normalized as parts of ‘common sense’ ideas 
within texts (as a part of discourse). Following the assumptions of Fairclough’s ‘dialectical-
relational’ model of CDA, tracking such textual features over time helps to reveal the 
development of the power relations and ideological struggles present within discursive and 
social practices with regard to immigration.  
Specifically, the chapter will focus on headlines and the first paragraphs of coverage within 
three salient and distinct thematic areas of coverage, namely i) ‘precarious routes’, ii) 
‘numbers’ and iii) ‘the migrant vote’ and migrant candidature. These topics constitute a 
selection of some of the most frequent thematic areas in coverage128, thereby each 
generating a suitably large corpus within which temporal comparisons may be made and 
mitigating possible biases in selection by the researcher. Where ‘critical discourse moments’ 
is a term used to refer to periods of time for which coverage (of particular topics) is 
particularly salient, sub-topics of particular prominence might therefore be called ‘critical 
discourse themes’, and tracking diachronic change within their discursive representation 
helps to focus attention on their place within the development of the politics of immigration 
in general. 
                                                     
128 ‘Immigration Services Procedure’, ‘Forced Migration’ and ‘Numbers’ were the 1st, 3rd and 4th most frequent 
themes in immigration coverage of main focus respectively. Though Irregular Migration was the 6th most 
frequent theme in main focus coverage, it has been combined with Forced Migration coverage due to similarly 
observable patterns in their discursive construction and due to their conflation as observed in the lexicon of 
coverage in latter periods. Further, although Crime was the 2nd most frequent theme in main focus coverage, 
an analysis of its characteristics was eschewed here due to the wealth of existing literature which analyses 
crime, threat and deviancy in relation to media coverage of immigrants and ethnic minorities (e.g. Hall et. al 
1978; van Dijk 1989, 1991; Law 2002; Philo et. al 2013; Hartmann and Husband 1974). 
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 ‘Precarious’ Routes: The Responsibilities of the Host? 
Asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants were among the most visible categories of 
‘migrant’ within the immigration coverage sampled. The themes of ‘forced migration’ and 
‘irregular migration’ were very prominent, especially when considered in comparison to 
other themes such as ‘voluntary migration’ and ‘return migration’. As Figure 8.1 shows, 
much of this coverage came after 1970, peaking in 1979 and later 2010. Nonetheless, Figure 
8.1 also shows the (albeit less frequent) prevalence of such stories in periods as early as 
1918, 1922 and 1923. The corpus for this section of analysis consists in total of 78 
headlines/leads, selected on the basis of being primarily about either Forced Migration or 
Irregular Migration and primarily focussed on immigration issues (i.e. of main focus). 
It was during latter campaigns that asylum and irregular migration were electorally 
prominent, as is also evident from Figure 8.1 in the quantity of forced migration/irregular 
migration items in IAE coverage. The 2010 campaign was in fact the only campaign during 
which such issues were resonant to any substantial degree, with 11 items during the 
campaign primarily about either forced migration or irregular migration bearing the imprint 
of contemporary anxieties and debates about these kinds of migrants, over a range of 
stories.  
Approximately half (51.3%, or 40 of 78 articles) of main focus ‘precarious migration’ 
coverage came in the quality press, with 21 articles in the mid-market press and 17 articles 
in the popular press. 
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Figure 8.1: The coverage of ‘precarious migration’ (i.e. ‘forced migration’ and ‘irregular 
migration’) over time129 
 
Forced migration and irregular migration have been grouped in this analysis for a number of 
reasons. Despite their differences in several respects (which will also be considered in the 
analysis), as discussed in Chapter 3, forced migration has become increasingly deterred and 
criminalised in similar respects to the way in which irregular migration is essentially 
‘unwanted’ for various reasons by governments (even if there is a strong demand for this 
type of migration by employers in the ‘shadow economy’). Further, such migrants are 
subject to the same ‘macro-structures’ (KhosraviNik 2010b: 21-22), facing in common 
various traumatic upheavals – among them geographic displacement, losses of wealth and 
property (leading often to destitution), exploitation, arbitrary detention, deportation, a lack 
of access to public services and associated risks to health and mortality. ‘Precarious’ 
migrants thereby constitute some of the most disadvantaged of people in society. That in 
many circumstances they cannot even be said to be permitted to exist in society (except for 
those granted refugee status, who nonetheless continue to suffer from many of the issues 
                                                     
129 The data points representing all ‘precarious’ migration coverage correspond to all coverage (i.e. including 
instances in which such coverage was a secondary or tertiary theme and/or immigration not the primary focus 
of an item). The data points corresponding to main focus immigration coverage are therefore a subset of this 
category of coverage, and those corresponding to main focus IAE coverage are a subset of both. 
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mentioned above) is an indication of their prescribed (or perhaps proscribed) status as ‘non-
citizens’. Escaping the worst excesses of these problems has relied historically on the extent 
to which the societies of receiving countries have accepted a ‘responsibility to protect’ such 
people. This responsibility is negotiated by asking which ‘precarious migrants’ deserve ‘our’ 
assistance (whether in allowing entry and/or aiding settlement) and which conditions can 
reasonably be placed upon this assistance. Press discourses of such issues, written by and 
therefore from the perspective of members of an in-group which (in accordance with the 
logics of liberal democracy) partly bears this responsibility, are therefore interesting sites for 
analysing the discursive (re)production of the membership of associated in- and out-group 
categories and the limits of the UK’s (i.e. ‘our’) humanitarian obligations. The section will 
begin with a discussion about the specifics relating to the coverage of forced migrants, 
followed by a discussion relating to the coverage of irregular migrants. Finally, the conflation 
of these migrants in press discourse will be considered. 
Forced migrants: asylum seekers and refugees 
This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured 
discussion of people having immigrated, or in the process of migrating, to the UK due 
principally to ‘push’ factors or as an ostensibly enforced decision. Discussion of asylum 
seekers and/or refugees described as immigrating to the UK seeking refuge for reasons of 
persecution in their home or previous nation of residence therefore fell into this category 
(see Appendix C). 
The previous chapter illustrated patterns in the lexicon of the immigration debate over time. 
The usage of words to describe migrant groups coalesced primarily around categories such 
as ‘alien(s)’ and ‘immigrant(s)’, with ‘illegal (im)migrant(s)’, ‘refugee(s)’, ‘asylum seeker(s)’ 
and ‘migrant(s)’ also among some of the most commonly used terms. Particularly in 
campaigns from the 1990s onwards, the coining of various neologisms (e.g. ‘bogus refugees’ 
and ‘genuine refugees’) was evident, which has broadened the range of vocabulary within 
media debate as well as functioned to delegitimize the asylum claims of the ‘non-genuine’. 
As these examples suggest, analysing referential/predicational strategy with regards to 
forced migrants is able to give some indication of which ideas dominate and define the 
politics of this type of migration. The discursive construction of asylum seekers and refugees 
will therefore now be focussed upon to identify how this may change over time. 
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In earlier periods, forced migrants were most typically described using the term ‘refugee(s)’ 
in an expansive sense, as shown in the following such stories selected from the interwar 
period: 
1. ‘The repatriation of Belgian refugees has begun’, Belgians going 
back, The Daily Mirror, 9 December 1918; 
2. RELIEF OF IRISH REFUGEES, The Times, 9 November 1922;  
3. REFUGEES FROM IRELAND, The Daily Telegraph, 9 November 
1922; 
4. ‘…Princess Catherine Galitzine, a refugee from Russia, married in 
London yesterday’, RUSSIAN PRINCESS WEDS [picture caption], The Daily 
Mirror, 13 November 1922. 
These stories were reported in an era in which very few practical distinctions were made 
between immigrants of differing types (e.g. between refugees and immigrants), so terms 
such as ‘refugee’ could be used without the endorsement of legal decisions. However, these 
examples also suggest that the categorisation of these forced migrants as refugees rather 
than the possible contemporary alternative ‘aliens’ also depended on the legitimising role 
played by government intervention in the specific politics of the Belgian and Irish cases130, 
for example. Further, the description of Princess Galitzine as a refugee from Russia seems to 
provide, if momentarily, an index of the way in which popular discourses of forced migration 
tend to confirm the values of the ‘liberal self’ while implying those of the ‘illiberal other’ 
(see Anderson 2013: 55-56; van Dijk 1992: 109-111; Stern 2014). This dichotomy was 
ostensibly at work also in a similarly subtle example from several decades later: ‘Refugees 
from the Jordan fighting disembark at Gatwick from a R.A.F. Britannia’ [picture caption], 
The Times, 15 June 1970.  
However, with the dual forces of the ‘fractioning’ (Zetter 2007) of forced migration 
categories and the ‘juridification’ (see Chapter 3) of forced migration cases, the usage of the 
                                                     
130 In the case of the Belgian refugees, their repatriation came at the end of a longer process of initial 
sympathy which eventually culminated in residual sympathy, apathy, some hostility but ultimately 
international co-operation between the two governments for their removal (Holmes 1988: 100-102; Kushner 
2003: 264). In the case of the Irish refugees, the compensation provided to Irish loyalist victims of the civil war 
by the government until such people could find work or return to Ireland essentially conferred refugee status 
on those compensated (Brennan 1997). 
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refugee term in an expansive sense and without a dependence on overtly political 
considerations began to be deployed less frequently in the coverage from around the late 
1980s – its usage coming almost exclusively in circumstances whereby it had been conferred 
(or not) by law. In other words, its usage became more precise and functioned to 
differentiate between legal stages of the asylum application process; ‘refugee’ was no 
longer sufficient as an almost ‘catch all’ term. Examples in which the term was used or 
avoided (i.e. in which other terms, such as asylum seeker, had become available for use) 
often arrived in the form of court reports in the broadsheet press: 
4. Home Secretary applied wrong test to refugee, The Times, 8 June 
1987; 
5. ‘New legal safeguards should be available for people who 
overstay in this country and claim asylum, according to the European 
Commission of Human Rights’ [my emphasis], Tamil case leads to asylum 
review, The Times, 5 June 1987; 
6. Yemen envoy seeks asylum, The Times, 30 April 2005; 
7. Iranian asylum seeker fears ‘honour killing’, The Guardian, 5 May 
2010. 
In fact, constructions of forced migrants as ‘asylum seekers’ and the elaborative though 
different ‘failed asylum seekers’ in this kind of coverage emerged only in latter campaigns, 
as seen in examples below: 
8. ‘The Home Secretary won High Court backing yesterday over a decision to 
return a Turkish asylum seeker to France’, Asylum judges agree that France is ‘safe’, 
The Times, 1 May 1997 
9. ‘A FAMILY of failed asylum-seekers is to challenge a government decision to 
deport them on the ground that it breaches their human rights’, Failed asylum 
family fights order to deport them back to Angola, The Times, 3 May 2005 
10. Lib-Dems want to give asylum seekers our jobs, The Daily Express, 6 May 
2010. 
Interestingly, in contrast with the discourse of the broadsheets, the third of these examples 
is revealing of a way in which the Daily Express constructs asylum seekers as not part of the 
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‘we’ which constitutes ‘our’ society. The headline is constructed in this way to delegitimize 
the policy proposals of the Liberal Democrats and provides a sense of injustice at the 
supposed gift of ‘our jobs’ (gained presumably by birthright) by the party to asylum seekers 
who we are asked to believe do not deserve such frivolous charity. The example thus 
demonstrates how the context of such terms can help to re-construct the entitlements 
associated with them and in turn re-constitute what seem to be relatively neutral terms into 
categories with highly negative connotations. 
Notably, The Sun provided something of an exception to these developments during the 
2010 week in an article typical of the narrative style of the newspaper, in which small 
reports surface about apparently trivial-but-peculiar events:  
11. ‘Four Afghan refugees held in Hungary astonished cops by telling them they 
were WALKING from Kabul to London and had done 4,000 miles’, Afghans’ UK walk, 
The Sun, 1 May 2010. 
Although this example seems to correspond with a narrative (often advanced in the 
conservative tabloid press) which suggests that Britain is overwhelmingly attractive to 
asylum seekers, the Sun’s use of ‘refugee’ (without the endorsement of any legal decision) 
helps to construct the four Afghan men of the piece as essentially sympathetic characters. It 
can only be speculated in this instance as to the extent to which the UK’s possible culpability 
for their desperation and the extra-ordinary nature of their journey may have deemed 
‘refugee’ a more appropriate term in this instance than alternatives (e.g. ‘asylum seeker’) 
which have been associated in newspapers such as The Sun with deception and avarice 
(Conboy 2006: 98-100). 
The functionalisation of forced migrants as ‘refugees’ in earlier periods (and in the single 
latter instance) therefore constructed them definitionally as essentially deserving of refuge, 
and it is of little surprise that the comparatively minor news value of forced migration in 
earlier periods (as manifest in the quantity of coverage over time) can be tallied with very 
little elaboration in terminology. Divergent (or ‘fractioned’) definitions of the notions of the 
‘refugee’ and the ‘asylum seeker’ came later, and on the surface might be defended as the 
innocent and necessary means of demarcating between those with either pending or 
successful claims for asylum. However, along with other pre-modifiers such as ‘genuine’, 
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‘bogus’ or  ‘failed’ can be reconsidered in terms of ‘overlexicalization’ – the expanded use of 
‘repetitious, quasi-synonymous’ terms which are ‘woven into the fabric of news discourse’ 
(Teo 2000: 20). The rise of over-lexicalization in discussion of asylum indicates a more 
intense ideological interest in the issue at hand over time which requires an expansion in 
available lexical categories (Richardson 2009: 363). Indeed, the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ term 
emerged in the mid-1980s in negative reference to Tamil refugees fleeing Sri Lanka to 
Europe (Runnymede Trust 2000: 212-213; van Dijk 1997). Over-lexicalization therefore 
‘often has a pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from social convention or 
expectation and reflects perceptions and judgements’ (Teo 2000: 20-21). Even supposedly 
‘positive’ terms, such as ‘genuine asylum seeker’, are dependent on their mutual opposites 
and help to sustain the assumption that many asylum seekers are not in legitimate need of 
our assistance.   
As suggested by van Leeuwen (1996: 58), immigrants are classified more often in 
contemporary discourse by their country of origin or ethnicity than by other factors such as 
class, race, education/skilledness, wealth or religion, a general rule which suggests that 
evaluating immigrants based on their geographic origins is deemed to be highly important 
to (as in his study) newspaper audiences in Western societies. It is noticeable from the 
examples already given that nationality is a routine category by which asylum seekers and 
refugees are classified. In newspaper discourse, the nationality of an asylum seeker may find 
importance in the ability for this information to construct the ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ 
status of asylum seekers depending on what the audience knows or thinks about the 
relationship that the specified country has with the UK and with the prevailing political 
conditions of that country.  
However, it is also likely, due to developments in asylum law, that an asylum seeker’s 
country of prior residence (and therefore where he/she has travelled from before arriving in 
the UK) is also an important factor in the construction of deserving or undeserving status. 
This is important in the international politics of asylum due to issues surrounding, for 
example, the principle in international law of ‘non-refoulement’ and the adoption of the 
Dublin Convention in European asylum law131. Domestically, the introduction in asylum 
                                                     
131 The Dublin Convention requires asylum seekers to ‘lodge their application only in the first EU member state 
entered’, which deals principally with the application (Toshkov and Haan 2012: 662-663). This occasionally 
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policy of ‘white lists’ to automatically determine supposedly ‘unfounded’ cases (as well as 
diplomatic reasons) mean that asylum seekers from certain designated countries are not at 
all likely to be considered ‘genuine’ refugees according to law, a framework which may be 
reflected in newspaper discourse. 
The previous chapter charted the prominence of this information (in terms of both 
nationality and country of previous residence) in coverage. Table 8.1 shows proportionately 
how likely it was for immigration coverage (for which immigration was of main focus) to 
feature any such reference within forced migration coverage, irregular migration coverage 
and in other thematic areas of coverage. Although the implications we may draw from a 
small number of cases are limited, Table 8.1 shows a disparity between the proportion of 
items in which the country of previous residence or nationality of migrants within forced 
migration coverage is mentioned compared with other thematic areas of coverage. This 
suggests that, where asylum seekers and refugees are concerned, where they’re (coming) 
from is a more important aspect of their representation than for other types of migrant. As 
suggested above, the likely function of such information is therefore to associate certain 
asylum seekers and refugees with ongoing political or humanitarian crises in shorthand, and 
to implicitly assign ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ status. 
Table 8.1: The proportion of articles in which migrants were referred to by country of 
previous residence or nationality in main focus coverage 
Precarious migration coverage 
Other coverage Overall coverage Forced Migration 
coverage 
Irregular Migration 
coverage 
N % N % N % N % 
44/47 93.6 24/31 77.4 371/442 83.9 439/520 84.4 
N applies to cases rather than responses. The figures apply to whether such a term was used within the whole article. Up to three terms 
could be coded per item, but the results shown correspond to whether a minimum of one relevant term was used. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
combines with the principle of non-refoulement to mean that governments are unable to deport asylum 
seekers to a country which may in turn deport the asylum seeker to a country in which they may be 
persecuted. 
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Consider, for instance, the following examples: 
12.  ‘TWO Russian defectors believed to be runaway sweethearts were yesterday given 
permission to stay in Britain’, RUSSIAN COUPLE TO STAY, The Sun, 3 May 1979; 
13.  ‘MISHA, the 13-year-old Russian boy freed from the Soviet Union after a world-wide 
campaign, started school near Cambridge yesterday…’, Welcome for the new boy, 
The Guardian, 3 May 1979; 
14. ‘Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, has put pressure on an Anglican church in 
Manchester to end the sanctuary it is giving to a Sri Lankan Communist, it was 
disclosed yesterday’, Priests ‘pressed to end sanctuary’, The Guardian, 10 June 
1987; 
15. Iranian civil rights activist spared deportation, The Guardian, 6 May 2010. 
In many of these cases, information regarding where the respective asylum 
seekers/refugees were from was a very prominent detail in contextualising the 
circumstances of their applications for asylum in the headline or lead.  When asylum 
seekers/refugees were categorised in terms of their nationality and made the subject of an 
active headline or the object of a passive headline, this served to prioritise linguistically this 
information ahead of numerous other salient details. 
Further, in each of these examples, terms such as ‘defectors’, ‘freed’, ‘welcome’, ‘sanctuary’ 
and ‘spared’ perform particular functions in these headlines/leads when read alongside 
what the audiences of these newspapers may know or suspect about the then-
contemporary connotations of being a ‘Russian’, ‘Sri Lankan (Communist)’ or ‘Iranian’ 
refugee, as well as to confirm the liberal and hospitable values of the UK. It is also notable 
that none of these asylum seekers or refugees are involved in transactive processes; they 
are either active in intransitive action processes (Richardson 2007: 55) or are passive agents. 
Refugee and asylum seekers are shown with little agency (in both a sociological and 
linguistic sense) within these examples, while those responsible for giving Russian defectors 
permission to stay, freeing Misha from the Soviet Union or sparing the Iranian civil rights 
activist from deportation are not provided by the constructions of these headlines/leads. 
The backgrounding or deletion of active agency may be deployed in discourse either due to 
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its ideological inconvenience or because such information is assumed to be known and 
unworthy of comment.  
The nationality, ethnicity or previous country of migrants can be represented in various 
ways. Firstly, this can be done through the use of nouns (e.g. BELGIANS GOING BACK, The 
Daily Mirror, 9 December 1918; Threat to Asians, The Guardian, 26 February 1974; Afghans’ 
UK walk, The Sun, 1 May 2010). Secondly, prepositions can be used in reference to an 
asylum seeker/refugee’s previous country of residence (e.g. REFUGEES FROM IRELAND, The 
Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1922; ‘Refugees from the Jordan fighting disembark at 
Gatwick from a R.A.F. Britannia’ [picture caption], The Times, 15 June 1970). Thirdly, and 
most commonly, nationality or ethnicity can be given through the use of adjectives (e.g. 
RELIEF OF IRISH REFUGEES, The Times, 9 November 1922; Russian defector changes his 
mind, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1979; Yemen envoy seeks asylum, The Times, 30 April 
2005; Iranian asylum seeker fears ‘honour killing’, The Guardian, 5 May 2010). The effect of 
using especially nouns, though also adjectives, to represent the nationality or ethnicity of 
asylum seekers and refugees lies in their foregrounding of the importance of such 
information (and thereby their reification of the meaning of such categories) and in their 
essentialising of people into an impersonal framework of categorisation which allegedly 
helps ‘us’ to understand ‘their’ circumstances. 
As noted above, the countries through which asylum seekers and refugees journey on their 
way to the UK have become of major importance in the legal decisions made in the modern 
asylum process. One such country has been France, the proximity and perceived importance 
of which is evident in the following examples: 
16. Asylum judges agree that France is ‘safe’, The Times, 1 May 1997; 
17. Refugee alert as France leaves ports unguarded, The Daily Telegraph, 4 June 
 2001. 
Within these examples, presuppositions (see Conboy 2007: 69-70; Richardson 2007: 62-64) 
work to suggest that a pre-existing statement has been made to suggest that France is ‘safe’ 
(in example 17) and that France should usually leave its ports ‘guarded’ (in example 18). In 
the first of these examples, three judges at the High Court have ‘agreed’ with a decision 
made by (or on behalf of) the Home Secretary. An alternative construction might have 
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suggested that the asylum judges disagreed with the applicant and her lawyers (who argued 
that ‘the French authorities did not properly consider asylum claims and that she would be 
in danger of being returned to Turkey, where she feared persecution’). This choice was 
made seemingly on the basis of the Home Secretary’s status, but the effect of this is to 
emphasise consensus concerning the description of the safety – rather than dissensus 
concerning the possibly fatal danger – of deporting somebody to France (although the use 
of scare quotes is noted). In the second example, the use of the ‘temporal conjunction’ as 
(Bell 1991: 181) suggests that there is a connection between ‘France [leaving its] ports 
unguarded’ and a refugee ‘alert’. The usage of ‘refugee alert’ is a noun phrase sufficient 
both to eradicate agency from the construction of this alert and to reify a specific, alarmist 
way of evaluating the events which had taken place at the French port. The article also 
conflated refugees with irregular migrants, which will be discussed below. 
Irregular migrants 
This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured 
discussion of migrants perceived to have overstayed their terms of leave to remain, entered 
through ‘clandestine’ means (including by providing false documentation or those victim to 
trafficking and smuggling), or who are only semi-compliant with their terms of entry (e.g. by 
working without permission). 
Previous findings show that the coverage of irregular migration does not construct the 
migrants within such coverage in terms of their nationality, ethnicity or country of previous 
residences with as much frequency as the migrants within forced migration coverage. This 
was discussed in terms of the function of providing such information in coverage of asylum 
seekers and refugees in part in order to help audiences to reach judgements about the 
circumstances of asylum applications and implicitly help to assign ‘deserving’ or 
‘undeserving’ status to asylum seekers and refugees. This function appears to have been 
less relevant for journalists in their construction of irregular migrants, who were 
represented overwhelmingly in a dichotomy as either ‘undeserving’ predicated on their 
status as ‘illegal’ people or ‘helpless’ and passive victims predicated on the absence of any 
‘status’ whatsoever – as people of little agency or consequence. These migrants therefore 
need not be constructed in comprehensively ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ terms. This is not to say 
that such terms were absent, however; they were simply less prominently placed. 
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Nonetheless, vague references to ‘Asians’ (e.g. LEA ‘PAID’ TO LET ASIANS IN, The Daily 
Express, 16 June 1970), ‘Chinese’ (LAUNDRY SLAVES. CHINESE SMUGGLED INTO ENGLAND’, 
The Daily Mail, 1 December 1934) and ‘Africans’ (‘A MR FIX-IT who charged Asians and 
Africans up to £1,000 a time “to turn them into British citizens” was behind prison bars last 
night’, Mr Fix-It conned Asians, The Sun, 1 May 1979) are conspicuous precisely because 
they prominently collectivise and reduce their referents to partial aspects of their identity. 
Their representation in these terms might well have been premised foremost on a 
foundation of banal nationalism (in which such categories appear to be the most natural 
descriptor) (Billig 1995) but in collectivising and impersonalising (van Leeuwen 1996) 
irregular migrants they also serve to provide the raw materials for the manufacture of 
panics about faceless and innumerable people from ‘alien’ places. The prominence of these 
national/‘ethnic’ labels (e.g. in headlines) was nonetheless less apparent than in forced 
migration coverage. 
Reference to such migrants as ‘illegal’ is a relatively contemporary phenomenon. For 
example, within the 31 stories from which irregular migration headlines were taken, 16 
contained references to either ‘illegal(s)’ or ‘illegal immigrant(s)’ – all from 1974 onwards. 
As with forced migration, these neologisms therefore arrived in conjunction with the rise in 
news value of irregular migration issues:  prior to the 1970 campaign there had been just 5 
irregular migration stories, after which there were 26 (including 9 in 2010). The criminalising 
connotations of the premodifier ‘illegal’ to the noun ‘immigrant’ are obvious, and their 
sustained and combined usage ensure that the people the term refers to ‘become locked 
into a cyclic, stereotypical logic’ in which their ‘illegality’ is recurrently assumed and 
reinforced (Lynn and Lea 2003: 428).  
Occurrences of the term ‘illegal(s)’ without ‘immigrant(s)’ came in The Sun, whose colloquial 
register and highly critical stance towards irregular migration combined in the usage of 
‘illegal(s)’ in two stories in 2010 (CLEGG IS FRIED ON ILLEGALS, The Sun, 30 April 2010; ONLY 
HERE FOR THE BLEARS. Campaign worker is an illegal/ILLEGAL HELPED BLEARS ‘TO TRY 
AND STAY IN THE UK’, The Sun, 1 May 2010). Demonstrating the possibility of its usage in 
both singular and plural forms, the expressive properties of the term served to leave the 
reader in no doubt of The Sun’s political stance towards the two issues at hand – the Liberal 
Democrats’ proposal for an ‘amnesty’ for irregular migrants after 10 years’ residence in the 
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UK and the rights of irregular migrants to work (particularly scandalous here as it was for a 
Labour campaign team). 
Irregular migrants were consistently subject to representations which foreground their 
objectification and victimhood and back-ground their agency. For example, irregular 
migrants were often described as having been ‘smuggled’ by criminal, foreign smugglers 
(e.g. LAUNDRY SLAVES, The Guardian, 1 December 1923; LAUNDRY SLAVES, The Daily Mail, 
1 December 1923; Smuggler who got rich quick132, The Daily Mirror, 28 February 1974) or 
as ‘slave traffic’ (WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC IN LONDON, The Daily Mirror, 13 November 1935). 
As irregular migration became a more frequently covered topic, those seen as culpable for 
migrants’ exploitation were focused on more personally and represented as folk devils. This 
came either in the form of ‘insiders’ betraying loyalties to nation (e.g. the British diplomat 
Brian Lea variously described as involving himself in a ‘plot’ to help Asians in the Daily 
Mirror133 or who ‘let in’ Asians134 ‘”by the back door”’135 in the Daily Express/Daily 
Telegraph, while the examples given above from 2010 of the representations of Nick Clegg 
and Hazel Blears also arguably borrowed elements of this narrative) or as ‘outsiders’ 
circumventing state sovereignty (e.g. Mr Fix-It conned Asians, The Sun, 1 May 1979; How 
Uncle Azad, the master forger, gave thousands of illegal immigrants a passport to Britain, 
The Daily Mail, 1 May 2010). On the other hand, in the absence of any ‘accomplice’, John 
Motioheloa from South Africa ‘stowed away’ on a ship headed for the UK and was 
congratulated with appraisals of his ‘ambition’ (THE STOWAWAY WITH AMBITION, The 
Daily Mail, 21 May 1955), while the director of a pirate radio station – Urs Emmenegger – 
was described quite freely of criticism as ‘slipping’ into Britain after having been refused 
entry by immigration officials the previous week (POP PIRATE SLIPS IN AFTER AIRPORT 
BAN, The Daily Express, 8 June 1970). It is difficult to imagine such sanguine narratives of 
irregular migration being published in the Daily Mail and Daily Express in more 
contemporary times, which if correct suggests both that irregular migration has become 
                                                     
132 The lead for this item states: ‘AIRPORT baggage handler Andrew O’Brien got rich in a matter of months 
when he joined a gang smuggling Asians and drugs into Britain’. The linguistic association of ‘Asians and drugs’, 
along with the back-grounding of their status to the object of the lead – rather than as a prominent feature of 
the headline and story – arguably serves to collectivise the migrants referred to and dehumanise them to the 
status of objects in a trade. 
133 ENVOY ‘IN PLOT TO HELP ASIANS’, The Daily Mirror, 16 June 1970. 
134 LEA 'PAID' TO LET ASIANS IN, The Daily Express, 16 June 1970. 
135 LEA TOOK £6 BRIBES TO AID IMMIGRANTS, INQUIRY TOLD, The Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1970. 
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highly politicised and problematised but also that the sovereignty of the state has become 
ideologically more embedded within the assumptions to be found in immigration 
discourses. 
Stories about irregular migration relented between 1983 and 1997, but upon the re-
emergence of the topic news reports in the tabloid and mid-market press largely back-
grounded referential strategies which placed irregular migrants as victims and fore-
grounded those which constructed them as threats and which conflated asylum seekers, 
refugees and irregular migrants together. A crisis frame (for us, rather than them) seems to 
have been readily available to journalists in this period, with single aberrant events or short-
term patterns extrapolated to warn of present and future catastrophe. Such events elicited 
‘fears’ over an expected increase in asylum applications (The Daily Mail)136, caused the 
aforementioned ‘refugee alert’ due to French ports being left ‘unguarded’ (The Daily 
Telegraph)137 while Britain’s ‘small ports’ were described as being ‘hit’ by a ‘tide of migrants’ 
(The Daily Mail)138.  
Much of the coverage relating to irregular migration during the 2010 campaign was 
explicitly and prominently related to the election for the first time across all campaigns, and 
concerned mainly the so-called ‘amnesty’ proposals (a term usually applied to the pardoning 
of criminals) of the Liberal Democrats (e.g. CLEGG IS FRIED ON ILLEGALS. He flounders over 
an amnesty, The Sun, 30 April 2010; Migrants plan puts Clegg on back foot, The Daily 
Express, 1 May 2010; Opponents seize on amnesty policy, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 2010) 
and the Hazel Blears scandal in The Sun (ONLY HERE FOR THE BLEARS. Campaign worker is 
an illegal/ILLEGAL HELPED BLEARS ‘TO TRY AND STAY IN THE UK’, The Sun, 1 May 2010). 
These stories provided evidence of the growing politicisation of irregular migration both in 
terms of its importance as a policy issue and for its potential importance as an issue with 
implications for electoral process. A consequence of this politicisation, however, is in the 
tendency for the active fore-grounding of political elites such as Clegg and Blears to come at 
                                                     
136 Fears over 58pc increase in admissions from abroad. For asylum seeker, read bogus student, The Daily 
Mail, 29 April 2005. 
137 Refugee alert as France leaves ports unguarded, The Daily Telegraph, 4 June 2001. The lead for this article 
states: ‘BRITISH ports are facing a sudden influx of illegal immigrants forced to find new ways into the country’. 
138 Small ports hit by tide of migrants, The Daily Mail, 5 June 2001. The lead for this item continues the 
metaphor, stating: ‘ILLEGAL immigrants are flooding into Britain through small French ports as police seal off 
the traditional smuggling routes via Calais and the Channel Tunnel’. 
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the expense of the impersonal, passive, back-grounded and even overtly pejorative 
representation of irregular migrants. 
Convergence 
The conflation of these types of migration has already been characterised by illustration of 
the prevalence of neologisms in latter campaign coverage in the previous chapter. The 
proliferation of these terms is a highly notable aspect of ‘precarious migration’ coverage 
(e.g. the growth in usage of ‘illegals’ and ‘failed asylum seeker’ as seen in earlier examples). 
As noted earlier, this development constitutes ‘overlexicalization’, indicating a ‘more 
intense ideological interest in the issue at hand’ (Richardson 2009: 363). Another way in 
which conflation can be realised includes through association, as evident in the superfluous 
co-location of both forms of migration in coverage (e.g. ‘Following widespread criticism of 
the party’s call for an amnesty for illegal immigrants, the Lib Dem leader came under attack 
over proposals to lift the ban on claimants taking employment in the UK while waiting for 
their asylum applications to be processed’ in Lib-Dems want to give asylum seekers our 
jobs, The Daily Express, 6 May 2010). However, it is through the more specific strategy of 
‘re-lexicalization’ that conflation is most evident in latter coverage. This is, for example, 
overtly evident in the sub-headline ‘For asylum seeker, read bogus student’ (Fears over 
58pc increase in admissions from abroad. For asylum seeker, read bogus student The Daily 
Mail, 29 April 2005), which quite literally invites the reader to substitute instances of the 
usage of ‘asylum seeker’ for an epithet associated with irregular migration. Similarly, 
‘refugee’ was re-lexicalized from the headline to ‘illegal immigrants’ in the lead of Refugee 
alert as France leaves ports unguarded (The Daily Telegraph, 4 June 2001)139. In contrast, in 
other examples ‘migrants’ appeared in the headline but ‘illegal immigrants’ appeared in the 
lead (Small ports hit by tide of migrants, The Daily Mail, 5 June 2001140; Migrants plan puts 
Clegg on back foot, The Daily Express, 1 May 2010141; Lib Dem no to Clegg migrants 
‘amnesty’, The Daily Express, 3 May 2010). This strategy is notable for sequencing this re-
lexicalization only in this order; the reverse would ostensibly contradict the norm in which 
the lead elaborates details in the headline. In this sense, it becomes clear that ‘migrants’ is 
                                                     
139 The lead claimed ‘BRITISH ports are facing a sudden influx of illegal immigrants forced to find new routes 
and new ways into the country’. 
140 This story later referred to the same people as ‘refugees’. 
141 The lead of this article also referred to irregular migrants as ‘border cheats’. 
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semantically structured as the hypernym of ‘illegal immigrants’ (the hyponym) in these 
examples, rather than as its synonym. However, the initial implication in each case that 
these stories are in reference to all ‘migrants’ is therefore shown to speciously conflate 
groups of migrants together. 
As may be evident from the numerous examples above, precarious migration coverage is 
almost exclusively occupied with stories concerning the entry and deportation of such 
migrants; rarely have such issues been covered without an emphasis on the prospect of 
either of these consequences. The overarching logic of this coverage is one which places 
precarious migrants in opposition to immigration officials, politicians and/or the nation at 
large. However, with the politicisation of both forced migration and irregular migration, 
there have also been notable if rare cases in the broadsheet press of sympathetic 
commentary about forced and irregular migrants represented as having suffered the 
consequences of the inadequacy of political measures to protect the vulnerable or of the 
impersonal excesses of state bureaucracy: 
18. THE NEW SLAVE TRADE. Abducted, sold by their families and raped by 
pimps, thousands of girls - many just 14 - end up as prostitutes in cities such as 
London. We reveal the barbaric trade that shames Europe, The Daily Mail, 2 June 
2001; 
19. Two girls' agony - and why the Home Office just doesn't care, The Times, 30 
April 2005. 
The second of these stories was accompanied by an editorial (CLOSING THE DOOR. The 
United Kingdom's asylum system is still inadequate, The Times, 30 April 2005) which 
simultaneously put the positive and humanitarian case for migration (while calling the 
Immigration and Nationality Directorate ‘Kafkaesque’), and argued for ‘economic refugees’ 
to ‘use the immigration, not the asylum route’. In doing so it managed to sustain the bogus 
vs. genuine dichotomy (‘there are concerns about those coming here under false pretences, 
who leave less room for those with the most deserving asylum claims’) and limit criticism to 
issues of procedure rather than anything fundamental about the ethical basis of the 
immigration and asylum system. For example, the use of ‘still’ in the headline of the 
editorial suggests that ‘the United Kingdom’s asylum system’ can in future be remedied to 
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become ‘adequate’, while the lead suggests that the case ’throws up questions about how 
far the asylum system still has to go in terms of efficiency, humanity and fairness’.  
Numbers: The Rights of the Host 
If precarious migration coverage entails questions of ‘our’ responsibilities, then numbers 
coverage can be said to conversely entail those of ‘our’ rights concerning those of the state 
to limit immigration and set entry requirements. This theme was coded in the content 
analysis based on whether or not coverage featured discussion of the numbers of 
immigrants thought to have migrated in recent weeks, months, years or decades, or 
estimates of future migration in similar terms. As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, the issue 
of ‘numbers’ has driven and dominated the political debate of immigration since at least the 
1960s, while this aspect of discussion is one of the four major themes of immigration 
coverage identified by Law (2010: 193). The corpus for this section of analysis consists of 39 
headlines/leads, selected on the basis of being primarily about the theme of ‘Numbers’ and 
primarily focussed on immigration issues (i.e. of main focus). 
Numbers coverage comprised the fourth most frequent theme in all immigration coverage 
of main focus. As Figure 8.2 demonstrates, much of this coverage appeared in 1992 and 
2010, though with some appearances on the agenda in the 1960s and 1970 campaigns. The 
high quantity of ‘numbers’ coverage in 1992 is in contrast to the seemingly low level of 
precarious migration coverage in the same campaign (see Figure 8.1); framed in terms of 
numbers first and foremost, the ‘asylum scare’ stories (Billig and Golding 1992a, 1992b; 
Thomas 1998) of this campaign also contained discussion of forced and irregular migrants in 
particular, but the emphasis was on the numbers involved. For the 2001 campaign, during 
which numbers coverage (as a primary issue in main focus coverage) was absent, the inverse 
was true. Then, the inflection was on the primacy of precarious migration (either forced or 
irregular) as ‘the issue’, with numbers a subsidiary concern in several cases. 
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Figure 8.2: The coverage of numbers over time 
 
As shown by the results in Figure 8.2, the level of numbers coverage of secondary focus 
reached new heights in the 2010 campaign. In the 1966 and 1970 campaign, though, there 
was also a considerable amount of peripheral/subsidiary discussion of numbers, which 
translated into a small amount of coverage which fore-fronted the theme.  
Over the entire sample period, relatively little ‘numbers’ coverage was found in the popular 
press at 15.4% of all main focus coverage (i.e. 6 of 39 articles). The quality press and mid-
market press shared the remaining coverage almost equally, at 17 to 16 articles 
respectively. 
Only a relatively small proportion of numbers coverage (13%) did not contain some 
reference to either the election or candidates, suggesting that when arguments about the 
volume of immigration have surfaced, they have recurrently been reported as an aspect of 
the debate which falls under the remit of politicians and which may have significant 
electoral relevance and consequences. 
As Bell notes, numbers lie at the core of the ‘facticity’ of news reporting, undergirding the 
‘objective, empirical claims of news’ even as they simultaneously ‘undermine that principle’ 
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in a bid to enhance the news value of the story (1991: 203). The publication of migration 
figures (especially if cited from reports of official statistics) offers newspapers a routine 
opportunity to provide an ostensibly dispassionate, objective and authoritative assessment 
of the scale of migration. Unfortunately, especially when figures are given without any 
context, the audience is ‘in no position to gauge whether a particular statistic is large, small 
or insignificant’ (ibid.). Certainly, Chapter 3 illustrated that confusion and misperception 
seem be abundant in the public’s knowledge and interpretation of migration figures. 
Further, a concern for coverage which focuses so heavily on the supposed scale of 
immigration to the back-grounding of other possible issues within the debate is that 
migrants will inevitably be represented in aggregated or collectivised ways which reduce 
them to their supposed membership of socially constructed groups and thus depersonalise 
and dehumanise them (KhosraviNik 2010a, 2010b; van Leeuwen 1996), or in the case of 
‘functionalisations’ (e.g. ‘asylum applicants’), objectify them as things to argue over or to 
provide controversy (KhosraviNik 2010b: 13). Further, as immigration has become subject to 
sustained politicisation and the news value of immigration events has increased, research 
findings are able to be drawn upon to expose ‘scandal in the form of political 
transgressions’, particularly in the defense or criticism of the record of incumbents (Boswell 
2009: 102-103), therefore consolidating the news value of facts and figures in the mediation 
of immigration. 
The authority of facts and figures 
The sophistication of the bureaucracy surrounding immigration procedures is a product of 
structures created through immigration legislation, and it is these structures which enable 
the categorisation of immigrants and their precise numeration for the purposes of 
immigration control. As a result of the bureaucratic and political function of figures, 
numbers in news reports can very often be represented through what Richardson calls 
‘quantification’: whether through ‘exact quantification’ (i.e. approximate or precise figures), 
‘relative quantification’ (i.e. given through terms such as ‘lots of...’, ‘a large population of...’ 
alongside ‘excessive quantity adverbials’ such as ‘huge numbers’ [KhosraviNik 2010b: 14]) or 
‘fractional quantification’ (i.e. by using percentages) (2009). In combination with ‘non-modal 
categorical assertions’ (Richardson 2007: 61), the numeration of immigrants in articles 
dealing with official figures can be legitimised as though a naturally-occurring fact, with the 
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details of their collation and discursive production elided altogether. This is the case, for 
example, in a headline from the 1987 week which stated that ‘Immigration in the first 
quarter of the year was 10,840–1,140 less than the same period last year’ (Immigration 
trend down, The Daily Telegraph, 11 June 1987). As this example shows, leads usually give 
the ‘exact quantification’ that is rarely given in the headline, which tend to use ‘relative 
quantification’ (e.g. MORE MIGRATE TO SCOTLAND, The Daily Telegraph, 8 October 1974; 
IMMIGRANT DROP, The Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1970). Occasionally, exact figures are 
given in the lead but it is mainly through the headline that evaluative narration is provided. 
For example, one article claimed in the lead: ‘Aliens landing in the United Kingdom during 
July, August and September, totalled 121,363. Five hundred and eight were refused 
permission to land, while 131,021 embarked. For the first nine months of the year 258,441 
landed, 250,336 embarked, and 1,402 were refused leave to land.’ The extensive use of 
exact figures in this article was not reflected in the headline: ALIENS’ EBB AND FLOW (The 
Daily Herald, 11 November 1922), which reduced these patterns to a water-based metaphor 
suggestive of a predictable and ongoing pattern. In all, the linguistic ‘assimilation’ (van 
Leeuwen 1996: 48) of immigrants in news reports, while prima facie an objective reporting 
of measurable figures, bears the ideological imprint of its administrative purposes, and in so 
doing serves to homogenise and impersonalise immigrants while providing the perspective 
of the state. In short, migrants are treated as statistics, not people (van Leeuwen 1996: 49).  
Moreover, presupposition is able to implicitly provide a narrative of previous developments 
(e.g. ‘IMMIGRANT DROP’, ‘Fall in immigrants allowed to stay’, Immigration trend down’, 
emphasise mine). In the most recent campaign, the findings of a Migrationwatch report 
were re-presented in the headline 1m more migrants by 2015 (The Daily Express, 3 May 
2010). These presuppositions work through the use of ‘orientational metaphors’ of 
immigration, such as with ‘levels’ going ‘up’ or ‘down’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, ch. 4). 
Despite the precision of the exact quantification provided in the body of numbers items, the 
headlines above suggest that some degree of explanatory interpretation is seen to be 
required in headlines in order to fit them into an ongoing narrative – at the second of two 
general points in time, with a third and more presumably to come.  
Other devices provide a sense of precision and assured authority to figures. Non-modal 
categorical assertions (e.g. is/are, was) are used instead of less assertive modal claims in 
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order to maximise their ‘argumentative force’ (Richardson 2007: 61), while ‘utterance 
autonomisation’ is a form of metonymy in which ‘social actors are represented by means of 
reference to their utterances’, affording the corresponding utterances a considerable 
degree of ‘impersonal authority’ (van Leeuwen 1996: 60). In combination, they allow 
journalists to make strong interpretative claims about the statistics available. An example of 
this is the following lead: ‘There has been a big drop in the numbers of immigrants allowed 
to settle in Britain, according to new figures from the Home Office’ (Fall in immigrants 
allowed to stay, The Times, 11 June 1987, my emphasis). The report thereafter detailed the 
‘new figures’ (e.g. ‘A total of 47,000 people were accepted for settlement in 1986, 
compared with 70,000 in 1980 and 80,000 in 1976’) in a manoeuvre presumably intended to 
justify the figures (quite literally) ‘speaking for themselves’. In the only prominent ‘numbers’ 
article from campaigns in the first half of the twentieth century (ALIENS’ EBB AND FLOW, 
The Daily Herald, 11 November 1922), ‘utterance autonomisation’ was entirely absent in an 
article far shorter than its later counterparts, with the journalist(s) in this earlier example 
from 1922 refraining from complementing the figures with the insertion of their own 
interpretation beyond that of the headline. In other words, in the earlier example, figures 
are given without their source while in the latter, the source (the Home Office) is named. 
We can only assume that the 1922 figures come from government records, but these 
examples seem to indicate both that the publication of official figures has an intrinsic news 
value in itself (even before the intensification in the volume of immigration coverage) and 
that official figures have become more likely to feature ‘distance markers’ (e.g. according to 
[source]) which caveat the claims made about them. 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that there has been some continuity overall in the 
representation of migrants in numbers coverage, with little that has changed. However, a 
notable difference comes in the increase of such coverage in campaigns including 1992 and 
2010. It is possible that an increase in the focus on numbers within the debate brings with it 
a differentiation in its discursive features. 
1992 and 2010 
Numbers coverage in the 1992 campaign focused on numbers as the primary theme among 
a number of other, recurrent but subsidiary themes (particularly social cohesion, forced 
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migration and irregular migration). Several metaphors dominated the news narrative, 
including: 
• water-based natural disaster (HUMAN TIDE LABOUR WOULD LET IN142, The Sun, 4 
April 1992; BAKER’S MIGRANT FLOOD WARNING, The Daily Express, 7 April 1992; 
Major stands firm against migrant flood, The Daily Mail, 8 April 1992)143; 
• social cohesion (including the defeat of extreme right parties) and net migration as a 
zero-sum game (in an opinion piece headlined We risk sowing seeds of fascism, The 
Sun, 4 April 1992); 
• the nation-as-home/immigrants-as-guests (Paddy puts out the welcome mat for 4m 
from Hong Kong, The Daily Mail, 7 April 1992); 
• politics-as-war (Tory attack turns to PR and immigration, The Daily Telegraph, 7 
April 1992).  
The first three of these represented the UK as an extraordinarily unwilling receiver (or 
victim) of immigration which (as with the social cohesion vs. net migration metaphor) would 
be self-inflicted, in the sense that these undesirable events could seemingly only be brought 
about with the election of the Labour Party. As was shown in the previous chapter, water-
based natural disaster metaphors formed part of the interpretative framework through 
which immigration was described in several campaigns. In their usage here we see that 
Labour would let ‘[the] human tide’ in, Norman Baker providing a ‘warning’ of a ‘migrant 
flood’ (though the party/parties to whom he issued this warning was omitted) and John 
Major standing – apparently alone – in defiance of the same ‘migrant flood’. With a section 
of the press144 apparently prepared to use Labour’s opposition to the Asylum Bill as capital 
for Tory support (Billig et al. 1992a, 1992b; Thomas 1998), the participation of political 
actors and the back-grounding of the utterances and actions of immigrants themselves is 
not surprising. Whereas politicians were individualised and personalised (consider ‘Paddy, 
                                                     
142 This article was accompanied by an illustration in which arrows headed EASTERN EUROPE, ASIA, MIDDLE 
EAST and AFRICA, detailing the numbers in the thousands of prospective ‘bogus refugees’ from various 
countries point towards an outline of the UK, filled by an image of a large crowd of people placing the image’s 
audience in an elevated position. 
143 Also prominently found in a headline during the 1970 campaign: 9,000 KENYA ASIANS ‘READY TO FLOOD 
HEATHROW’, The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1970. 
144 Numbers coverage in the 1992 campaign emerged in the Daily Express (2 articles), Sun (3 articles), Daily 
Mail (4 articles), Times (1 article) and Daily Telegraph (1 article). 
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‘Baker’ and ‘Major’) and their utterances transformed from complex verbal processes (such 
as with speech taken from press conferences) to more categorical material processes (e.g. 
to ‘stand firm’), immigrants were assimilated, back-grounded through nominalisation and 
dehumanised through metaphor (e.g. ‘…4m from Hong Kong’, ‘immigration’ and ‘migrant 
flood’/’human tide’). 
It has been argued that in recent years, the currency of ‘expertise’ in settling disputes 
regarding immigration issues in the press and Parliament has risen (Boswell 2009). In 
opposition, Conservative politicians recurrently voiced insistence on the collation of more 
‘reliable’ immigration figures, while the impact of the think-tank ‘Migrationwatch’ on a 
necessity for ‘technocratic’ forms of justification in media and political debate was relatively 
considerable, especially in the early part of the 2000s (ibid.). Politicians have become 
accustomed to their invocation of statistics being heavily scrutinised, particularly with 
regard to past or projected levels of immigration (though also with regard to related 
economic figures and estimates). Indeed, during the 2010 campaign, accusations recurrently 
abounded regarding the apparent ‘misuse’ of statistics by politicians, with Gordon Brown, 
Nick Clegg and Immigration Minister Phil Woolas charged with using supposedly ‘wrong’ 
figures, or even wilfully ‘misleading voters over EU migration’ (The Daily Telegraph, 5 May 
2010), as can be seen in the following examples:  
• Immigration figures used by Clegg ‘wrong’, The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2010; 
• Flip-flop Clegg gets his migration sums wrong, The Daily Mail, 1 May 2010; 
• PM faces inquiry over ‘wrong’ numbers, The Daily Mail, 3 May 2010; 
• Fury over 1.2m EU workers in Britain, The Sun, 5 May 2010;  
• THE EU MIGRANT LIE, The Daily Mail, 5 May 2010;  
• Labour accused of misleading voters over EU migration, The Daily Telegraph, 5 May 
2010. 
Despite such strong claims, in the main body of many of these articles it transpired that such 
accusations were essentially the product of disagreements between these politicians and 
journalists regarding the boundaries of migrant categories and for what arguments certain 
figures may be used. Nevertheless, in constructing these differences as the 
misappropriation of statistics, these reports drew on the idea that some figures are 
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indisputably ‘correct’ and elided consideration of how such statistics are initially collated, 
under which categories, and for what purpose. Overall, these examples suggest that 
politicians claimed to be abusing official statistics can be criticised on grounds of either 
incompetence or untrustworthiness and even wilful deceit. The appearance of several 
similar reports about the misuse of statistics in 2010 numbers coverage suggests that 
debate around the facts and figures of immigration are highly contested and of great 
rhetorical force in the contemporary politics of immigration. Ironically, official statistics 
published usually by the government are selectively appropriated by the press in order to 
hold government actors accountable, criticise government incompetence and invoke 
questions of longer-term trust in the government’s ‘management’ of immigration. The 
headlines and leads of these articles thereby magnified statistical use and misuse to the 
detriment of substantive discussion about the politics of bureaucracy. The 2010 campaign 
might therefore be said to have constituted the concentration of ‘the numbers game’ down 
to its bare essentials: the statistics game. Within this development, numbers coverage in 
2010 suppressed the presence and agency of migrants to perhaps their most acute levels. 
Indeed, it was very rare in numbers coverage for the utterances and actions of migrants and 
ethnic minorities to be the focus of headlines and leads.  
Moderate spokespersons 
An exception to this rule came in the 2005 campaign, in which polling data from MORI 
(commissioned by the BBC Asian Network) was used in reports in the Mail and Express, 
suggesting in part that 60% of British Asians believed that there were ‘too many immigrants 
in Britain’ (Most Asians want a cut in immigration, The Daily Mail, 29 April 2005; BRITAIN 
HAS TOO MANY MIGRANTS SAY ASIANS, The Daily Express, 30 April 2005). There are 
several things to be said for these articles in their usage of this survey data. The sourcing of 
‘Asians’ (‘British Asians’ and ‘Britain’s Asians’ in the respective leads) in both is symptomatic 
of what van Dijk has described as one effect of the lack of access minority speakers have to 
journalists: if ‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’ are not used to ‘facilitate ridicule or attack’ (van Dijk 
1996: 93) then, as here in the Mail and Express, ‘moderate spokespersons will be quoted 
who share the opinions or perspective of the majority’ (ibid.). There were several other 
findings reported by the BBC/MORI, which made an appearance later on in the reports. For 
instance, 75% of respondents thought Britain had ‘good race relations’, 23% thought it 
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possible that Britain could have its first Asian Prime Minister within 20 years, trust in 
politicians on immigration was lower than 50% for each of the three party leaders, 75% of 
respondents said they would not change their vote ‘simply because one of the candidates 
on the ballot paper was Asian’ and 75% thought that ‘the decision to go to war in Iraq was 
wrong’. These findings were sequenced in this way in the Mail report, but in the Express’ 
front page article (which was continued on page 2), the findings were sequenced in order of 
‘too many migrants’, trustworthiness on immigration, ‘good race relations’, lack of 
preference for Asian candidates and opposition to the war in Iraq. Opposition to the war in 
Iraq was placed in the last paragraph on page two (the others appeared on the front page), 
as a ‘further blow to Mr Blair’, while the minority who predicted that there would be an 
Asian Prime Minister within 20 years were excluded from the Express report entirely. The 
backgrounding in each report of respondents’ opposition to the war in Iraq is interesting 
given that the consensus on this point was higher than the headline finding (75% to 60%) in 
a campaign for which Iraq was a major issue featuring more prominently in the quality and 
mid-market press than asylum and immigration issues (Deacon et al. 2006). It would appear 
that the opportunity to use an apparent ‘concession’ by British Asians that there were ‘too 
many’ immigrants in Britain proved too appealing to the editorial staff at the Mail and 
Express in their choice of headline ‘focalization’ in this instance (Fairclough 2003: 84).  
The re-contextualisation of this finding in each headline is also of note in itself. In the Mail 
the ‘perceptive’ (van Leeuwen 1995: 87) mental process ‘to believe’ (that ‘there are too 
many immigrants in Britain’) changes to the ‘affective’ (ibid.) mental process ‘to want’ (a 
‘cut in immigration’). This recontextualisation is important, as it therefore assumes and 
inserts a connection between the perception of a problem (‘too many’) and a related 
political proposal to alter that state of affairs. The Express headline, on the other hand, 
elides mention of the 40% of respondents who didn’t regard Britain as having ‘too many 
immigrants’, instead choosing to represent the findings through a form of indirect discourse 
(‘…say Asians’) as though all (British) Asians had come to a unified consensus on the issue, 
only clarifying the percentage after both the headline and lead. Overall, the effect of these 
headlines is to suggest that even Asian Britons, a traditionally marginalised and negatively 
represented group in these newspapers, are disillusioned with the amount of immigration 
there has been to the UK. The other political interests and dissensus of such out-groups are, 
247 
 
however, relegated or suppressed entirely. The representation of the political interests of 
immigrants and ethnic minorities will be discussed more in the next section. 
‘The Migrant Vote’: Insiders or Outsiders? 
This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured 
discussion of the impact of the political representation of migrant/ethnic minority interests 
on patterns of turnout and vote distribution, plus discussion of the candidacy of migrant or 
ethnic minority politicians (see Appendix C). The corpus for this section of analysis consists 
of 52 articles, selected on the basis of being primarily about the theme of ‘the Influence and 
Mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates’ and primarily focussed on 
immigration issues (i.e. of main focus). 
As immigration from Commonwealth countries to the UK increased in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and in tandem with their pre-existing rights to vote as British subjects, 
coverage of the mobilisation of ‘the migrant vote’ in election campaigns correspondingly 
began to increase (see Figure 8.4). This kind of coverage provided an overt connection 
between immigration and its more direct civic consequences: the enfranchisement of 
migrants, their political mobilisation and the potential influence of their presence on local 
constituency politics and electoral outcomes. This coverage therefore disrupts the 
rights/responsibilities framework. The representation of migrants’ political interests 
presents a dilemma: on the one hand, ignoring the specific group interests and personal 
experiences of migrants in discussions of political decisions which affect them is potentially 
negligent, even if this approach recognises the commonalities of migrant attitudes and 
behaviours with those of the rest of the population and attempts to represent them in 
terms of aspects of their identity other than those which reduce them solely to their 
migrant experience. On the other hand, however, presenting migrants’ political preferences 
in every instance as differentiated is also problematic for the way in which it constructs 
migrants as segregated groups distant from the rest of society (c.f. Richardson 2009). The 
question for this kind of coverage is arguably therefore, instead, whether and how migrants 
are placed inside or outside of the imagined nation by the representation of their political 
attitudes.  
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As Figure 8.3 shows, this coverage reached its peaks in 1922, 1970, 1979 and (to a lesser 
extent) in 2005. In fact, in terms of all coverage (i.e including coverage of both main and 
secondary focus), this issue appeared on the election news agenda in every campaign from 
the 1950s onwards, with the exception of 1992. For self-evident reasons, this coverage was 
uniformly found as IAE coverage.  
A stark aspect of this kind of coverage comes in its distribution across the press. The quality 
press was responsible for 41 (almost 80%) of the 52 articles in this coverage, compared with 
4 in the mid-market press and 7 in the popular press. This is largely an artefact of the larger 
space and resources allocated to local electoral news in this section of the press, and much 
of the discussion of the mobilisation of ‘the migrant’ vote came through discussions of their 
impact on individual constituency outcomes in ‘constituency roundup’ items or through the 
public pronouncements of pressure groups. 
Figure 8.3: The coverage of ‘the migrant vote’ and candidature over time 
 
The German and Austrian voters forgery, 1922 
The earlier coverage of the 1922 campaign came about due to the sudden appearance of a 
letter (‘manifesto’) addressed to German and Austrian immigrants resident in the country, 
implausibly asking them to ‘vote Labour’ due to their apparent sympathy towards Germany. 
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These reports surfaced despite the inability of German and Austrian ‘aliens’ to vote unless 
as naturalized citizens. The Labour Party and the apparent publishers of the manifesto 
denied all responsibility for its publication, with the contention being that its forgery was 
intended to damage Labour’s electoral hopes. The emergence of the letter and the Labour 
Party response were reported within the broadsheets, the Mail and the Labour-supporting 
Daily Herald (e.g. ALIENS AND LABOUR. APPEAL TO GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VOTERS, The 
Times, 9 November 1922; APPEAL TO ALIENS WHICH LABOUR DISOWNS. "AN ENEMY HAS 
DONE THIS THING”, The Guardian, 10 November 1922; LABOUR REPUDIATION OF "ALIENS" 
MANIFESTO. A FALSE IMPRINT, The Times, 10 November 1922; BOGUS LEAFLET TO FIGHT 
LABOUR, The Daily Herald, 10 November 1922; "ALIENS & LABOUR." A FORGED LEAFLET, 
The Daily Mail, 10 November 1922; "ALIENS AND LABOUR." A FALSE IMPRINT, The Daily 
Telegraph, 10 November 1922). The Daily Herald’s coverage alone made clear the 
redundancy of any such appeal to German or Austrian migrants. In their printing of the 
original story, the rest of the press betrayed an absence in their working knowledge of the 
civic rights of migrants, for example in the particularly conspicuous Times headline which 
claimed an ‘APPEAL TO GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VOTERS’ early on in the reporting of the 
issue – presupposing that such voters existed in substantively large numbers. Whereas later 
coverage on this theme would discuss the legitimate and influential role of migrants on 
electoral outcomes and in terms of their allegiances, the fallout of these stories revealed the 
lack of voting rights afforded to certain resident migrants and could have provoked 
questions regarding the legitimacy of this situation, but the issue dissipated as quickly as it 
had arrived once the forgery became clear. 
The migrant vote 
Overall, however, the headlines of this coverage approached the issue from two angles. The 
first came from a perspective which considers migrant political expression in particular as 
ethnic minority voting blocs, whether in general or as narrower electorates:  
• Coloured vote may decide London marginals, The Guardian, 30 April 1979;  
• Ethnic vote to be analysed, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1979;  
• Parties seek ethnic vote but fail to offer minorities safe seats, The Times, 4 June 
1983;  
• Asian Tory woos ethnic vote, The Times, 6 June 1983;  
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• Labour cannot count on the votes of ethnic minorities this time, The Guardian, 4 
May 2005; 
• Vote Labour, Pakis told, The Sun, 9 June 1970; 
• Indians choose Labour, The Guardian, 17 June 1970; 
• The Muslim vote could be decisive in 40 constituencies, The Guardian, 29 April 
2005. 
The second was a perspective which focused on the fortunes of migrant candidates, whose 
ethnic minority or immigrant identity was represented in coverage as a substantive aspect 
of their appeal to migrant voters and therefore as the category within which their identity 
could be described first and foremost. 
In the post-war period, stories about the migrant presence and vote emerged from the 1959 
campaign and gathered momentum throughout those of the 1960s. During this period, 
stories mostly concentrated on the presence of New Commonwealth and Irish immigrant 
voters as an influence on the outcome in local constituencies, with estimations usually given 
for the size of the local population of certain groups. For example, migrant voters were 
sometimes described in headlines and leads in terms of their number through a pseudo 
form of ‘exact’ quantification which nonetheless remained imprecise in its rounding to the 
nearest thousand: 
• IMMIGRATION AN ISSUE IN CLAPHAM. 5,000 COLOURED PEOPLE, The Daily 
Telegraph, 10 October 1964. 
• Gratitude will sway votes of 12,000 Asian refugees, The Daily Telegraph, 22 
February 1974. 
Here, precision was secondary to communicating the substantial influence which 
established migrant communities contributed to the outcome of certain constituencies in 
terms of the size of their vote (although within these headlines no other comparative figures 
are given for the size of the electorate of either constituency). As in numbers coverage, this 
kind of construction aggregated migrants, the result of which was to differentiate migrants 
from the rest of the electorate as a group of voters requiring special consideration, and as 
though their political concerns were of some dissimilarity to the rest of the public. The first 
of these headlines did this vaguely through the general category of ‘coloured people’, in an 
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article which identified housing as ‘inevitably related to the colour problem’ and which 
particularly reported on the chances of the Labour candidate and a Conservative candidate 
‘unafraid to speak openly on such a sensitive issue’ – that of the ‘Immigration question’. One 
potential effect of a strategy in which ‘coloured people’ are identified as a sizeable and valid 
category by which to refer to voters would be in the potential recognition of mutual 
challenges involved in common aspects of the migrant and diasporic experience, but in this 
case it appears to be the result of an arbitrary differentiation from the white population and 
voters of Clapham. On the other hand, in the second example (also taken from the Daily 
Telegraph) in the campaign which came almost a decade later, it is precisely through a 
perception of the common experiences of Asian refugees on which their political decisions 
were presumed to be based (i.e. ‘to be swayed’ by ‘gratitude’).  
The only instance in which the votes of Irish immigrants was mentioned came in the 1959 
campaign, in a Daily Telegraph report from the Paddington North constituency in London 
(HORSE AIDS IN WINNING OVER ELECTORS. READY MONEY STILL THE IRISH FAVOURITE, 8 
October 1959). Irish voters were here described as ‘electors’ (in the headline) and ‘the Irish 
electorate’ (in the lead), and were numerated in the lead as constituting ‘just over a vital 
1,000 voters’. In reference to a horse jockeyed by the Conservative candidate who 
apparently won ‘£2,000 of Paddington-Irish money’ in a 1959 horse race, the headline also 
claimed such a thing as ‘THE IRISH FAVOURITE’, whose gratitude was presumed to be 
collective and meaningful to the outcome of the local campaign. As with much migrant vote 
coverage, Irish voters were not exempt from treatment as a voting bloc with incredibly basic 
loyalties and motivations as in this example. 
The appearance of pressure groups during the 1966 and 1970 campaigns (see previous 
chapter) had much to do with the growing influence and political mobilisation of migrants, 
and many of these pressure groups appeared in this kind of coverage as prominent actors. 
These organisations invariably appeared when encouraging migrants to withhold their vote, 
allocate it to particular candidates or allocate it to a party at the national level.  During the 
1966 campaign this was related to immigrants mainly at the constituency level, as the Indian 
Workers’ Association, the Pakistani Welfare Association and the West Indian Standing 
Conference encouraged immigrants to abstain completely in the All Saints and Sparkbrook 
constituencies in Birmingham in protest at the immigration policies of the major political 
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parties and in particular their disillusionment with the Labour government  (e.g. 'Don't vote' 
appeal, The Sun, 25 March 1966; IMMIGRANTS URGED NOT TO VOTE, The Times, 25 March 
1966; 'DO NOT VOTE' PROTEST BY COLOURED GROUPS, The Daily Telegraph, 25 March 
1966; DON’T VOTE PLEA TO MIGRANTS, The Daily Mirror, 25 March 1966). The only relation 
made to immigrants at the national level was in the later clarification that immigrants ought 
to vote Labour elsewhere, as the Birmingham protest was the result of the specific 
withdrawal of support for Labour’s Brian Walden and Roy Hattersley (IMMIGRANTS TOLD 
TO VOTE LABOUR, The Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1966). 
During the 1970 campaign it was at the national level that this advice was issued and the 
growing political influence of migrant voters recognised. Pakistani and Indian voters were 
again the predominant targets for such advice, this time ‘told’ to vote for the Labour Party, 
despite reservations, by the League of Overseas Pakistanis and the Central Committee of 
Indian Organisations (Vote Labour, Pakis told, The Sun, 9 June 1970; PAKISTANIS TOLD 
'VOTE LABOUR', The Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1970; Indians choose Labour, The Guardian, 
17 June 1970).  A stark distinction can be seen in the construction of the headlines of the 
Sun and the Guardian in these examples. The Guardian headline suggests that the 
endorsement of the Central Committee of Indian Organisations was sufficient to suggest 
that Indian voters had freely chosen Labour, while the Sun suggests with more hostility – 
and with the highly provocative colloquial term ‘Pakis’ – that Pakistani voters were (perhaps 
illegitimately) directed to vote for the Labour Party. The use of the term others this group of 
citizens – as a collectivized group far removed from ‘our’ ordinary experiences, stigmatised 
through the usage of a term widely accepted in hindsight as distinctly pejorative. Within the 
Guardian headline, the assumption was made that this group spoke for ‘the Indian 
community’ rather than at ‘the Indian community’, but in both types of construction the 
presupposition that such a community (either as Indian or Pakistani) exists as a politically 
cohesive entity went unquestioned.  
A dichotomy appears to have emerged in headline constructions over these campaigns, 
dependent on whether the matter at hand was an instruction to abstain or an instruction to 
vote for Labour candidates. Where immigrants were asked to abstain in the 1966 campaign, 
this was construed variously as an ‘appeal’, ‘plea’, ‘[urge]’ and ‘protest’, with paraphrasing 
and indirect quotation providing the substantive argument of the pressure groups who 
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issued the instructions. It is perhaps of little surprise that the sanctity of expressing one’s 
right to vote was what made the headlines here given the pride with which the UK’s 
democratic history is held and expressed culturally, but this part of these organisations’ 
pronouncement came ahead of the reason for their proposals, which were based on 
opposition to the immigration policies of the major political parties (e.g. 'Don't vote' appeal, 
The Sun, 25 March 1966). The Telegraph allowed the organisations enough space to even 
suggest that the two main parties were engaged in a race to see ‘who will keep the most 
number of blacks out’ ('DO NOT VOTE' PROTEST BY COLOURED GROUPS, The Daily 
Telegraph, 25 March 1966). Statements such as this appear rarely in the press, and it was 
ostensibly due to the potentially self-imposed abstention of migrant voters and the limited 
threat that this might have posed to the democratic pretensions of the UK parliamentary 
system that seemingly made this local issue of mainstream national importance. The 
disillusionment of these voters seems to have therefore been taken seriously, reflected in 
the nominalised usage of ‘metapropositional directive’ verbal process words (Caldas-
Coulthard 1994: 306) such as ‘appeal’, ‘plea’, and ‘protest’, which suggest that these 
pressure groups may bear some persuasive influence over those addressed. In contrast, any 
struggle for influence was absent in the verb ‘told’, found in the later headlines wherein 
migrants were being advised to allocate their vote to the Labour Party. Through the usage of 
‘told’ in these three headlines, the legitimacy of these pressure groups to issue their advice 
was arguably called into question because, in a democratic electoral system, voting is 
regarded as a personal choice free from external pressures.  
The focus on the importance of the immigrant vote at the constituency level persisted, in 
the main, throughout campaigns in the 1970s and early 1980s, usually emerging from the 
‘constituency roundup’ items and reportage commonly found in the broadsheets (e.g. 
Election Sketchbook. No Gujarati voice for Thorpe, The Daily Telegraph, 5 October 1974; 
Immigrants hold balance in Labour's Leicester marginal, The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1979; 
Coloured vote may decide London marginals, The Guardian, 30 April 1979; Asian Tory woos 
ethnic vote, The Times, 6 June 1983; Parties woo the Asian voters, The Guardian, 7 June 
1983; VOTES IN URDU, The Daily Telegraph, 9 June 1983). Nonetheless, in the 1979 
campaign, there was a return to the national perspective in some items (e.g. LABOUR VOTE 
URGED, The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1979; WHY IMMIGRANTS SHOULD VOTE FOR 
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MAGGIE, The Sun, 1 May 1979; Ethnic vote to be analysed, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 
1979; Pakistanis urged to back Liberals, The Guardian, 3 May 1979), a perhaps unsurprising 
development given the concomitant growth in the quantity of coverage generally during 
that campaign. The Sun ‘spotlight’ on ‘why immigrants should vote for Maggie’ welcomed 
the influence of the migrant vote and included four ‘vox-pop’ style aspects of the 
Conservatives’ policy programme that particular migrant voters were supportive of. As 
Richardson (2007: 63-64) remarks, the use of ‘wh-’ questions is an indicator of 
presupposition and here the use of a ‘wh-’ statement helps to support the use of the modal 
verb ‘should’ regarding what migrants ought to do. The usage of the impersonalised 
‘immigrants’ helped to subsume the divergent and dispersed political interests of various 
migrants as though reconcilable, while the nicknamed reference to Margaret Thatcher 
further helps to personalise her as the friendly face of a Conservative vote. 
During the 2005 campaign, the Guardian printed 3 reports on this issue from ethnic minority 
perspectives, which discussed the ‘Muslim vote’ (The Muslim vote could be decisive in 40 
constituencies. Don't take us for granted, The Guardian, 29 April 2005), ‘the votes of ethnic 
minorities’ (Labour cannot count on the votes of ethnic minorities this time. Beyond the 
prism of race, The Guardian, 4 May 2005) and the ‘new generation’ of Muslims ‘breaking 
with Labour’ (A new generation of Muslims is breaking with Labour. Ties that no longer 
bind, The Guardian, 5 May 2005). The presence of such voters in this discourse, particular to 
the Guardian, also came alongside an otherwise lack of interest in the issue, possibly 
signalling a new phase in which ‘the migrant vote’ is less problematised and an ordinary part 
of the electorate which requires only occasional special attention. The shift to a focus on the 
‘Muslim vote’ (c.f. Richardson 2009) alongside that of ‘the votes of ethnic minorities’ (more 
prominent in recent campaigns than ‘the (im)migrant vote’) is telling, possibly signalling a 
change in elite perceptions about new ‘outsiders’, disaffected and a significant challenge to 
an inclusive democracy. 
On occasion, the extant migrant community translated into the emergence of nominally 
‘migrant’ candidates, often presumed to embody migrant interests first and foremost with 
their political affiliations and other proposals reduced to a sub-plot: 
• LONDON DAY BY DAY. Immigrant Ticket, The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1964;  
• Migrant doctor endorses a Liberal prescription, The Guardian, 25 February 1974;  
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• The candidate who opposes crash helmets, The Daily Telegraph, 27 February 1974; 
• Asian Tory woos ethnic vote, The Times, 6 June 1983; 
• Begorrah! It's England's only Paddy-stani, The Daily Express, 9 June 1987;  
• Ugandan Asian Briton tipped for the top, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 2005. 
These examples are indicative of the strength with which migrant candidates are 
represented as migrants first and foremost but also in many cases as having allegiances 
primarily to a supposed ‘migrant bloc’. This serves to trivialize migrants’ political candidacy 
and the diversity of migrants’ political leanings in the wider electorate. Despite these issues, 
it is only the last of these examples which convincingly presents a migrant candidate as part 
of the ‘we’ of the nation, by describing him as a ‘Ugandan Asian Briton’ and by its suggestion 
that he may be ‘Britain’s first Asian prime minister’ in the lead.  
In several ways, then, the allocation of immigrants’ votes was ordinarily seen as the 
allocation of the immigrant vote, despite disparities between or within certain communities’ 
ideological commitments. The mobilisation of migrant voters, and even candidates who 
happened to be migrants, came to be seen as a voting bloc (or at least a largely coalesced 
cluster of voting blocs), whose influence on electoral outcomes became increasingly crucial 
as the migrant population increased in the latter part of the twentieth century.  
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9: Conclusion: continuity and change? 
Introduction 
This thesis has been concerned to study a number of different aspects of the way in which 
the national press has represented immigration during general election campaigns. The 
rationale for the study, in accordance with both the self-professed claims of the news 
media’s democratic credentials as well as normative theories about their role, is predicated 
upon the importance of the national press of democratic societies during such periods to 
mediate social and political issues comprehensively and therefore to sufficiently inform the 
public about such issues. In a number of different ways, the research presented within this 
thesis has attempted to ascertain whether the press has adequately met these duties. The 
conclusions which can be drawn from this study therefore intersect the concerns of a 
number of different research agendas, in particular research focused on the mediation of 
immigrants and immigration as well as the study of election reporting in general.  
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 established the necessity for the study of news discourse of 
immigration and electoral news coverage in the longue durée. Numerous studies have 
shown that immigration has consistently been represented as a problem or threat, and that 
this contributes to an overall picture in which immigrants are symbolically excluded from 
the imagined national community. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 demonstrated that this 
impression has done much to shape and be re-shaped by the introduction of immigration 
policy and its definitions, which structure the conditions and experiential features of 
immigration. The political environment of immigration policy has meant that symbolic 
exclusion has come alongside (and quite conceivably been enabled by) exclusions both 
territorial and material. Meanwhile, public majorities (who ultimately constitute news 
audiences) routinely demonstrate a set of attitudes which are restrictive, alarmist but 
ultimately highly misinformed. A media and political environment such as that indicated by 
this evidence would suggest that the mediated electoral politics of immigration would be 
characterised by negativity and the problematisation of immigration, alongside the 
marginalisation of positive views and the exclusion from discourse of migrants themselves. 
However, much of the existing research, demonstrating the evidence upon which such a 
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prediction can be based, has been temporally limited in its focus, with little interrogation of 
longer-term trends. 
For example, little research was conducted to explore the representation of immigration in 
the British news media prior to the 1960s. The politics of immigration were transformed 
during this period in response to the immigration of people from Britain’s former colonies, 
which ultimately precipitated the collation of public opinion data about immigration and 
heralded distinctive changes in immigration policy and demographic patterns. There is, 
however, a paucity of systematic work to examine developments in the representation of 
immigrants and immigration as a broader issue over an extensive time frame, and to 
investigate the extent to which these post-1945 developments are possibly rooted in prior 
discourses of immigration.  
A related issue exists within studies of electoral news, which very often focus on the events 
and mediation of single campaigns (e.g. the Nuffield election studies) or provide a 
comparison of only a few campaigns (e.g. Deacon et al. 2005). Many such studies, being 
concerned with the mediation of the campaign overall, fail to explore the representation of 
specific issues beyond a superficial examination of their presence in the campaign debate. 
However, these studies at least provide some idea of the discourses which circulate during 
election campaigns, whereas this is not always the focus of studies of the representation of 
immigrants and immigration. This study has aimed to marry these two areas of research in 
order to address these issues. In doing so, it provides a lens through which conclusions 
regarding continuities and contrasts in patterns of representation can be made, while the 
examination of the content of several newspaper titles and the incorporation of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods has provided a necessary breadth and depth to the 
analysis. 
Chapter 5 outlined a number of key research questions which have been the focus of this 
study. These were related to the extent to which immigration has been a part of electoral 
discourses over time, which social actors have received most news presence and news 
access over time, whether the debate has been characterised by pro-immigration or anti-
immigration voices, what the thematic profile of the debate has been, how migration and 
migrants have been constructed discursively over time and how certain aspects of the ethics 
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and politics of immigration have been negotiated qualitatively. I will now reiterate the major 
findings of the study in these terms, and discuss their implications. 
Summary of findings and discussion 
In every election campaign since the 1950s immigration has been a part of electoral 
coverage to at least some degree, and in some of these campaigns it has been particularly 
prominent in terms of its representation as an electoral issue. There has, notably, been a 
substantial spike in immigration coverage overall in recent campaigns, culminating in the 
peak of the 2010 campaign. However, recent expansions in coverage have largely been 
caused by the expansion of coverage for which immigration issues were secondary or 
peripheral. This is perhaps the starkest difference between the immigration coverage of the 
1970 campaign and that of the 2010 campaign: the 1970 campaign featured the most 
coverage for which immigration was prominently discussed overall. 
However, the 1970 campaign featured far less of the ‘ambient’ coverage of immigration (i.e. 
of ‘secondary focus’) so abundant in the 2010 campaign, and came off the back of the rise of 
Powellism. There has arguably been no parallel figure to Enoch Powell in the contemporary 
debate (although Nigel Farage may in time claim the mantle) and yet immigration has 
ascended onto the news agenda with comparable vigour to then. The rise in immigration 
coverage in the 1960s which culminated in the peak of the 1970 campaign may appear to 
have foreshadowed the trend leading towards the 2010 campaign in that both featured a 
similar degree of immigration coverage of ‘main focus’, but this earlier peak was succeeded 
by a dramatic decline in immigration coverage. Whether the 2010 campaign represents a 
departure point from which immigration will become a permanent and occasionally defining 
feature of the mediation of campaign politics, or something resembling more of a plateau or 
peak, remains to be seen in the forthcoming 2015 campaign and beyond. 
Using the concept of ‘immigration-as-electoral’ (IAE) coverage, it was also established that 
IAE coverage has increased despite an overall stagnation in the amount of election coverage 
produced across the press in the post-1945 era. Again, it is recent campaigns which have 
broken in particular from the campaigns between 1959 and 1997 (excluding 1970), which 
featured less IAE coverage than post-1997 campaigns but more in comparison than those up 
to 1959. The proportion of electoral coverage for which immigration issues were constituent 
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rose from 2% of all election coverage in 1997 to 6% in 2001, 15% in 2005 and 22.5% in 2010. 
The latter of these figures can surely be credited to the dramatic fall-out from ‘bigot-gate’, 
but the incident was telling in its own right and bears the imprint of the long-term rise in the 
electoral currency of immigration. With immigration coverage having become increasingly 
cast within an electoral rubric, such that almost 95% of all immigration news in the press 
during the 2010 campaign was IAE coverage, immigration has become highly politicised and 
its discussion dominated by considerations of electoral implications and broader outcomes. 
Although coverage was not broken down into discussion of policy stories and process 
stories, the ascension of immigration as a predictable election issue and of great concern to 
the public means that immigration has become a strategic battleground in electoral conflict. 
If claims that there has been a rise in ‘strategic framing’ are warranted, and therefore that 
news is more often devoted to campaign trail activities, tactics and strategies: “process” 
stories at the expense of coverage of substantive issues’ (Scammell and Semetko 2008: 82), 
then the implications of this for immigration coverage may be significant. Certainly its 
establishment as one of a number of political ‘issues’ may have particular consequences. In 
contemporary media debate for example, the word ‘immigration’ carries all the baggage of 
what journalists assume audiences know about problems, public concerns and political 
responses, far removed from recognition of the variety of journeys and stories which are 
inadequately and partially connoted by the nominalisation of the process itself. People’s 
lives are therefore reduced to an ‘issue’, for which discussion centres on ‘how the debate 
can be won’ rather than about the ethics or legitimacy of state practices (KhosraviNik 
2010b: 16-17). So while there may be political winners and losers in such coverage, 
immigrants are rarely active or in the foreground; they are ‘passive, unified, motionless and 
mute people (or figures) who merely constitute the topic of the debate’ (ibid.). The media 
furore which came in the days following Gordon Brown’s ‘bigot-gate’ gaffe and which 
focussed essentially on the reactions of Brown’s detractors provides one example of this, 
but the previous chapter showed that politicians seen to be abusing immigration figures (an 
example of abstraction [see van Leeuwen 1996]), regardless of the complexities and politics 
involved in interpreting and representing such information, were depicted in coverage as 
‘wrong’ (if not deceitful and incompetent), and therefore as not playing the numbers game 
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by its established rules. Since deceit and incompetence signal weakness, ‘wrong’ politicians 
can be shown as losing on the issue and helpless to make the facts work in their favour. 
The rise in immigration coverage in the longer term, particularly non-electorally focused 
immigration coverage, might admittedly be expected given the substantial developments in 
immigration patterns that have occurred during the last several decades. Immigration has 
been a significant contributor to population change in the UK, and within the last century 
the UK has become a country of net immigration and begun to receive immigrants from a 
broader range of places such that its society has begun to be described as ‘super-diverse’ 
(Vertovec 2004). A political and media response to social change of this kind is not only to 
be expected, it is also arguably necessary. The question, however, is what form this 
response has taken. The volume of coverage is therefore but one element of the 
development of coverage. 
Another comes in the news presence and news access of key social actors. Opposition actors 
appeared and were sourced particularly frequently in campaigns of high coverage, 
suggesting that when immigration is a particularly salient issue in a campaign, opposition 
actors are able to capitalise on and further entrench an immigration problematic which 
places pressure on government. Moreover, despite expansions in coverage, the news 
presence of migrants themselves has decreased in recent campaigns, suggestive of a press 
debate in which migrants are abstract ‘others’ rather than addressed directly and 
personally. In terms of news access, or ‘who gets to speak’, opposition and citizen sources 
were quoted the most in coverage, with incumbent party sources receiving the third-most 
news access. However, while both incumbent and opposition sources were ‘over-accessed’ 
(Hall et al., 1978) in terms of the proportion of their news access to news presence, citizen 
sources have been overwhelmingly ‘under-accessed’ on average over time (the only 
exceptions coming in the second 1974 election campaign, 1987 and 2010), particularly in 
the quality press, less so in the popular press and only marginally in the mid-market press. 
As for the news access of migrants, they were highly marginalised in the popular press 
(receiving approximately half the proportion of news access they received in presence), 
though to varying levels they were under-accessed across the entire press, an artefact of 
their abstraction from media debates concerning their personal experiences and reflective 
of a general neglect to seek their opinions on the policies which structure their lives. 
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In order to explore the evaluative dimension of coverage, the study utilised a measure 
relating to actors’ tone in direct quotation to help establish the extent to which coverage 
has featured attitudes supportive, critical or neutral towards immigration issues. Overall, 
critical quotation was more prominent in immigration coverage than supportive. However, 
dissecting the coverage in terms of the extent to which it related to the election or not 
revealed that critical quotation dominates IAE coverage, while in non-IAE coverage neutral 
and mixed attitudes compose almost 70% of the quoted voices, while supportive quotation 
is more frequent than critical quotation.  
These findings have dramatic implications for what can be said about immigration as an 
electoral issue in the press. They illustrate that the marginalisation of the positive case for 
immigration in electoral politics provides more space for negative attitudes, makes for a 
more divisive debate (i.e. with a lower proportion of mixed and neutral quotation), and 
appears to mean that journalists have less regard for balance between pro- and anti- 
attitudes to immigration. This is not to suggest that critical quotation equates to critical 
coverage, but the availability of these perspectives is nonetheless able to shape news 
reports and promote a partial understanding of immigration issues and events, with 
potentially momentous political ramifications. Following Hallin’s spheres of media debate 
(1986), this evidence suggests that immigration has become an issue so toxic in party 
politics that positive views of immigration lie somewhere on the outer regions of the sphere 
of legitimate controversy, if not in the sphere of deviance for some newspapers. When 
immigration is not seen in this light in terms of the evaluative dimension it is practically a 
different subject altogether – journalists attend to notions of objectivity and balance with a 
far greater degree of consistency. 
Another aspect of the evaluative dimension concerns the lexicon of immigration coverage, 
which has proliferated over time – particularly in latter campaigns. Linguistically, the 
neologism, ‘over-lexicalization’ and ‘re-lexicalization’ which have marked this shift are 
indicative of a deepening of concern over the arrival of certain kinds of migrants – whether 
according to the worthiness of those who apply for asylum or the invisibility of irregular 
migrants. Some terms received elaborative prefixes (e.g. ‘illegal immigrant’) or intensifying 
modifiers (e.g. ‘mass immigration’) while others were new to latter campaigns altogether 
(e.g. ‘overstayer’). This indicates that the vocabulary available to journalists to describe 
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migrants and their movements has grown and been subject to innovation as press interest 
in the subject has broadened. There is thus an additional dimension to the expansion of 
coverage in that there has been an intensification of discourses about immigration.  
Although the vocabulary of immigration news grew, many of the most dominant terms 
remained popular throughout (e.g. immigration), with the transition from ‘alien(s)’ to 
‘immigrant(s)’ the primary major terminological shift. The dominance of such terms can be 
regarded as symptomatic of a coalescing around terms borrowed from judicial and political 
domains due to a perception of consensus and expertise associated with these fields, with 
more contentious and evaluative terms infrequently used for this reason also. Of these 
evaluative terms, many process-based terms were based on metaphors of natural disaster, 
animal and insect migration, trade and war, while group-based terms – particularly in latter 
campaigns – conflated irregular migration with forced migration and generated a dichotomy 
between refugees and asylum seekers seen as either genuine or ‘bogus’. The vocabulary of 
the debate can be divided into two types in the contemporary era. There is what we might 
call ‘state speech’, which comprises terms such as ‘aliens’, ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’ and 
‘asylum seekers’ which have inscribed into them as categories a level of explanatory appeal 
and authority and which therefore tend to present journalists with relatively 
uncontroversial choices to make regarding referential strategy. But there is also what might 
in certain circumstances based on its potential effects be called a form of ‘hate speech’. The 
growth of negative connotations within terms such as ‘asylum’ and the conflation of asylum 
with irregular migration risks damaging public impressions of refugees, asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants, and stoking social tension. The terms which have circulated in 
immigration and asylum debates from the 1990s onwards have contributed to the 
conflation of both groups of migrants and the corresponding elision of definitional 
differences between two distinct (though linked) forms of migration. It is certainly the case 
that the public remain confused about the size and nature of both irregular migration and 
forced migration ‘flows’, and that this may be the basis upon which restrictive attitudes find 
legitimacy and numerically-driven reductions in immigration are not deemed credible (see 
Chapter 4). In an environment of press-fuelled hostility in which asylum seekers are deemed 
to be equivalent to irregular migrants (and in which irregular migrants are referred to as 
‘illegal’ people unlike any other kind of civil or criminal lawbreaker), the worst excesses of 
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the contemporary asylum regime and the supposedly common sense assumptions which 
underpin it are therefore able to go unchallenged. From this, audiences of such kinds of 
coverage may find themselves asking ‘who (if anyone) deserves our assistance?’ Moreover, 
at perhaps their most disturbingly influential, terms such as those found in this study are 
reflected in those used during the committal of racist attacks against migrants or people 
deemed to be migrants (Casciani 2004 in Philo et al. 2013: 6).  
In order to explore the interpretative dimension of coverage, the presence of a number of 
themes was examined to help assess what the immigration debate is ‘about’ in general, how 
this has changed over time, what differences exist between newspapers and whether 
expansions in coverage have led to an opening up of the debate to consider a wider range of 
themes. Overall, the dominant themes of (main focus) coverage centred primarily on 
‘immigration services procedure’, crime, forced migration, numbers, the influence and 
mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates and irregular migration. These 
issues dominated even as coverage expanded. Many themes of coverage, however, were 
almost wholly absent, particularly those which would necessarily invoke explicit discussion 
of Britain’s links with the European Union, the Commonwealth, the economic impacts of 
immigration, its cultural effects, and routes of migration other than those which contain 
asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants were they to be present. Across the press, a 
degree of uniformity in the selection of themes within newspapers suggests that the press is 
in general in agreement about what immigration is centrally ‘about’. The news values which 
contribute to immigration issues and events becoming news have therefore been 
interpreted in similar ways across the time as well as across newspaper titles. 
This thesis has also explored the way in which immigration coverage helps to (re)construct 
the ethics of immigration, in terms of what ‘our’ rights and responsibilities are towards 
migrants. Through an analysis of headlines, which are assumed to provide a ‘preferred 
reading’ of the narrative of immigration-related newspaper content, the themes of 
‘precarious’ migration (a composite of the themes of forced migration and irregular 
migration), numbers and the migrant vote and candidature were investigated to understand 
how continuity and change in press representations of immigration and immigrants might 
be manifest qualitatively in coverage.  
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For discourses concerning forced migration, some notable discursive shifts are evident in 
the extent to which, for example, there has been a ‘fractioning’ (Zetter 2007) of the refugee 
label, indexing the broader political shifts which have taken place in the international, non-
governmental, domestic and ‘juridified’ politics of forced migration. However, with striking 
continuity, the nationality or country of origin of forced migrants is frequently and 
prominently given which, it is argued, provides in shorthand the likely degree to which 
forced migrants are deserving or undeserving of refuge. 
Irregular migrants were often backgrounded in coverage: constructed as victims in earlier 
periods, they were later represented as reliant on insider or outsider folk devils who 
circumvented the sovereignty of the state for personal gain. Latterly, however, they became 
increasingly represented in terms which positioned them as a threatening potential 
presence. This is generally in keeping with the observation made by Teun van Dijk that 
‘minorities are often represented in a passive role (things are being decided or done, for or 
against them), unless they are agents of negative actions, such as illegal entry, crime, 
violence or drug abuse’ (van Dijk 2000: 40). 
Of the two aspects of precarious migration coverage, forced migration was far more 
consistently an aspect of immigration coverage overall, while irregular migration appeared 
in some campaigns in the 1950s and 1970s, but was absent throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, finally returning to become a highly salient topic in 2010.  The growth in political (i.e. 
legislative and electoral) attention on forced migration and irregular migration was manifest 
in a growth in the extent to which precarious migration coverage appeared as IAE coverage 
in the campaigns of the 2000s - evident in the foregrounding (and nomination) of elite 
political actors in headlines (e.g. Clegg and Blears in 2010) and an over-representation in the 
‘indirect discourse’ (Fairclough 1992: 107) of headline quotation that elite social actors’ 
speech and actions were afforded. This privileging of elite social actors is, nonetheless, not a 
totally new phenomenon; earlier coverage from 1918 and the 1920s extensively reported 
the speech and actions of political actors and members of the judiciary in headlines.  
In terms of discourses about ‘numbers’, the establishment of the primacy of arguments over 
‘numbers’, particularly since the 1960s is evident in the amount of such coverage which has 
been produced during this period. The headlines of this kind of coverage aggregated and 
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back-grounded migrants through various forms of quantification, which elide their 
differences and thus homogenise them. The ‘numbers’ debate in itself is premised on 
assumptions which implicitly contribute to an assumption that policy decisions ought to be 
based on arbitrary quotas and that higher immigration equates to more problems for the 
receiving society. A shift within such coverage to more contestation over the precision or 
validity of the figures used by politicians, as evident in the 2010 campaign, is suggestive of 
the rhetorical and ideological power of numbers to support arguments in a debate based on 
such assumptions. For one thing, journalists are likely to selectively cite sources whose 
interpretation of figures accords with their own editorial agenda (van Dijk 1991: 175; Balch 
and Balabanova 2011: 901). But further, as Hall et al. (1978: 59) suggested in support of the 
primary definition model, ‘liberal’ spokespersons who try to prove that immigration figures 
are exaggerated ‘subscribe, implicitly, to the view that the debate is ‘essentially’ about 
numbers’. When the immigration debate turns, as it often does, to discussions concerning 
the ‘numbers’ of arrivals – which are assumed to create problems for ‘us’, this introduces 
indirect evaluation simply by dint of its mention.  
The political mobilisation of migrants has been represented in the press in two main ways, 
both of which have done little to advance an impression that migrants have political beliefs 
which are unrelated to their specific identity as migrants or as people of ethnic minority 
groups. The first of these relates to migrants as electors, the coverage of which tends to use 
terms that represent migrants as existing in voting blocs, removed from the rest of local or 
national electorates and preoccupied with different, migrant or ethnic interests. In some of 
this coverage, migration is elided with ethnicity in ways which suggest that issues 
surrounding migration are the preserve of ethnic minorities, and vice versa. The 
quantification of migrant voters suggests that their vote counts in as much as their 
presupposed bloc vote may have an impact upon local electoral outcomes (in coverage 
during the 1960s and onwards) or national electoral outcomes (from campaigns in the 
1980s onwards). The marginalisation of migrants as political subjects in this sense seemed 
to find little improvement in the way that migrants were represented when candidates. In 
much the same way, the migrant status of such politicians was foregrounded in these 
accounts, and either through constituency profiles or personal features, it was often 
assumed that they would be reliant on the bloc votes of other migrants.  
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Continuity and change 
In providing an overview of several major aspects of electoral immigration coverage over 
time, this thesis affords an opportunity to form a broad retrospective about what has 
remained consistent and what has changed over these periods.  
The summary of findings within this chapter suggests that there have been four broadly 
distinct periods in the electoral coverage of immigration. The period 1918-1959 was 
characterised by a general lack of politicised or prominent coverage of immigration (except 
for the 1918 campaign). Immigration coverage grew from 1959 and culminated in an 
explosive 1970 campaign, charting the emergence of a steady immigration ‘flow’ from the 
countries of the New Commonwealth, the Smethwick campaign of 1964 and a restrictive 
political debate in general. The politicisation of immigration did not thereafter relent to the 
levels prior to 1959, but the frenetic electoral debate of the 11-year and 4-campaign period 
of 1959-1970 could not be sustained between 1974 and 1987. The prominence of the 
electoral politics of immigration from 1992 (especially from 2001) in the press cannot be 
ignored, and may have been encouraged by the success of the highly prominent front page 
coverage immigration received in 1992. Certainly, the increasing potential for immigration 
and asylum to be exploited in this way during the campaign was recognised at the time by 
Conservative party strategist Andrew Lansley, who was reported to have observed that the 
issue had ‘played particularly well in the tabloids and has more potential to hurt’ (in Spencer 
2011: 29). It would seem that this was a modest assessment of the capacity for the 
immigration ‘issue’ to emerge and become an essentially low-threshold electoral issue. 
The question for current forms of coverage is in whether such distinctions in 
representational patterns reveal emergent and disjunctive changes in the rhetoric of the 
past or whether they are simply amplifications and accentuations of discursive features 
which have become etched into the public debate of immigration. Has the expansion of 
immigration coverage and the reduction and trivialization of immigration to a strategic 
game coincided with a more embittered and marginalising discussion? The results from this 
study suggest that there have been some improvements, but that well-worn features of 
discourses about immigration and immigrants remain similar. Returning to some of the 
issues discussed in Chapter 2 which perhaps account for this, it is pertinent to reiterate that 
immigrants, refugees and people from ethnic minority backgrounds have been consistently 
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under-represented in national newspaper newsrooms, that news values remain 
‘homocentric’, that there has always been a lack of teeth to any self-regulatory bite and that 
migrants suffer various forms of exclusion with regards to access to news media discourses. 
It is hardly surprising, given the strength of these constraining factors which underpin news 
discourse about immigration, that there has yet to be a radical overhaul in the practices and 
ideologies of mainstream journalism in the UK relating to immigration issues, and therefore 
that textual patterns remain relatively similar in a number of respects over time.  
Nevertheless, there have been some notable differences, for example in the pre-eminent 
themes of debate in each period (even if thematic diversity overall is limited), the national, 
ethnic or religious groups subject to discussion and the level of support for migrants based 
on the growth in migrant advocacy groups. A relatively recent approval in political and 
media discourse for an apparent need for ‘managed migration’ and politicians’ frequent 
invocation of the economic ‘positive case’ for immigration also means that there is less 
overtly condemnatory coverage of skilled migrants in contemporary discourses. 
Speculatively, if this common type of immigration were to be problematised to the same 
extent that ‘precarious migration’ has been, we would expect to see ‘voluntary migration’ 
prominently placed in the thematic dimension of coverage and much ‘overlexicalization’ in 
descriptions of voluntary migrants (beyond the fairly recent introduction of ‘economic 
migrants’). Instead it is asylum seekers, Eastern Europeans and anyone else who is unable to 
significantly add wealth or skills to ‘UK plc’ and ‘integrate’ seamlessly that are unwanted, 
and therefore prominent in media debate. This is little different from the demands made on 
the ‘wanted’ migration of the past, and suggests that a symbiosis or advantageous dynamic 
is expected of the immigrant-state relationship. Freedom of movement is thereby not a 
right, it is a transaction conditional upon 'our' generosity and hospitality. 
It is perhaps difficult to imagine headlines such as THE HUN INVADERS (The Daily Mail, 11 
December 1918), Send the immigrants home says Whittle (The Sun, 13 October 1964), Vote 
Labour, Pakis told (The Sun, 9 June 1970), or A charmer from the National Front (The Daily 
Mail, 22 February 1974), to provide a few of the starkest which appeared in coverage over 
time, appearing with much regularity now. But as Hall (1990) astutely noted, ‘inferential 
racism’ has not replaced ‘overt racism’; it has supplemented it. These headlines appeared in 
the context of a contemporary political and social milieu, and while forcible repatriation, 
268 
 
terms of abuse such as ‘Paki’ and overt admiration for fascist politicians have largely been 
eschewed in the recent coverage of our sampled newspapers, it is not inconceivable that 
overt racism will surface in the coverage of immigration in present news content, and 
certainly not inconceivable that migration will be likened to invasion in current headlines. 
More insidiously, the ‘deracialization’ of discourses about immigration and asylum 
(Goodman 2007; Goodman and Burke 2010, 2011; Augoustinos and Every 2007), along with 
arguments that society is now ‘post-racial’ and the multiplication in immigrants’ places of 
origin in the profile of immigration to the UK, mean that discriminatory sentiments are able 
to be represented as superficially ‘sensible’ and ‘rational’ solutions (e.g. on economic 
grounds) to ‘the [latest] immigration problem’, which target the general category of 
immigrants and thus pre-empt criticisms that immigration policies have disproportionate 
effects on racialized and impoverished groups. 
Hence, despite improvements in the coverage of ethnic minorities, this has as yet not 
dragged some newspapers' editorial lines along in relation to immigrants. Immigrants are 
still depicted as symbolic outsiders (forced and irregular migrants especially so) and many 
apparently sanitised ‘concerns about immigration’ implicitly reveal their latent racism, such 
as those relating to ‘minority white cities’, the crimes alleged to be associated with certain 
ethnic minority groups, the voting rights of Commonwealth citizens (e.g. Doyle 2013) and 
the assumption that 'they' (the immigrants and asylum seekers) are taking ‘us’ for a ride 
have all surfaced in contemporary media debate. These concerns seem to re-inscribe a 
‘common sense’ in notions that migrants ought to receive fewer privileges. Such arguments 
converge not only in the press but also in legislation such as the Immigration Act 2014. It is 
plausible, therefore, that discriminatory and exclusionary rhetoric has excelled in 
immigration coverage even as it has been placed in superficially reasonable language. But 
this rhetoric, as discussed in Chapter 2, borrows and adapts from the past, and it is not 
difficult to find the same or similar generic arguments about immigrants in the political and 
media discourse of many points along the journey from the early twentieth century to the 
present. 
The ‘so what’ question 
It has been recognised by scholars of journalism and political communication that elite 
dissensus and disunity can foster opportunities for the press to engage in a more open 
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debate and encourage voices critical of established positions (McNair 2009: 66; Deacon and 
Golding 1994; Bennett 1990; Hallin 1986). However, reminiscent of this it is also the view of 
scholars of the politics of immigration in Britain that ‘when public opinion is more evenly 
divided [on immigration] there is much more freedom for political elites to act’ (Studlar 
1974: 376). Since elite politicians believe the British public to be unyielding in their appetite 
for ever-more restrictive policies (Studlar 1974, 1980; Dummett 1973: 244; Layton-Henry 
2004: 332) it is therefore logically the case from this view that the political and therefore 
media environments relating to immigration are at their root led by public antipathy. More 
directly, an immigration narrative in the press palatable to the middle ground of ‘white 
opinion’ and sympathetic to restrictionism is encouraged by the views held by large sections 
of society and the profit-orientation of newspaper titles (Cottle 2000a: 20; McNeil 2014). It 
would seem that there is a complex relationship between the press, party politics and the 
public, through whom a self or nation-centric interest provides the driving force behind an 
exclusionary political and media landscape.  
However, suggesting that the media and politicians follow the public ignores the role of the 
press in mediating social issues for which readers have little direct knowledge or evaluations 
of alone. It is one thing to recognise that public concern about immigration has risen in 
correlation with changes in net migration, but another to suggest that the public learn of 
this almost by intuition. There therefore appears to be an agenda-setting/framing role 
(Blinder 2013: 17; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Philo et al. 2013; Hartmann and Husband 
1974) as well as something of an agenda-reflecting role for the mass media in the 
immigration debate. For example, contemporary public opinion data suggests that when 
people think about immigration they have in mind asylum seekers and refugees rather than 
more common forms of migrants such as international students, and yet refugees comprise 
0.3% of the population and a sizeable number of asylum seekers are detained, dispersed or 
deported away from regular contact with the public (Bloch and Schuster 2005). 
The view that the media (and politicians) are simply responding to public concerns therefore 
somewhat absolves the news media from their duties in regards to functions both to 
transmit information as well as to ‘bring readers together as part of a community’ (Williams 
2010: 10, citing Carey 1989, ch. 1). It would appear that both the information and 
community constituted through newspaper discourse about immigration are partial. The 
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evidence suggests that for many of those for whom immigration is an issue of major concern 
and who demand tighter restrictions, it is a lack of a sufficiently informative media debate 
premised on their necessary reliance on the mass media that help to form the basis of their 
political views. As for the ‘ritual’ function of newspaper discourse, the vocal majority of 
people who wish to see immigration reduced do not represent the entirety of the public, 
and migrants are of course symbolically excluded from this imagined community. The 
community brought together by a partial representation of the wider society is thus likely to 
create disenfranchisement and the fracturing of social cohesion. 
This view also ignores some of the more positive conclusions that may be drawn about the 
development of the politics of immigration and the character of the mediated immigration 
debate. The albeit problematic preservation of sympathy towards so-called ‘genuine 
refugees’, the piecemeal growth in the media’s symbolic inclusion of Britain’s ethnic 
minority citizens, the rise of pro-migrant advocacy groups and the supportive views which 
emerge when immigration is not placed in a party political frame provide some 
encouragement that such ‘cracks in the hegemony’ (Richardson 2007: 209) might be 
capitalised on to provide a more impartial, humanising and inclusive debate.  
Just as newspapers have gradually acknowledged the presence of people from ethnic 
minority groups in society and included such people in the ‘we’ of society (Statham 2002), 
so too in future might the continued if not increased presence of immigrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees contribute to a reluctant acceptance that such people constitute a 
significant proportion of society, whose stigmatisation may well grow to be commercially 
imprudent as well as socially irresponsible. However, as Conboy notes, globalisation and an 
‘increased recognition of the diversity of people and places’ might actually reinvigorate 
nationalist, exclusionary reactions once again, driven by ‘an increased search for ethnic and 
national identification, possibly exacerbated by the national imperatives which structure our 
understandings of the world through our news media and by cultural insecurities when 
faced with such an unstable world’ (2007a: 152-153). As Lynn and Lea (2003: 427, citing 
Billig 1995) argue, ‘it is in times of crisis or triumph, when geographical or territorial 
boundaries are breached and an ‘Other’ is confronted or threatens, that a collective identity 
– a British identity – is invoked: those characteristics that signify ‘Englishness’ are then 
transposed’. As the ‘age of migration’ continues apace, refugees continue to be displaced by 
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political, economic and – increasingly – environmental events, the domestic population 
continues to age and the automation of the workplace expands, the global population 
continues to increase and debates continue regarding Britain’s place in the global economic 
order and the European Union, the isolationist and exclusionary rhetoric which marks much 
newspaper discourse regarding immigration may begin to become less tenable but more 
resolutely advanced.  
Particularly in a stratified society such as the UK’s, the arrival of new groups of people can 
appear to some to place a strain on the availability of scarce resources (Philo et al. 2013: 
165). The mass media can respond to immigration and integration processes by providing 
some perspective, be it via international comparison, historical comparison or by advancing 
a moral framework which acknowledges Britain’s intimate role in helping to create the 
political and economic conditions that prevail around the world and which prompt 
migratory movement. The first two of these would reveal that modern-day Britain is no ‘soft 
touch’, while the third would demonstrate that it has the capacity to constitute a society of 
greater equality and justice. Some newspaper titles in particular choose, however, to appeal 
vocally to a base of potential audiences who remain resolutely concerned and 
contemptuous of ongoing patterns of immigration, many of whom presumably refuse to 
recognise the historical deeds which have helped to structure the privileges that allow their 
freedom and deny those of others. These sections of the press seem locked in a cycle of 
populist indignation driven by this apparently sound business case for anti-immigration 
stories and the entrenchment of common sense ideas about the ‘soft touch’ state and 
opportunist ‘illegals’ allegedly posing in refugee disguise. Certainly in the contemporary 
period, it has been left to the centre-left and quality press, supported by pro-migrant 
advocacy groups, to expose political scandals affecting the rights of migrants and make the 
case for more humane treatment of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants.  
Even for those news outlets which take a more sanguine approach, however, the ideologies 
and practices of news production mean that it is difficult to escape contributing to the 
construction of a narrative defined by ‘high-profile events’ (Suro 2011: 8) that ignore the 
processual and cumulative contribution to history of smaller events. Further, as van Dijk 
suggests (1991: 247-248), these news outlets are unable to reach the same mass audiences 
as those more critical of immigration and as such have a limited range of influence on the 
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wider debate. If anything, it appears that they are unable to escape using similar discursive 
patterns as found in the conservative press, and often tend to rely on the us/them 
framework which inscribes victimisation and paternalism into reports and fails to undermine 
the assumption of power differentials between migrants and elites (ibid.; KhosraviNik 
2010b). The ‘common sense’ view of the state’s right to exclude is rarely, if ever, questioned 
across the press, meaning that criticism is restricted more often to issues of procedural 
adequacy and error rather than issues of substance relating to systemic and intrinsic failures 
(see Entman 2004: 5-6). 
This thesis was devised in recognition of the importance of studying election campaign press 
coverage. Elections and their campaigns are unquestionably critical junctures in the life of 
democratic societies, and the study of electoral news coverage is of essential symbolic and 
discursive importance. Even within the tabloid press, which tends to represent politics in 
sensationalised and personalised ways (Conboy 2006: 152), coverage of the campaign is in 
general sustained and prominent. It is pertinent to consider, as a final point therefore, the 
question of whether immigration has received coverage in accordance with the normative 
democratic roles that many see the press as responsible for during election campaigns, 
especially its role in regard to informing and/or representing its audiences (see Chapter 2: 
The role of journalism). Certainly these are the standards newspaper staffs often claim for 
their work, even if there are plenty who might see the ultimate aim of a newspaper as 
economic survival – of simply capturing a paying readership (whether by cover price or by 
their saleability to advertisers) whatever the result for its editorial direction. If journalism 
ultimately exists for anything as a discrete form, though, we can say that it exists ‘to enable 
citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world’ (Richardson 2007: 
7). If newspapers were to pursue and succeed in this essential function in relation to 
immigration, they could hardly avoid offering a sound basis upon which an informed, 
responsible and democratic debate could take place. There is also an opportunity to 
consider at this stage the effects of such developments on contemporary and future 
prospects. 
The study has shown, on the one hand, that immigration has grown to become embedded 
as one of the major policy issues discussed across election coverage during the campaign, 
especially in the 1990s and 2000s when immigration patterns changed dramatically. On the 
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other hand this study has shown that such coverage is, interpreted according to what might 
be hoped of press performance, somewhat disquieting. The role that sections of the press 
claim as that of representing the public is arguably partial and suggests a highly restrictive 
and unwelcoming society, even as the coverage of such newspapers also organises and 
helps to shape the self same public opinion. A creative elision between readership and 
citizenry creates the opportunity for the commercial opportunism by which opponents in 
many guises may be marginalised and the representative role is advanced. The intensity and 
perceived influence of these newspapers’ campaigning (and a routine blurring between 
news and editorial) mean that immigration has not only become an ordinary political issue 
the presence of which no modern campaign would be complete without, but that it has also 
become imbued with sufficient cache to puncture the electoral fortunes of politicians who 
do not subscribe to a sufficiently negative immigration problematic. 
Despite this, a perception has been promoted in certain sections of the press – as evident in 
the Daily Mail headline mentioned in Chapter 1 – that politicians have maintained a 
conspiracy of silence on the issue, and that it is up to the press to take the government to 
task over this on behalf of the public. This narrative – that the attitudes and influence of 
metropolitan elites represent a treacherous betrayal to those of ‘us’ living across the 
breadth of an imagined national community – should be familiar to readers of the 
conservative press. This ‘pretence of censorship’ (van Dijk 1992: 105) seems likely to remain, 
while politicians and commentators will presumably continue to ritually announce that ‘we’ 
need to have a more open, honest or mature debate about immigration – a debate which 
never seems far away but frustratingly also never seems to arrive (Titley 2012). The 
rhetorical power of strategies of reversal which assign victim status to ‘us’ (van Dijk 1992), 
which claim a conspiracy of silence and censorship, and which make demands of the terms 
of debate is, ironically, to limit the horizons of discussion and to effect exclusion ‘not just in 
plain sight, but under the sign of openness and increased democratic participation’ (Titley 
2012: 67). As the media critic Charlie Brooker (2010) sarcastically put it in a Guardian 
Comment Is Free (also published on page 5 of the G2 section in print) piece during the 2010 
campaign, immigration is a subject ‘so taboo in modern Britain that even fearless defenders 
of free speech such as the Mail and the Express only dare mention it in hushed capitals 
tucked away on the front page of every edition’. 
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Indeed, this thesis has shown that – in terms of the informational part the press plays in 
informing the electorate – the press have talked about immigration a great deal, especially 
from the second half of the twentieth century. What is more, it has been discussed in fairly 
narrow and negative terms, which may have dramatic consequences for the responsibilities 
felt towards immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. As Gary Younge (2010) suggests,  
‘there can be no meaningful debate about immigration in 
Britain...that does not address neoliberal globalisation, trade policy, 
development aid, colonial legacy, the European social fund, the 
dependency ratio and the low paid. But that is not the debate we 
have been having. Indeed it is not a debate we have ever had. It’s 
not accusations of racism that are stopping that conversation, but 
racism itself. For if there is a liberal elite out there thwarting 
discussion on immigration, it is doing a very bad job. The tabloids 
and middle market papers seem to talk about little else, and 
whenever they play their inflammatory tunes the politicians duly 
dance. Each tries to sound tougher than the last and with each effort 
they all sound more deluded’.  
Thus, the press have talked about immigration at great length and have been given ample 
opportunities to conduct a full, fair, multiperspectival and inclusive debate recognising 
Britain’s historical and present role in the world, mitigating and reducing social tensions and 
outbreaks of racist violence and representing the politics of immigration and the political 
mobilisation of immigrants in emancipatory ways. In their failure to do so, they have talked 
at considerable length without espousing a particularly constructive discussion. 
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Appendix A: Major Statutory Immigration and Nationality Legislation 
prior to 2010 
 
Year Governing Party Legislation Brief Overview 
1905 Conservative Aliens Act 
First major immigration control.  
Excluded ‘undesirable’ aliens and designated ports of 
authorised entry for ‘immigrant ships’ (those carrying 
more than 20 steerage passengers) (Bevan 1986: 70). 
1914 Liberal Aliens Restriction Act 
Emergency, wartime legislation (passing all parliamentary 
stages in a single day) endowing the Home Secretary with 
extensive powers over the ‘landing, registration, 
movement and deportation of all aliens’ (Holmes 1988: 
94), including the repatriation and internment of 
perceived ‘enemy aliens’. 
1914 Liberal 
British 
Nationality and 
Status of Aliens 
Act 
Formalised the principle of jus soli for those born in the 
British Empire (Panayi 2010: 211). 
1919 Conservative-led Coalition 
Aliens 
Restriction Act 
Consolidated wartime powers of Aliens Restriction Act 
1914 thereby converting emergency legislation into 
general law; ‘skeletal in form’, again conferring extensive 
powers on the Secretary of State (Clayton 2010: 9).  
1948 Labour British Nationality Act 
Affirmed the British subject status of Commonwealth 
citizens in the face of colonial independence movements 
and their implications for Commonwealth citizenship, 
thereby entrenching the rights of 600 million people to 
enter the UK. 
1962 Conservative Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
Ostensibly a reaction to the implications of the 1948 Act, 
and the first immigration control of Commonwealth 
citizens. 
Introduced work vouchers in three categories. 
1968 Labour Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
Removed settlement rights of East African Asians, who 
had begun to arrive in increasingly large numbers 
(Spencer 1997: 140-141). Began the move from jus soli to 
jus sanguinis. 
1969 Labour Immigration Appeals Act 
Established a ‘comprehensive structure of appeals against 
decisions of the Secretary of State’ (Sachdeva 1993: 25). 
1971 Conservative Immigration Act 
Formed the skeletal structure for subsequent legislation; 
enabled the Home Secretary to make Immigration Rules 
which now formed the body of the law (Bevan 1986: 13); 
consolidated concept of ‘patriality’; virtually ceased 
‘primary immigration’ from Commonwealth. Came into 
force on the same day (1 January 1973) that the UK 
entered the European Community (Sales 2007: 143). 
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1981 Conservative British Nationality Act 
British citizenship established and based on the categories 
introduced by earlier immigration law; no automatic 
rights of citizenship for those born in Britain to non-British 
citizens (Sales 2007: 143). 
1987 Conservative 
Immigration 
(Carriers’ 
Liability) Act 
Introduced fines of up to £1,000 for carrying passengers 
without correct documentation (Schuster 2003: 143), 
which doubled in 2000. 
1988 Conservative Immigration Act 
Restricted rights of appeals against deportation for 
irregular migrants (Hayter 2004: 57); reduced the rights of 
entry for multiple spouses. 
1993 Conservative 
Asylum and 
Immigration 
Appeals Act 
Incorporated 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees; introduced in-country right of appeal; ‘fast-
tracking’ of asylum claims ‘without foundation’; allowed 
the detention of asylum seekers (Stevens 2004: 165-166). 
1996 Conservative Asylum and Immigration Act 
Expedition of asylum claims from countries deemed safe 
(i.e. on the ‘white list’) or if having travelled via a ‘safe 
third country’; expansion of ‘fast track’ procedure; 
abolition of in-country appeal; fines for employers of up 
to £5,000 if employing irregular migrants; limiting or 
withdrawal of non-contributory benefits for asylum 
seekers and some immigrants (Sales 2007: 134; Schuster 
and Solomos 1999: 51; Stevens 2004: 170-171);  
1998 Labour Human Rights Act 
Effectively enabled immigrants and asylum seekers to 
challenge Home Office decisions by enforcing the 
European Human Rights Convention in British courts and 
elsewhere.  
1999 Labour Immigration and Asylum Act 
Introduced subsistence system of vouchers (£35 per 
week) and ‘no-choice’ dispersal system for asylum 
seekers; expanded use of detention centres and prison 
facilities; appeals reduced to ‘one-stop’ procedure; 
expansion of powers of immigration officers to enter and 
search premises, arrest without warrant, and [regarding 
the] use of force’ (Stevens 2004: 177); extended 
criminalisation of irregular entry; registrars responsible 
for reporting ‘suspicious’ marriages. 
2002 Labour 
Nationality, 
Immigration and 
Asylum Act 
Contraction of claims for support and accommodation of 
asylum seekers; removal of right to work for asylum 
seekers; ‘right to obtain physical data such as imprints of 
the iris’; ‘new powers of entry and search’ (Stevens 2004: 
197); introduction of citizenship exams. 
2004 Labour 
Asylum and 
Immigration 
(Treatment of 
Claimants, etc.) 
Act 
Now a criminal offence to destroy travel documents (e.g. 
passports); combined asylum and immigration appeals 
into a one-tier system;  further reduced rights of appeal; 
support for failed asylum seekers conditional on 
cooperation with removal. 
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2006 Labour 
Immigration, 
Asylum and 
Nationality Act 
Incorporated points-based system; limited appeal rights 
for work and study visas; increased penalties for 
employing irregular migrants; increased powers and 
‘intelligence coordination’ for immigration officers and 
police (Clayton 2010: 23); granted Home Secretary the 
power to remove citizenship from dual nationals or deny 
asylum to people deemed to be criminals/terrorists; 
electronic tagging used as an alternative to detention; 
gave recognised refugees limited leave to remain of five 
years, subject to review at any time. 
2007 Labour UK Borders Act 
Introduced compulsory biometric ID documents for non-
EU immigrants; allowed deportation of criminals 
imprisoned for longer than a year or for certain serious 
offences; granted Border Agency officers with powers of 
detention, entry, search and seizure (Guardian 2009).  
2008 Labour 
Criminal Justice 
and Immigration 
Act 
Followed an increase in terrorism-related legislation (e.g. 
Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the 
Terrorism Act 2006); enabled the Home Secretary to 
remove rights to social benefits and to restrict the 
residence and work of people with criminal convictions, 
such as people convicted of terrorism offences (Clayton 
2010: 25). 
2009 Labour 
Borders, 
Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 
Intended to make gaining citizenship harder, introducing 
‘probationary citizenship’ and the requirement to earn 
‘points’ in the pursuit of full citizenship (which could 
reduce the time taken to acquire citizenship). 
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Appendix B: Coding Dates 
 
The table below summarises the dates coded within each campaign for Monday to Saturday 
editions (i.e any Sundays which fell within these dates were not coded). In each campaign 
the final day of coding was polling day. 
Campaign Dates Details 
1918 9th December-14th December Herald published only on Saturdays 
1922 9th November-15th November  
1923 30th November-6th December  
1924 23rd October-29th October  
1929 24th May-30th May  
1931 21st October-27th October  
1935 8th November-14th November  
1945 29th June-5th July  
1950 17th February-23rd February  
1951 19th October-25th October  
1955 20th May-26th May  
1959 2nd October-8th October  
1964 9th October-15th October  
1966 25th March-31st March  
1970 8th June-9th June, 15th June-18th June 8
th and 9th June used due to strike action by 
printers 
1974a 21st February-28th February 21
st February used for the Daily Telegraph instead 
of the 28th due to strike action by journalists 
1974b 4th October-10th October  
1979 27th April-3rd May The Times not published due to strike action 
1983 3rd June-9th June  
1987 5th June-11th June  
1992 3rd April-9th April  
1997 25th April-1st May  
2001 1st June-7th June  
2005 29th April-5th April  
2010 30th April-6th May  
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Appendix C: Content Analysis Variables 
 
Date: Date of the article’s publication in dd.mm.yyyy format. 
Paper –Title of publication: Guardian, Times, Telegraph, Mail, Express, Mirror, Sun/Herald. 
Page number. 
Type of article: Straight News, Editorial/Leader, Comment/Opinion, Picture caption, 
Interview, Sketch, News Analysis/Background/Facts & Figures, Feature/Profile, Signed 
Column, Other. 
IAE – Whether the article mentions the election or politicians/candidates: Yes, No. 
Focus – The extent to which the article focuses on immigration: main (the article 
prominently and predominantly focuses on immigration issues, e.g. in the headline, lead, or 
throughout the article), secondary (the article features immigration issues but they are not 
the principle topic of discussion, are as equally prominent as several others or are 
mentioned in passing). 
Pressure group – the name of any pressure groups mentioned in the article (up to 3). 
Themes 1, 2, 3 –  
The theme categories are used to indicate broadly what the article is about. It may be that 
the article is concerned with only one theme, but up to three themes can be coded. If there 
are ostensibly several ‘themes’ within the item, a judgement needs to be made based on 
the space taken up by themes within the article, the prominence of the theme within the 
article and/or the use of headlines and sub-headlines which relate to the theme values. 
In order to be coded, a theme must occupy at least two full sentences in an article – unless 
shorter than two sentences in which case the article is coded in one theme field according 
to the most prominent theme (if mixed, use ‘general/indeterminate concern’). 
Themes are defined as follows: 
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resources and structure of state apparatus: discussion of the ability to which immigration 
officials and the state are able to implement government policy (e.g. reference to statutory 
organisations charged with enforcing immigration control policy to carry this out, provision 
of resources for these organisations, the operational facilities of detention and deportation, 
etc.). 
immigration services procedure: discussion of the competence, efficiency and adherence to 
law thought to have been practised by those in charge of implementing government policy 
(e.g. reference to the time taken to process immigration or asylum applications, appeals to 
deportation orders, the decisions made at various stages of asylum applications, allegations 
of negligence, rulings made by the European Court of Human Rights, etc.).  
numbers: discussion of the numbers of immigrants thought to have migrated in the past x 
week(s), month(s), year(s), decade(s), or estimates of future migration in similar terms.  
voluntary migration: discussion of the settlement of people described as having immigrated, 
or immigrating to the UK, due principally to ‘pull’ factors. While the term ‘voluntary 
(im)migration’ is used, it is with the mitigation that the agency of migration is unlikely to be 
wholly with the migrant, who ‘it is important to locate…within the parameters of a capitalist 
order in a world system’ (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 18). It simply provides some distinction 
between those considered to have ‘freely’ arrived and those for whom migration is 
considered temporary, forced or irregular. 
family reunification: discussion of migrants described as migrating for the purposes of re-
joining family members who have already migrated to the UK, as well as ‘family formation’ 
and ‘whole family’ migration. 
forced migration: discussion of permanent settlers described as having immigrated, or 
immigrating to the UK, due principally to ‘push’ factors or as an ostensibly enforced 
decision. Asylum seekers and/or refugees described as having immigrated/immigrating to 
the UK having sought/to seek refuge for reasons of persecution in their home/previous 
nation of residence fall into this category. 
irregular migration: discussion of migrants who are perceived to have overstayed their 
terms of leave to remain, who have entered ‘clandestinely’ (including by providing false 
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documentation or those victim to trafficking and smuggling), or who are only semi-
compliant with their terms of entry (e.g. by working without permission). 
temporary migration: discussion of migrants described as lacking possession of, or aspiring 
towards, permanent settlement rights (e.g. students, workers on short-term visas, but not 
visitors, such as holidaymakers, those in the UK for business purposes, visiting foreign 
dignitaries, etc.), but whom are described as intending to stay for several months or longer. 
The UK and pan-European institutions: discussion of the implications of immigration within 
the UK’s accession and maintained subscription to the EEC/EU, the implications of the 
Schengen agreement for the UK (discussion of any proposed UK accession or any perceived 
indirect effect of others nations’ accession), accession of other countries to the EU, 
decisions made at the European Court of Human Rights, obligations according to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission, Council of Europe, 
European Parliament, etc. 
The UK and the Commonwealth: discussion of the impact of processes of post-colonialism 
upon levels of immigration from within the British Empire/‘the colonies’ (such as the gaining 
of independence by member nations). NB. this does not cover stories simply about 
immigration from the Commonwealth, which are captured elsewhere. 
employment/trade: discussion of the employment or unemployment of migrants and/or its 
social and personal effects (includes trade unionism). 
housing: discussion of the distribution (geographic, numerical or otherwise) of public 
housing in relation to migrants, or of destitution among migrants, or of other discussion 
relating to migrant-owned or -rented private housing.  
education: discussion of the educational attainment and prospects of migrants in full-time 
education and their effects. 
cultural integration: discussion of the diffusion of cultural practices and other such ‘imports’. 
social cohesion: discussion of the perceived strength of community-based relationship 
dynamics, particularly when between groups of people of potentially different ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds. 
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citizenship: discussion of the apparent affordance and attainment of official legal, political 
and civic rights of citizens. 
welfare provision: discussion of the perceived rights, availability of and subscription to social 
welfare provision provided by the state to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. 
racism: discussion of behaviour or attitudes described as racist or discussion in terms of 
differential treatment on grounds of ethnicity, ‘race’ or nationality. 
health: discussion of the quality of access to healthcare available to migrants, or discussion 
in which a connection is made between migrant(s) and a health issue. 
crime: discussion of crimes committed by citizens described in terms of their migration 
status, or against citizens described in terms of their migration status. 
security: discussion of issues regarding perceived threats to the safety of the general public 
and the preservation of institutions of strategic political or economic importance from acts 
seen as politically illegitimate. This would include discussion of terrorism, espionage, etc. 
influence and mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates: discussion of the 
impact of the political representation of migrant interests on patterns of turnout and vote 
distribution, plus focus on the candidacy of migrant or ethnic minority politicians. 
disillusionment with political response: criticism directed at political institutions or 
politicians for an apparent failure to previously address their perceived responsibilities to 
the social actor/identified stakeholders in immigration to the UK. 
repatriation: discussion of the supposed merits, consequences of and enforcement of 
schemes which are occupied with the arbitrary repatriation of citizens of the UK to a 
previous nation of birth/citizenship, enforceable according to ethnic, national, ‘racial’ or 
other arbitrary social characteristics. NB. reports of individuals’ deportation are coded 
elsewhere. 
return migration: discussion of UK citizens or people previously settled in the UK re-
migrating to the UK. 
the economy: discussion of the economic causes or consequences of immigration to the UK. 
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general/indeterminate concern: discussion of immigration with no specifically identified 
frame of debate, or of mixed debate but discussed for less than two sentences. 
Actors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
1 Prime Minister 
2 Leader of the Opposition 
3 Home Secretary 
4 Immigration Minister 
5 Shadow Home Secretary 
6 Other Government Minister 
7 Other Shadow Cabinet Member 
8 Other Government MP 
9 Other Opposition MP/Candidate 
10 Other Party Leader 
11 Former Prime Minister 
12 Former Party Leader 
13 Former Senior Politician 
14 Labour Party 
15 Conservative Party 
16 Liberal Democrat Party 
17 Other Political Party 
18 The Government 
19 The Opposition 
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20 Parliament/MPs (in general) 
21 The European Union/European Commission 
22 Millbank 
23 Quango 
24 Charitable Organisation/NGO/Other Pressure Group 
25 Civil Servant(s) 
26 Celebrity 
27 European Leader/Politician/Government 
28 EU Representative 
29 World Leader/Politician/Government (not European) 
30 Economist 
31 Heckler/Demonstrator 
32 Media Commentator/Journalist/Author 
33 'The Media'/Media Outlet 
34 Police/Security 
35 Judiciary 
36 Anti-immigration pressure group 
37 Pro-immigration pressure group 
38 Trade Union/Representative/Member 
39 Unnamed source - non-party 
40 University Academic 
41 Citizen(s) 
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42 Other Government Department 
43 Television Broadcaster 
44 Think Tank 
45 Other General 
46 Religious figure 
47 Corporate spokesperson/representative 
48 Other pan-European institution 
49 Civil Servant(s) - Immigration entry staff 
50 Local government 
51 Other Political 
52 Liberal party 
53 SDP 
54 Alliance (SDP-Liberal) 
55 'Community Leader/spokesperson' 
56 Race Relations Board/Community Relations Commission/CRE/EHRC 
57 Community liaison officer 
58 Immigrants' Advisory Service/Immigration Advisory Service 
59 Lawyer 
60 Diplomat (UK) 
61 Diplomat (non-UK) 
62 Private sector immigration/asylum representative 
63 Port staff (non-immigration) 
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64 Home Office 
65 Foreign Office 
66 British High Commission(er) 
67 National Front 
68 British National Party 
69 British Embassy (any based abroad) 
70 UKBA 
71 Ukip 
72 Green Party 
73 Respect Party 
Actors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 – direct quotation: if the actor is directly quoted, how many words they 
are quoted on, if any, where the actor is discussing immigration issues. 
Actors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 – tone: the actor's tone in terms of the immigration issue at hand 
(supporting, criticising, mixed, neutral, indeterminate). This includes in direct or reported 
speech. nb. a restrictive tone on immigration control can be counted as criticising, while a 
tone in support of a relaxation in controls can be counted as supporting. 
Descriptors 1, 2, 3: The first three terms (if necessary) used by the journalist to describe the 
process of immigration to the UK should be coded – i.e. these terms must ‘escape the 
speech marks’. This variable includes verbs (such as those formed from ‘to come’, ‘to 
migrate’, ‘to swamp’, etc), nominalizations (e.g. ‘immigration’, ‘influx’), collective nouns (e.g. 
‘hordes’, ‘swathes’, ‘masses’, etc), and so on.  
The following values were coded inductively: 
1 crawl 
2 enter/entry 
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3 invade/invasion 
4 come 
5 domicile 
6 immigrate/(immigration) 
7 land 
8 arrive 
9 smuggle 
10 return 
11 influx 
12 flee 
13 slave traffic 
14 settle 
15 flock 
16 flood 
17 bring 
18 swarm 
19 embark 
20 import 
21 flow 
22 waves (of) 
23 migrate 
24 fly 
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25 dash 
26 visit 
27 send 
28 inflow 
29 set foot 
30 slip 
31 go 
32 admit/admission 
33 join/rejoin 
34 concentrate 
35 trickle 
36 illegal (im)migration 
37 move/ment 
38 get into 
39 seek/ask for/claim/plead for (political) asylum 
40 stay 
41 remain 
42 gain/be granted (political) asylum 
43 reunite 
44 mass immigration 
45 overstay 
46 emigrate 
327 
 
47 move to 
48 tide 
49 be let in 
50 pour into 
51 swamp 
52 floodgates 
53 be absorbed 
54 allow in 
55 economic migration 
56 descend on 
57 stream 
58 travel 
59 escape to 
60 granted refuge 
61 welcomed 
62 head for 
63 mass illegal immigration 
64 trafficked 
65 exported 
66 hordes (of) 
67 refused asylum 
68 infest 
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Immigrant group 1, 2, 3: the first three terms (if necessary) used by either the journalist or 
actors to describe the ethnicity, nationality and/or religion of migrants referred to in the 
article. 
The following values were coded inductively: 
1 Belgian 
2 American 
3 German 
4 Chinese 
5 Hungarian 
6 Colombian 
7 Russian 
8 Irish 
9 Polish 
10 Jewish 
11 Roman Catholic 
12 Spanish 
13 Italian 
14 white 
15 Czech 
16 coloured 
17 West Indian 
18 Cypriot 
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19 African 
20 French 
21 Jamaican 
22 Swedish 
23 Austro-Hungarian 
24 Protestant 
25 Austrian 
26 South African 
27 black 
28 Commonwealth 
29 Turkish 
30 Indian 
31 Canadian 
32 Finnish 
33 Pakistani 
34 Southern Rhodesian 
35 USA 
36 Asian 
37 Japanese 
38 English 
39 British 
40 Ghanaian 
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41 Ugandan 
42 Swiss 
43 British Asians 
44 Kenya Asians 
45 Trinidadian 
46 Uganda Asians 
47 Australian 
48 East African Asians 
49 East African 
50 Mauritian 
51 Ethiopian 
52 Sikh 
53 Romany Gypsies 
54 Jordanian 
55 European 
56 Eastern European 
57 Latvian 
58 Bangladeshi 
59 Dutch 
60 Arabic 
61 Hong Kongese 
62 Tanzanian 
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63 West German 
64 white Rhodesian 
65 black Rhodesian 
66 Soviet 
67 Iranian 
68 Moroccan 
69 Rhodesian 
70 Vietnamese 
71 Argentine 
72 Lithuanian 
73 Palestinian 
74 Lebanese 
75 Greek 
76 Sri Lankan Tamil 
77 North African 
78 Zairean 
79 Angolan 
80 Somalian 
81 Muslim 
82 Togolese 
83 Nepali 
84 Afghan 
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85 Albanian 
86 Zimbabwean 
87 Ukrainian 
88 Kosovan 
89 Yemeni 
90 non-EU 
91 Congolese 
92 Nigerian 
93 Algerian 
94 Dependent Territories 
95 Brazilian 
96 Sierra Leonean 
97 Bolivian 
98 Romanian 
99 Vincentian 
100 Ivory Coast/Côte d'Ivoire 
101 Gujarati 
102 Bulgarian 
103 New Zealand 
104 Israeli 
105 Grenadian 
106 Thai 
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107 Turkish Kurd 
108 Maltese 
109 Serbian 
110 Ecuadorian 
111 Slovakian 
112 Portuguese 
113 Basque 
114 non-white Britons 
These were later re-coded into the following categories in the analysis: 
1 Europe (general) 
2 Central Europe 
3 Eastern Europe 
4 Southern Europe 
5 South-East Europe 
6 Northern Europe 
7 Western Europe and Ireland 
8 Americas (generally) 
9 North America 
10 Caribbean 
11 Central and South Americas 
12 Africa (generally) 
13 Northern Africa 
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14 Central Africa 
15 Eastern Africa 
16 Western Africa 
17 Southern Africa 
18 Asian (generally) 
19 Central Asia 
20 East Asia 
21 South-East Asia 
22 South Asia 
23 Western Asia/Middle East 
24 Oceania 
25 Other 
26 black/coloured 
27 white 
28 Jewish 
29 Roman Catholic 
30 Protestant 
31 Commonwealth (generally) 
32 British/English 
33 Sikh 
34  Muslim 
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Immigration type: the first three terms (if necessary) used by either the journalist or actors 
to describe the type of migrants referred to in the article. However, in order to distinguish 
between the terms used by journalists and the terms used by actors, inverted commas (‘) 
are used to denote those used by actors. Note that, in terms of the inverted commas rule, 
the use of a term by a journalist supersedes that of an actor. The following values were 
coded inductively:
1 refugee(s) 
2 alien(s) 
3 traveller(s) 
4 undesirable(s) 
5 enemy alien(s) 
6 Communist alien(s) 
7 stowaway(s) 
8 immigrant(s) 
9 emigrant(s)/émigré(es) 
10 newcomer(s) 
11 political refugee(s) 
12 slave trafficker(s) 
13 wanderer(s) 
14 migrant(s) 
15 illegal (im)migrant(s) 
16 visitor(s) 
17 boat refugee(s) 
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18 economic migrant(s) 
19 bogus refugee(s) 
20 genuine refugee(s) 
21 asylum seeker(s) 
22 settler(s) 
23 economic refugee(s) 
24 economic asylum seeker(s) 
25 illegal entrant(s) 
26 bogus student(s) 
27 illegal(s) 
28 border cheat(s) 
29 overstayer(s) 
30 failed asylum seeker(s) 
31 boat people 
32 bogus asylum seeker(s) 
33 genuine asylum seeker(s) 
34 illegal asylum seeker(s) 
35 illegal newcomer(s) 
36 undocumented migrant(s) 
 
